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WESTERN CIVILIZATION
IN THE NEAR EAST

WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE NEAR EAST

BY
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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY
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TO
DR. J. L. MAGNES
IN GRATEFUL MEMORY OF
THE YEARS IN JERUSALEM

"The right reading of nationality has become an affair of life and death."

ARNOUD J. TOYSUCKE.

"The world is one and indivisible in a sense so compelling that the only question before us is the method by which we represent its unity."

HAROLD J. LASKI.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
THE ENVIRONMENT	9
MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT IN HISTORY	23
MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT AT THE PRESENT DAY	69
CHANGING MAN IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT	87
INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD COMMUNICATIONS	115
INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD ECONOMICS	147
INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD POLITICS	185
METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF EUROPEANIZATION	227
BIBLIOGRAPHY	307
INDEX	321
MAP	330

PREFACE

MODERN civilization had its origin in Western Europe. But from its beginnings it was universal in aim and scope. Its fundamental attitude was rationalist and individualist, secularist and scientific. It appealed to man and his reason, it destroyed the traditional attitude of mind and structure of society. During the nineteenth century it spread from Western Europe to the rest of Europe and to all other parts of the earth. The latest stage of modern civilization, the age of the motor car and the aeroplane, of the cinema and wireless, spread almost simultaneously through Europe and the two Americas, to Asia and Africa. Modern civilization has become world-wide.

This process of the spread of modern civilization, which has become the outstanding and dominant factor of the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has been called the Europeanization of mankind. On account of its modern civilization Europe was able in the nineteenth century to conquer and dominate the world politically and economically. The spread of modern civilization enables the non-European peoples to-day to reject Europe's political and economic control. The brief epoch of European world domination seems to be approaching its end. The world-wide triumph and ascendancy of the civilization of Europe implies the weakening and waning of Europe's political and economic superiority. Like other races before them, the Europeans were entirely ready to ascribe their political and economic successes to an inborn or God-ordained superiority. But before the rise of modern civilization Occidental and Oriental races had met as equals, in fact the cultural and the political superiority had rested frequently with the latter.

Modern civilization transformed Europe. This highly complex process was not only a question of technical innovation, of political and economic reorganization, of the advance of science. The coming of modern civilization involved a complete and profound re-moulding of the entire cultural and social heritage of Europe. Man and his environment changed entirely ; a new outlook upon the world, a new feeling of life, a new valuation of man's place in history and society evolved. But in the midst of the new dynamic changes and adaptations ancient primitive and medieval beliefs, emotions and states of mind survived. This cultural lag and the quickening pace of changes made modern civilization conscious of the need for permanent readjustment.

The new Europe arising out of this transformation came in its new feeling of exuberant strength into contact with the old civilizations of the East at a time of their decay or stagnation. Out of this meeting followed not a clash of races or religions, but a contact and conflict of civilizations or of stages of civilization. The medieval but flexible civilizations of the East adapted themselves to modern civilization as the medieval civilization of Europe had done before them. Again, as in the countries of Europe, the change could not remain confined to matters of technique or organization, but comprehended the whole man and all manifestations of life. As modern civilization becomes more and more universal, the races and peoples of the earth meet again more and more on a footing of equality, as they did before the rise of modern civilization.

This universal acculturation and the ensuing birth of a coherent and closely-knit humanity, facing similar social economic and cultural problems, will determine the new trends of world history. Their effect is felt in Mexico and in China, in Ethiopia and in Brazil. I studied them for almost twenty years in the more limited area of the Near and Middle East. These lands had been for many centuries politically and culturally linked up with Europe ; their estrangement had set in with the rise of modern civilization. I entered first into contact with the Muslim East

in Turkestan, when I came in April 1915 to Samarkand. Having been born in Prague in the old Austrian Monarchy, the classical battleground of nationalities and civilizations, I quickly became interested in the problems of nationalism and the history of civilization. I spent fifteen months in Samarkand and in Ferghana and then over three years in different parts of Siberia and the Far East. A residence of nearly six years in Paris and London brought me into the centres in which modern civilization was first born and from which the main modernizing influences upon the Near and Middle East emanated. From the autumn of 1925 I lived in Jerusalem and travelled extensively in the countries of the Near East. I wrote the present book mainly in the year 1932 and finished it on May 15th, 1934, the day I left the Near East. In the present edition figures and other statements have been brought, as far as possible, up to date.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation and gratefulness to Mr E. W. Dickes of Manchester for his most valuable help in rendering the present book into English and for his interest in the book.

H.K.

Northampton, Mass.

January 1936.

INTRODUCTION

THIS book is concerned with the countries of the Levant and their immediate hinterland. There are two ways of approaching such a subject. It is possible to choose geography as the starting point—nature, the factor which remains unchanged through long epochs as the basis of all happenings, and the picture can then be rounded into plastic form. Or the starting point chosen may be history, the communal life of men with its changes in the course of time, the competitive ambitions and tendencies in political and economic life, the tireless effort of the human spirit, and the story may then lift itself up to the dynamic of drama. In every exposition the two elements interpenetrate one another: space and time, nature and mind. The environment, in its divisions into valleys and mountains, in the composition of the soil and the coast formation, in climate and winds, sets limits to man's political and economic activities, and in all sorts of ways determines his manner of living and his mental make-up. Its influence shows itself, however, most strongly in primitive man; humanity gradually learns to become more and more independent of its environment: in this victorious though never-ending struggle the mind's weapon is technical advance. The character and destiny of a nation are partly determined by the soil, but they also overcome the influence of the soil, wrest the national type from it, and determine its place amid further associations.

Among various peoples, in different countries, and at different times, there are to be found identical or similar economic and cultural stages, with their characteristic effects on all fields of personal and social life. The unity of great cultural regions, embracing many countries and peoples, which come to share a common destiny; the contact and mutual enrichment of these cultural regions in the course of time through their neighbourhood; the

unity of the human race and of its intellectual and social development—a unity preserved in spite of all territorial and national divisions—release the life and the history of man more and more from the first predominantly static condition, reinforce the dynamic influence of the inter-relationship of all happenings, and give the lives of men and nations a meaning and a unity which permit of comprehension and of mutual understanding. So, in the exposition which has to proceed from the geographical starting point, the historic destiny, and for us the living present with its tendencies to growth and change, come more and more into the foreground. Geography sets the stage, a magnificent scenery with the dignity and the gravity of thousands of years; for the old writers, both in the Bible and among the Greeks, tell us that in the Levant the climate and the soil have remained uniform through all history. On this stage, within its limits but not its limitations, there proceeds the spectacle of history.

All history is interwoven, every act has its natural antecedents, but, for all that, new elements may make their appearance again and again and dependence on the past at a critical turning-point may mean the destruction of the future. This should be borne in mind above all in the present condition of the world, threatened everywhere with ruin and chaos on a scale never before witnessed. The only way out is to make now a radical breach with the past, to enter on new paths, and, distant and doubtful as the goal may appear in the age of universal nationalism and of jealous autarchy within every geographical area, to proceed to the creation of an all-comprehending economic order, a world federation, embracing and preserving all individual characteristics, but establishing on our shrinking earth the one world-wide stage for the one single spirit of man.

The countries of the Levant, the coastal strip around the south-eastern basin of the Mediterranean, reaching from Greece and the Straits of Byzantium to the Nile Delta in a vast arc which encloses the Aegean and the Levant Sea, have already occupied the centre of the stage

in past history at a period when there existed a forerunner of the World State. The Roman empire, with its Hellenistic culture, had been an approximation to the World State; it had founded a unity of the whole economic area of civilization on the basis of unity of intellectual life; it had embraced the "world"; at its frontiers there came to an end all of the "world" of which the people of that day had knowledge; beyond them began the deserts and virgin forests of barbarians destitute of economic organization and of intellectual life. The eastern basin of the Mediterranean had divided the three continents of that world; and since, with its wealth of islands and bays, it had formed a highway which had long been in use, it had also united the three continents. Here Asia and Europe met one another, here they exchanged their wares, from here in the very earliest times routes led in one direction to the barbarians of the north—north-west through the western Mediterranean to Gaul and Britain, north-east through the Black Sea to the vast plains of Sarmatia—and in the other direction to the storied lands of the south, to India and the Far East. Here, therefore, there rubbed shoulders the various cultures and ways of living which were to determine the character of Western humanity. From here Europe and Asia received their names, Europe, the old Assyrian *ereb*, the western land, and Asia, the old Assyrian *acu*, the eastern land—Occident and Orient, from the viewpoint of the Aegean, *Ponente* and *Levante* as they were called later, when in the Middle Ages the Italian maritime towns began to control the trade of the eastern Mediterranean; the Far East, the way to which led through the *Levante*, was then called the High Levant.

The Levant was at first the centre of the world, the beginning of world history. Here the cultures of the Nile Valley and of Mesopotamia met. From here the Phoenicians went out on their mission of cultural and economic development and synthesis of the Mediterranean. Here, in Crete and Cyprus, the first centres of Aegean civilization came into existence. For thousands of years

the Levant remained the great bridge of the world, or more precisely the Pontifex Maximus, the great builder of the bridges thrown between the civilizations of different regions and epochs. Perhaps "Pontifex Maximus" should be kept as a human distinction, and in that case the title belongs to Alexander the Great, whose action made the Levant the home of the Hellenism which in its universalism paved the way for Christianity, and, grown rigid, has lived on to modern times in Islam and in the eastern churches. The Levant was the centre of the two greatest movements in the history of the Middle Ages, Islam and the Crusades ; the blood that was shed was the Levant's ; and in those movements the Levant completed its bridge-building function. By the end of the Middle Ages the Levant was sinking out of history ; the eastern Mediterranean, once the central sea of the world, the historic stage *par excellence*, was becoming a deserted backwater.

Since then Europe has advanced to world dominion as the realm of modern humanism and industrialism. Only in recent decades, with the cutting of the Suez Canal and the coming of the motor car and the aeroplane, has the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the girdle dividing north and west Europe from the tropical wealth of the south of Asia and the east of Africa, returned to its old importance. In our own days there has been proceeding in this region a structural change affecting its inhabitants in all their social and personal relations. This change is not confined to the Levant, to the territory of the former Ottoman empire and Persia ; it is proceeding similarly, sometimes with more intensity, sometimes with less, in Russia and central Asia, in India and China, in Africa and Latin America. All these countries, which embrace three-quarters of the human race, are becoming "Europeanized". They are awakening to historic consciousness, are taking over from Europe its humanistic mental attitude, inherited from the Renaissance and the Encyclopædists, and its technique, based on natural science. They are "modernizing" themselves, and are determined to enter into active partnership in the single

economic and intellectual community of the world which is being formed through the new possibilities of communication and production. The Mediterranean is no longer the centre of the world as it was in the time of the first World State, the Roman empire. But it is once more of great and growing importance.

The Near East, unlike the Far East, was at one time, indeed until far into the Middle Ages, based on the same intellectual and social foundations as Europe. It is not as something entirely strange that it is now receiving the revitalized inheritance of ancient thought in Europe's science and humanism.

The structural change in social life in the Levant becomes of significance as typical of the process of Europeanization which is now going on throughout the world. From its geographical situation the Near East is of incomparably greater importance to Europe, politically as well as in other respects, than the Far East and the Pacific, South America or Africa. In the "Near East question" lay the origin of the Crimean War, the Balkan Wars, and the World War. Here Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, Italy struggled and still struggle over the most important inter-continental routes in the world, for world power and world influence. In Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Arabia, there stand confronting one another, more than elsewhere, the two great systems of world power of the present day—the Anglo-Saxon Imperium, the commercial imperialism of the capitalist and industrialist economic epoch, supported by the missionary ideals of Christian and democratic civilization and by the race-consciousness of the Nordic aristocrat; and the Soviet Union, the social imperialism inspired by a new missionary ideal and by the conviction of the complete equality of rights of all races and peoples, which stands ready to serve as pattern and helper for all peoples engaged in their own industrialization and modernization.

The change in social and economic structure is proceeding under the slogan of Nationalism. The peoples of the Levant—first, in the nineteenth century the inhabitants

of the Balkans, and then, at the beginning of the twentieth, Egyptians and Anatolians, Arabs and Iranians, even Kurds and Afghans, have awakened to national consciousness. They aim at making the territories they inhabit into unified states, politically and economically independent, and to provide them with a modern administrative system. And they aim at the fulfilment of their historic "mission", which every people likes to infer from its past and from its talents, and no longer to be objects of "imperialist activism" in the political and economic fields. They are taking up the struggle against centuries-old fetters of tradition, and are trying to create a new State, a new economy, a new society, and as their bearer a new human type—tasks of a magnitude demanding the utmost expenditure of effort from all these peoples, economically and culturally backward and sunk under misrule and oppression.

In this effort they find themselves in conflict not only with the external adversary, Imperialism, in whose interest, as it seems to them, they are kept in a weak condition and at a modest level of development, but also with their own intrinsic weaknesses, which the external adversary knows how to exploit, their great poverty and ignorance, an inheritance from the past, their sparse population, the absence of a sense of solidarity, and the lack of endurance, strength of character, and sense of responsibility. The overcoming of these defects presupposes the creation of an élite, a stratum of intellectual and moral leaders; it presupposes also a patient and tenacious work of education in every field and a period of undisturbed development. But these desiderata of time and peace are lacking, and so the structural change has to proceed amid pressure from without and poverty at home, in the midst of the play of conflicting forces, amid a painful succession of frictions and inadequacies. Centuries of progress have to be overtaken in a few years before the bases of organic growth have been established.

From the point of view of world politics and world trade, these are regions of comparatively little significance

apart from the important fact of their situation as transit countries. They are relatively small States, not in area, it is true, but in population and industrial equipment; they are largely covered with deserts, steppes, and infertile mountain territory, and are frequently without natural water supplies for the development of agriculture and without mineral wealth for the development of a large-scale industry.

But what is going on in the Levant is typical of a process which is now world-wide—the effort of the colonial and semi-colonial countries to achieve emancipation. In this territory of an immemorial civilization, this classic field of tension between Orient and Occident, this historic battlefield of empires and peoples, civilizations and religions, there are now proceeding an outward struggle and an inward change of fundamental importance. Here the expansionist tendencies of all the Great Powers come into conflict in a narrow space. Here Napoleon sought the route to India and Great Britain found it and developed it, though the dream of the great Middle Eastern empire, based on Constantinople and Baku, Haifa, and Basra, could only be partially realized. Here Germany made her thrust with the Baghdad Railway and tried to take up anew, across a vast land bridge and with a bold territorial grasp, the old medieval dream of the succession to the Imperium. Here Russia pressed forward from her cold northern steppes through the Bosphorus, from the Caucasus and from the oases of Turkestan to the warm open seas and gulfs of the south, and sought to found her Middle Eastern empire. Here the traditions of the Crusades still lived vividly enough in French minds to inspire the ambition of incorporating the Levant in the French Mediterranean empire, and the memories of Rome's world dominion awoke in the new naval standing which the Italian flag has secured in the Mediterranean, with the repeatedly announced intention of spreading the power of the new Roman empire and its surplus population over the territories in which Rome

once before showed her quality in the ordering and policing of the world.

In this unique field of tension of world politics the indigenous peoples are trying to secure their existence and progress. In the last fifteen years new States have arisen here, old ones have recovered their youth, social and cultural and economic systems hundreds and indeed thousands of years old have been rapidly revolutionized; here the primitive and immemorial lives on side by side with the latest advances in civilization. Islam is beginning to change under the influence of the enlightened West in the same way as once the religion of the desert Arabs was modified through contact with the surrounding civilization of Hellenism and the Persian empire. The dignified but entirely torpid churches of the Orient are awakening to new life through contact with their Western sisters, and the reunion of Orient and Occident under the imperial ægis of the Anglo-Saxons finds its spiritual reflection in the approach between Anglican Protestantism and the patriarchates of the East. All these political, intellectual, and economic movements are being lit up by the emotion, often expressed in the rhetorical terms of the southerner, of newly awakened and enthusiastic nationalisms; to them there come from the opposite pole of Western influences storms which are sweeping over the whole of Asia and which bear seeds of unrest from China, from India, from the Soviet Union, to the shores of the Mediterranean.

So it is not by any means through the scale of its economic or political power, but through the effects, still operating, of its great past, through the passionate conflict of so many forces, and through the typical nature of the structural change in every field, that the Levant once more attracts our attention to-day and is once more becoming a representative arena for the play of conflicting issues in world history. This region is sparsely inhabited; much of it is desert; it has lived through centuries of neglect and impoverishment. But it seems to be inseparably bound up with world history.

THE ENVIRONMENT

UNITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

THE cultural unity of the territory of Hellenism and of the Roman empire corresponded to a similarity in the physiognomy of the whole country. Amid the manifold variety of the landscape and the human types, both from country to country and within the various countries, the observant traveller who visits Spain and Anatolia, Greece and Syria, southern Italy and northern Africa, will be surprised at the uniformity he finds in all the Mediterranean countries in the character of the landscape, in the flora, the climate, and the rhythm of human life. The northerner, in his longing for the blue waters, the brilliant sunshine, the clear atmosphere, and the picturesque though dignified nonchalance of the natives, is very liable to idealize the country of the South, and on the other hand to be disgusted on a closer acquaintance with the unfamiliar scene, the dried up rivers and streamlets, the burning sun, the dust, and the dirtiness and lack of discipline of the inhabitants. But the dweller in any one Mediterranean country will feel at home in any of the others; sun and shade, spring and grove, the animals and the way of living of the humans will remind him of his own homeland.

Not only have the same influences of soil and climate been at work among the people of the Mediterranean countries, but the people have been formed by the same historic forces. The Phoenicians, and after them the Greeks, travelled throughout the Mediterranean in ancient times; Hellenism gave it a cultural unity and the Roman empire a legal and political one. This general culture was fed from sources contributed by every Mediterranean people. In Imperial Rome, where the Stoa taught universalism and the unity of the human race, Greeks and

Berbers, Syrians and Spaniards mingled. The unity of the Mediterranean countries provided the basis for the spread of Christianity and later of Islam, which in turn determined the cultural stamp of the whole region. The Church, which had come into existence in the Mediterranean area, remained a Mediterranean church; its centre of gravity in the West was Rome; so soon as northern Europe won its emancipation from the Mediterranean and rose to intellectual and political world dominion, it fell away from Rome; the centre of gravity of the Church in the East was Byzantium, which brought civilization to the Slavs as Rome had brought it to the Teutons. The Arabs penetrated as far as Spain, where for seven centuries they determined the physiognomy of the country; they were only driven out four centuries ago. They spread a lingual and cultural unity from Asia Minor by way of Malta and Sicily as far as Gibraltar. Later, under Turkish leadership, Islam spread through the Balkans and round the shores of the Black Sea; at its zenith the Ottoman empire united the countries between Belgrade and Basra and from the Crimea to Tunis. Through their common history the Mediterranean countries acquired a unity not only in the character of the landscape, but also in the spiritual attitude of the people and in social structure.

In later times also the critical epochs of history were common to them all. The Crusades brought to the South the first flicker of northern aggressiveness; they were the forerunners of the change that reached a symbolic acme about 1492 with the discovery of America and the expulsion of the last Arabs from Spain. From that time onwards the surviving spirit of the Crusades carried European adventurousness in another direction. In spite of centuries of effort, the Crusades failed in the Mediterranean and ended in retreat, for the difference in civilization between the north-western and the south-eastern Mediterranean countries was too slight; it is doubtful, indeed, whether at that time the superiority in civilization did not lie on the side of the south-east,

the Levant. The new Crusades, the journeys of the *conquistadores* across the Atlantic and round Africa, were entirely successful, since the difference in civilization between their homeland and the new countries was very great. The discovery of the world beyond the Atlantic, and of that vast ocean, shifted the centre of gravity from the Mediterranean to north-western Europe and produced a new mental outlook and a new social order. The Mediterranean world fell from its world-dominance. The mental outlook and the social order of the Mediterranean countries were unable to maintain their supremacy. Spain and Italy fell into decay, as did the Asiatic and African shores of the Mediterranean. The great trade routes became deserted.

Not until three centuries later did the Mediterranean re-awaken under Napoleon, himself a Corsican and a man of the Mediterranean. His ambition was to be the first to restore by conquest the old unity of the Mediterranean, to re-open the old trade routes, and through his campaign to shake Egypt and Syria, Italy and Spain out of their lethargy. The first signs of renaissance in the Mediterranean countries date back to Napoleon—the activity of Mehemet Ali in Egypt and Syria, the Greek war of independence, the *Risorgimento* in Italy, and the assembly of the Cortes in Cadiz in 1812. From that time the influence of the mental outlook and the social order of the people of north-western Europe began to penetrate the Mediterranean region.

The various stages in the process of Europeanization were reached with varying speeds. England, the outpost of north-western Europe, was the first non-Mediterranean Power to gain controlling influence in the Mediterranean. French—the language of a country adjoining the Mediterranean but centring historically and geographically in the Ile de France, belonging to north-western Europe, and primarily concerned not with the Mediterranean but with the Atlantic—became the language of culture and of political and commercial relations, in place of Italian, which had predominated up to the seventeenth century.

In the nineteenth century, however, this Europeanization remained no more than a thin film, embracing an almost infinitesimal upper stratum. Beneath it the life of the people in Spain and Turkey, southern Italy and Egypt, Greece and Persia remained substantially uninfluenced in its traditional character. Not until after the World War were there any attempts to effect a more thorough Europeanization of the life of the masses in the Mediterranean countries, in Spain through the revolution of 1930, in southern Italy by Fascism, in Turkey by Mustapha Kemal, and in Persia by Reza Shah. This process, however, is going on uniformly all round the Mediterranean, though on a varying scale, and is leaving unaltered the unity of character of the whole region.

PHYSIOGRAPHY

The Mediterranean stretches from west to east as the central region of the Old World. At its eastern end it divides into two arms. The north-eastern one is formed by the Aegean and the Black Sea and continued by the Caspian; the south-eastern one is formed by the Levant Sea and continued by the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The long coastline of Turkey is washed by the Levant Sea, the Aegean, and the Black Sea; Syria and Palestine are coast lands of the Levant Sea, and the river-oasis of Egypt opens into the Mediterranean. These four countries directly adjoin the Mediterranean and have their full part in it. But their importance in history and at the present day as transit countries is given to them by their hinterland, which provided from the earliest times and to-day again provides the connecting link with Asia: Iraq on the Persian Gulf, central and southern Arabia between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and Iran (Persia) between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian. As the importance of Marseilles and later of Genoa and Venice in the northern Mediterranean rested on the fact that by means of their hinterland, the Rhone valley and the valley of the Po, they provided the means of communication with Europe,

so in the past and in our own day the cities of the Levant have controlled world trade with Asia through their connection with their hinterland, with the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

This region around the Levant Sea is bounded on the north by a girdle of highlands which rise gradually from the Ionic shore of the Aegean and run from west to east into the mountain country of Anatolia, Armenia, and Persia between the Black Sea and the Caspian, and on the south from the Levant Sea to the Persian Gulf. Anatolia is a highland surrounded by high mountains except in the west ; its centre is a depression without an outlet, and has become a salt steppe. The plateau attains its greatest height in the east, and falls away toward the west. At its highest point it passes into the Armenian highlands, the topmost peak of which, Ararat, rises to 16,920 feet ; these highlands, with their deep ravines and rich meadows, form an excellent grazing country. The mountain chains running out from the ranges on the borders of Anatolia divide the country into a number of almost inaccessible regions. They offer great obstacles to transport, but along the coasts and through the passes there have always been important routes leading to the Aegean, to Cilicia and to Armenia, making Asia Minor a transit country between west and east. Through it the Persians marched into Greece and Alexander the Great into Persia, and through it in our own day Europeanizing influences are finding their way eastwards and southwards into Asia.

The tableland of Iran, united with Anatolia by Armenia, is cut up by mountain chains which meet along the shores, enclosing between them a highland country split up into several basins. The highest mountain in Iran, Demavend, south of the Caspian, attains a height of 18,600 feet. In Iran, as in Anatolia, there are basins with no outlet, in which there are many salt lakes, often dried up in summer.

South of this highland girdle lies the great Libyan desert tableland. Syria and Palestine form a country of mountains and deep valleys between the Mediterranean

are known as *khamsein*, in north Africa *simoon*, in south Spain *leveche*, and in Italy and Greece *scirocco*. The sky becomes of a leaden colour, the air unendurably dust-laden, the horizon, generally so clear, is hazy with water vapour, and the parching effect of these winds withers the plants. The night brings no coolness, and the sultry atmosphere makes sleep impossible.

Entirely different is the winter time. The first rains to fall in the autumn, the Biblical "showers that water the earth", cover the land with green. The time of sowing comes; water begins to collect and flow. But the winter is not exclusively a rainy period. Splendid days of mild sunny weather alternate with days of rain; rain lasting all day is comparatively rare; winter is largely spring-like. Often there is no rain for weeks, or rain in insufficient quantity. These frequent and dreaded periods of drought in the Mediterranean region bring shortage of water and harvest failures. Of great importance to the crops are the late rains, which ripen the grain. In the winter there are also occasional frosts, and in the high mountain regions, in the Lebanon, in Asia Minor, and in Iran with its more continental climate, snow lies for many weeks a yard deep and makes railways and roads impassable. The more low-lying regions seldom or never see snow; if it comes it melts away as a rule after a short time. In places like Jerusalem, which is over 2,000 feet above sea level, the snow lies for several days in some years, though only rarely. The Mediterranean thus has no really cold season, except in its highland girdle; nevertheless inadequate heating often makes the winter a very uncomfortable period.

The landscapes of the south are very attractive. The air is clear and transparent, and the wealth and purity of colours constantly delight the eye of the observer. On the other hand, there is little or none of the gentle transitions and shadings to which the central European is accustomed, the streamlets and woods and meadows of his homeland. Nature is rich in sharp and sudden transitions. Summer and winter follow one another without

any definite spring or autumn, day and night without the long hours of twilight. Unknown are the long snug winter evenings, unknown the short summer nights; all contrasts are abrupt, without the imperceptible merging through intermediate stages.

Nowhere are springs of such importance and water courses so sought after as in the Mediterranean region. Villages crowd around springs and wells where they are not built on mountain slopes or like fortresses on hilltops, for security or in order to avoid malaria. The streams often flow only periodically; characteristic are the wadis, which have water in them only for quite a short time after rainfall and are then like foaming mountain streams, but quickly dry up again and are then nothing but wide beds of stones destitute of water or with nothing but an almost invisible trickle of water. The water resources are also sapped by evaporation. In the steppes and deserts the few springs are surrounded by lusciously green oases, which stand out sharply without any transition, like miracles, from the cheerless surrounding barrenness. In towns and villages the rain water is collected in cisterns; if there is little rainfall the crops wither and man and beast go thirsty. The mountain slopes are bare, deforested through thousands of years of felling in order to build ships, of wartime ravaging, and of the destruction of the young growth by goats, which will chew up anything. Thus one very frequently meets with a naked rock which is clothed only for a short period in spring in a many-coloured carpet embroidered with a fairylike wealth of flowers. The deforestation is also answerable for the slowness of the formation of soil: when arable land has once become desert, usually through historic events, its past productivity is restored only with great difficulty and after heavy expenditure of labour and capital.

An exception in this general Mediterranean climate is formed by the coastal mountains of southern Arabia with their ample rainfall in summer, and by the tropical climatic enclaves along the south-eastern coast of the

Black Sea and the southern coast of the Caspian, where rain falls in quantities throughout the year, and where, in consequence, the vegetation is tropical and the uncultivated land is covered with ever-damp virgin forest.

THE FLORA

Apart from these climatic enclaves, in which coffee and tea thrive, the flora of the Mediterranean region is as uniform as the climate. Nature has no winter sleep; vegetables and grasses flourish most luxuriantly in winter and spring; most of the trees are evergreen, and the type of growth most frequently found is that of trees like the olive and the laurel, whose tough leaves afford protection against evaporation. The date palm is typical of only a few districts; it bears fruit in the sandy soil of Mesopotamia, south Palestine, Arabia, southern Iran, and Egypt, often being planted in extensive, spacious groves. The typical plants of commercial importance in the Mediterranean region are either indigenous, like grain, vines, olives and fig trees, or have been introduced, as rice and the various sorts of citrus, from the monsoon regions of Asia, and tobacco and maize from America. Grain and olives are of primary importance as food for the simple countryman; bread, with onions or garlic, forms his daily food, and the olive supplies him with the fats represented by butter in northern regions. As the grain is sown at the coming of the early rains and harvested at the beginning of the dry period, it can be stored and threshed in the open, in contrast to northern usage. In the Mohammedan countries in particular the grapes are dried after the harvest, being converted into raisins on open barn floors. In many parts the mulberry tree is planted for silkworm culture; in others, cotton, which like citrus trees and rice requires artificial irrigation. Agricultural labour is often carried on with great intensity, and in the neighbourhood of the towns and in many alluvial plains by horticultural methods, with minute attention to each plant. The mountain slopes are made

cultivable by a laborious construction of terraces; as a rule every inch of soil is utilized, even soil which would hardly seem worth cultivating by the ordinary European methods.

The Mediterranean flora differs from that of northern Europe in the absence of woods. There are forests in the Mediterranean region, but they are not the fairy woods of central Europe with their damp moss, their running water, their thick carpet of green, the rustling leafage underfoot, and the twilight gloom amid the tall, crowded trunks, where goblins and fairies can play. The Mediterranean forest is not dense; the trees are at a distance from one another, without undergrowth; everywhere the clear, bright light penetrates. The timber is oak of various sorts, pines, and cypresses. But more frequent than these sparse and airy woods, in the Mediterranean basin and especially in the countries of the Levant, are isolated trees, often miles apart from one another. These are pine, oak, the wild olive, sycamore, and terebinth.

THE FAUNA

The fauna is as uniform as the flora. There are the little animals met with in all the Mediterranean countries, which impress the traveller in various ways—the graceful gecko, or house-lizard, which becomes an appreciated inmate of the home, and the feared scorpion, whose sting causes severe and long-continued pain; the harmless-looking locust, whose immense swarms, to-day as in Biblical times, threaten whole countries, and the cicadas, whose song rises in the stillness of summer nights; gnats and bugs, which are not unknown in northern Europe, but often reveal in the Levant, under the stimulating influence of the sun, a persistency and endurance of which they fortunately do not seem capable in northern countries. More important, however, than the lower animals are the mammals. Dog and cat are comrades of man and inmates of his home here as elsewhere, but they are rougher and wilder, more timorous and

mistrustful, as the people of the Mediterranean rarely treat them with affection. On the other hand, the people rarely interfere with them; only in recent years has there been some action to combat the plague of ownerless cats and dogs. The donkey is much more common than in Europe. It is one of the most useful animals, patient and intelligent, and gains from closer acquaintance. Often its frame seems small and frail, but it carries heavy loads and is everywhere the mount of the poorer classes, where the horse is the mount of the richer. Mule and hinny are frequently found as mounts and beasts of burden, especially the mule, the offspring of a male ass and a mare, which has all the endurance and more than the strength of the donkey. The camel, in the Near East the one-humped dromedary, is not only the Bedouin's mount but until recent times has been one of the most important beasts of burden of the caravan routes and tracks for pack animals. It is an extraordinarily powerful animal, and can carry heavy burdens with ease. Everywhere outside the desert it is now replaced by the motor lorry, but the tourist may still meet the heavy-laden camel caravans which come into the streets at night, led by drivers who precede them on asses; the camels' bells are heard long before the caravans come into sight.

The ox is much less common than in northern Europe. It is used almost exclusively as a beast of burden, rarely for food. The indigenous oxen are very different from the European breeds of cattle; they often have a woeful appearance; they are small and lean because they are ill-fed. There is no rich pasture, no hay, and no stall-feed; in the dry season especially the oxen have to make do with such sparse and withered vegetation as they can find. Thus sheep and goats are much more important than the ox. When the people of the Levant eat meat, a thing the masses do only on feast-days, they eat mutton or fowl. But while oxen and fowls seem skinny and of poor breed in comparison with the European, sheep and goats are noticeable not only from their number but often on account of their splendid condition. They are the

principal animals bred for profit. Goats' milk and goats' cheese are the food of the masses, and sheep's and goats' wool is spun for their clothing; the famous Angora goats of Turkey yield mohair.

Stock-raising has a different significance in the countries around the south-eastern Mediterranean from that which it has in Europe. In Europe it proceeds hand in hand with tillage; the farmer is also a cattle breeder; horned cattle, which are principally bred, play a fundamental part in farming. The case is different in the Mediterranean countries, where sheep and goats play no part in peasant agriculture. The herdsmen there are a separate occupational group, plainly marked off from the agriculturists; they feed their flocks in spring along the border between the fruitful land and the desert, where the steppes turn into green pasturage; in summer they make for the highlands and mountains, where there is more water and the highland meadows provide food for their animals. In Europe, where large cattle are principally kept and are fed in the stall, the farmer obtains ample supplies of dung for his fields. There is nothing of this in the breeding of the small cattle of the Levant. Little use is made of dung; it is mostly dried and used as fuel. The conflict between settled agriculturists and the nomad or semi-nomad herdsmen, to whom the patriarchs of the Bible belonged, has governed the history of the Near East. This immemorial conflict becomes specially acute along the border of the arable land, where it is complicated by the competition for springs and wells. Cain's murder of Abel bears witness to this immemorial conflict. In the early times of the Old Testament it was the shepherd and the goatherd who represented the peaceful element. "Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground." It was the tiller of the soil whose wrath rose up and who became a rover and a fugitive.

Thus in their general features the countries around the Mediterranean have a unity of character in respect of landscape and climate, fauna and flora. In this region

man was set down, and through the life of generations he became one with it. The history of this region and of the historic forces which had their play within it became his history. Without a knowledge of the broad lines of this history, of its community with the West and its divergence from it, it is impossible to understand the mental and social bases of the existence of the people of the Near East and their incorporation in the new universality which is spreading out from Europe in our day.

MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT IN HISTORY

ANCIENT TIMES

WHETHER the first home of all civilization, the place of origin of the higher forms of agriculture, of cattle breeding and of the plough, is to be found in Mesopotamia, whether it was from there that these arts spread across southern Arabia into the Nile valley and across the Persian Gulf to southern and eastern Asia, is likely to be difficult for research ever to establish beyond question. But the matter is of no importance as an aid to understanding the present day. Even the civilizations of Babylonia and Egypt, with which their monuments have made us familiar, are of much more interest to the modern European and convey much more to his imagination than they do to that of the present-day inhabitants of those countries. The Egyptians and the Iraqi sometimes look with curiosity, but never with any sense of spiritual community, at the treasures which European science has brought to light, treasures which Europe's wealth has made accessible and which have deeply influenced European æsthetics and art. The latest descendants of the creators and artificers of these monuments of religion and art no longer feel any vital community with those past epochs. Only under European influence have they begun of late to feel pride in the origin of their race, but this too is a part of the process of their Europeanization, not the revival of an inheritance and not a spontaneous feeling.

So much of the religious and intellectual traditions of these old cultures as has lived on into later epochs, had to be re-cast and re-moulded in the syncretistic culture of Hellenism. Only one of the older cultures was able to maintain its creative individual existence against Hellenism and against the humanism of the Roman empire,

24 MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

and to carry its historic continuity in unbroken vitality down to the present day. This was the most meagre of the important cultures in monuments, in artistic expression, and in splendour, that of the small and poor Judaic mountain country ; a culture which in its unique and extreme historic consciousness overcame the limitations of time and space by means of its concentration on religious and ethical thought. But this culture too attained its importance in world history from the fact that through the Septuagint, Philo, and Paul, it became merged, in Hellenistic intellectual garb, into the unity of the expiring ancient world.

The Greeks were originally under the influence of the civilizations, already highly developed, of the Oriental river oases. Old legends describe the journey of civilization from the eastern shore of the Levant Sea into the Aegean. The alphabet came from the Phoenicians, who, founding Carthage, also transplanted the civilization of the Levant to northern Africa and the western Mediterranean. Europe, according to Greek mythology, was the daughter of a Phoenician king ; Zeus carried her off to Crete, where she became the mother of Minos, the first of the Aegean rulers. The home of Greek philosophy was Miletus, in Asia Minor, then one of the foci of the Levant, an outpost of Babylonian-Assyrian civilization, where Thales appropriated the wisdom and knowledge of the East and developed it, as a disciple of Babylonia, Egypt, and Phoenicia. Karl Joel attributes Thales' success in raising their philosophy to a higher level to the fact that Greece was politically a small and weak state : the Greek spirit owes its eminence in the same way as the Judaic to the limitations imposed on a nation by the lack of power. " The whole of the wealth of the East, which called for supervision, circulation, synthesis, and control of great masses, lived on here in the brain of a citizen of Hellas without any opportunity of mass application, and therefore the more inwardly and spiritually. The urge towards unity and comprehensiveness, which he was unable to satisfy politically in face of

the particularism around him, sought satisfaction in the intellectual field, in the idea of the unity of the world; the mathematical art grew amid the modest circumstances beyond practical needs into an abstract science, pursued for its own sake as a field of action for the superfluity of intellectual energy. He controlled all the world's wealth of change with the high hand of the Oriental despots of the time, with the unifying force which he demanded in vain for Ionia, and so there arose out of disappointed and checked practical activity the first theory." In the age of the foundation of great empires and of the emergence of dominant personalities in the East, the mind celebrated its triumphs in Judah and in Hellas as a result of the powerlessness and pettiness of its environment.

But in political life the Greeks evolved an attitude which the East has lacked down to our own day, and which was the basis of the great superiority of Europe, the heir of Greece in this respect, in the field of political ethics—the sense of free citizenship. Heinrich Gomperz may or may not be right in finding the central idea of Greek ethics in the ideal of inward freedom, but the free citizen, inwardly depending on himself, whose criterion is self-knowledge, is the victory of Greece, of the Ionic coast of Asia Minor, over the power of the East which then held sway over it. This Greek spirit of citizenship, first represented by the sages of Ionia, finds its culminating point in Socrates, the individual who resisted the mass of the people, "the first entirely free man on this earth, not because he set himself like the Sophists above all laws and conventional valuations, but because he formed valuations anew in his mind, because he contained the law in himself and was the first man who in self-rule created personality." (Karl Joel.)

The first Greek to take up the empire-building idea of the Oriental monarchies was the Macedonian semi-barbarian Alexander, who had been brought up under the influence of Greek intellectual training. Under this influence the empire he founded proved much more of a spiritual power than all its predecessors. It brought

Greek thought and knowledge to the East ; it absorbed the wisdom and the myths of the East and gave them sharpness of conceptual definition ; but it did not succeed in giving the East the Greek concept of citizenship and liberty ; Greece herself had not the strength left for this. In the countries of the Levant, down to the present day, the Bedouin has been able to show a sense of freedom and a primitive democracy with nobility in its attitude, but the townsman has not ; public life in these countries suffers to this day from this inferiority in political character of the settled population. The Hellenism which flourished in the Levant was no longer of the Greek pattern but a hybrid civilization. Hellas rationalized the Near East, but Greek thought returned to the bondage of quasi-myth from which it had once been liberated at Miletus.

On another plane there recurred in the world port of Hellenism, Alexandria, the contact between the Hellenic and the Oriental spirit which had taken place once at Miletus. Greek philosophy, which had arisen out of the East, finally dissolved again into it. A Hellenism which had adopted the wisdom of the priests and the cult of the mysteries of the East, and had come into touch with Judaism at Alexandria, became for many centuries the cultural basis of the countries of the Levant. In the world empire of Alexander the Great, which had embraced the Levant and all its hinterland from the Bosphorus to the Indus and the Nile, the idea of catholicity had for the first time materialized. Alexander took Oriental princesses as wives and ordered his generals and soldiers to marry eastern women. His empire proclaimed the equality of its races and made an end of the conflicts between its peoples. It provided a common ground for understanding, a vast basin into which the various streams of progress could debouch. Alexander and the Diadochi who shared the succession to his empire aimed at the maintenance of Greek culture as the basis of this catholicity ; wherever Alexander came he founded Greek cities with Greek civil rights as the moral pillars of his power. But the Greek

spirit was unable to maintain itself in this vast expansion. The Greek element was swamped in Hellenism and languished in its original home.

Gradually, with the growing activity and boldness of navigators, who ventured more and more away from the coasts, and as their ships grew in size were able to remain day and night on the seas without continually returning to port, Greece with her bays and islands lost her world importance as a neighbour of the Levant. It was now possible for Carthage and Rome to carry on the world trade with the Levant direct from the western basin of the Mediterranean. Rome took over from Hellas her importance as a trade centre—and also, a thing of still greater importance, her ideal of free citizenship. Under Greek influence the primitive Roman *virtus* advanced to *humanitas*; Rome took over the succession to Alexander in a still more comprehensive oecumene. She became a world city in which there were brought together not only the treasures but the civilizations of the whole world. Rome's situation in the centre of the world of her day favoured her. The Italian peninsula divides the Mediterranean into two as it runs from north-west to south-east; its south-eastern extremity looks out at the Levant, and in Sicily it has a bridge to Africa. Thus Italy's maritime cities became the great transshipment centres for goods sent via the Levant from the East to Europe; they have remained so to this day. Rome herself lies in the centre of Italy, where the road west of the Apennines crosses the Tiber. Her situation made it easy for Rome to hold her empire together.

But Alexandria, whither after his death the remains of Alexander the Great were borne, remained the intellectual centre of the empire, and was also a close second to Rome as a trade centre. Alexandria was the seat of Hellenistic philosophy, poetry, and science. Here was the Museum, the foremost university of ancient times, and here what was until quite recent times the greatest library the world has known contained the treasures of the world's literature. This city saw a period when

Jewish philosophy flourished, and after it Christian philosophy ; here the Church fought the greatest intellectual movement of the expiring ancient world, now become oecumenical—Gnosis, which “sought to overcome dualism by intermingling the truths of the Christian faith with Oriental mythology and Greek speculation, and so to found a universal religious view of life embracing the truth of all existing religions and philosophies.” (Arthur Drews.) Since Alexander’s expeditions, science had conquered new fields : reports from foreign countries had been accumulated, expeditions sent out to distant lands and seas, and the many observations of geographical and sociological facts surveyed. Through Alexandria there streamed the trade from India and southern Arabia, proceeding from the Red Sea down the arms of the Nile.

With the fall of Alexandria after the Arab conquest of Egypt, Egypt ceased in its turn to be a main channel of world trade ; it lost contact with the Mediterranean and fell into isolation. Alexandria remained for centuries a small outlying town of a few thousand inhabitants. Not until the French and English armies were opposed to one another near Alexandria in 1801 did this town again attract attention, becoming of importance to those who were concerned to bring Egypt out of her isolation and open her up once more as a trade route from southern Asia to the Mediterranean. The awakener of modern Egypt, Mehemet Ali, recognized the importance of Alexandria, connected it with the Nile in 1820 by the Mahmudia Canal, and made it Europe’s gateway to the Nile valley and the starting point of the route to India for half a century, until the completion of the Suez Canal.

To-day as in ancient times Alexandria is a chief centre of the Greek dispersion. The Greeks have remained in modern as in ancient times an extremely shrewd trading people, and for that reason have not always been popular. Greek colonies, spread in ancient times through southern Russia and as far as the borders of India, in Mesopotamia, and in Spain, dominated the exchange of commodities on

the great trade routes. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the great Greek colonies in Odessa and Constantinople, Alexandria and Marseilles, Manchester and Liverpool, were the agents for the grain trade between the Black Sea and north-west Europe and for the export of British cotton goods to the Levant. With the aid of the wealth they accumulated, these Greeks of the diaspora promoted the development of Greek national consciousness and the wars of liberation in their entirely impoverished and decayed homeland. Their Greek patriotism is live and ardent to this day. In all the ports and cities of the Levant they form the core of the population known as Levantine ; they engage in wholesale and retail trading and agency business. In Alexandria to-day they form the strongest non-Egyptian nationality.

A rival of Alexandria as an outpost of the Levant and an entrepot centre for world trade was the Greek colony founded a little later at Antioch, in a fertile plain on the left bank of the Orontes in northern Syria. This spot was the junction of the routes leading from the Euphrates and from the northern highlands to the Mediterranean. Antioch was far behind Alexandria in cultural importance, but its geographical situation was much more favourable than that of the Egyptian port, which lay far from the natural overland lines of communication. Antioch's population seems to have had from the first the mixed character of the Levantine trade centres ; the wealth and the morals of the city were famous, though hardly of good fame. Antioch also formed the first and greatest Gentile Christian community of early times. It was the seat of one of the four patriarchates of the Eastern Church, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Jerusalem being the three others. On account of its situation and importance the patriarchate of Antioch became known as the patriarchate of Asia. With the decline of the ancient civilization the importance of Antioch dwindled away ; its place in relation to the hinterland was taken by Aleppo and Damascus, both of which were better situated from the point of view of the new rulers of the country, on the

30 MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

border of the desert ; and the connection with the West passed to the ports of the old Phoenician coast.

Alexandria and the region around Antioch, the great entrepot centres of ancient times in Egypt and Syria, have shown by their revived importance that the new trade routes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, following geographical laws, have returned to the old routes of world traffic. The third important Hellenistic city, Seleucia, on the Tigris, has similarly shown that there are places which, though political changes or changes in methods of transport may turn them into backwaters for centuries, again and again return through their geographical situation to their old importance. According to Pliny, Seleucia had 600,000 inhabitants in his day ; it was a Greek settlement at no great distance from the spot at which Babylon, the first world-city of history and the sacred city of western Asia, had stood on the Euphrates for thousands of years, until the year in which its last remaining inhabitants were transferred to Seleucia.

The importance of these cities, and later of Baghdad, which was founded in the neighbourhood of their sites by the Abbasid Khalifs, depended not only on the fertility which irrigation assured to Mesopotamia but above all to the fact that they formed entrepots for trade and consequently centres of industrial crafts. During the eighteenth century industry developed wherever there were sources of raw material and of motive power, especially coal ; but before the Industrial Revolution industry had settled wherever commerce assembled the goods of various countries on its few great routes, so giving a field for wealth and enterprise and knowledge of the world and of market opportunities.

Baghdad entered into the inheritance of Babylon and Seleucia. At the time of Haroun-al-Rashid it was said to have two million inhabitants. The trade routes from China and India led through Mesopotamia to the Syrian coast except when the prosperity of Alexandria was at its height, after the fall of Babylon and before the growth of Baghdad ; during that period the trade was diverted

from the Mesopotamian route through the Red Sea and from the Syrian ports to those of the Nile valley. Baghdad in its time was the centre of Islam, which played in world civilization and world trade the part played later by Christianity. Baghdad, like Babylon, was an industrial centre and world-famed for the beauty and costliness of its richly-dyed cloths. With the breaking over the Levant of the storms of Mongol migration and the desertion of the trade routes in the "dark ages", Baghdad fell into decay as Alexandria and Antioch had done before it. Only at the present day has it re-awakened to new life with the revival of the old routes.

THE END OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

For nearly 1,600 years Byzantium, the new Rome, was the capital of the Levant, the seat of the imperial power on which all the countries of the Levant were dependent. It was the centre of the first great Christian Power and subsequently of the last great Mohammedan one. It was originally a Greek colony, and with its excellent natural harbour it lay in a situation of unique advantage, commanding the routes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and from Europe to Asia. When the centre of gravity of the Roman empire, and therewith of the world, shifted back from the west to the east, Byzantium was the natural capital. It was chosen as capital by Constantine I, who gave it his name; from A.D. 330 Constantinople was the capital of the Roman empire. Here Roman law was completed and consummated, and here Christian dogma was first elaborated. While in the west the Roman empire fell to pieces under the onslaughts of the Teutons, and civilization perished, in the east, the first home of civilization, empire and civilization continued to exist. But the empire was no longer an oecumene, no longer *orbis terrarum*; the peoples of forest and steppe had advanced into it, and in the east it faced a new Power—the old Power with which Hellas and Alexander the Great had fought, Persia.

32 MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

Since the times of Cyrus and of Darius the Persian kings had arrogated to themselves the title of "king of all civilized countries", right down to our own time. The Persians have never entirely lost the sense of being a Great Power, and even the Hellenistic empire of the Seleucids and the Parthians had adopted the national Persian civilization and customs, until in 224 B.C. a national Persian dynasty, the Sassanids, re-ascended the throne. While the Roman empire under Constantine became Christian, the national faith of Zoroastrianism continued to hold sway in Persia; the king was the representative of Ormuzd; the priesthood, the Magi, were the controlling element, and there was severe persecution of Christians. The conflict between the two States thus became a conflict between the two great religions. Both States had later to yield before a new Great Power, bearer of a new religion, which overran them from central Arabia. The Roman empire, confined mainly to Byzantium and Hellas, was able to continue in existence, robbed of its old splendour, for a few more centuries, but Persia and Zoroastrianism collapsed entirely, the State for many centuries (in the fifteenth century a new national dynasty, the Safawids, rose to power), the religion for all time.

However much territory the Roman empire might sacrifice under the onslaughts of the barbarians, the Roman Emperor still sat on his throne in Constantinople, and the succession of emperors followed without a break from Augustus to Constantine XI (1453). Until A.D. 800 there was only one Empire, only one Imperium; in that year the Pope took advantage of the circumstance that after the death of Constantine VI in 797 a woman, Irene, became Empress, to confer the imperial crown on Charlemagne. From then on there were an eastern and a western Imperium, but until the eleventh century the eastern remained the more powerful, until the twelfth Constantinople remained the wealthiest commercial centre in the world, and the Byzantine empire remained, until its end, amid all the changes in its character, the legitimate

successor of Rome. Its Senate was formally vested with the same power and authority as in Imperial Rome, and the Byzantine emperors were chosen, like those of Rome, by the Senate. In the Byzantine empire the Roman idea of the State lived on; the legislation, the administration, the military system, and the extraordinarily high level of strategic science continued the Roman traditions. The very inhabitants of the empire, the Greeks, called themselves Rhomaioi, and retained this appellation in the Turkish empire, in which they were called Rumi, until our own day. The name "Hellene" had a depreciatory flavour. Hellenes were heathen. Not until the time of the Greek liberation movement of the nineteenth century was the old name proudly revived, in memory of the pre-Roman, pre-Christian epoch.

Constantinople was the new Rome, and the political elevation of Constantinople as the Imperial capital over old Rome was followed by the attempt of the Patriarch of Constantinople to secure equality of standing with the Bishop of Rome. The division between East and West in the empire was repeated in the church. Until the death of Athanasius in 373, Alexandria had maintained ecclesiastical hegemony in the East. After that the predominance went to Constantinople. The Patriarch of Constantinople was only *primus inter pares*, but he was the first, the Patriarch of the Imperial city, the oecumenical Patriarch. The Emperor of Constantinople naturally favoured the Constantinople Patriarch; the creation of the States of the Church out of territories which formed parts of the Roman Imperial possessions administered by the Byzantine exarch in Ravenna, and the creation of a new Western Imperial seat, of necessity widened the breach between Rome and Byzantium. Over against the oecumenical empire and patriarchate of Byzantium there emerged in Rome another empire and church, both of which also claimed universality. So the hatred constantly grew between Rome and the East. The final parting between the two Apostolic and Catholic churches, the tearing apart of Christianity, in 1054, was only the

34 MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

external completion of a deep cleavage based on race, civilization, and geographical tradition.

With the onslaught of Islam the Byzantine empire lost its eastern provinces. Within less than ten years the Near East was revolutionized. Khaled, the great general of the first Khalif, Abu Bekr, made a simultaneous attack on eastern Rome and Persia, and under the second Khalif, Omar, Syria and Iraq, Egypt and Persia, fell into the hands of the Arabians. New towns, originally Arabian military encampments, were founded—Fustat in Egypt, out of which Cairo grew, and Basra and Kufa in Iraq. Twice the Arabians laid siege to Constantinople, in 673-7 and 717-18, but failed to take the city; 500 years were to pass before it fell into the hands of a cruel enemy who came not from the East but from the West.

The loss of the eastern provinces of the Roman empire made no change in the character of the empire. It remained essentially an admixture of East and West. Byzantine art was strongly influenced by the East. The plastic, clear stylistic aim of the architecture of the ancient Greeks was transformed by the wealth of colour of the East; in place of the austere and simple external arrangement there came an imposing and picturesque interior style. The Hagia Sophia, built 1,400 years ago, is a monument of the new influence of the East in the heart of Hellenic civilization. While eastern influence thus penetrated Hellas, Hellenism retained its vitality in the Near East. "The Syrian and Mesopotamian art of the Christian period is living evidence of the astonishing vitality with which Hellenism was filled even after the destruction of the ancient world. In the great cities along the upper course of the Mesopotamian rivers there flourished a purely classicist art. The architectonic language of these buildings did not consist of the dark glow of mosaics and marble surfaces, but of the strongly outstanding profiles in emulation of the antique, in the pillars with their capitals and in the unconcealed masonry." (Samuel Guyer.)

For 2,000 years, in ancient times and during the period of decay of the ancient world, the Near East had a common cultural basis in Hellenism, which was penetrated by Roman constitutional and legal conceptions owing to the setting up of the new Rome in the Byzantine empire. The Ottoman empire, strange as the fact may seem at first sight, entered upon the inheritance of Byzantium as a state and a civilization. The Arabian Mohammedans completed and took over the heritage of Hellenism. "The spiritual culture of Islam is Islamized Hellenism. Christian Syrians, Zoroastrian priests, and Gnostics, on Aramaic and Iranian soil, passed on to the Muslims the Grecian inheritance. Islam, which from its earliest origins and in the spirit of its prophet was capable of a greater degree of adjustment to the surrounding world than any other religion of redemption, was bound under these influences to produce new forms of piety and theology. The spiritual culture founded by Hellenism reaches in the Near East to the threshold of the present times, to the period of the penetration of European civilization and science in the last three generations." (Hans Heinrich Schäfer.) The Greek heritage lost its vitality in the Near East, so that in later times it was unable to bear fresh fruit and exhausted itself in adaptation and interpretation. But by way of the Levant, through the penetration of Arabian Islam into Spain and Sicily, the intellectual life of the ancient world was saved for the West, and there, after the fall of Constantinople, it was able to renew its youth and to flourish in a regained spontaneity.

Hellenism did not reveal in the Levant the power of forming and absorbing nations which Rome had in the western Mediterranean. The Hellenic language was unable to make the conquests which Latin made in the western basin of the Mediterranean and Arabic made later in Syria, Iraq, and northern Africa. Aramaic, Coptic, and other languages held their own against Greek, while Gallic and Iberian disappeared entirely before Latin. Syrian and Coptic, indeed, were able to hold their own,

at least as the languages of religious ceremonial, even against Arabic, while Greek disappeared entirely in all these countries, in which it had once flourished. "The Greeks did not possess that enormous political energy and force which enabled the Romans to assimilate foreign races; and they were confronted by sturdy Oriental peoples who were by no means so easy to subjugate as were the inhabitants of Gaul and Spain." (Carl Krumbacher.) Nevertheless, Hellenism had thrown bridges between Baghdad and Constantinople at a time when they were centres of the civilized world, the Christian and Mohammedan foci of the whole earth, enemies to all appearance, and yet, in their mental outlook and in their administration of a common heritage, closely related to one another, just as to this day the Christians of the Near East are closer in their mentality and their social institutions to the Mohammedans than to the Christians of the West.

Thus Byzantium, the new Rome, fell in the end, not to the West and North, but to the East and South. As the Teutons began to invest old Rome from the moment when they awoke to historic consciousness, so the Slavs have been trying to capture Constantinople since their entry into history. The longing for the southern waters, the blue sky, and the old civilization drove the Teutons against Rome and the Slavs against Byzantium. Rome became for the Teutons and Constantinople for the Slavs the imperial city and the religious metropolis. But the aim the Teutons achieved, the capture of the Urbs, the Slavs pursued in vain. After the fall of Constantinople the Tsars of Moscow took over the imperial title (Tsar, like Kaiser, means Caesar), and inherited the Caesareo-Papism of the Byzantine empire which was characteristic of the Eastern church. Moscow felt itself to be the heir of Byzantium, the third Rome. From then on the rulers of the new Byzantium were unceasingly inspired by the ambition to incorporate in their possessions the old Byzantium and the old Byzantine empire. As successors of the Basileus, they regarded themselves as the

protectors of Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman empire, and this Caesareo-Papistical claim became for them, under its modern form of the claim to be a protector of the Christian minorities, the powerful lever which in the end destroyed the real heir of the Byzantine empire, the Ottoman Sultanate.

THE EASTERN CHURCH

The position of the church in regard to the state in the Near East was fundamentally different from the position in the West. In the West, Pope and Emperor, the spiritual and secular powers, faced one another like two swords, in combat as equals or the stronger dominating the weaker. In the Eastern church, as in Islam and as in the Persian empire of the Sassanids, state and church formed a single unit like body and soul. In the East the Emperor was the head of the church, in the same way as the Khalif was a temporal ruler and at the same time the commander of all the Faithful. The Roman Emperor presided over the Church Councils or was represented by a delegate who was usually a layman ; the resolutions of the Councils required his assent to acquire legislative force in the empire. The Byzantine Emperor used his influence in the election and deposition of the Patriarch.

This union of state and church provides the explanation of many peculiar characteristics of the Eastern church. The church did not stand above the state but entered into the state or national group and filled it. On the other hand, it was dependent on the secular organization of state and nation, the political and ethnic dividing lines, which determined the organization and the dividing lines of the church. The church in the West set itself above national distinctions, and the formation of nations accordingly proceeded originally amid a struggle against the church ; in the East the national groupings and the national organization of the church proceeded in harmony with one another. For this very reason there came no schism ; the various national

38 MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

ecclesiastical organizations remained united in faith as members of a single Holy Orthodox Apostolic Eastern Church. Thus in place of the rigid monarchical unity of the Western church there was established a conception of synthetic unity, the consciousness of unity in multi-formity, a vital sense of cohesion coupled with the continuance of an autocephalous or autonomous church in each state. The Eastern church was a federation, at the head of which stood the four Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, and the highest organ of which was the Synod of Bishops. All these churches have developed organically from a single root; they are not alienated from one another although most of them use in their liturgy the language of their own country, often in an antiquated form. Their inter-association is similar to that which developed in the Anglican world-church on constitutional and political grounds in the course of the nineteenth century. But while this church, itself split up into a number of churches with territorial autonomy, has possessed since 1867 an organ, the Lambeth Conferences which regularly assemble under the presidency of the Archbishop of Canterbury (promoting co-operation and agreement, though they have not the authority of an oecumenical synod), the Orthodox church has no such organ. Not until after the world war did the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople draw up a plan for the assembly of a council of the Orthodox churches. A preparatory conference assembled in 1930 on Mount Athos and a Pro-Synod on the Orthodox Whit-Sunday in 1932, to discuss measures for bringing more effectively into play in external relations the internal unity of the Orthodox church, and for co-operation with the Western church.

The close connection between nationality and religion shows itself still more clearly in the heretical churches of the East. It was in theological formulas and disputations that the independence movements of the Egyptians, Syrians, and Mesopotamians found expression in opposition to the Greek church of the empire. Ethnical

differences gave the controversies over the godhead of Jesus their violence. The Nestorians, who arose in Persia and Mesopotamia, came out in opposition to the resolutions of the fourth Oecumenical Council, held at Chalcedon in 451, maintaining the separateness of the godhead and the human character in Jesus ; the Monophysites of Armenia and Egypt affirmed the oneness of Christ's nature, his human character being entirely comprehended in his godhead. A later schism was that of the Monothelites of Syria, who refused to accept the decision of the sixth Oecumenical Council (Constantinople, 680) that Christ had two wills. These separate national churches, in their dissent from Greek Orthodoxy, facilitated the conquest of their countries by Islam. Many of these schismatic churches exist to this day ; sections of all of them, in many cases only small sections, have gone over to Rome.

The Nestorians, some of Aramaic and some of Persian national origin and character, attained their maximum influence in the eighth century. Out of their ranks came the teachers of theology at the court of the Khalif of Baghdad ; they sent successful missions to central Asia, China, and Ceylon. All that are left of them to-day are the few tens of thousands of the ancient national church of the Assyrians, a primitive and warlike mountain people, who with other national churches of the Near East became during the world war a plaything of the policy of expansion of the Christian Great Powers. They fought against the Turks, were driven out of the territory they had inhabited in Urmia, and finally became a troublesome problem for British policy in the north of Iraq and for that young State. A section of the Assyrians, the Chaldeans of the plain, went over to Rome.

The Monophysites are still divided into three national churches, the Armenian, the Coptic in Egypt, to which the Abyssinian Monophysites belong, and the Jacobite in Syria. The Monothelistic sect in Syria, the Maronites, went over to Rome as long ago as 1182. This union, which was finally consummated in the sixteenth century,

had great importance for Christian literature and Christian politics in Arabian Syria. Pope Gregory XIII founded a Maronite college in Rome in 1584, which sent out many men of learning, and the Maronite Christians of Lebanon came into contact with the vivifying tendencies of the West much earlier than other Christians of the Near East.

All these churches have their Patriarchs, to whom there are often added Patriarchs of those sections which have united with Rome. But behind all the external pomp and the venerable past of many of the patriarchates there is no longer any power at the present day. Even the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria in Egypt, who to this day bears the title of "Pope, Father of Fathers, Shepherd of Shepherds, Archpriest of Archpriests, Thirteenth Apostle and Oecumenical Judge," has only one bishop under him, and in his archdiocese has authority over perhaps 20,000 souls.

Religious and racial considerations also entered into the struggle between Constantinople and the West, and together dominated every issue and every stage of it. The Greek clergy stood at the head of the Byzantine nation, which was filled with hatred of the West. The Pope of Rome himself pursued his efforts at dogmatic union with the Orthodox church both by diplomatic and by belligerent means; his purpose was "to attain union by means of an alliance of anti-Byzantine Powers of the West, indirectly through the political subjection of the Greeks". The ideal method of attaining his hegemony over new Rome seemed to the Pope to be "the conquest of eastern Rome by a western petty prince as the leader of an international crusading army". This aim was attained in 1204. Christian Byzantium fell then into the hands not of Mohammedans, but of Catholic Crusaders. Their fury was worse than was ever that of the Turks; the Christian churches of Constantinople went up in flames or were degraded to stables. "Illustrious Crusaders rode on neighing steeds into the Church of St Sophia; others caroused there, drinking wine from the sacred vessels, whose consecrated contents they had first poured

out like refuse, while a courtesan mounted the Patriarch's throne. They adorned themselves and their women with the costly materials of the priests' vestments and with the jewels from the sacred utensils. They laid barbarous hands on the noble works of ecclesiastical and profane art, destroying the tokens of an almost millennial culture. Frightful also was the fate of the inhabitants. They were mercilessly plundered and massacred, youths were sold into slavery, maidens dishonoured. And the conquerors had no awe of saintliness: no nun was safe from violation, no church afforded protection of life." (Walter Norden.)

It was long before the exasperation and the hatred of the West with which these outrages filled the Greek community and its church abated. Two centuries later the majority of the Byzantines preferred to live under the Crescent rather than the Tiara. Turkish rule was "actually made light for them by the consciousness of being emancipated in this way from the rule of the Latins". This feeling of alienation between East and West, of community of the Eastern church with the East, has re-awakened in recent times among many of the Eastern churches, since they have had the feeling of being used as pawns in the political competition between the European States, to be sacrificed regardless of all protests when any change in the situation occurs or when they have served the required purpose. Max Pribilla, S.J., writes: "But just as in Germany there are Protestants who went to Versailles rather than accept a tolerable peace at the hands of the Pope, so there are also many members of the Orthodox faith who would rather suffer perdition under Bolsheviks or Turks than be saved at the hands of Rome." The concluding part of this dictum may be too sweeping, but the mistrust and indeed the hatred of the political and religious "Imperialism" of the West among various churches of the Near East is scarcely less than in Islam.

In the East the national churches fulfilled the rôle of the national state. In a multi-national state each church

formed a state within the state. The form of the Mohammedan state in the Middle Ages took account of this structure: the law of personal status, including the law of marriage and inheritance, came under canon law and accordingly was administered separately for each particular religion; the church exercised in certain defined fields rights of legislation and of administration of law which the modern state reserves to itself. The Patriarchs and heads of the church in the Near East represented the members of their religious community in the world outside it; they were not only ecclesiastical but political and juridical leaders of the Faithful. In the Ottoman empire historic tradition lent the Patriarch of Constantinople a special position; in the Phanar he possessed a court of his own on the Byzantine model. He had the assistance not only of a clerical Synod but also of a "Permanent National Council" with very strong lay representation, which took part in the election of the Patriarchs.

In the Orthodox Greek patriarchate of Constantinople the religious and national elements were of identical scope; it became the centre of nationalist Hellenizing movements among the Ottoman Christians. The situation was different in the Orthodox patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem. Here the higher clergy were Greek and the lower clergy and the laity Arabic. These were the only churches in the Near East in which the national element had not made its appearance in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. This and the establishment of the influence of the laity took place in the diocese of Antioch in the nineteenth century; in Jerusalem the struggle is still proceeding.

After the world war, British Commissions of Inquiry pronounced in favour of the urgently needed reform of the administration of the Jerusalem patriarchate, including the admission of the laity to a large share in the administration. But on political grounds the British administration in Palestine is protecting the privileges of the Greek prelates, who are united in the Brotherhood

of the Holy Sepulchre, against the Arab laity. The Greek clergy are clinging to the nationalist Greek character of the Jerusalem patriarchate with the same determination with which in the nineteenth century they tried to retain the Orthodox churches in Roumania and Bulgaria under the Greek nationalist and Hellenizing domination of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The strong nationalism of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate and its prelates has contributed greatly to the awakening and intensification of the national consciousness of the non-Greek laity.

The Anglican church, which regards itself as a third oecumenical church alongside the Roman and the Orthodox churches, took repeated steps in the nineteenth century to effect a rapprochement and thereafter perhaps a re-union with the Orthodox church. What a contrast there is between the two churches ! One represents the spirit of modern dynamic civilization, the quest for social and practical reforms of Anglo-Saxondom and of the countries with highly developed industry ; the other, in its dignified torpidity, its contemplation, and its way of living, belongs entirely to the East with its primitive agricultural countries. For all that, this is not merely an attempt at expansion of the British Empire and of the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence under cover of the stole, but a genuine part of the universalizing effort, embracing East and West and all humanity, which to-day, amid all the conflicts and clashes of nationalisms and imperialisms, and in the midst of all concealments and distortions, is steadily growing.

Since the world war the Church of England, with the Archbishop of Canterbury at its head, has repeatedly raised its voice on behalf of the Eastern churches, the Patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople, the Armenians, and the Assyrians. At the Lambeth Conference of 1920 delegates were present from the Patriarch of Constantinople (the city was then under British occupation), and in 1923 the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem and the Archbishop of Cyprus recognized the Anglican

ordinations. This happened, it is true, to churches within the British sphere of influence, and the patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem were then in a difficult political situation and in financial distress and were expecting aid from the Church of England. The Orthodox church of the East was also represented at the international conference of the Protestant churches at Stockholm and Lausanne. But no progress was effected in the direction of the hoped-for union of the faiths.

Rome, like the Anglican church, has interested itself in the churches of the East. In 1917 Benedict XV founded the Congregation of the Eastern church and the Papal Institute for Oriental Studies. In the Encyclical "Rerum Orientalium" of September 8th, 1928, Pius XI laid stress on the importance of the restoration of unity, and further developed the Oriental Institute for this purpose. The *motu proprio* "Quod maxime" of September 30th, 1928, affiliated the Institute to the Papal University "in full confidence that this Institute will be of great service in attracting the Orientals as soon as possible into the centre of unity" (Rome).

The churches of the Near East have been "orphaned" since, with the fall of the Tsardom, the most powerful of the Orthodox churches has no longer been able to extend its protection to the others and to give them the benefit of frequent material aid. Rome and the Anglican church are in competition for the succession to this inheritance. The journey made by the Archbishop of Canterbury to Jerusalem in the spring of 1931 was jealously watched by the Vatican. But the churches of the Near East, apart from the Russian and the Balkan churches, are virtually of no significance as an element in power, comprising only a few million souls; the revolutionizing of the eastern world and the contact with the West in recent decades have roused them, however, from their lethargy, and the modernization of the ethnic groups they represent faces them with new tasks. Their new responsibilities have strengthened their sense of a special trust. Under the entirely altered conditions of the new Orient these

churches, which, like Islam, have borne the cultural heritage of the last centuries of the ancient world right down to the threshold of the present times, have to go through a process of thorough transformation. To-day once more their destiny is bound up with that of the whole of the Near East and with that of Islam.

ISLAM

Islam entered in the Levant into the spiritual and political heritage of Hellenism and of the Eastern church. Its beginnings lay in Arabia, and here religious and national elements were closely associated. "At the time of his rise Mohammed was free from universalistic aims; he was an Arabian prophet for the Arabians." (C. H. Becker.) As the preaching of Jesus was directed solely to the Jews, so the preaching of Mohammed, which in its content was also an eschatological preaching of repentance, with a highly-coloured description of the Day of Judgment, the pains of Hell, and the delights of Paradise, was directed to the Arabs. Islam brought a watchword uniting all the Arabs, and rousing them out of "ignorance" and tribal hatred to mighty deeds. The fact that Islam did not confine itself to Arabia was due, according to Leone Caetani, to economic causes: a continuous process of desiccation of the territory they inhabited drove the Bedouins into raids on the fertile land on their borders. To this day hunger is the principal cause of Bedouin raids; changes in the natural environment out of which they gain their subsistence result in mass migrations from the desert. A migration of this sort took place when the Arabs streamed out of the peninsula in the seventh century; Islam had been the force that united them and the weakness of the Byzantine and Persian empires the circumstance that tempted them. The Mohammedan empire which then grew with such rapidity was originally a national Arab realm; the Mohammedan Arabs formed the dominant class, and their subjects, who were left unhindered in the maintenance of

their faith, were the tillers of the soil, the artisans, the tax-payers. Islam only gradually developed into a universal religion; the subjugated peoples voluntarily went over to the new faith of the ruling class on social and economic grounds—"an entirely peaceful and natural spread of the new religion." (C. H. Becker.) It is interesting to compare this with the spread of Christianity, a "slaves' religion," followed by the lowest strata of the people, which forced its way upwards from below until it reached the head of the state: Islam, the religion of an aristocratic fighting caste, flowed down from above, beginning as the religion of the head of the state. In Islam there reigned a spirit of fraternal equality between all Mohammedans, a spirit adopted in the teaching but strange to the way of life of Christianity. Racial pride was unknown to Islam; everyone who confessed Allah was accepted as a brother and an equal, whether he were a negro, a Malay, or a European; the great attraction exercised by Islam in Africa to this day is largely due to this attitude.

In many parts of the eastern Roman empire, especially in Syria and Egypt, the Arabs were welcomed by the population as liberators. It was possible for the Arabs to conquer Palestine and Syria so rapidly and without any determined resistance because the Byzantine rule was hated everywhere outside the Greek cities, of which Jerusalem, Caesarea, and Gaza were the most important. The burden of taxation under Emperor Heraclius weighed down the country. "On top of this economic burden there was the religious; the ecclesiastical policy of Heraclius, the introduction of a Monotheletic formula, was pursued to the length of an inquisition against the Monophysites and the Jews. To this religious difference there was now joined the natural reaction of the Semitic element against Greek alien rule. In the Muslims, on the other hand, the many Christian Arabic clans, including the Aramaic ones, welcomed, to begin with, blood relations; the tribute demanded by the Arabs was not heavy, and finally the Arabs granted full religious freedom

—indeed, for political reasons, they actually favoured the unorthodox tendency. Thus, after the annihilation of its despotic masters, the country fell into the Arabs' hands without any effort on their part; the opposition offered by Jerusalem and Caesarea is the exception that 'proves the rule,' for both cities were entirely Grecianized and Orthodox." (C. H. Becker.) Similarly the Monophysite Copts of Egypt were glad to see the country wrested from the hands of the Greek-Orthodox Emperor by the Arabs. In Persia, where the Arabs were not welcomed as Semitic racial brethren or religious liberators, they met with greater resistance in their invasion; and in Persia, unlike Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, the native language and the national traditions were preserved.

Through the conversion of the conquered peoples to Islam the new great state soon lost its national character. The new Mohammedans brought their Hellenistic culture and the state-craft and science of the Byzantine and Persian empires, and under their influence the primitive Arabian Islam changed; through Mohammed's relations with Judaism and Christianity it had been ready in advance for the full assimilation of the civilization of Hellenistic Asia Minor. Consequently Mohammedan civilization developed on the same bases as the medieval European civilization. This is true particularly of the Christian eastern Roman empire and the empire of the Khalifs, whose eastern frontiers coincided with the limits of the old spread of Hellenism. East Rome and Islam "were equals in the possession of a related but differently developed heritage, as bearers of the unbroken tradition of the last centuries of the ancient world". (Robert Tschudi.) This similarity also embraces the medieval Christendom of western Europe. "The peculiar religious culture of the Middle Ages in Christendom and Islam is identical in its basic ideas; the roots of both cultures and religions are intimately related. . . . In the last resort both religions are rooted in the Orient and its world of ideas. In the period between the seventh and thirteenth centuries the politically strengthened world

of the East was bound to be superior to the West, which had been politically and culturally broken by the invasions of the Teutons: in the East there was an organic connection between the ethnic forces and the intellectual ideals and conceptions, since here the thread of development had not been broken. . . . Hence the enormous cultural influence of the Islamic world on Christendom, which finds expression to this day in the numberless words of Arabic origin in our languages and of which it is impossible to have an exaggerated conception. Not only material products of the East but the broad lines of economic life, the ideal expressions of our medieval chivalry—including even the poetry of the Minnesingers, for all its European appearance—the bases of our whole education in the natural sciences, even ideas in philosophy and theology which have had a wide influence, came to us during that period from Islam. The consequences of the Crusades are the plainest evidence of the enormous superiority of the Islamic world, which we are recognizing more and more every day.” (C. H. Becker.)

So it is permissible to speak of a similarity, indeed an identity, of the cultural bases of the Near East and of the West in the Middle Ages. It was not only in the East that the contact between Islam and Christendom took place. The civilization founded in Sicily by the Arabian dynasty of the Kalbites made possible the country's progress under the Normans and under Frederick II. In the ninth century central Italy was under the dominion of the Sultan of Bari; in 846 the Arabian fleets were at the gates of Rome, and in 878 Pope John VIII had to pay tribute to them. It was no superiority of the West but the disunity of the Arabs and the too-vast extent of their empire that made possible the *riconquista*.

The adoption of Hellenism changed the character of Islam as a state. It had originally been democratic and tolerant. This applies not only to the time of the first four Khalifs (the title Khalif means successor of Mohammed as commander of the Faithful), but also to

the time of the Omayyad Khalifs of Damascus. The change came when the Abbasids ruled Islam from Baghdad. The court of the Abbasids followed the precedent of the court of the Great Kings of Persia and the Emperor of Byzantium, and developed into a despotic oriental princely court with an elaborate ceremonial. The Omayyads in their desert fortresses had cultivated the old ideals of free Arab life ; the Abbasids, in contrast to the more temporal and secular leanings of the Omayyads, proposed "to regard their Khalifate as an ecclesiastical state, in whose government the sacred law was the only criterion. The Persian ideal of the intimate relationship between religion and government was plainly the programme of Abbasid rule." (Ignaz Goldziher.) This brought a change in the habitual toleration of Islam, a change due to the influence of the Christian ideas which it took over. Originally "the principle of toleration was put into operation in regard to the exercise of religion ; and the considerate and gentle treatment of persons of other faiths became the law of the land also in civil matters and in matters of trade. The oppression of the non-Muslims under Islamic protection was condemned by the Faithful as a sinful excess. The governor of the province of Lebanon took stern proceedings at one time against the population, which had revolted against the oppressive measures of the tax-gatherers. He was reminded, by way of warning, of the teaching of the Prophet : "If any man shall oppress one who is assigned to his protection, and lays too heavy burdens on him, I shall myself stand forth as that man's accuser at the Day of Judgment." (Ignaz Goldziher.) Leone Caëtani also points out this change in Islamic tolerance : "In the earliest times the Arabs were not fanatical but associated almost fraternally with their Christian Semitic cousins ; but these latter, after themselves quickly turning into Mussulmans, introduced into the new religion the intolerance, the blind hostility to the faith of Byzantium, with which they had previously brought destruction to the spirit of Oriental Christianity."

For the Bedouins, conversion to Islam was mainly a superficial matter ; only in Hellenized Islam did the canonical law, the Sharia, become the basis of the whole life of the community. As in medieval Jewry, whose Middle Age ended only a few decades before that of Islam, and in many cases continued to the threshold of the immediate present, religion, the obligation to God, dominated until recent times every act in daily life ; it was the ideal of the life of the community, the basis of the state, as well as the personal ideal of education and life. As the administration of the law required its interpretation and exposition, and this required an exact knowledge of the law, in Islam as in Jewry the caste of those proficient in the law, of the wise men learned in the word of God, enjoyed special esteem. Yet there was no priestly caste and no sacrament ; except for particular sects, Islam, like Jewry, held aloof from the Near Eastern cult of mysteries.

Islam means submission to God, concentration on God. To Islam the absolute domination of the world by God is a basic dogma. Therefore the whole duty of man is to obey the will of the Creator. Many Sufis have clothed the basic dogma of Islam in magnificent phrases. The chief prayer of Ibrahim ibn Adham ran : " O God, bring me out of the contemptible condition of rebellion against Thee into the nobility of obedience." When the son of Elfadil died, this man, who at other times did not even smile, laughed and said : " If anything pleases God, it pleases me too." (Adalbert Merx.) Another Sufi spoke the word " Allah " without intermission until he went into ecstasy. At that a stone shattered his head, and the blood that spurted on to the ground formed as it flowed on the earth the letters of the name of God. (M. Horten.) This entire devotion to Allah explains the belief in fate (Turkish *kismet*) in Islam ; but the fate that comes to the Mohammedan and which he accepts in faith is no blind fate in the Greek sense, no senseless tragedy under the weight of which the hero is destroyed, but the will of God, inscrutable by man, to which honour and

praise is due ; obedience to it ennobles and consummates the hero. That this fatalism can spur men on to overcome the fear of death and to commit courageous acts is evident, but it is equally evident that it may easily become a maxim of life injurious to culture and to activity and that it deters men from tenacious energy, from steady pursuit of a purpose in spite of obstacles and opposition. "For the rest, Islam has itself at times come out in opposition to the misuse of fatalistic ideas. Thus there is a tradition that there are three sorts of prayers to which God does not listen—when anyone is living in a tumble-down house and prays to God to prevent it from falling in ; when he puts his goods and chattels out in the street and prays to God to protect them ; when he lets his beast run away and prays to God to catch it for him." (Alfred Bertholet.)

Islam has only one main division into sects which has continued down to the present time, influencing its political life in various fields. The four rites or schools of orthodox Islam do not amount to sects ; the differences between them are slight and do not touch essential questions either in dogma or in the law. The most conservative of these schools, the Hanbalites, who reject all innovations and hold fast to the Sunna, the oral tradition from the time of the companions of the Prophet, has the fewest supporters, but experienced a renaissance in central Arabia with the Wahhabites in the eighteenth century. Twice, at the beginning of the nineteenth century and again in the twentieth, the followers of Mohammed ibn Abd-al-Wahhab have tried to restore the pure faith of the Sunna and a union of the Arabs in a single great realm ; like the Arabs under Mohammed himself, they were inspired at once by religious, national, and economic considerations.

- The Shiite sect, the only dissenting sect known to Islam, had its origin in constitutional problems, not religious ones. The Shiites form the Shia (party) of Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law and the fourth Khalif ; they regard only Ali and his descendants as true Khalifs or

Imams. Ali had two sons, grandsons of the Prophet, Hasan and Husain. Hasan's descendants bear to this day the title of sherif, those of Husain the title of sayyid. Husain died a martyr's death in battle against the Omayyads at Kerbela in Iraq, which has since been a pilgrims' resort for all the Shiites. The battle decided the question of the Khalifate, but in the eyes of the Shiites all the Khalifs were usurpers. The true Imams in their view were Ali and his descendants, consecrated in their office in virtue of a dispensation of God, not of a human choice. According to the Shiite doctrine every generation and every epoch possesses its Imam, "who is alone entitled and enabled, by means of the extraordinary quality of infallibility bestowed on him by God, to instruct and to guide the community in all its religious affairs. The presence of an Imam is indispensable in every epoch, for without one of these inspired persons the aim of godly legislation and leadership would be unattainable." (Ignaz Goldziher.) Thus the Imam in the Shia becomes something quite different from the Sunnite Khalif. The Khalif becomes Mohammed's successor by human selection, not through his inner qualities; his task is the execution of the laws and the defence of Islam. He is not an authority on dogma, not a Pope; he is the external symbol of the unity and continuity of Islam, which is a state and a religion at one and the same time. The Imam of the Shia, on the contrary, has superhuman qualities; he is by birth a leader without sin and an infallible teacher of Islam. Some Shiite sects have brought the Imam into close association with the name of God. The Shia itself is divided into sects segregated according to the series of Imams whom they recognize. One group ends the series of Imams at the twelfth, another at the seventh. The last Imam is then regarded as the invisible lord of the age, living on in seclusion; one day he will return as Imam Mahdi, the saviour of the world, and will set up the realm of peace and justice.

In ordinary life Sunnites and Shiites differ little. The law and the dogma are binding on both and are the same

for both except for insignificant differences. The Shiite himself recognizes the principle of the Sunna, the oral tradition, but he bases his Sunna on the authority of Ali and his circle, not of the other "comrades" of the Prophet. Wellhausen and Goldziher have shown that the Shia did not arise under Persian influence. "The Alidic movement arose on native Arabic soil. The roots of the Imam theory, the theocratic opposition to the temporal conception of the power of the state, the Messianism into which the Imam theory runs, are to be attributed to Jewish and Christian influences. The Shiite form of opposition was, however, entirely welcome to the Persians." (Ignaz Goldziher.) In opposition to its neighbour, Turkey, the national Persian dynasty of the Safawids raised the Shia in Persia to a state religion, and the conflicts between Turks and Persians, which formed a continuation of the old conflicts between eastern Rome and Persia, accentuated the religious difference.

In addition to the Persian Shiites, who recognized the twelfth Imam as the last in the series, two other branches of the Shia have maintained their existence down to the present—the Zeydites and the Ismailites. The former end the series of Imams at the fifth and recognize Zeyd as Imam. They stand nearest to the Sunnites. The Idrisides of north-west Africa, and to-day both the Imam of Yemen with his Zeydites and the Idrisidic Emir of Asir, go back to them. The Ismailites end the series of the visible Imams at the seventh, Ismail. They stand farthest from the Sunnites and have adopted into their system of belief a great deal of alien speculative matter, especially Neo-Platonic and Gnostic doctrines of emanation; they have also given an allegorical significance to the Islamic traditions. The Ismailites are the most backward group in Islam, filled with a blind authoritarian belief in the power of the Imam and intolerant against other faiths. They live in India and in central Syria; their head is the Indian Aga Khan, himself entirely Europeanized—he lives in London and on the Riviera. He is a man of extraordinary wealth and one of the most

loyal supporters of British policy in India and in the Near East. A peculiar, isolated Shiite sect, in which a good deal of old primitive paganism lives on, is that of the Nussayrians or Alauites, who live in the mountains along the coast of Syria between Tripoli and Alexandretta.

For all the relationship between their bases and their ways of life, medieval Europe and Islam parted completely when Europe broke with the Middle Ages through the influence of the humanists and the rationalists. The Europe that came into existence in the sixteenth century and was in full bloom in the eighteenth was inspired by a new sense of life which remained foreign to Islam and to the Eastern churches. In the past, East and West had been equals; but from now onwards the West grew far beyond the East not only in power but in the breadth and depth of its intellectual life. The gulf between the two widened decade by decade, for while Europe advanced the East fell more and more deeply into lethargy and narrowness of spirit; it not only lost touch with the Western progress, but also with its own past, with the period when its own field of culture flourished and was at the height of its vitality. Only in recent years has Islam begun to awaken under the influence of Europe, to break away from the medievalism that has fettered it, to allow a field to critical thought, and to participate, even if, at present, only passively, in the cultural development of Europe since the days of Humanism. Religion is losing in the East, as it has lost in Europe, its universal influence over all life, it is beginning to be but a province of the life of the individual, new forces are bringing inspiration, reforming movements are setting in, and all this is taking place amid a serious crisis in every sphere of intellectual and social life. It does not mean the end of Islam, any more than the Renaissance and rationalism meant the end of Christianity in Europe. Islam will be able to adapt itself to the new field of work. "Islam, too, in a crisis of the gravest, is emerging from medievalism; but its religious and ethical forces will retain their vitality, even if the Sharia is no longer anything but an

ideal and there is no longer a Khalifate." (Robert Tschudi.) Thus there are grounds for hope that with time a new type of Mohammedan will arise, and that the relationship between East and West in bases and ways of life which was so pronounced in the Middle Ages will reappear. Then there will be an end of the four centuries of entire aloofness and segregation and a new approach will begin. Alfred Bertholet quotes a phrase of a present-day Mohammedan which contains much food for thought, and which the historian of this period will again and again feel to have in it at least an element of truth: "Men resemble their time more than they do their fathers."

THE CRUSADES

In the exercise of their rule over the Holy Places in Palestine, the Arabs showed a generous tolerance, in the spirit of the original Islam of Arabia, a tolerance of which there can scarcely be many other examples in the Middle Ages or even in modern times. The Khalif Haroun-al-Rashid appointed the Franks to be protectors of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre: Charlemagne founded a hospital and a library in Jerusalem. Numbers of pilgrims from the West came to Jerusalem and were able to live there in peace and go their way entirely undisturbed. This lasted until about the end of the eleventh century. In 1021 eastern Rome took over the protectorate over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and the struggle over the Church between Rome and Byzantium which then began has lasted down to the present day, and has produced around the Holy Places an atmosphere of religious and political exasperation and jealous hostility which has brought conflicts and disturbances over and over again. The assumption of the protection of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre by the Byzantines also placed obstacles in the way of the pilgrimages from the West, which until then had taken place in peace.

Toward the end of the eleventh century Palestine

became the battlefield in which, as so often in history, the powers in Mesopotamia and in the Nile valley fought out their differences. The Turkish Seljuks, as hirelings and mayors of the palace of the more and more feeble Abbasid Khalifs of Baghdad, fought the Shiite Fatimids, who had founded an independent realm in Egypt. Syria and Assyria broke up into a number of semi-independent Seljuk governorships. This disunity between the Mohammedans, and the weakening of their power through division and through quarrels between the Seljuk generals, offered western Europe an opportunity of gaining a footing in the Levant for the first time since the fall of the western Roman empire. The fighting between the Mohammedans had closed to European trade the great routes through the Levant, along which the world's commerce had passed under the earlier Abbasid Khalifs. At the end of the eleventh century the West armed for its second great thrust against the Orient. The Crusades lasted three centuries and ended in complete failure. The Orient proved the stronger in the long run. But this period revolutionized the West and laid the foundation for its later rapid progress, while it left the countries of the East almost unaffected. So the Crusades, in spite of the victory of the Orient, became a source of the strength of Europe and started the decay of the East.

At the bottom the Crusades were due to the religious excitement of the Middle Ages, the longing for repentance and for works pleasing to God. But the religious enthusiasm was accompanied by many other motives and furthered them in turn. To begin with, at first a non-political and non-material motive, there was the vitality of chivalry, its urge to action, its thirst for adventure. The church had been exerting itself to keep within bounds the vengefulness and the brutal fighting spirit of the knighthood by means of the Truce of God and in other ways; now there was an opportunity of enabling the knights to wear out their passions on a pious and useful mission. "The knight who joined the Crusades might thus still indulge the bellicose side of his genius—under

the aegis and at the bidding of the church ; and in doing so he would also attain what the spiritual side of his nature ardently sought—a perfect salvation and remission of sins. He might butcher all day, till he waded ankle-deep in blood, and then at nightfall kneel, sobbing for joy, at the altar of the Sepulchre—for was he not red from the winepress of the Lord ? One can readily understand the popularity of the Crusades, when one reflects that they permitted men to get to the other world by fighting hard on earth, and allowed them to gain the fruits of asceticism by the ways of hedonism.” (Ernest Barker.) Manly courage and godly love, massacre and pilgrimage were bound up with one another. But the Crusades gained significance from three sets of political and economic motives—the greed for booty on the part of knights and vassals, driven by years of famine and pestilence in north-western Europe to search for new countries and rich treasure, including new fiefs for the younger sons of the nobles ; the desire of the Pope to see Roman Christendom extend not only at the expense of Islam but also at that of the Eastern church, and so to attain the Catholic unity of the whole of the known world ; and the efforts of the rising Italian trading towns of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, to re-open to trade the great routes which had been made unsafe by the unsettled state of the country through which they passed, to set up trading branches in the Levant ports, and to secure trading privileges of various kinds.

The Crusades made Venice the leading power in the Levant. The city had become independent of Byzantium in the ninth century, and in 1048 it received such extensive privileges in Constantinople that it soon began to dominate the whole trade of the port. The fourth Crusade, which set up the empire of the Latins in Byzantium in 1204, was carried out under the leadership of Venice ; Venice gained from it privileges in the territory of eastern Rome and annexed Crete, the Greek islands, coastal territory in the Adriatic and the Black Sea, and Thessaly. The monopoly of trade in the

Adriatic, the Levant Sea, the Aegean, and the Black Sea made Venice the wealthiest city of the later Middle Ages and a great power. Not until the advance of the Ottoman Turks and the discovery of the route round Africa to India was an end made of the monopoly of trade with the East which the proud city of the Doges held throughout the centuries of the Crusades.

While the Crusades brought the Italians the control of trade with the East, the political and cultural dominance fell to France. The Crusades began as a French and Norman enterprise; the Crusaders were called Franks in the Near East, and the name is given to this day to the Christian Levantine population of the trading cities; and the states founded in the Levant by the Crusaders bore in every respect a French character. France has kept alive her spiritual and political claim to the Levant since the Crusades; in taking possession of Syria in 1919 France entered into the heritage of Godfrey of Bouillon and Saint Louis; in addition she laid hands on Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, which had never been in the possession of the Crusaders. But "historic" claims have a way of not only lasting but growing as they last.

Jerusalem fell into the hands of the Crusaders on July 15th, 1099. Its kingdom extended eastwards to the Jordan; east of the Dead Sea it also included a small strip of territory with Kerak. It reached southwards as far as Akaba, the port at the north-east point of the Red Sea. Akaba was an important point for the Crusaders; the goods of southern Arabia and India came there through the Red Sea and could be forwarded thence to the Phoenician coast. But the centre of gravity of the kingdom of Jerusalem did not lie in Jerusalem or in Judaea or in the mountains, where the Israelites and the Jews had once lived, but in the coastal plain, which had once belonged to Phoenicians and Philistines. It is interesting to note that Zionist colonization, which took up the historic claim of the Jews of ancient times, followed the Crusaders' policy; the mountain country, which had originally been the home

of the Jews, remained as in the time of the Crusaders in the hands of the indigenous inhabitants ; the colonists coming from the West concentrated on the fertile coastal plains and their trading cities.

Alongside the kingdom of Jerusalem the Crusaders founded three other states, the principality of Antioch and the countships of Edessa and Tripoli. They thus controlled the whole coastland from Egypt to the Gulf of Alexandretta, leaving the interior of the country to the Mohammedans. Here again the latest developments have followed precedent : after the world war the British and the French sought to establish their domination of the Levant and its trade routes by bringing the coastal strip from Egypt to Alexandretta under their direct control, separating it to this end from its hinterland and splitting it up into various small states in which they assured their domination by favouring the minorities—the Jews in Palestine, the Maronites in Lebanon, the Alauites in the Government of Latakia, and the Turks in the Sandjak of Alexandretta. The Mohammedans were left only the territory that had reverted to desert. This territory lost its importance in being cut off from the coastal strip ; that strip, open to the world, was of critical political and commercial importance.

In this coastal strip the Western traders then, in the time of the Crusades, as now, set up their factories and commercial houses, protected by special privileges. At that period Venice and Genoa were granted important privileges by the Crusaders, special areas in the Near East cities, freedom from all taxation, and their own courts of justice. These privileges, first granted in such towns as Tyre and Acre, as well as Constantinople, were the origin of the system of capitulations which made the European business communities in the Near East a state within the state and withdrew them from the financial and juridical sovereignty of the territorial state in which they had settled. The states that have won their independence, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, have now abolished capitulations, but in Egypt they still remain in full force,

and in Palestine and Syria the Mandatory Powers still retain them on a restricted scale.

With the setting up of the kingdom of Jerusalem the Crusaders reached the summit of their success. The second Crusade, under two Western kings, Louis VII of France and Conrad of Germany, collapsed under the victories of the Mohammedans, who now took the offensive; Saladin had meanwhile re-united Syria and Egypt. The Crusaders were unable to withstand the united Mohammedans, and Jerusalem was attacked by the armies of Saladin. It is a Holy City to the Mohammedans as well as the Christians; its Arabic name of Kuds al Sherif is derived from the sacredness of the city, and its recapture was greeted with the same enthusiasm which had filled the Crusading armies ninety years earlier. The city fell into the hands of the Mohammedans on October 2nd, 1287. All the efforts of united Europe to recapture it by force of arms failed.

Among the peoples of Christendom "national jealousies had been increased and national differences brought into prominence by association in a common enterprise, while on the other side Christians and Mohammedans associated as brethren in a way they had never done before". (Ernest Barker.) In Europe in the twelfth century the Crusades had begun as a bond of religious and Christian union between the peoples; but as they proceeded they developed into an important factor in the awakening of the nationalism of the Western peoples and so in the destruction of Christian unity. On the other hand they proved to the Europeans that the Orientals were not only their equals in culture and capacity but in many respects their superiors.

Lessing, in his *Nathan der Weise*, had good reason for making Saladin an example of noble tolerance. Saladin was of the fine flower of Arab knightliness. Arab Chivalry did not become, like the Chivalry of the West, an organization; it remained, as before Islam, a principle and a way of life; but it had a manifold influence on Western Chivalry. Magnanimity and courage, the sense of honour,

the respect for womanhood, the art of poetry and the love of the chase were regarded as knightly virtues. The common aspiration to knightliness and the mutual trading relations brought Franks and Mohammedans close to one another. Most of the Crusaders married eastern women, and their princes Greek and Armenian princesses. They adopted the higher and more refined standard of the Orientals in clothing, way of living, and education. Only through a negotiated treaty and for the very limited duration of the treaty was the Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II (who under the influence of Arab civilization had become one of the most notable princes of the Middle Ages) able to bring Jerusalem and the coastal cities back into Christian ownership, from 1229 to 1244. Not until 673 years later was a Christian Crusader, General Allenby, once more to capture Jerusalem. This time, too, ideals were united with aims of economic and political expansion as motives of the enterprise.

In 1291, after further vain Crusades, the last fortress of the Crusaders, Acre, fell into the hands of the Mohammedans. The Bay of Haifa was Europe's last possession in the Holy Land. The Venetians hastened to conclude advantageous treaties of amity with the foes of Christendom and to secure for themselves the same trading privileges that they had possessed under the Crusaders. Only in Cyprus, the commanding outpost in the Levant Sea, did the Crusaders retain their hold until 1489; its capital, Famagusta, was an important trading centre. With the death of the last king of the island Venice came into possession of it through adopting the king's widow, a Venetian woman, as a daughter of the republic. For eighty-two years Venice ruled over Cyprus, whose inhabitants had even more reason to complain of its harsh rule than of that of the titular kings of Jerusalem. Then the island shared the fate of Jerusalem: it fell into the hands of the Turks, and came later under British rule.

The Crusades continued for nearly 200 years after the fall of Acre. But their character had changed: they

were no longer an offensive against the Holy Land, but a defensive struggle against the Turks, who carried the banners of Islam as far as Hungary. The Levant remained in Eastern hands. But the Crusades had greatly widened the vision of the Europeans. About this period European missionaries and traders had reached China, India, and central Asia; the Levant routes were more thoroughly explored and the wealth of the Far East became more familiar. The journey was made overland from Acre to Peking, and by sea from Basra to Canton. New horizons opened, the frontiers were pushed farther back, and a new vision of life arose. The medieval lethargy and isolation of Europe had been broken down. The spirit of the Crusades took Vasco da Gama round the Cape of Good Hope. The Levant had been able to beat off the invaders, but the ultimate result of the Crusades was the thrusting out of the Levant from the centre of history. Trade and civilization took other paths. But before this happened the end of a great historic period was to be, as it were, compressed into one symbolic act: on May 30th, 1453, the Turks entered Constantinople, which they regarded as the capital of Christendom, the *urbs* of the expiring ancient world, the *polis* of Hellenism. From their long struggle to enter this city—*eis ten polin*—it received its Turkish name of Istanbul. The capital of the Christian Roman Emperors became the seat of the Khalif, the Hagia Sophia a mosque.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

When Constantinople fell, the great civilizing power of Islam was already broken. As the ancient civilization of Europe foundered amid the mass migration of peoples, and several centuries passed before civilized life began anew in Europe, so the civilization of Islam and the beginnings of an eastern European, Slav civilization perished amid the great mass migration which brought the Mongols under Genghis Khan westward from the interior of Asia. That great conqueror left behind him -

an empire that stretched from the China Sea to the Dnieper. In 1258 Baghdad fell before his successor, and the Abbasid Khalifate and the power of the Seljuks, who had founded a state in Asia Minor with Konia as its capital, came to an end. The Mongols had a number of Turkish tribes in their ranks, and drove others before them.

At the time when Baghdad fell before the Mongols, the Osmans, one of the Turkish knightly fraternities settled by the Seljuks on territory in the north-west of Asia Minor, rose to power. The early history of this fraternity is lost in legendary obscurity. Its leader Osman, son of Ertoghrul, conquered Brussa in the year of his death, 1326. From then on the Osmanli advanced rapidly and unceasingly through two centuries to world power. By 1361 Murad I had conquered Adrianople and reduced the Balkan countries to submission; Constantinople had long lost all real power and independence before it fell in 1453. The Ottoman empire reached its zenith under Suleiman I (1520-1566), who conquered Budapest and Algiers; his victorious fleets dominated the Mediterranean, and his possessions included the shores of the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf. But with the expansion of the empire the first signs of decay made their appearance. Suleiman, "the great lawgiver, was still able to cope with the difficulties. Through peace and security in the wide realm, through the admirable administration, the excellent state of the finances, and the strong army, always ready to strike, the Ottoman empire was one of the most powerful and most prosperous of states. The old method of bringing in assimilated renegades to reinforce the upper ranks gave an incomparable field of service in the world empire to the best heads among the subjected population." In those days the Ottoman empire saved from the heritage of the civilizations that had sprung from the latest period of the ancient world so much as had escaped in the destruction of the Khalifate by the Mongol incursion and the destruction of Byzantium by the Latins. "These were, it is true, old, tired

civilizations ; they were granted a second flowering, and the syncretistic technique this demanded made the Ottoman state not only an artistic but an artificial product, too Oriental for the West, too Byzantine for the East." (Robert Tschudi.)

With Suleiman there came to an end the succession of great and powerful sultans. The external magnificence and the wide extent of the empire continued unchallenged for a further century and a half. But within it there was being repeated the experience of all the autocracies of the Orient: feeble rulers, with their harems and their favourites, ruined finances, disordered administration, everywhere corruption and the absence of all sense of responsibility for the state as a whole. The turning point in the empire's external relations came with the peace treaty of Carlowitz in 1699. At the same time there began the long continued conflict with Russia, whose Tsar demanded from the Sultan, for a long time without success, the recognition of his title of Emperor and his equality of standing. The peace treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) brought Russia the right of surveillance of the Danube principalities which were under Turkish sovereignty, and the opportunity of claiming under a clause of the treaty a protectorate over the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire.

After this the dissolution of the once mighty empire was only a question of time. It was delayed by the jealousy of the European Powers, which kept the "sick man" alive. There were many points of friction ; the interests of Russian and Austro-Hungarian expansion came into conflict in the Balkans, and the control of the Bosphorus was regarded alike by Great Britain and by Russia as a matter of vital importance. Asiatic Turkey, which until well into the nineteenth century had been regarded as outside the sphere of interest of the European Powers, began to attract their attention, each of them watching to see that none of the others extended its field of influence. Out of this conflict of interests there arose the programme of the maintenance of the integrity of

Turkey, at all events until the Powers could agree between themselves over the detachment of one or other of the provinces of the empire, or until one of them should take the risk of facing the rest with an accomplished fact.

As early as 1815, at the Vienna Congress, the Powers were planning a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Turkey, and at the Congress of Paris in 1856 all the signatories bound themselves to respect her independence and territorial integrity. At that time Turkey had made a beginning with her first attempts at reform, to turn a medieval oriental state into a modern state, all the inhabitants of which should enjoy equal rights and accept equal obligations. But the Powers had an interest in maintaining Turkey in her old weakness and disunion. Within the Ottoman empire there was no dominant class to carry out the reforms from patriotic zeal and to awaken a new sense of the state. The placing of the Christian population on an equality with the Mohammedan did not have the desired success ; many Mohammedans looked down with contempt on the unbelievers who had suffered centuries of oppression, while the Christian nationalities concentrated their whole attention on the acquisition of independence, and to that end on the weakening of Turkey with the aid of the foreign Christian Powers. The struggle between Russia and the Western Powers, especially France, for dominance in Turkey, went on under the cover of a struggle between the Orthodox and Catholic churches for controlling influence in the Holy Places. It was a struggle of this sort over the rights of the monks at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem that led to the Crimean War.

On its eastern frontier the Ottoman empire continued the old struggle of eastern Rome against Persia. Persia had not had, like Turkey, a period, at the beginning of the modern age, of great advance in political power, but on the other hand Persian culture had spread through Turkestan and, under the rule of the Grand Moguls, Mohammedan India, where Persian became the language of official and educated intercourse. But the struggles

between Persia and Turkey were without significance. the fate of Persia (which had been ruled since the end of the eighteenth century by the dynasty of the Kajars) depended, like that of Turkey, on the issue of the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. As in Turkey, the policy of the granting of loans to the government was pursued with a view to securing political and economic concessions for the European states and continually weakening and exploiting the country. "It is manifest that the brutally selfish policy of the Europeans, together with the incapacity and unscrupulousness of the government, was bound to result in the economic and social ruin of the country. And the people were still too weak to take their fate into their own hands." (Hans Heinrich Schäfer.) When, however, the people took courage to do this, when the Persian revolution, the first in the countries of the Orient, gave the signal for political and economic emancipation, the Powers exerted themselves to the utmost to make impossible any reform and any improvement in the condition of the people. The history of this period, which is only typical of what was going on all over the East, has been written by an American, Morgan Shuster, from a knowledge of the circumstances gained in Persia itself in the course of intimate collaboration with the Persians. He gave his book the significant title of *The Strangling of Persia*.

It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that Persia came into contact with European ideas and so was led to set her house in order. In Turkey there had already been contact with Europe for half a century. Turkish writers had conveyed the ideas of the Western world in the Turkish language to their compatriots. There had been an uninterrupted process of modernization among the Turkish intelligentsia, though it only affected a small upper stratum of the people. The social and cultural attitude to life of medieval Islam was replaced by the ideas of the West, the rights of man and of the citizen, the freedom and dignity of the nation, the rationalist and scientific attitude to life. For three decades

Sultan Abdul Hamid attempted through his reactionary and tyrannical régime to check the progress of modern ideas, of Liberalism and nationalism, in his empire. He made use for this purpose of the religious fanaticism of the uneducated masses of the people. Abdul Hamid became the great champion of Pan-Islamism. He made much of his position as Khalif, and used it to gain the adhesion of Mohammedans outside Turkey. But his resistance to the penetration of Western ideas proved as hopelessly ineffectual as the similar efforts of the Austria of Metternich and those of Tsarist Russia had been. The assimilation of the technical progress of the West, at least by a small class of intellectuals, was absolutely necessary to enable an army and an administration to be developed, and it was impossible to permit this without also admitting the ideas which formed the basis of all technical achievement. It was this upper stratum that carried through the revolution of 1908, with the watchword "Unity and Progress". They were led by officers and by intellectuals who had returned from exile. The nationalism they brought with them from Europe was bound to hasten the dissolution of this empire of many nationalities.

During the last two centuries of its history the Ottoman empire has been the arena of the new contest between East and West. But this resumption of the old rivalry of the time of the Crusades took place under totally changed circumstances. The political and cultural superiority of the West was firmly established; in no field of social or intellectual life had the East anything of comparable value to oppose to it. Thus it was possible for the West to penetrate the East politically and culturally without meeting with any lasting resistance. The political pressure has grown in recent decades with the opening of the international trade routes by water, on the land, and in the air, and with the continually increasing closeness of the network of world trade. The Levant became a field of tension in world politics, in which the oriental peoples were merely passive elements with which world policy operated. Only in recent years, with the change in the view of the world formed by the people

of the Orient under the influence of European thought, has there begun a complete transformation in the political, social, and cultural life of the East which, under the stimulating influence of the West, has awakened to new activity in political and economic life.

The relations between East and West have entered upon a new phase. The world war, in which all the countries of the Near East were involved, was the turning point. At the end of the world war the West succeeded in doing what it had already done once at the time of the Crusades. Constantinople was occupied by the Allied Powers, under British leadership. European influence in the Near East attained its zenith. Turkey, Persia, the countries of Arabia, and Egypt seemed to have fallen once and for all under the political and economic domination of the West. But this apparently supreme point attained by the power of the West was actually the turning point. The fate of Constantinople seems like a symbolic summing up of the significance of this transition period. In the Middle Ages the Pope, the Latins, Normans, Italians, had invested the city in vain; the Tsar of Russia, the King of the Hellenes, the Tsar of the Bulgars made efforts in the past century to obtain possession of the city in order to fulfil the aspirations of their peoples. Here West and East had fought for domination of the world, for their souls, for their faiths. This city was witness of a historic continuity which reached from Hellenism down to the twentieth century. Down to our own day it bore the name of the founder of its greatness. Only now has it lost its world significance; and now it has only its Turkish name left—Istanbul. The Turks themselves have transferred their capital to Asia, to the interior of Anatolia, whence they once issued for the conquest of the West. With the victory of European ideas in the Near East the centuries of rivalry of which Constantinople was the symbol seem to have ended. On the rejuvenated bases of a historic past, which was determined by the attraction and rejection, the penetration and separation of West and East, the present is building farther.

MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT AT THE PRESENT DAY

WITH the uniformity of his climate and natural conditions, and the uniformity of his history, in the course of which there were continual interminglings of races, all of them exposed to the working of the same civilizing forces, there is a corresponding uniformity of type of Levantine man in spite of all differentiations. His character has been determined by two different elements: the inborn qualities of the man of the Mediterranean and the man of the Near East, and the typical way of life of the man of the pre-capitalistic economic epoch. The Mediterranean man and the man of the Near East still live in some degree in the pre-capitalistic world; they are only at the threshold of industrial capitalism. The changing economic conditions will affect the character of these men, will change some of their distinguishing features, and will train them in a new general outlook. For human characteristics are not determined only by race and environment but also by history and social development. The process of economic restratification will result in changes similar to those which took place in Europe some centuries ago in men's way of living, in their general attitude and in their outlook on the world, and which in recent years, with the bringing of the whole planet into a uniform and world-wide machine economy, has taken place alike in Russia and in the Far East, in South America and India.

The climate of the Mediterranean countries determines the external features of life. In the north the closed house is the centre of life—not only of family life, but also of social, cultural, and economic relations. Men leave their houses only for the special reasons which bring them into the street or the open air. It is different in the

Mediterranean region. There the centre of personal and social life is the open place, the Forum or the Agora, the cafés with their seats on the pavement, the open shops and booths. The reliability and mildness of the weather permit the great open-air theatres. This life in the open air brings more intimate comradeship than does the seclusion of the northern houses. Speech flows more easily, men are not so cut off from one another, they meet everywhere, and this intermingling produces a natural, unconstrained, hearty democracy ; intercourse is not so stiff, men are more impulsive, voices are louder. Only the Mohammedan preserves at times the silent dignity of the desert.

But this public life is only for the men ; the women are tied to the house, not only among the Mohammedans, although with special strictness among them. Women do not enter the cafés or places of entertainment, and men's and women's gatherings are usually strictly segregated. In the home the position of the woman varies ; often she is the servant of the man, often she ranks as mistress of the house. Her seclusion frequently results in ignorance, in a blasé shallowness and superficiality, in mere sweet-eating and idling. Yet there are many exceptions. The woman of the lower classes is very hard-working, her frame steeled by the rigours of exacting labour, but often prematurely aged. The mother is everywhere in a position of authority among her children ; she is the most respected member of the home ; the grandmother also is treated with great respect. The isolation of family life has prevented any relaxation of morals.

The climate reduces the need for clothing and shelter. The man of the Near East is temperate in eating and drinking. The Mohammedan is forbidden wine, but among the Christians also drunkenness is rare. Since needs are less, especially in view of the different attitude to industry, less labour seems necessary than in the European capitalist countries. The man of the Mediterranean has more free time, more sense of the simple

joys of life, of the *dolce far niente*. Business deals are concluded in the open air, in cafés, always amid easy-going negotiation, without any undignified haste, without any sense of time or of the value of time.

This "timelessness" is a part of the pre-capitalist attitude towards trade and industry. Life still proceeds amid a natural harmony, in which there is as yet no dominance of the impulse to push business at the cost of everybody else, of the lust for the acquisition of material possessions. Men still have a dignified indifference to the chances of business success; they feel it as important to satisfy the need for an easy-going and care-free existence and for a simple and direct joy in life as to earn money. Poverty is no disgrace, and in business life irrational considerations play an important part. In the *suk* (bazaar) one may often find vendors who make themselves a nuisance in their efforts to attract customers and who sing the praises of their goods with Oriental extravagance; but this is more from southern exuberance and the joy in simply making a noise, especially among the typical trading peoples of the Levant; most of the shopkeepers sit silently amid the treasures of their open shops, waiting patiently for customers to come; if the customer enters they allow him to explore their stock in silence, and scarcely betray by a movement any interest in doing business. The typical Levantine trading is not carried on out of trading zeal or self-seeking.

There is not the same care as in the north to keep to the exact truth; people promise more than they mean to do; but those who are dealing with them are aware of the rhetorical exaggerations and know exactly how much or how little of all the talk and big figures need be taken seriously. In all this there is less of peasant cunning and graspingness than in northern Europe. It is a "naïve joy in bargaining, not for the sake of making money but just for the joy of beating the opponent in the trading game, a deal which is nothing else than a competition between man and man. Such business has nothing whatever to do with honesty and dishonesty;

everything is permitted that can be devised by human ingenuity." (Reinhard Junge.)

The Mediterranean workman also works industriously, but only as much as he has to, and if he has saved up a little he will live on it until it is exhausted and he must go to work again. He works with a will only when his work has in it a creative element or satisfies his pleasure in form and colour, and his patience is soon exhausted by monotonous and undistinguished work such as is offered by modern machine production. The lack of a sense of time is characteristic of the whole life of the easterner: in the languages of the peoples at this stage in social evolution, in Arabic, Russian, Spanish, the word for "to-morrow" has a vague and indefinite significance, amounting in effect to "by and by". Time is not money, and money itself is held of much less account than in Europe or North America. The easterner who states a time never means it with any precision. Similarly, in common with all men of the pre-capitalist era, he is without a sense of precision and proportion in other ways, in industrial processes, for instance, which call for minute attention in correlating the play of various operating parts, or for the last millimetre of accuracy in finishing. His spirit rebels against any excessive rationalization of life and work.

In his business life, too, an important part is played by fancy, by sympathies and antipathies. At one moment he will be tempted by alluring castles in the air, at another he will fall into the resignation of fatalism. He is not hard enough with himself, is easily led by his inclinations, and will interrupt the work on which he is engaged on the slightest occasion. Moreover, the townsman, especially the trader of the type described as Levantine or, like the traders of Turkestan, as a Sarte, belongs to a class that has been oppressed for centuries; he is driven by the desire for respectful recognition to an exhibition of vanity and an attempt to exaggerate his importance, both of which interfere with his business efficiency.

The same irresponsibility is found among the peasants, who after many months of living on the edge of hunger will suddenly, on some festal occasion such as a betrothal, spend in a single day more than they normally spend in a whole year, so incurring an enormous burden of debt. Hospitality is lavish everywhere, frequently to the extent of injuring the host's financial position; for a chance guest the easterner will rush into expenditure out of all proportion to his normal meagre existence. Among the well-to-do classes in the towns this desire to make a good show has results which are even more injurious socially and economically, when the penetration of European civilization brings the opportunity for a manner of life which also undermines the traditional bases of stern morality and patriarchalism.

The population is divided into three groups, differing in their economic activities and in their characteristics—the nomads, the peasants, and the townspeople. The nomads include the Arabs of steppe and desert, the Bedouins, and numbers of Turkish and Kurdish tribes. They are all characterized by a proud demeanour and an impatience of anything that interferes with their independence. They have not the desire for recognition or the ambition to cut a figure with which the townsman and some of the peasants are filled. Their cultural level is very low; they do not display the desire for education or the intellectual activity and receptivity that distinguish the townspeople. The Bedouins are herdsmen, but often live in walled towns in the oases, where they cultivate grain; the date palm, however, provides the main food supply. As they dominate the caravan routes, they draw profit from trade, either as dealers or as guardians of the highways exacting levies from the caravans. The important route from the south of Arabia along the Red Sea to the Mediterranean was the seat of numbers of tribes who lived in this way on trade, some of them directly, some parasitically. The nomad herdsmen, on the other hand, in the steppes and deserts of Arabia, Asia Minor, or Iran lead a very meagre and

primitive existence. Most of them are driven by hunger to raid the cultivated land or the other nomad tribes on its border.

If ever, thanks to the rare combination of an exceptional gift of organization with public spirit in the government or among the leaders, the opportunity comes for them to settle and take up agriculture, they gladly seize it. King Ibn Saud, the leader of the Wahhabites, has settled many of the restless Bedouin tribes of central Arabia around springs in the desert in the present century. In this way he has not only given these tribes increased economic security, but has also given his empire some prospect of permanence. For the nomad is politically unstable and rebellious. Under the leadership of a great statesman and soldier he can found an empire, but this empire soon falls into dissolution. The life of the nomad knows nothing of the steady continuity of an organic system of government.

Among the various tribes the loose forms of government are entirely democratic. The community as a whole determine matters of common concern, and only for the duration of a campaign or a raid do they accept submission to a chosen leader or to one who stands out through his bravery and qualities of character. Their rejection of authority prevents the misuse of authority general in urban and peasant communities.

Thus the nomads form no permanent states either in the steppes or in the mountains. The principal representatives of the mountain nomads of the Levant are the Kurds. In winter they live in strongly built villages on the lower slopes of the mountains, and grow grain around them; in the summer they take their herds to pasture high up in the mountains. They too are proud, independent, and often ferocious as fighters and raiders. The Kurds, and also the Druses of Lebanon and the Druse mountains, have developed, unlike the nomads of the steppes, a tribal organization under the rule of hereditary feudal families, to whom they give allegiance.

The Turks also were originally nomads, and the aristocratic stratum among the Turks has retained something of the lordliness of the nomad chiefs. The Turkish peasant has become a peasant of the normal type. The Turkish townsmen, on the other hand, have remained until recently a ruling class alien to urban economic life, a caste of soldiers and officials, proud and full of the sense of their own dignity, but without application, without any ambition for education, and without any gift for trade and industry, which have fallen entirely into the hands of the Christian peoples of the Levant, especially the Greeks and Armenians, on whom the Turk looks down with contempt. This character of the Turkish ruling class, inherited from its nomad days, accounted for the fact that the vast empire so rapidly formed by the ruling race, at the time when its powers were still unexhausted, lingered in impotence for a time before it entirely fell to pieces, and did not contain within itself the guarantee of an efficient order that could establish permanence.

The peasants or fellaheen are hard workers, cautious and suspicious, but with great natural intelligence. They carry on a hard struggle against the unfruitfulness of the soil and the shortage of water, or against its exuberance in the deltas, but are underfed and uneducated, suffering from centuries of oppression and exploitation. His prudence and caution makes the fellah "in his daily labours an extremely patient worker, able to carry out with great industry the most tedious and monotonous tasks in petty cultivation; his mentality often makes him an unexcelled master of such work. A further consequence of cautiousness is often great obstinacy in holding on to old economic forms with the utmost tenacity, and in meeting the foreigner, if he tries to introduce new methods with all too little consideration of the human element, with insuperable suspicion. Lack of understanding becomes refusal to understand. Only the deepest consideration for the people, the deepest love for the people, touching the heart of the Oriental, can

conquer this difficulty" and pave the way for more modern methods. (Reinhard Junge.)

The peasant's wife is as industrious as the peasant himself. Even among the Mohammedans the countrywoman is not subjected in any way to the seclusion suffered by the townswoman, especially among the upper classes.

Until recent times the peasant, as in eastern Europe and a hundred years ago in central Europe, counted politically for nothing at all; to the governments he was simply a source of revenue and to the usurers a subject of exploitation. But the new national movements have given him a hitherto unknown self-confidence and have directed the attention of national governments to the peasantry as pillars of the strength and future of the nation. On the other hand, the quickened flow of money and exchange, the complications of world trade, and the contact with new and superior forms of economic organization, at first far beyond his comprehension, have, if anything, made worse his century-old impoverishment. The burden of taxation in all these countries was borne mainly by the peasants and was made still more unendurable by the farming of the taxes, greatly increasing a burden already excessive. The lack of any organized system of credit prevented any transition to more intensive farming, even had the peasant had the needed education, and drove the peasantry into the hands of moneylenders who demanded rates of interest often amounting to 50 per cent. per annum and even exceeding this; the ignorant and unprotected countryman was quite unable to repay his loan on top of the interest, and fell deeper and deeper into debt.

Large ownership does exist in the Near East, and also large ownership in mortmain, which is known as *waqf*, "pious foundation". But there is very little of large-scale farming; the land is leased to peasants, who usually pay as rent a proportion of the harvest, one-fifth to one-third. These small farmers are driven down to a low level of existence by the absence of any legislation

giving them security of tenure, and this also prevents any effective work for the amelioration of their condition. In many regions they suffer from excessive division of their small properties, which cuts down their existence to the very minimum.

On top of this there were special institutions born of the limited wisdom of the Middle Ages, but readily taken over sometimes even by the mandatory governments, such as that of collective penalties when it was impossible to discover the authorship of crimes or outrages ; these might bring economic ruin to whole villages or districts. Latterly the national governments in Turkey, Iran and Egypt have tried to improve the lot of the peasants by the provision of small credits and by taxation reform.

The situation of the peasant is a most serious social and economic problem in all the countries of the Near East. The transition from a primitive economic level to the modern capitalistic world, involving a complete break with his habits of thought and life, needs to be made easier for him by governmental measures of protection and an understanding and sympathetic consideration of his position. The national governments recognize the necessity of protecting the peasant during the transition period from exploitation of his economic weakness and inexperience and from a diminution of his possessions, from the danger of landlessness and proletarianization. Indigenous agriculture suffers from the great shortage of capital ; the peasant, indeed, is entirely without capital ; he not only has no working capital, so that he is dependent on the usurer, but his whole live stock and implements are of infinitesimal value.

In earlier times, before the influx of modern cheap factory-made goods, the peasant and his family carried on in their leisure hours an artistically developed home industry which met the needs of home and family and provided remunerative occupation at times when there was no work to do on the land. Household utensils and clothing had an individual character ; the peasant was

proud of the good work put into them ; everything was made with the natural popular feeling for form and colour, and embroidery and carpets aroused the admiration of Europeans. In recent times this home industry has greatly declined ; on the other hand, with the development of urban industry, the opportunity has come to the peasant of work away from home during the months in which there is little or nothing to do in the fields. Agriculture did not offer him sufficient support even to meet his own poor needs, and he sought employment for wages on public works and in the building trade in the towns ; there has not yet been an actual flight from the country into the towns, but nevertheless where the peasant has been fortunate he has become an element in the urban labour supply.

Urban economic life has developed differently in the ports and in the towns of the oases. Trade with Europe was concentrated in the ports ; European elements settled in them in early times, mixed with the Christian Levantine population, and produced the type of "Levantine" who became the middleman between Europe and the Near East—a denationalized class, shrewd and exceedingly active, but often unscrupulous and given over to senseless luxury. The peculiar character of the internal water supply has resulted in massed populations settling in the oases while the desert all round was uninhabited. These oases thus developed into urban centres around which village settlements came into existence in a narrow but fertile space. Such an oasis city as, for instance, Damascus, has a peculiar character of its own—the closely packed city in the midst of rich vegetation, with swiftly running water and many canals in the oasis, houses with marble courts shaded by trees and cooled by fountains, orchards and fields always green ; and all round, visible almost everywhere from the slightest elevation, the desert always threatening encroachment, yellow sand, bare, dust-covered rocks, passing suddenly, without any transition stage, into rich, watered oasis country.

These oasis cities have for ages been centres of trade and industry. But here as in the ports the despotic form of government has prevented the development of any spirit of free citizenship. Here, too, one finds a class of middlemen related to the Levantine type, mostly Christian Syrians and Armenians, of outstanding intelligence and energy, and like all minorities in the Near East inspired by an extraordinarily strong sense of solidarity with one another. The Mohammedan prohibition of interest and the various expedients for circumventing it have encouraged usury rather than the reverse. Financial business lay in the hands of the traders, though they had very little capital. Commerce was the only form of economic activity in which there was any appreciable accumulation of capital; in other fields such money as was obtained was hoarded or invested in personal property and jewellery.

In urban as in rural economy the lack of an organized system of small credit was acutely felt. Of the two branches of urban economic life, trade and industry, only trade worked with a certain capital; with the complication and the mobility of commercial business it was easier to place trading capital beyond the reach of arbitrary authorities than industrial and agricultural capital.

The urban industries had been famous from of old and were able to continue in their traditional form down to the latest times. In view of the Oriental taste for sumptuous clothing and for jewellery, the clothing industry and the jewellery, metal, and leather industries grew to importance. The impulse to make money was not the primary motive; as in the Middle Ages, these industries served only to provide a living for the practitioner, who worked slowly, full of the sense of art and of intelligent deliberation; but there was no production to order for special customers as in medieval Europe, only production for the market, for the unknown customer of the bazaar. The artisan "with his superfluity of time could put imagination into his work, express

his whole individuality in every object, no matter how unimportant it might seem. Customers had always insisted on individuality in his articles, and the richer class demanded goods of high quality. His own joy in beautiful work was a great incentive. So there came into existence the wonderfully clever little works of art in leather and metal work, wood carving, silk dyeing, and embroidery. All the wonderful charm for our eyes in all Oriental handwork is due largely to this artist's attitude towards industry, which makes of shoe and cloak and turban, cup and jug, bolt and window and door, everything, from the smallest everyday utensil to the cupola of a mosque, a masterpiece of beauty, with individual differences from shop to shop, from oasis to oasis, from region to region. Here again art and science went hand in hand. A particularly fine piece was shown only to the real connoisseur, not to the mere buyer. And the seller could proudly produce his little wares hour after hour, even if nothing was bought." (Reinhard Junge.) In the narrow lanes of Baghdad, with their ugly and short-lived clay houses, there are continual surprises in the wonderfully individual execution and the rich and careful carving of doors and balconies, which give each of the richer houses an individual dignity and beauty even amid its pathetic dilapidation. Often a particular trade is in the hands of a religious or ethnical group, in which the tradition is carried on from generation to generation, as, for instance, the silversmith's work of the peculiar old sect of the Sabaeans, who live to this day, to the number of three to five thousand souls, in Mesopotamia.

Not only all trade but all industry is concentrated in the bazaar, which is the centre of all the town life. Here the various trades possessed their own streets, and the modern division of a town into a residential quarter and a business quarter, the two being clearly marked off from one another, was always followed in the layout of Eastern towns, where the quietness of the lanes of the residential quarter is only broken by the hawkers passing through and not by the bustle of commerce.

In Arabian countries trade was never looked down on ; for most people, indeed, the ideal was to get into the trading class. Such wealth as existed had originated in trade. Agricultural and industrial activities were tied to a spot, and it was trade that provided the connection between the various oases and countries and became the economic pillar of the unity of an empire or state.

While the life of the nomads of the deserts and steppes was one of freedom and of almost anarchical decentralization, there developed in the great river oases of the Nile valley and of Mesopotamia a highly centralized form of state. For the inhabitants of these oases could only exist in the midst of the desert if they devoted a regularly ordered and regularly shared labour to the task of irrigation. The unified direction of great masses of workers which was needed for capturing and making use of the floods led in these regions to the creation of mighty states under despotic rule ; it also required at an early date an intensification of cultivation to secure adequate yield. On the other hand, the true Mediterranean climate of the Levantine coast, of Syria and Asia Minor, with ample rain and more widespread springs and subsoil water, permitted cultivation without big concentrations of labour for water control, and so made it possible for decentralized city and oasis states to come into existence. But even in those regions with settled populations the scarcity of water and the irregularity of the rains compelled close settlement.

This closeness of settlement, and the existence of the open market or village square as the centre of all life, go to explain why in recent times, with the fall of despotism, the interest of the whole population, including the peasantry, in politics is so keen, far keener than any other interest. Newspapers are eagerly read and passionately discussed ; they are read out to those who are unable to read, and in the country districts the number of illiterates is very great ; newspapers enjoy great prestige ; great faith is placed, often in a naïve way, in the printed word. Latterly there has also been an improvement in the

contents of newspapers. Books are little read; there is no modern organization of the publishing and sale of books, and there has hardly been even a beginning of public libraries on the modern plan; thus the newspapers are the only means of penetration of news and knowledge from the civilized world in general among the masses, or even among the educated classes.

Newspapers and reports spread by word of mouth, conversations in the bazaar and the cafés, and the more and more frequent visiting of the towns with the aid of the modern means of transport, have also made the peasant an active element in politics. As everywhere, it is the townsman who takes the lead in political life, above all the educated townsman. His influence is beginning, as in Europe, to replace that of the landowner and the village elders, who used to monopolize power, though in colonial rule the governments, often in co-operation with native reactionaries, do their best to exclude the towns from influence over the countryside. Experience has taught the populations to suspect all the intentions of their rulers, and they are ready at all times to be sharply critical of government measures and little inclined for constructive co-operation. It is a general characteristic of political life in the Mediterranean countries and the Near East, as also, for instance, in South America, that there is little readiness for patient practical detail work, for steady conquest of cultural and economic advances; energies are used up on wrong lines, and are often exhausted in rhetorical declamation. Political passions are easily aroused, and are capable of producing great deeds and unselfish sacrifices for the nation and for freedom, but there is little respect for the daily work which is the basis of all advance, and in the face of obstinate resistance there is a tendency to give up the struggle, though without abandoning the political aim, which fills men's minds almost to the exclusion of all else.

As the effort to secure political and economic independence unites all sections of the population and forms the common political programme, there are few parties with

fixed programmes or with definite sociological theories or fundamental views of life ; the parties are distinguished more by the personality of their leaders than by theoretical principles. Consequently the change over from one party to another is comparatively easy and frequent ; parties form and dissolve in connection with the personal ascendancy and decline of the various leaders.

The personal element, and the tendency of likes and dislikes to outweigh rational and practical considerations, often lead to nepotism and to the granting of personal favours which interfere with the quality of administrative service. " The feeling of friendship often outweighs the sense of justice and the sense of duty," as Hermann Lautensach writes of analogous conditions in Spain. Adolf Reichwein writes of South America : " This mixing up of general considerations with personal interests in political life has remained up to the present a disease of Latin America, out of which it is only with difficulty that a way can be found to a true policy founded on the needs of the *polis*," and this applies to many of the Mediterranean and Levant countries. But for that very reason it is possible for strong patriotic personalities like Saad Zaghlul Pasha in Egypt to found parties with the simplest of programmes, summarized in the two terms Independence and Popular Rule, which give evidence of a stability, lasting for many years, which is rarely to be found in other circumstances. Patriotism and the strong personality of a leader can even overcome the constant tendency to faction and disunion which in other circumstances is so constantly evinced, as, for instance, among the Greeks, even at the time of their wars and struggles for liberation.

Of one element in the psychology of the Greeks James David Bouchier writes : " Sustained mental industry and careful accuracy are distasteful to them." This can be said of most of the peoples of the Mediterranean and the Levant, although often in a very restricted sense. Their thoroughness often does not go very deep ; they scarcely have the patience and perseverance for working for days and months at the solution of a problem. On the other

hand, they have a quick comprehension, a gift of oratory, great experience in the handling of men, and a natural gift of courtesy. Moreover, among all classes, especially the middle class and the peasantry, the hunger for education is very great. A tradition dating from pre-capitalist times leads them to prefer a humanistic education to a technical one. Their ideal is to enter the service of the state, and so there easily arises a black-coated proletariat of educated men who are shut out from the official career of their ambition by the superfluity of candidates. As business life is entirely in the hands of better-trained Europeans or semi-Europeans, there are often insufficient opportunities for the native population to take up business careers, unless the national state paves the way for them as Turkey has now done. So long as the influence of alien powers or capital keeps the state at the level of a colony or semi-colonial country and prevents it from acting first and foremost in the interest of the native population, the great lack of capital and experience of the population makes possible this retention of the control of native trade and industry in alien hands. This in turn forms the greatest obstacle to native training and progress in the higher forms of economic life.

In all these countries there has been in the course of the last few centuries not only a retrogression of culture but also a fall in the population. One of their most difficult political and economic problems is the sparseness of the population. But if erroneous inferences are to be avoided it is important to use great caution in drawing conclusions as to the density of population by having regard simply to the numerical extent of the population and the size of the country. For all these countries are very largely uninhabitable desert, with closely packed masses of people in the cultivable oases and valleys. The total territory of Egypt (this, it is true, is an extreme example) is over a million square kilometres; of this only 32,000 square kilometres are cultivable, having been made so by means of expensive irrigation systems. On this small area, one-thirtieth of the whole, there are

living more than fourteen million people, and on the whole of the remaining territory no more than a few tens of thousands. A totally different conclusion is, of course, arrived at as to the density of population according as regard is had to the whole surface or only to the cultivable surface. The same is true of the Arabian peninsula, whose enormous territory appears to be very thinly populated but is probably greatly over-populated, so that, at all events with the water supply as it is at present, the population of the peninsula is only able to lead a rough and entirely primitive existence.

In the last two hundred years there has been an extraordinary increase in the population of Europe; the growth of European trade and power is bound up with this increase in population. Meanwhile the population in the Ottoman empire and in Iran has remained stationary, with a high birth rate but an equally high rate of mortality. In the Levant, as in Spain and southern Italy, malaria has been ubiquitous and has undermined the stamina of the population. Bad water supply and entirely inadequate health and education systems have continued almost to this day to decimate the population, which is ignorant of the most primitive rules of hygiene and makes up for this ignorance by a luxuriant overgrowth of superstition. In addition there have been frequent wars and the burden of years of service in the army, which have made impossible any increase in population.

The economic and cultural decline were due in the old Ottoman empire and in Persia to the obsolete form of the state and to the lack of enlightened patriotism among the ruling classes. The despotism prevalent in these countries killed all initiative and produced universal insecurity. Its intrinsic element of arbitrariness and irrationality, the incalculable element in life, made every attempt at foresight and calculation, at rationalization of the juridical and economic system, illusory. It was impossible to carry on any steady enterprise in any field. In the absence of any public life the formation of character

was almost impossible ; men's spirits were ruled by blind fatalism. The suspiciousness of the population prevented any formation of capital, producing either a dull resignation or wasteful and spoliatory accumulation in the effort to get rich as quickly as possible. The administrative officials possessed a narrow range of vision, and were incompetent and corrupt, the judiciary were no less corrupt.

Contact with Europe has given these peoples the vision, on which they have acted, of a rational state inspired by the sense of justice, and they have awakened to a new self-confidence and to a realization of their dignity and their rights. They are proceeding now to revolutionize the whole of their constitutional and economic life. Their experiences of the recent past and their fear, fully justified by the weaknesses of the transition period, of the alienation of their industry and trade and the throttling of native economic activities and of their liberties, have led these peoples to insist on complete self-government and on national control by their own people over their state and their economic life. A new social order is coming into existence, in many respects nearer to that of European countries than to that which only a few decades ago was regarded as the typically Oriental society. In this transformation of the social order the individual is being trained in a new outlook, in new ambitions, and in a new activity.

CHANGING MAN IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

THE change proceeding among the people of the Near East in the twentieth century is only part of a universal process, the Europeanization of all humanity, at work to-day even in the remotest regions of the world. The Europe which has grown up since the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the Europe of freedom of the person, of the critical play of the intellect, of technical control of natural resources, has so amply demonstrated its superiority over older and perhaps also deeper civilizations that they have been unable to withstand its penetration. This Europeanization is a process both of education and of resistance. It can be brought to nations from without ; in that case it clothes itself in the forms of imperialism, training the peoples in European economic, technical, and general progress in its own interest, and only to the extent its own interest requires, but taking care to prevent, or at least not actively to promote, any deeper measure of Europeanization, of popular education, and of modernization of native trade and industry. To this end it unites with and strengthens those forces which in their own conservative interests are opposed to more far-reaching Europeanization—usually princes, nobles, and priests, but often also a small upper class of big capitalists who profit by the newly-opened commercial relations.

But after initial resistance Europeanization may proceed from the peoples themselves ; it then clothes itself in the forms of nationalism, and penetrates much more deeply into the whole life of the people. It does not merely affect the upper strata, but creates a new nation, which uses the means of Europeanization to drive Europe out of its territory. Often both types of Europeanization are found intimately associated together. And always Europeanization is a very complex process,

influencing and altering the attitude and general outlook of the individual, his intellectual and emotional reaction to his environment, and also the commercial and industrial methods and the social life of the community. A new picture of the world, a new valuation of life, a new activity inspire in the first place a numerically small upper stratum, the "intellectuals", who are unsettled as they have not been for centuries by contact with the history of European civilization, of which they learn at school, and with the achievements of the machine age. From this stratum these new elements spread through the masses of the people, slowly, resisted rather than promoted in the countries under imperialist domination, more quickly and with deliberate encouragement in the countries of nationalist resistance.

Imperialism, in this case the intrusion of Europe in the East, and nationalism, in this case the resistance of the East to European dominance, condition and inter-penetrate one another. Europeanization in either form is not a question of race or religion but one of the stage of civilization and social progress reached in the course of history. The nations which have begun to be Europeanized or have Europeanized themselves in the twentieth century may be Orthodox Christians (Russians, Armenians), Catholic Christians (Spaniards, South Americans, Filipinos), Mohammedans (Turks, Iranians), or Buddhists; the essential thing is the transition from a feudal, medieval, religious framework to a new age of machine industry and rationalized trade and of critical and liberal thinking. Thus in the Levant as elsewhere there is no fundamental difference between the changes that have come as between one religion and another; there has not been merely a crisis or reformation of Islam, but Mohammedans and native Christians and Jews have been passing through the same change and transition. For the general outlook of the men of the Near East has not been determined so much by religion or race as by stage of historic development, which has found expression in all the fundamental aspects of their

life. Arnold Toynbee's dictum concerning Oriental Christendom that "our common Christianity is not a living fact but an historical curiosity" well describes the conditions, except that the Europeanization of the Christians through political conditions and better opportunities of education (mission schools, emigration) has often proceeded more rapidly, at least on the surface.

The transition from one stage of civilization to another is always a painful and confused process and seldom pleasant to watch. An old civilization, self-contained and harmonious in its working, is destroyed; and then the internal balance, the peaceful security, and the dignified elegance which characterized pre-industrial civilizations, begin to disappear. Morality, until then strictly enforced by custom, family tradition, and religious precept, slackens; the unknown, its whole nature often completely unfamiliar, faces men unprepared and perplexes them. The inherited sense of beauty cultivated through centuries of craftsmanship, the thoughtful leisure of a life lived without haste, generally in a narrow environment, are destroyed by the machine, its products and its tempo. Much that is good and solid gives place to a Europeanization which often is only external, a merely superficial assimilation, sometimes, indeed, an adoption of the least desirable features of European civilization. Men are uprooted and easily lose their hold. They do not penetrate the essentials of modern Western life, its humanism, or the intellectual bases of science and research, but are out to adopt only the "practical".

But all this belongs inevitably to the transition period—symptoms of decay intermingled with signs of advance, the Janus-head of a period pregnant with destiny. No regrets can hold up this process. In this awakening out of centuries of passivity, narrowness, and rigidity, there lies a new start full of promise. The civilizations which are being weakened and transformed through contact with Europe are venerable and beautiful in outward aspect, but have long lost their native virtue, they are without creative activity, and without self-renovating

vitality. European superiority, often clothed in a spirit of moral arrogance, has produced in those who came first under its influence a feeling of hatred of their own most recent past with its humiliations and exploitation, corruption and helplessness. The Europeans, presuming on real or imagined cultural superiority, proud of their hygiene and technique and strong through their superiority in capital and organization, looked down on the non-Europeans, the "natives", and regarded them as material for their economic and political domination.

This very period of transition, of the penetration of European culture and economic forms among the native society—which has thus been robbed of its former strength without being able to gain at once an equal footing in trade and organization with Europe—this time of weakness is often exploited by European groups in order to gain strong positions in the political and economic fields, to secure concessions and fertile land, and to prolong the period of weakness of the society in transformation. The great value to the native society of political independence is that it enables it to protect itself during the weakness of the transition period, that it can place the resources of the state, its legislative power and means of organization, in the service of economic and cultural advance, while protectorates, mandates, and other forms of colonial expansion leave the native society unprotected at the very time when protection is most needed, and thus do irreparable injury to its future development.

The will to Europeanization seeks to offer protection against this. At the outset some of the native leaders are fascinated by the glamour, the freedom and beauty of European civilization, not only by its external wealth but also by the internal power of its life-giving, adventurous fullness; they are in danger of losing themselves in Europe, of becoming semi-Europeans with no roots to them; but many realize that the inevitable Europeanization has to be led into safe paths, taken in hand instead of being passively and helplessly submitted to.

This transformation of man and society is an extremely

difficult task; the process which in Europe went on undisturbed through many decades among people living in independent states, on familiar intellectual bases, and amid an incomparable intellectual freedom has here to be assimilated hastily in as many years, often without full insight into the intellectual bases of the proud structure and the creative forces which erected it, and almost always amid perpetual pressure, weakening and obstructing from without. This process of Europeanization, as a necessary resistance and self-defence, is imposed from without, but it is of more importance as an inner transformation, and soon as an autonomous growth and an advance to a fuller life and to an independent intellectual and social activity. It is going on alike in the Near East and the Far East, in Russia and in South America, in all the colonial and semi-colonial countries which desire to enter on equal economic and political terms into the great society, into the economic and cultural unity of humanity which is being formed under the direction of ideas emanating from Europe. It embraces all sides of communal and personal life: a new self-confidence and an awakening activity, popular education, industrialization, literary renaissance, and a struggle for political independence.

This all-embracing revolution, which has received its first impulses from without, is capable of leading to one-sidedness and superficiality. A heavy price has to be paid for its lessons. Much that seems immature is the outcome of a suspicion of Europe justified by experience, a heightened sensitiveness due to earlier humiliations suffered and not forgotten, the fruit of Europe's attitude toward the natives. Only a changed attitude on the part of the Europeans, inspired by understanding and the readiness to be of service, a consideration and respect for sensitiveness and for the non-European peoples' sense of their own dignity, can bridge the gulf and clear away misunderstandings, while liberating the process of Europeanization from its regrettable elements and promoting a real cultural rapprochement.

For the complex process of rendering dynamic a society that has become static and rigid but is developing politically, economically, in social organization, and in intellectual life, the conception of nationalism offers the best general description. The emergence of the European peoples from the Middle Ages into the present epoch took place under the banner of nationalism. The nation became the highest political, social, and economic form of organization; nationalism became an intellectual attitude that determined men's course. All the characteristic events of the age of nationalism in Europe are now being repeated in the Orient. Here nationalism also makes possible a synthesis between the new and the inherited intellectual outlook. "The problem of the modernization of the Muslim Turkish community began to bear most heavily on precisely those circles which were most deeply convinced of the necessity of this modernization and yet were most intimately attached to all that was good in the faith of their fathers and the national character." (Richard Hartmann.) Nationalism was to establish the synthesis between Europe and the national character, between future and past, between the mother country and humanity. The Turkish nationalist thinker Ziya Goek Alp (1875-1925) enunciated a triple solution for the transformation of his people, which may be applied to all nations in transition: nationalism, Europeanization, religious reform. By Europeanization or modernization he meant "the acceptance without reservation of the civilization of the modern West"; nationalism meant for him Turkization, "the development of the intellectual forces slumbering in the Turkish people, in order that a national culture may emanate from these forces"; religious reform he called Islamization, "a return to the intellectual content and spirit of the true and original Islam, sacrificing all later theological exegeses and perversions which have been sanctioned by the church of Islam, and sacrificing even the commands of the Prophet himself where these were applicable only in past periods of history."

Where the nation becomes the highest form of organization, religion loses much of its earlier authority over public and private life. The citizen becomes of more importance than the co-religionist. Right down to the eighteenth century in Europe full citizenship belonged only to the member of the state religion: *cuius regio illius religio*. Religious minorities had not full rights of citizenship. Protestants were driven out of Catholic countries; Catholics in Protestant countries only secured their emancipation about the middle of the nineteenth century; Jews lived in ghettos. The Near East was only a few decades behind the West in regard to religious emancipation. The first steps to give full equality of citizenship between Mohammedan and non-Mohammedan subjects of the Ottoman empire were taken as early as 1839 by the *hatti-sherif* (decree of the Sultan) of that year, and especially by the *hatti-humayun* (imperial decree) of 1856. But at that time public opinion in the Near East was not ripe for this advance; the Oriental state remained based on religion, and the religious minorities led an autonomous existence only loosely incorporated in the state. As in Europe, religion has now (not only in Islam but equally in Oriental Christendom) had to suffer the loss of its position as ruler of all life; as in Europe, it has had to give way before the emergence of politics, law, and economics as autonomous provinces of life, beyond the control or influence of religion. This is certainly a critical process for the religions of the East, but it does not mean the end of them, any more than the Enlightenment and Rationalism made an end of religion in Europe. A great process of secularization has set in. The organization of the state, the administration of law, the education system in the Levant have all been hitherto within the sphere of religion, alike among the Mohammedans, the eastern Christians, and the Jews; they are emancipating themselves and becoming a temporal concern. Religion is becoming a private affair, and the citizen, defined by his allegiance to state and not to church, is emerging. Nationalism forms the

bridge over which the religious communities formerly strictly segregated are meeting for collaboration in political and social life. Differences and disagreements remain, just as they do between Catholics and Protestants in European countries; but they are overborne in the unity of the national idea. Community of religion is losing its political importance; it retains it now only where religious and ethnical frontiers coincide, as, to quote a European example, in Ireland. In Egypt or in Palestine Mohammedans and Christians are entirely united in their political demands and activities; they feel themselves at one in race and speech, though they retain their loyalty to their several religious communities.

Alongside this process of secularization there has gone a process of technical advance; machine industry is conquering the Near East. At first there were only external signs of this penetration, which began to reach to the remotest villages: oil stoves, sewing machines, gramophones. With the arrival of the first machines which required skilled attention the difficulties of technical progress quickly showed themselves: there were no skilled workers to attend to the complicated machines and above all to keep them in repair. They were soon worn out and so proved extraordinarily costly. It is only in quite recent times that steam and motor-driven machinery has begun to receive expert care, repair shops have come into existence, and a local machine industry on a small scale has begun to develop. The advance in scientific-mindedness which has celebrated its triumph in Europe ever since the Renaissance is as unknown to the Near East as it was to medieval Europe. What is happening now is a growth of interest in technical advance, but though this advance is gladly accepted it is not yet promoted by any original contributions. Nevertheless the entry into the age of machine civilization is gradually transforming people and helping to give them a new mentality. The daemonic element in the machine, its tendency to take charge and play havoc among its creators,

is still something unknown in the Near East, where industry is in its very first stages.

Scientific discovery has brought in Europe an unexampled increase of population; it has greatly reduced human dependence on Nature, has averted the danger of harvest failures, has made possible an undreamt-of intensification of industry and trade, and has greatly improved the standard of living of the masses. The Near East, with its sparsely populated regions, its mainly extensive agriculture, and its incredibly low standard of living, is in need of machine industry. Industry may be destroying the creative virtues of traditional handicraft, the innate sense of beauty, the intellectual concentration of the hand-worker; but it is precisely through scientific invention and discovery that the man of creative individuality has advanced to his greatest achievements since the Renaissance and worked vast miracles. It is in technical advance that the Easterner senses this quality of greatness in the European, long before he is able to understand its intellectual bases. Sometimes he may gain a glimpse of the fact that technical advance faces men with new and difficult problems, that man, who created machine industry, is ceasing to be its master, that his creation, driven by a daemon of its own, is growing independently and without end. All this the Easterner may suspect without being able to comprehend from his own experience the insistence of machine civilization on growth and spread; but the conquering march of science can no longer be stemmed; the Easterner must receive the conqueror with open arms if he is to exist. And for him technical advance is still displaying all the splendour of its youth. Only later will he be faced in common with the European by the problem of setting limits to the daemonic independent growth of machine industry, of subordinating it organically to a conscious feeling of responsibility of man for his fellow-men and subordinating it to the new supernatural idea of humanity, which technical advance has helped to bring to life, and which has begun completely to change the face of the world.

It is in Turkey that the transformation of the state and of social life in the Levant has proceeded farthest. The Constitution, the legal system, trade and industry, and cultural life have been radically transformed. But Turkey is not alone in this respect; she has only been able, as an independent state, to carry out these changes most thoroughly and without consideration of the interests of foreigners; the same changes are being pushed through with more difficulty in Iran and Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Everywhere it is being recognized that the foundations of social and cultural life of the past are no longer intact. An intelligible conservatism often shows itself in desperate opposition to the radicalism with which changes have been made in Turkey; the imitation of the Turkish example is opposed in Iran by the influence of the Mohammedan priesthood, in Lebanon by that of the Christian clergy, in Egypt by that of the king and the court; in all these countries, except Iran, the influence is especially felt of certain European governments and foreign colonies, which are too greatly interested in the maintenance of the old conditions. But in spite of all these hindrances the structural change which has taken place in Turkey in the course of ten years is typical and characteristic of all the countries of the Levant, and, indeed, of the universal process of Europeanization by means of which states hitherto economically and politically dependent or semi-dependent on Europe have latterly been emancipating themselves from Europe.

In Turkey the fifty years of preparatory work of the intellectuals had created a much more receptive soil for structural change than in countries which had scarcely been accessible to European influence until the beginning of the twentieth century. Turkey had also created among the masses the political and psychological conditions for radical structural change through her victorious campaign against the Greeks, who were allied with the Entente Powers, and through the tearing up of the Treaty of Sèvres. Her people had not only a sovereign independence unknown in the other countries

of the Levant, except Iran, but had also gained a new self-confidence and a trust in the leader of the war of liberation, who set himself at the head of the process of modernization in the country. A description of the main lines of the structural change in Turkey will show also the tendencies at work to-day in all the countries of the Near East, changing the face of these peoples and countries.

A structural change as radical as that which has been effected in Turkey within ten years is only possible with a unity of leadership and a leadership with firm purpose. Turkey thus has only one party, which controls every field of public life. The statutes of this party, the Republican People's Party, of 1923 lay down in their first Article that "The aim of the Party is government through the people and for the people and the making of Turkey into a modern state." The old Ottoman state had not been a modern state. At its head had stood the Khalif, who at least in theory had been the ruler of all the Faithful, in other words of all Mohammedans. The Khalif was a temporal prince, but his sphere of authority was not a national state but a universal state built up on a religious basis and held together by religious bonds. A modern state required the disappearance of the Khalifate, for which it could no longer find room.

On November 1st, 1922, the Turkish Great National Assembly deposed the last Turkish Sultan. From then on, although the formal announcement did not come until later, Turkey was a republic, in which the whole power proceeded from the people and lay in the hands of the representatives of the people. Considerations of personal policy played their part in the deposition of the Sultan ; he had set himself against the national movement for independence and, like many other Oriental princes, had tried to come to terms with the imperialism of the Western Powers. There still remained the Khalifate. A prince of the imperial house, acceptable to the Turkish National Assembly, was appointed Khalif. But, robbed of its temporal power, the Khalifate was reduced to a

nonentity; it had never been a doctrinal authority. And just as there was no room for a Sultan in a country which had set out to give itself "government through the people and for the people", there was no room for a Khalif "in a modern state". On March 3rd, 1924, the Khalifate was abolished in Turkey; the last Khalif went, like his predecessor, into exile, to a Christian country. An institution more than twelve hundred years old came to its end. On February 29th, 1924, the last *selamlık* of a Khalif took place, his last ceremonial attendance at a mosque for the Friday prayer. This scene, which had so long been characteristic of the splendour of Oriental life on the shores of the Bosphorus, was witnessed in Constantinople for the last time.

The end had come rapidly, but it had been inevitable. In the Europeanization of the Near East, which brings with it secularization, the replacement of religion by the nation as the basis of the life of the state, any attempt to revive the institution of the Khalifate was foredoomed to failure, not only because there was no pretender powerful enough and independent enough to wield the sword of Islam, but because the conditions on which alone a Khalifate can rest had disappeared. It is dead not only for modern Turkey but for Islam. Islam is still a spiritual power and will remain so, even in Turkey. It is a bond of union between all its adherents, and has actually gained new strength where Islam feels itself oppressed by Europe. But it is changing, becoming secularized and assuming a national character. Turkey has gone farthest in this as in other respects. Secularization meant the emancipation of the Constitution, of the legal system, and of education, from their religious bases. Nationalization meant the saturation of the Islam whose historic bases had been Arabian, and whose essential character had been supernational, with Turkish nationalism. Through its secularization Islam is approaching the position held by Christianity in Western European states. Through its nationalization it may come to resemble in its organization the territorial churches

which arose out of the Reformation, or the churches of the East, which also administer a common religious domain under separate national and lingual forms.

The various stages of these two processes rapidly followed one another. On March 1st, 1924, when the final abolition of the Khalifate was under discussion in the Great National Assembly, Mustapha Kemal enunciated the programme of "the liberation of politics from religious preconceptions". Two days later the Ministry of Religious Affairs was abolished and the closing of all *madrasahs* (mosque schools) was decreed. Five weeks later the National Assembly introduced a new legal constitution, which abolished the *sheria* courts, ecclesiastical courts which had administered justice under canon law. This effected the secularization of education and of the legal system; both were withdrawn from the competence of religion and brought within that of the state. The process had already begun in the Ottoman empire before the world war; it is now going on in all the states of the Near East, but in Turkey it has already been completed. At the opening of the Faculty of Law at Ankara (Angora) on November 5th, 1925, Mustapha Kemal declared: "To-day we are united by national and not by religious uniformity." The Koran verse 42, 36, commands the Faithful "to settle their affairs in discussion with one another", and forms the basis of democracy in Islam. It had been placed on a tablet in the Great National Assembly in the Arabic original. Now it was replaced by a tablet bearing in the Turkish language the inscription: "The power of the state proceeds from the people"—an inscription which based democracy no longer on Islam and religion, but on the new principle of the sovereignty of the people. In the same month the Dervish monasteries were closed—they had played a very important part in the religious life of Mohammedan Turkey—and decrees were issued concerning the vestments of the priesthood and the exercise of its office. It was also decreed that public officials should dress entirely in the European style, in order to distinguish

them unmistakably from the priesthood. At the end of 1925 the European calendar was introduced in place of the Mohammedan.

The most important step in the modernization of Turkish life took place in 1926 in the introduction of Western law. Until then the medieval canonical law of the various religious communities had governed all questions of personal, family, and inheritance law in Turkey. This had had disastrous consequences in two respects: the inhabitants of one and the same state had been under the jurisdiction of various systems of law, differing entirely with one another, in the very fields which cut most deeply into intimate daily life; and the application of medieval law offered many obstacles to a modernization of family life. The law of contract and the law of real estate were governed by the *mejelle*, a statute book which combined principles of Islamic canon law and of French and Western law. All these laws were repealed in 1926. Within a year Turkey received a new civil code and law of contract on the Swiss model, a commercial code based on the German and Italian, and a criminal law on the Italian model. Thus in a very short time Turkish law was placed not only on a secular but on a thoroughly modern basis. In the matter of the modernization of the system of law, as in other fields, the Levantine states which are under European control are far behind Turkey. In these states the old Ottoman law continues in force.

The Turkish Constitution still contained, however, the provision that Islam was the religion of the state. On April 10th, 1928, a law was passed by the National Assembly removing all religious expressions from the Constitution. The laicization of the Turkish state had now been completed; all that remained to be done was to nationalize Islam, to clothe it in national dress. Until the nineteenth century Turkish culture had been a religious and humanist culture, resting on Islamic and on Arabian and Persian national bases. The classic Islamic literatures of the Arabs and Persians were the material

of the education of the cultivated Turk, whose language was impregnated with Arabic and Persian words and terms of speech. As Latin and to some extent Greek had in past centuries been the basis of the religious and humanist culture of Europe, so Arab and Persian culture had been the basis of Turkish intellectual life. Not until the nineteenth century had there entered also, as a new element in Turkish culture, the influence of the French language. With the awakening of nationalism the popular tongues in Europe had become the languages of literature and science, which had thus been given a more popularly assimilable form and had been brought closer to the everyday life of the mass of the people. Similarly the Turkish language, simplified under the influence of nationalism and modernism, brought into a more popular form, and divested of its humanist and classicist associations, became an instrument of literature and science. In 1929 a Turkish language committee was set up in Ankara to work out a grammar, rules for a unified Turkish orthography, and the publication of a Turkish dictionary in which all words borrowed from Persian and Arabian should be replaced by Turkish words. Similar efforts have been made in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to compile an Arabian encyclopædia and to subject the modern Arab vocabulary to scientific revision. But only in Turkey have the efforts been systematically pursued and promoted by legislation.

A law of 1929 did away with the teaching of Arabic and Persian in the higher schools ; their place was to be taken by French and a second European language. This was one more step along the path of modernization and nationalization.

As early as February 1928, the Friday prayer, the *khutbah*, had been recited in the mosques of Stamboul in Turkish instead of Arabic. A further step in the nationalization of Islam took place at the beginning of 1932. On January 22nd for the first time a *sura* (chapter) of the Koran was recited by a famous prayer-leader in a Stamboul mosque in Turkish. The invocation with

which the prayer-leader followed his reading, again in Turkish, reveals the new religious attitude :

“ O Lord and God, thanks be to Thee and praise. From the seat of Thy power accept the Koran which has now been recited. We give to the souls of our Prophet Mohammed—hail be to him !—and of all the Faithful the merit that is their due ; do Thou ordain that they receive their guerdon. Establish for ever the Turkish Republic, the expression of the national sovereignty ; grant success to our Republican administration, victory to our heroic army, happiness and well-being to our beloved fatherland and to the nation.”

On February 3rd, the day of the Mohammedan festival of the 27th of the fast month of Ramadan, the mosque of St Sophia in Constantinople was crowded to its utmost when the most famous reciters of the Koran chanted the story of the birth of the Prophet, some *suras* from the Koran, and the prayers, in Turkish. The service was transmitted by wireless to every town in Turkey, receivers having been installed in the mosques.

Secularization of Islam has been carried out along the same lines as in Turkey, although much more slowly and cautiously, and in the other countries of the Levant ; here, however, there is not the incentive to the nationalization of religion. In the Arab countries Islam, through its language and origin, has become most intimately associated with the national heritage ; in Persia the Shiite form of Islam has a national character of its own. But nowhere has the secularization of Islam been so clearly envisaged as in the report of the commission of the Stamboul Theological Faculty set up to discuss that reform in 1928. The report says : “ Religion is a social institution, and must therefore be adapted to the needs of life and the laws of progress. In the Turkish democracy religion, like everything else, must enter into the new era of vitality which that democracy needs. It is indispensable that the teaching and the precepts of the Koran shall be re-interpreted and re-valued.” The actual proposals in the report had reference to the outward

form of religious service, which was to be in Turkish, and to the intelligibility and intellectual standard of the preaching. "Religious life must be reformed with scientific means and with the aid of reason, so that it may advance in line with other social institutions and bear all the fruit it is able to give."

Secularization and nationalism have also created a new educational system. In the nineteenth and even at the beginning of the twentieth century there existed everywhere in the Levant a double system of education : a mainly religious system, possessing numbers of elementary schools connected with the mosques or churches, in which the teaching consisted of not much more than merely making the children learn religious texts by heart ; and a mainly secular system, virtually confined to secondary schools for the children of the upper class undergoing preparation for a career in the public service. The vast majority of the population in Turkey, as elsewhere in the Levant, could neither read nor write. This was not merely the fault of Turkish misrule. Even in so thickly populated and prosperous a country as Egypt, where for forty years, from 1882 down to the declaration of independence in 1922, the British administration had been responsible for education, the census of 1927 gave the number of men who could read and write as 20 per cent. of the population, and of women as only 4 per cent. Of the boys of five to nineteen years 26 per cent. were attending school, and of the girls 8 per cent. Conditions were still worse in the rural districts. In Cairo 43 per cent. of the men and 20 per cent. of the women could read and write ; 50 per cent. of the boys and 30 per cent. of the girls from five to nineteen were attending school (these figures show the progress made in recent years) : provincial figures were far behind these. In the province of Gerga, in Upper Egypt, there were 89 per cent. of illiterates among the men and 99 per cent. among the women ; only 17 per cent. of the boys and 4 per cent. of the girls between five and nineteen years of age were attending school. Only in recent years,

with the growth of nationalism and the secularization of the educational programme, has the struggle against ignorance been taken up with energy by the national governments. In the few years of at least formal independence there has been a rapid advance in education in Egypt :

<i>School year.</i>	<i>Number of schools.</i>	<i>Number of children attending.</i>	<i>Boys.</i>	<i>Girls.</i>
1921-22	6,175	454,755	383,580	71,175
1924-25	7,240	570,423	479,420	91,003
1927-28	8,205	772,888	619,622	153,266

(These statistics include only the Egyptian schools, not the many foreign schools in the country.) The expenditure on education since the declaration of independence has steadily increased :

Expenditure (£E.).

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Ministry of Education.</i>	<i>Provincial Councils.</i>	<i>Mohammedan Theological Colleges.</i>
1921-22	1,209,653	703,324	189,937
1925-26	2,091,664	1,082,852	198,057
1929-30	3,163,038	1,158,317	321,033

Special attention has been given to the development of secondary schools and to the creation of as comprehensive a system as possible of elementary and advanced technical and industrial training. This is connected with the efforts to assist the Egyptians in the modernizing of their industry and in making it independent. In Turkey, Iran, and Iraq the independent national governments have attached the same primary importance as has Egypt to the development of popular

education and the economic training of the people. In the first year of Iraqi independence seventy new elementary schools were opened, and fifty in the second, and the teaching has been modernized. In contrast with this, the British administration in Palestine has scarcely any serious progress to show in this field in ten years. In 1922 there were 303 government schools in Palestine, with 17,966 children attending; in 1932 there were still 303 schools, though the number of children attending had grown to 24,153. The government itself admits that, in spite of the excellent financial progress of the country, about half of the Arab children applying for admission to school in the towns and villages have had to be turned away. No attention has been paid to the wishes of the population, and the mandatory government itself has to admit in its report for 1932 that "Government was actually charged with a deliberate policy of keeping the Arab population in a state of illiteracy and ignorance." There is only one complete government secondary school for boys, and not a single secondary school class for girls. Only in 1934 was provision made for the opening of the first school giving craft or industrial training to the Arab youth.

In Turkey the introduction of compulsory school attendance meets with the same difficulties as in other backward countries: lack of teachers, of suitable school books, and of financial means to enable the necessary reforms to be carried out at the desired rate. Yet in 1928-29 there were already 6,836 elementary schools in Turkey with 484,748 pupils and 155 secondary schools with 31,484 pupils. Many of the secondary schools were craft or occupational special schools. In the elementary schools co-education is general, and in the secondary schools it is frequently to be found. In 1928 there were also 2,683 continuation schools for adults, with 59,314 students. As long ago as 1927 one of the best-informed writers on Anatolia, Richard Hartmann, wrote: "Even in remote country villages, far from a railway, the most serious efforts are being made to carry the (educational)

programme into execution. Model schools are first set up in the centres of the various districts, schools which really have no need to fear comparison with Western schools. The standard of the teachers at these model schools, to whose training the state devotes special care, is quite excellent. The schools are often run also as boarding schools—a measure of the utmost importance so long as it is not possible to erect in every village a school adequate to modern requirements. It seems to be characteristic of the new Turkey that attention is concentrated on the hitherto neglected field of elementary education, especially girls' education, which in the past had scarcely even a nominal existence. It is not less significant that the educational authorities are at work in the remotest districts, which are those most in need."

It was determined to facilitate the struggle against illiteracy by the introduction of the Latin alphabet. On June 26th, 1928, a committee was set up in Ankara to examine the possibility of the use of the Latin letters; on November 3rd Latin type and script were introduced by law; on and after December 1st all street signs, placards, and newspapers had to be in Latin type; from January 1st, 1929, all books had to be printed in the new type and public offices and all businesses were to make exclusive use of the new writing; on and after June 1st, 1929, the authorities were only to accept correspondence written in Latin letters. The nation was turned into a school, and in this national school all the men and women in Turkey between sixteen and forty-five years of age were set to learn to read and write. The "head teacher" was Mustapha Kemal. The great number of illiterates made it easier to turn over to Latin writing.

The secularization and nationalization of education raised another important problem in the Levant—the placing of all education under the control of the state. Owing to the entirely inadequate provision made by the state in the field of education, foreign institutions, mostly Christian missions, had played a great and important part. In many directions they did a great deal of good.

Such schools as Robert College, near Constantinople, and the American University in Beirut did pioneer work in bringing new ideas of science, the training of character, initiative and democracy, to the Near East. In countries like Palestine and Syria, where to this day the government does little or nothing to meet the educational needs of the population, the foreign educational institutions continue to play an important part. But this can only be a transition stage. The modernization of the idea of the state and the growth of national solidarity in the countries of the Near East demand the subjection of the foreign educational institutions to state control and the shaping of the educational system in accordance with the national spirit. In this respect also the Turkish and Iranian governments have been able to go farther than the other states. Foreign schools in Turkey have been placed under strict government supervision, teaching through the medium of the Turkish language has been made obligatory, and history, geography, and the Turkish language have to be taught by Turkish teachers. In March 1931, the Great National Assembly passed a law requiring all Turkish boys and girls to be given elementary education in Turkish schools; all mission activity is strictly prohibited.

The strengthening and modernization of the national state has made a clean sweep of many obsolete and harmful institutions which had hampered the economic and cultural developments of the country. The capitulations in the countries of the Near East had withdrawn the foreigners, in whose hands the economic power lay, from the juridical and financial sovereignty of the state. These states had been required, in the interest of European trade, to maintain in force low and undifferentiated customs tariffs, which prevented the growth of a native industry and the modernizing of industry and trade. The Turks were enabled by their victory over the Greeks to shake off the capitulations and the tariff treaties (Persia followed their example in 1928). From then on it at last became possible for Turkish trade and industry to make

progress. The obsolete tithe system, which had weighed very heavily on agriculture, was repealed in 1925, and in the following year a new income tax law was decreed. Egypt also has won fiscal sovereignty in recent years, but the system of capitulations continues in full force in that country, and makes impossible any modernization of the taxation system.

Those of the countries of the Near East which are now independent, and the native population of which is thus no longer prevented from making rapid progress by a foreign administration of the colonizing type, are undergoing complete economic and social transformation. The changes that have taken place in the past ten years in the constitutional, juridical, and cultural fields, are finding their necessary completion in the economic field. Into that field also a new spirit has entered. The countries of the Levant are thinly-settled agricultural regions with a very poor and primitive population and with ill-developed communications. Now that they have set up a modern system of administration, they are beginning to modernize their economic system and to bring it technically up to date. Agriculture has largely worked to this day by methods thousands of years old; they have to provide it with adequate capital and the necessary direction in order to intensify it and to enable it to produce bigger and better crops. They have to provide a national industry, itself working up the natural resources of the country and gradually making it, with its growing requirements of industrial goods, more independent of imports from abroad.

This difficult transition from a semi-feudal and primitive agricultural system and from urban trade of the early capitalist type (such capital as exists in these countries is almost entirely trading capital) to modern capitalism and industrialization, is only possible, much as in the mercantile period of continental Europe, with state assistance. These states, which hitherto were only passively involved in the modern world economic system, and whose financial institutions were almost

exclusively foreign companies, are now beginning to prepare their indigenous resources, with the help of the state, for active participation in the modern world economic system. They are beginning to set up national financial institutions, to work against the alienation and vassalage of their economic life, and so to turn their political independence to practical account. Turkey has advanced farthest along this road; Iran and Egypt are following her example; and Iraq also is following suit. The same lines are being followed wherever independent national governments are at the head of the country, entrusted with the task of training their peoples and developing their country's trade and industry.

In those countries, on the other hand, in which the administration is in foreign hands, the governments are either neglecting the task of modernizing indigenous social and economic life or are embarking on it only with reluctance and hesitation. The lack of active encouragement often results in this case in no development at all of indigenous trade and industry. For at the social level at which these countries are existing the necessary economic and instructional resources, capital, gift of organization, and initiative, are in the hands of the state alone, and the modernization of trade and industry is only possible with state aid, through the provision of national financial institutions, through subsidies to native industries and the provision of small credit for artisans and craftsmen, through organization on a grand scale of agricultural credit, of co-operation, and of technical training.

The transition to a new social level, the necessity for gradual formation of capital, the indispensable precondition of educating and training a new generation, have the result that the transition period is one in which the native trade and industry are greatly weakened. The newly strengthened nationalism of the indigenous governments regards it as essential to protect the indigenous trade and industry from irreparable alienation and agriculture from the sale of potentially rich and fertile lands, and to grant concessions and monopolies

only in the general interest of the whole population. Here again Turkey has led the way. The rigorous nature of the steps she has taken can only be understood when all the danger of alienation, such as took place in the Ottoman empire, is borne in mind. Under the Turkish laws coastal shipping is reserved exclusively to Turkish vessels, Turkish is the exclusive language of business, there is a whole series of occupations which foreigners may not carry on in Turkey, and they are forbidden to acquire agricultural land. Similarly in Japan the great danger of being bought up, of the alienation of the bitterly impoverished country in the critical period of the transition from a barter to a money basis has been avoided by laws and protective governmental decrees.

The defensive measures of the new nationalism in the economic field often take rigorous and regrettable forms, but it should not be forgotten that in this respect Europe was the teacher of the Near East, and that it is only under the influence of bitter experience that the Orient has given up its past passivity and adopted the new language which is astonishing and sometimes shocking the West. The old *laissez-faire* has given way to a new passion for independence, a desire for self-respect and self-assertion. This, no doubt, is unpleasant for the West with its ambition for predominance and economic expansion in the Levant. In the states that have won their independence the European is no longer able to count on the privileged treatment and the submissiveness he found everywhere no more than twenty years ago. But it is from the West that the Orient has learnt its new determination to "keep its end up": it is now at work liberating itself from the domination of the West with the means of the West.

In all these countries the national industry is being encouraged by exhibitions and by efforts to train the masses in the accumulation of capital and in the purchase of home products. In April 1929, there was a demonstration in Stamboul University in favour of the use of national industrial products; exhibitions in Stamboul

and Ankara followed. At the beginning of the Moham-medan fast month in January 1930, electric signs were placed on all the mosques of Stamboul with the inscriptions "Waste is Sin" and "Buy Native Goods". At the end of 1929 an Association for National Trade and Saving was formed at Ankara, under the chairmanship of the president of the Great National Assembly. At the end of 1930 the first "National Savings Week" was organized under his direction. Its appeal contained this sentence: "Citizens! In the past it was regarded as dishonouring to make use of native products, but in the past it was also regarded as dishonouring to call the Turks Turks." So the spirit of the new nationalism, the new self-confidence, the new treasuring of the past and of the nation's individuality is penetrating every sphere of public and business life at the very moment of European-ization and under its influence.

Advance to an international civilization and pride in the nation's long history, in the historical or mythical roots of the nation's character, go hand in hand as in Europe's age of nationalism. The new programme of the Republican People's Party of 1931 contains the sentence: "The fatherland is the region within our present political frontiers, within which the Turkish nation lives with its long and glorious history and with the imprints which have sunk deeply into the soil." According to the official theory of the Turkey of to-day, the Turks did not migrate into Anatolia some nine centuries ago, but are identical with the peoples which inhabited Anatolia in ancient times, especially the Hittites. Thus Anatolia is their historic and original home, and the old civilizations of Asia Minor are their own. As many Teutons have traced back the whole history of human civilization to the migrations and the influence of Nordic Teutons, and have regarded the Teuton North as the cradle of all civilizations, so a Turkish author, Yussuf Ziya, in his book *Arier und Turanier*, published in German in 1932, comes after a comprehensive linguistic, ethnological, and mythological inquiry to the conclusion that

the so-called Indo-Germanic and also the Semitic peoples must be traced back to an original Turkish race, and that they migrated from the original seat of the Turkish race in Central Asia. "If the civilization of the whole world is the work of Turanian peoples, the 'Aryan' peoples also have their full share of the glory, for they too belong by descent and speech to the Turanians: the stem *ar* is a Turkish stem. . . . (The) civilization which originated in Siberia and spread over all Asia and Europe is the common work of all the Turanians. This explains the almost simultaneous appearance of the same civilization in China, India, Babylonia, Egypt, and the Mediterranean basin. And the language of the human groups, like their civilization, has also grown up, even in the farthest corners of the world, out of the same basis—the Turkish language."

So Turkish nationalism is providing itself with its own national and racial myths, just as European nationalism has done; its own past is given a legendary interpretation and extension, and so the Turks, in entering into the universal civilization, consider that they are entering only into a portion of their own heritage. They are not being absorbed in this civilization, but retain their historic national personality. In the programme already mentioned of the Republican People's Party there is also this passage: "Although the Party desires to advance along the path of progress and development and in international relations and rapprochements at the same pace as all nations of the present day, it desires in principle to preserve the character of Turkish society and its essentially independent personality."

The development of the national personality, the training of the people in the spirit of the new Turkey, was served by the *Türk Odjagi*, an organization founded in 1912 "to renew the national life through the youth of both sexes on the basis of a new national culture on the pattern of the ideas of Western civilization". At first the association pursued pan-Turanian aims, carrying on Turkish cultural propaganda also among the Turks outside

Turkey. With the victory of Mustapha Kemal it came over entirely to his programme of reform confined to Turkey, and in 1931 it amalgamated with the Republican People's Party. This party founded in February 1932 a new society, the "People's House", to carry on the educational work the Türk Odjagi had done. In all the Turkish towns this house was to become the centre of the whole work of popular education and to carry on Europeanization and national development concurrently. The "People's Houses", in which alcoholic drinks and card games are forbidden, are to have departments for language and literature, the fine arts, the theatre, sport, social aid, and work on the land; popular education courses, libraries, museums, and exhibitions. Such educational centres can do more even than legislation in exercising a profound influence on the transformation of the new generation and of the life of the people.

The new age is revealing itself also in personal life, in a new way of thinking and feeling, in the changed status of women, in their entry into social and public activities, and in the ending of the old seclusion of the family. In recent years women's emancipation has made great progress in all the countries of the Near East, but it has been fully carried out only in Turkey, which here again is in the van of progress. Women have full access to Stamboul University, including its Medical Faculty; the woman is the man's comrade in student and professional life. There is still a difference in the status of women in the big towns and the countryside, but women have appeared everywhere as officials and teachers. In 1930 the women of Turkey received the municipal franchise and the first woman publicly exercised the office of judge. At the end of 1934 the Turkish Republic granted Turkish women the vote for the Great National Assembly, and also made them eligible as members. The first elections under this new regulation, on February 8th, 1935, brought seventeen women members into the Turkish Parliament, out of a total of 399. Most of these were professional women, but one was a peasant; she was at the same time

mayor or head of her village. These women members participated in the International Women's Congress held in Istanbul in April 1935, in the former imperial palace of Yildiz. The Congress was able to record with satisfaction the complete emancipation of Turkish women. In the legal, political, and economic fields, women in Turkey have become the equals of men.

The relationship between the sexes is beginning to change entirely through the new manners, through co-education, and through association in society and in sport. A youth movement has come into existence and has brought sport and games, rambling and the love of Nature, as new elements into Oriental life. Perhaps to-day the differences between the generations are more marked in the East than anywhere else in the world. There is no longer any stopping the association of the East in the general trend of world civilization and world trade. The new means of transport and the incorporation of the Near East in the world system of communications will further accelerate the process.

INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD COMMUNICATIONS

IN regions dotted with inhabited oases, where the human groups are separated from one another by wide desert areas, uncultivable steppes, or barren and precipitous mountains, the improvement of communications is the first condition of modern state administration and of an intensification of trade. Civilized men can overcome the natural difficulties of their environment in regard to communications, but not until they have done so does it become possible for them to live at a higher level of civilization. Friedrich Ratzel rightly says: "Modern communications are a symptom of civilization and promote civilization." The Ottoman empire and Persia, both states of wide territorial extent, suffered severely until the present century from the lack of a developed system of communications. The various parts of the country were widely separated from one another, the central power was inevitably weakened, all reform was impossible, and the exchange of goods was faced with difficulties. The regions at a distance from the Mediterranean were cut off from the world even in the nineteenth century, remote from all the great trade routes, and could not be opened up to trade and civilization, with the increase of population they bring. The mountain passes were impassable for months in winter, the deserts and steppes accessible only to the camel. The only means of rapid transport then known was the railway. In the United States, in Siberia, and in other regions, the railways had promoted territorial unification and the development of economic relations to an extent undreamed of before their coming. They had become the means of the penetration of civilization.

But the building of railways was an extraordinarily expensive undertaking. If they were laid through

sparsely inhabited regions the return on the expenditure was doubtful, at least for the first years. The Ottoman empire and Persia were only able to raise the necessary sums for railway construction under burdensome financial and political conditions. The granting of loans to the states of the Near East (whose situation in this respect was similar to that of the states of South America) was one of the most usual means of gaining influence over their financial, economic and political affairs, and of making ruthless use of this influence to increase the political and economic power of the lending state. Railway concessions in Turkey, as in China, proved to be the principal levers for political control. Friedrich List had declared years before that "those who own a country's means of communication control the country".

The pressure of the Powers on the Constantinople government induced it, regardless of all objections, to grant railway concessions under which the Turkish state actually guaranteed a definite revenue on working per kilometre, so that it would have paid the railway companies best to run no trains at all, since their revenues were assured to them in any case. In the eastern part of Asia Minor the Russian government claimed the monopoly of railway construction, and refused to allow Turkey to build railways herself or to give contracts for railway construction to any other than Russian companies. It was not surprising that Russia took no steps to build railways connecting the east of Anatolia, which she hoped soon to conquer, with the main centres in Turkey, when such railways would have given the country strategic security and have strengthened its trade and industry; the Turkish government thus had to leave the eastern regions of its country without any connection with the Bosphorus. The Turkish government built only one railway, the Hedjaz railway, out of its own resources; this was also the only railway which directly served Turkish interests.

But in addition to the problem of internal communications, the Oriental states were faced by a second

problem, that of their connection with the outer world. Regarded from a general point of view, this problem was of even greater importance. Its solution could undoubtedly be, at least indirectly, of advantage to those Oriental territories which were affected by it; but at the same time it drew them into a field of tension in world politics which held grave dangers for their independence and progress. With the coming of the industrial epoch and the rapid growth of population Western Europe required constantly increasing quantities of raw materials and constantly extended markets for the sale of its products. Atlantic trade was no longer enough; the tendencies to universal world trade steadily grew in strength. Ways and means had to be sought of connecting the raw material countries and markets in southern Asia and in the Far East with Europe as rapidly and securely as possible. The world trade routes of ancient and medieval times through the Levant offered themselves as means of reducing distances in comparison with the sea route round the southern point of Africa. The Levant was to be enabled to recover its old importance as a country of transit between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. With the growth of capitalism, and its entry into the epoch of imperialism, world trade made successful efforts "to open up the intermediate countries between the principal regions of civilization and intercommunication, using all the means of transport, and finally to conquer the whole world. Similarly it tries to bring more and more articles of trade within its sphere and to control continually increasing quantities of goods, men, and news." (Kurt Hassert.) The number of people involved in world trade, the quantity of goods required, the quality of the means of transport, and therewith the possibilities of overcoming space and time, grew incredibly. Concurrently, however, there grew the importance of communications in world politics. The control of the great trade routes became one of the central problems over which the Powers wrestled with one another. Only by safeguarding the

functioning of the transport and news services could the world empires as they expanded be effectively cemented. The struggle broke out between the European Powers over the construction and safeguarding of these routes. The penetration and conquest of the Oriental countries followed the course of the routes and helped to safeguard them. Steamship and railway were the means of transport of the nineteenth century ; French enterprise built the Suez Canal and German the Baghdad Railway. Germany had come late into the struggle for world power and world influence, and her geographical situation as well as the coming trend in world politics made her natural line of penetration that of the south-east, Berlin-Belgrade-Byzantium-Baghdad (-Bombay). But neither of these great routes, neither the Suez Canal nor the Baghdad Railway, remained within the control of the states whose subjects had dreamed them and made them realities : both were taken over by Great Britain and fitted into her imperial network of communications.

In recent years motor car and aeroplane have been added to steamship and railway. They have revolutionized the problem of communications for the very countries in which communications were difficult and population sparse. Just as railway construction in the countries of the Levant had served trade only secondarily, and primarily policy—the assurance of world domination—so the institution of the air lines has served world policy and trans-continental domination. The struggles which broke out over the development and guarding of sea and land routes are beginning to reappear in connection with air routes. Aeroplane and motor car have altered the aspect of space and time in wide territories which until now had known no change for thousands of years, and have brought changes in the importance of various localities in their relation to the principal lines of world communication. Through their situation in regard to the main air lines, various towns and countries have gained an “unearned increment” ; the new means of transport have awakened them out of an enchanted

sleep of many centuries ; and the new lines of communication, following geographical laws, have brought new life into immemorial trade routes. But whatever may be their importance in the future, none of the later routes approaches in importance the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez.

THE SUEZ CANAL

The Isthmus of Suez unites two continents, Asia and Africa. It is the most important link in the Old World. Before long it will be crossed by the great direct land route from Europe through Asia Minor to Cairo and thence through eastern Africa to Cape Town. But the Isthmus of Suez also divides two seas, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. It thus blocked the shortest sea route from Europe to the wealth of southern Asia and the Far East. Here the old Egyptian kings tried to cut a canal ; Darius, King of the Persians, was the first ruler to succeed. Later Roman and Arab rulers restored the canal after periods of neglect and silting up ; in the eighteenth century it finally became unusable.

The purpose of these canals was to link up the Nile with the Red Sea, not to provide a direct route from the Mediterranean into the Red Sea. The possibility of this was first investigated by engineers of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition. Napoleon's breadth of vision, embracing the future of countries and continents in a measure unique among the statesmen of his epoch, recognized the importance of Egypt and of the Suez Canal ; but he had not time to devote himself to the execution of the project. It was taken up by another Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Lesseps had been consular agent for his country in Egypt from 1831 to 1838 ; he had made himself familiar with the terrain, and by 1852 he had worked out his project. On November 30th, 1854, the Egyptian viceroy, Mohammed Said Pasha (in whose honour the port of entry of the Suez Canal is called Port Said) signed the concession which conveyed the right of

property in the Canal for ninety-nine years after its opening—that is, until November, 1968—to the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*. On the expiry of the concession the Canal becomes the property of Egypt. In 1910 the company tried to get an extension of the concession for forty years, but in spite of British pressure the Egyptians rejected its proposals.

The company is constituted as a French joint stock company with its headquarters in Paris. Its share capital of 200,000,000 francs, divided into 400,000 shares, carries 5 per cent. fixed interest, together with 71 per cent. of the net profit as dividend. Originally the greater part of the shares was acquired by France; they had been offered internationally for subscription, but England, Germany, Austria, and Russia took up no shares. The British saw in the cutting of the Canal a continuation of the Napoleonic policy and a French threat to the sea route to India, and looked unfavourably on the scheme; the Viceroy of Egypt had to take up the 176,602 unallotted shares. They brought no benefit to Egypt, and did not long remain in the Viceroy's possession. He was constantly in financial difficulties, and in the end was forced to sell. Beaconsfield, whose gaze was fixed on the Empire in the East, seized the opportunity. In 1875 the shares were acquired by England. The price was high, but the deal proved extraordinarily profitable, and gave Britain decisive influence over this water route, so vital to her, which originally was constructed in spite of her protest.

The construction of the Canal was begun on April 15th, 1859. Ten years later, on November 15th, 1869, it was formally opened. Enormous technical difficulties had had to be overcome in this desert area, where everything required had had to be brought at great expense, and where water shortage and epidemics had continually menaced the progress of the work. The Canal runs without locks through its whole length of 168 kilometres. It has a depth at present of 12 metres along a channel at least 45 metres in breadth; the surface breadth is between

100 and 135 metres. With the aid of electric lighting and signalling plant it is possible for ships to pass through the Canal by night as well as by day. The average time taken in passing through is thirteen hours, speed being reduced to 10 kilometres an hour in the actual Canal channel, apart from the salt lakes.

There are three towns by the side of the Canal. Port Said, at its Mediterranean entrance, is the third largest city in Egypt, with over 100,000 inhabitants, and is one of the greatest coal and oil bunkering stations in the world. Ismailia, named after the Viceroy Ismail, is a pleasant garden city with 25,000 inhabitants, and is the seat of the administration of the Canal. Suez, with 40,000 inhabitants, is the old northern port of the Red Sea. Port Said is connected via Ismailia with Cairo by railway, and Ismailia is similarly connected with Suez. Between Ismailia and Port Said lies Kantara, where the immemorial caravan route leads from the Nile valley to Syria. During the world war the railway from Kantara to Haifa was built, but it has no direct connection with the Egyptian railway system. The Suez Canal is crossed by ferries; a project has been under consideration for the construction of a tunnel under it. In recent years a new port and entrepot, named Port Fuad, after King Fuad, has sprung up opposite Port Said, on the other bank of the Canal; it is intended to be the point of departure of the railway to Palestine and of a railway through the Sinai peninsula to Akaba.

The cost of construction of the Canal amounted to 472,000,000 francs, but the constant danger of silting and of collapse of the banks demands continual heavy expenditure. Nevertheless, the company has earned steadily increasing surpluses since 1872, and the value of the shares has risen to many times the nominal value. The transit dues were fixed in 1884 at ten francs per registered ton, 7·5 francs for ships in ballast. In the following years, as the use of the Canal increased, these dues were steadily reduced, ships in ballast always enjoying the reduction of 2·5 francs per registered ton. The dues are now 7s. 6d.

per registered ton, in English money, and 3s. 9d. for ships in ballast. The canal dues for passengers have remained unaltered at ten gold francs, with a reduction for children.

The total revenue of the company amounted in 1928 to 1,167,112,000 francs, and the net profit to 713,146,000 francs. In 1934 the corresponding figures were 860,760,000 and 546,750,000. Of the net profit 71 per cent. is distributed to shareholders, 15 per cent. to the Crédit Foncier de France, 10 per cent. to the foundation shareholders, and 2 per cent. each to the board of directors and the staff. The Egyptian government ceded its 15 per cent. to the Crédit Foncier in 1880, so that Egypt gains no financial advantage at present from the Canal. The nominal value of the shares was halved and their number doubled in 1924. In 1928 the dividend amounted to 510 francs per share, and in 1934 to 525 francs.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

No other artificial waterway approaches the Suez Canal in importance to world trade and world communications. It made the greatest revolution in transit by sea since the discovery of the sea routes to America and India. It helped the steamship to its final victory over the sailing ship. In the Red Sea with its frequent calms the sailing ship was at a hopeless disadvantage, while on the long route round the west coast of Africa, with its few harbours, the steamship had proved less serviceable. Before the cutting of the Canal the route from Europe to India, Australia, and the Far East had led round Africa. This route was almost entirely under British control. The few coaling stations were in British possessions. The route was mainly used, however, by sailing ships, as the large quantity of bunker space for coal reduced the cargo capacity. It was the Suez Canal that brought the supremacy of the steamship on the East India passage.

Great Britain proceeded at once to safeguard this sea route. In 1839, to make sure of the future, she occupied

Aden, at the south-western extremity of Arabia; the possession was extended by the acquisition of adjacent territory in 1869. This small rocky peninsula is entirely barren and waterless, but it dominates the route to India and East Africa as a fortress, cable station, and fuelling station of the first order. Further acquisitions substantially added to this safeguard. In 1857, when the construction of the Suez Canal had been begun and the risks of the Suez route to India had become real, the small island of Perim, in the Bab el Mandeb, the narrow entrance to the Red Sea, was occupied and fortified. Once before, at the time of the French occupation of Egypt, the British had sent troops to the island as a precaution, from 1799 to 1801. Perim commands the actual Red Sea route. The adjacent strips of Arabian territory, the protectorates of Aden and Hadramaut, are under British supervision. Of more importance are the Kuria Muria Islands, off the southern coast of Arabia, and the Socotra Islands, off the African coast; they were acquired by Great Britain in 1854 and 1886 respectively. The Socotra Islands, the "Fortunate Islands" of the ancients, had been a meeting place for Indian and Greek traders, and were fortified in 1507 by Tristan da Cunha, the Portuguese navigator, to serve as a base for the trade with India. To-day the Socotra Islands are dependencies of an Arabian sultan of the Hadramaut coast, who, with the other sultans of the southern shores of Arabia, came under British protection in 1888. In the Red Sea itself Great Britain has possessed a quarantine station on the island of Kamaran since 1827; she has beacons on three small islands, and during the world war she occupied two uninhabited islands of considerable size. So, in a consistently pursued policy which was completed by the occupation of Egypt and the Soudan, the Sinai peninsula, and Palestine, the Red Sea was made a British sea. The aim Napoleon's far-sightedness had sought was attained by Britain.

The Suez Canal may be regarded as a British waterway, not only because the number of vessels sailing under

the British flag is greater than that of all other vessels taken together, but also because the bulk of the goods supplied to the East and the raw materials coming from the East are consigned from or to England. It was the Suez Canal that brought the British possessions in India into the main stream of world trade, and this applies also, in rather less degree, to the territories lying farther east. It was only after the completion of the Canal, with the consequent shortening of the period of transit, that it became possible for many of the products of these countries to be brought to Europe without risk of spoiling.

The volume of goods coming through the Suez Canal from the East is nearly double that of the eastward bound goods. Of the countries of origin and consignment east of the Canal, British India and Ceylon still take first place, followed by the Far East and, at a considerable distance, by the Malay peninsula with the Sunda Islands, the Persian Gulf region, and Australia with New Zealand. Next, again at a distance, come East Africa and, finally, French Indo-China and Siam. The economic relation between East and West is reflected once more in the Suez Canal traffic : the West sends mainly industrial manufactures, textiles, machinery, and ironware ; the East raw materials—oil-seed, petroleum, rice, wheat, ores, and textile raw materials.

For Egypt the Suez Canal has had little economic importance ; politically it has been a heavy burden on the country. On the other hand, the Canal has been of great importance to the European Mediterranean ports, Marseilles, Genoa, and Trieste. The shifting of the centre of gravity of trade after the discovery of the ocean routes had seemed to relegate the Mediterranean to the state of an inland sea, until the Suez Canal turned it into an important channel for trade with the East. The change restored the importance of the old ports in comparison with the Atlantic ports, and the Italian coastal towns and Phœnician Marseilles awoke to new life. The passage from London to Bombay via Suez is 4,881 nautical miles shorter than the passage round the Cape ; the saving for

Hamburg is much the same. The saving for Marseilles is 6,280 miles and for Trieste 7,404. The greatest saving effected by the cutting of the Canal is on the passage to India ; the saving to the Far East is rather less, but still very considerable ; the saving between London and Australia is only slight. To escape the high Canal-dues many cargo boats still use the longer route round the Cape.

From 1870, when 486 vessels passed through, until 1913, the number and tonnage of vessels using the Canal continually increased. The 1913 figure was 5,085 vessels, with a registered tonnage of 20,033,884. During the war and the years immediately following it the figures fell, but they soon recovered, and the 1929 figure was 6,274 vessels with a tonnage of 33,466,000. In 1930, with the effects of the world crisis beginning to show themselves, there was a slight weakening to 5,761 vessels totalling 31,668,759 tons, and in 1931 a further weakening to 5,366 and 30,028,119. The 1934 figures were 5,663 vessels and 31,751,000 tons. The number of passengers was 325,855 in 1929, 305,202 in 1930, and 262,122 in 1934.

Great Britain has an enormous lead in the Canal traffic. In 1930, 3,125 vessels, out of the total of 5,761, were under the British flag. The dominant position of Great Britain is shown equally plainly by the tonnage figures :

	<i>Total registered tonnage of vessels passing through the Suez Canal. (000's omitted.)</i>	<i>Tonnage of British vessels. (000's omitted.)</i>
1930	31,668	17,600
1933	30,677	16,733
1934	31,751	17,238

Germany came next in the years before the world war, though at a great distance. After the war Germany began to recover her position. In 1923 she took fourth place in number of vessels and in tonnage, following Great Britain, Holland, and France ; in 1927 she came third,

close behind Holland, and in 1930 she was again in the second place as before the war, with 600 vessels aggregating 3,338,842 registered tons. Then followed Holland, France, Italy, Norway, Japan, and the United States. Austria-Hungary, which came fifth before the war, has disappeared ; Russia, which before the war was seventh, now shows only an inconsiderable figure.

The overwhelming importance of the Suez Canal seemed to be challenged for the first time when the Baghdad Railway, planned by Germany, showed the possibility of reviving the immemorial land route to India. The outcome of the world war, in the course of which the Suez Canal was threatened by Turkish and German troops, fulfilled the British desires for the safeguarding of the Canal and the removal of the threat to it from the Baghdad Railway. At the same time the land and air route through Asia Minor to India has begun to gain importance. This land route will enter into competition with the Suez Canal in the future, but for most sorts of freight traffic the Suez Canal will remain of primary importance for India, just as it will continue to be for the Far East in spite of the Trans-Siberian Railway and other Eurasian railways to come.

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY

The Suez Canal followed the great route of ancient and medieval times which had led from south-east to north-west, round the Arabian peninsula and through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The other route, east of Arabia and from the Persian Gulf through Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, was still awaiting revival. As early as the eighteen-forties Great Britain had made the first preparations for opening it up ; with this in view she had already countered Napoleon's expedition and Mehemet Ali's thrust from Egypt in the direction of Syria. In the capable and energetic Mehemet Ali Britain saw a potential reformer of the Ottoman empire, who might lift it out of its lethargy and the chaos of its

provincial administration. That would have reduced the chances of a future conquest of Arabia and of the land route to India. This land route, whose strategic points were the Bay of Acre in the Mediterranean and Basra on the Persian Gulf, continually occupied the attention of British imperial policy, which during the nineteenth century became more and more definitely a policy of safeguarding the Indian possessions. In the second half of the nineteenth century there began the struggle between Britain and Turkey for Arabia, which was decided finally in the world war. It was waged on the British side at first only from the Persian Gulf, the waters nearest to India, but later also from the Red Sea. The German plan of securing the concession for a railway line from Asia Minor to Baghdad, and on to the Persian Gulf, was thus bound to arouse suspicion and meet with resistance in England, as it did also, though not to the same extent, in Russia and France. Russia herself aimed at extending her influence as far as the Persian Gulf, regarding Armenia, Kurdistan, and Persia as her sphere of influence, and seeing in the new railway line a threat to it. France put forward claims on Syria and Cilicia, the Phœnician ports, and the Gulf of Alexandretta, with the hinterland of Aleppo and Antioch, territories which were largely to be served by and opened up through the Baghdad Railway. This railway also threatened to contribute to the economic and strategical strengthening of Asiatic Turkey. Iraq had until then been a neglected part of the Turkish empire, situated at an enormous distance from Constantinople, and hardly more than nominally subject to the Sublime Porte; British influence had been able to penetrate here from the Persian Gulf without hindrance: the railway threatened to unite it closely with the central points of the Ottoman empire. Finally it would carry Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda nearer to India. British nervousness about any military strengthening of Turkey, particularly along the land route to India, was increased by the speeches of Emperor William II, in which he represented himself as a friend of Turkey and as the

protector of all Mohammedans. These circumstances, together with the growing importance of oil supplies, made the Baghdad Railway one of the most hotly contested issues in foreign policy in the years immediately preceding the world war. The railway would have been able to open up the rich oil region of Mosul, and in the south it might have come dangerously close to the British oil concessions in Persia.

As in the case of the Suez Canal, the British government tried at first to make impossible the carrying out of the Baghdad Railway project by refusing to provide any part of the required capital. Only when the building of the railway showed signs of succeeding without British aid did Great Britain try to gain effective influence over it. Negotiations were carried on in 1913 and 1914, in the course of which the Ottoman government compensated Britain and France by the grant of valuable concessions in Anatolia and Syria; the outcome was an agreement which took full account of British interests in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the railway was not to be Kuwait, which lies actually on the Persian Gulf, but Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab, which was more accessible to British influence. This long and obstinate struggle seemed to be finally disposed of on June 15th, 1914; six weeks later the world war broke out and decided the fate of the Baghdad Railway.

At the outbreak of the war the railway had been constructed as far as the Taurus mountains and northwards from Baghdad as far as Samarra. During the war the Germans and Turks laid down the difficult stretch through the Taurus mountains as far as Aleppo, and pushed on in the direction of Mosul as far as Nissibin. The British connected Baghdad with Basra and built a railway north-eastwards to the Persian frontier and as far as the oil region of Kirkuk. But the Baghdad Railway remains uncompleted to this day; the section from Samarra to Mosul has not been laid. The interest in the railway has considerably diminished. The Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad scheme belongs to the past;

Baghdad's relations with Constantinople and Berlin no longer exist. With the dissolution of the Ottoman empire the railway itself has come into the possession of three states and is under three separate administrations. The completion of the stretch from Baghdad to Mosul is not now to be built via Samarra as originally planned, but via Kirkuk and along the Tigris through the fertile parts of Kurdistan. There exists now a "Taurus Express", belonging to the International Sleeping Car Company, which runs (in connection with the Orient Express from Paris to Constantinople) via Aleppo to Baghdad, but the section from Nissibin via Mosul to Kirkuk has to be covered by car. Great Britain is not interested in a direct connection of Baghdad and the Persian Gulf with Turkey ; her efforts are directed toward the connection of Baghdad with a British Mediterranean port ; it is impossible to-day to build the "all-red railway" to India via Constantinople and Aleppo, but the war has made possible the realization in coming years of another project, that of an all-British railway from the Gulf of Acre to Basra, a route which Napoleon in his day wanted to conquer. The German Baghdad Railway policy has become a British policy, and Berlin-Constantinople-Baghdad has become London-Haifa-Baghdad. The Iraqi Government's policy, however, is to link Baghdad and the railway system, which is now in the possession of the Kingdom of Iraq, with Iran, Turkey, and the Syrian ports, instead of with Haifa, and thus to strengthen the nascent alliance of the Near Eastern states.

THE HEDJAZ RAILWAY

The Hedjaz Railway, like the Baghdad Railway, was intended to strengthen Turkey in her struggle for Arabia. The Baghdad Railway encircled Arabia from the north-east, the Hedjaz Railway from the north and north-west. The two railway systems met at Aleppo, and forked there to surround Arabia and join up with Constantinople. The Hedjaz Railway was conceived as a

pilgrim's railway; the Mohammedan pilgrims from Turkey and other countries were to assemble at Damascus and travel thence by railway to Medina and Mecca. Abdul Hamid, the great protagonist of Pan-Islamism, built this railway as a Mohammedan ecclesiastical foundation, a *waqf*. The construction was made possible through contributions from pious Mohammedans of all countries and through a stamp duty in the Ottoman empire. The line was laid, in spite of the great difficulties, entirely with Turkish resources, a demonstration that under efficient leadership Turkey was able to overcome difficult transport problems unaided.

The railway also helped Turkey to keep her hold on the Hedjaz and the Yemen, whither the Turkish government had formerly to send troops through the Suez Canal, which was only nominally under Turkish sovereignty. The railway opened up the valuable cereal region of Hauran, in eastern Syria, but except for that it was only of slight economic importance, since it ran through desert country or along the border of the desert, far from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, in order to be out of range of naval guns and expeditionary forces under their cover. Two important branch lines connected the railway with the Mediterranean, one from Damascus through Lebanon to Beirut and the other from Deraa to Haifa, which through the building of this railway soon outgrew in importance the more famous Acre, lying on the same bay.

The Hedjaz Railway was begun in 1901. In 1904 it was completed from Damascus to Maan, where the south-west direction parallel to the Mediterranean coast turns into a south-east direction parallel to the Red Sea; in 1908 the section from Maan to Medina was completed. The Hedjaz Railway also remains unfinished. The section from Medina to Mecca and the three important branch lines from Maan to Akaba, from Medina to Yanbo, and from Mecca to Jidda have not yet been begun.

Britain saw in the Hedjaz Railway a potential threat to her domination of the Red Sea and the Sinai peninsula.

She was concerned above all for the port of Akaba, at the north-east end of the Red Sea, which may at some time acquire a crucial strategic importance in regard to communications similar to that of Haifa. During the world war a large part of the railway in the Hedjaz itself was successfully destroyed; Britain's Arab allies advanced along it and conquered Transjordan and Syria. To-day the railway has completely lost its strategic value; the line from Constantinople via Damascus to Medina has become of no importance. Like the Baghdad Railway, the main line of the Hedjaz Railway runs through three different states—Syria, Transjordan, and Hedjaz. In Syria there is very little traffic; in Transjordan only a couple of trains go every week between Amman and Maan, and the section from Maan to Medina is entirely out of use, having been in an unserviceable condition since the war; the French and British mandatory administrations carefully concentrated the locomotives and rolling stock in their areas, and the Hedjaz government has none left.

The Mohammedan world conference at Mecca (1926) and Jerusalem (1931) demanded the conveyance of the Hedjaz Railway as a Mohammedan *waqf* to Islamic administration, and drew up plans for the continuation of the railway to Mecca and Jidda. These projects could only be carried into execution after a union of the Arab states of Syria, Transjordan, and Hedjaz, just as the union between these states and Iraq would make possible, with all its potential importance, the completion of the whole Arabian system from Aleppo via Mosul and Baghdad to Basra on one side and via Damascus and Amman to Mecca on the other side. (The Aleppo-Basra line would not then go via Nissibin, which would mean crossing the Turkish frontier, but would be carried through Deir-ez-Zor, to open up the fertile grain lands along the Upper Euphrates.) But the revival of this plan is not in British interests, and the various Arab states are much too weak to be able to carry it out with their own resources. The British victory has left the Baghdad and Hedjaz

railway projects uncompleted. Their place is to be taken by a British scheme which has been maturing for decades, that of the all-British railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the British land route to India.

THE ALL-BRITISH RAILWAY

The Baghdad Railway and the attack of Turkish troops on the Suez Canal in the course of the world war opened British eyes to the urgency of safeguarding the land route to India and the access to the Suez Canal from the east. With the occupation of Egypt there was bound up the natural tendency of all strong rulers of Egypt to bring Palestine also into subjection. In the years 1892 and 1906 matters came to a head between Turkey and Great Britain, Britain successfully enforcing the claim to Egyptian possession of the Sinai peninsula. The Palestine Exploration Fund founded in England for archaeological studies did preliminary work of the utmost importance for the conquest of the country. It began its work with a cartographical survey of the Holy Land, carried out by British officers, one of whom was Kitchener, who later was British High Commissioner in Egypt. In the last year before the world war the Palestine Exploration Fund carried out survey work for strategical purposes in the Sinai peninsula. Among those who took part in this was T. E. Lawrence, who a short time later was to become known as the leader of the Arab rising against the Turks. Thus the conquest of Palestine, for which the world war provided the opportunity, had long been in preparation. As long before this as the end of the nineteenth century a British company had secured a railway concession in Palestine, the execution of which would, with very slight exceptions, have anticipated the all-British railway now planned from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. The railway was to lead in one direction from Haifa via Damascus to Mesopotamia ; in the other direction it was to connect Haifa with Port Said. This second part of the original plan was carried

out during the world war. Haifa is connected with the Suez Canal by a railway running southwards along the Mediterranean coast. The immemorial caravan route from Egypt to Syria, a route alike for armies and for traders, has been revived by this modern means of transport in its double significance. The building of this railway and the possession of Palestine render the eastern bank of the Suez Canal safe from future attacks on the part of enemy Powers.

But Palestine is of importance for a second reason, and one which renders the Palestine mandate of more importance to the British Empire than even the control over Egypt. Palestine (not Alexandria) is the Mediterranean point of departure of the land and air route to India. With the aid of a British loan which Palestine had to accept, the railway built by Britain during the war from the Suez Canal to Haifa was paid for and acquired by the Palestinian-British government. The loan also provided the means for the construction of the modern port of Haifa, which is to become the great British oil depot and airport of the eastern Mediterranean basin. Part of the oil from northern Mesopotamia is conveyed by pipe-line through the Syrian desert to Haifa. Haifa is to be the point of departure of a railway to Baghdad, leading through Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq—entirely through territory which is either, like Palestine, directly under the administration of the British crown or brought indirectly under its influence by treaties. In order to safeguard the communications and the pipe-line through the desert, the British government has cultivated friendly relations with the Arabs since the world war; friendship with the Arabs, though without over-promoting their state organization, is an element of critical importance in Great Britain's India policy. The route to India is to be under British influence. Transjordan and Iraq received a long stretch of common frontier, so dividing the French mandated territory from inner Arabia.

It was difficult at first for Great Britain to reconcile herself to the idea of French possession of important

sections of the Mediterranean shore after the world war—Aleppo, Antioch, Alexandretta, and Tripoli, the very ports and cities which in ancient and medieval times had formed the natural and the nearest means of access to the Mediterranean for Mesopotamia and Persia. As “historic heir of the Crusaders” France had tried to include Palestine in her sphere of influence, but the safeguarding of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal from the neighbourhood of another Great Power, and the possession of the Bay of Haifa, were vital to Great Britain if she was to be able to protect the route to India.

The contemplated all-British railway would pass round the French mandated territory, losing economic value but gaining in strategic importance. From Haifa the railway will lead to Baghdad and to Basra on the Persian Gulf. It will run through the level plain; to the north it will be excellently safeguarded strategically from Turkey and the Soviet Union by the range of Kurdish mountains in the Mosul area, for which, for this reason, Great Britain struggled with Turkey for many years, finally succeeding in forcing a decision in her own favour.

The continuation of the railway through southern Iran and its linking with the railway network of Baluchistan is resolutely opposed by Iran, which has no desire to see the southern part of her territory turned once more into a glacis for British India. Baghdad is, however, to be connected with the future Iranian railway system and so with Teheran, so that Iranian trade may find an outlet through Iraq and not through the Soviet Union.

Haifa, however, is connected not only with Asia but through Kantara with Cairo and with the future British line through Africa, the Cape to Cairo railway. The all-British railway from Cape Town to Cairo and on through Haifa to Baghdad and India will connect the important British possessions in the Old World like a girdle; the last obstacles to its completion, Germany in East Africa and Turkey in Arabia, have been removed by the world war. Before this railway has been completed

it has been beaten by air transport. The narrow line from Cairo to Haifa is the apex of a tremendous angle whose other extremes are at Cape Town and Calcutta. The bold territorial and imperial planning of the British has pursued this vast strategic plan of communications, perhaps the greatest in history, for decades with a tenacious logic and a mastery which have been accompanied by good fortune. They have prepared the way for its execution through a policy which appears full of improvisations and strokes of good fortune, but for all that with an intrinsic and almost intuitive logical consistency and an unfailingly clear-headed realization of what they were after.

British imperial policy first developed into conscious planning after 1874, when Beaconsfield inaugurated the policy of imperialism and, under pressure from him, Queen Victoria adopted the title of Empress of India. From then on, for the sake of the Empire, in which Liberal England had had little interest, the safeguarding of the routes to India became a principal concern. The possession of Palestine, and the strategic enclosure of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, and their conversion into British lakes, have established British control of the sea and land routes to India and to East and South Africa with a firmness which, to all appearance, could only be shaken from without through an entire collapse of the present system of Great Powers.

While the firm linking together of the various parts of the British Empire is of great importance to Great Britain, the linking up of the new railway with Europe interests her much less. Just as she has not completed the Baghdad Railway via Mosul, with the result that there is no direct link between Europe and the Persian Gulf via Constantinople, so again the direct land route from Europe via Constantinople, Aleppo, and Haifa to Cairo is not being completed. The Taurus Express, in connection with the Orient Express, is only able to take passengers to Baghdad by motor traffic past Mosul; the Cairo Express of the Sleeping Car Company takes its passengers only as far

as Tripoli in Syria, where motor cars take them on via Beirut to Haifa ; there they entrain again for Egypt. The all-British railway, however, from Haifa to Baghdad itself threatens to remain unbuilt owing to its costliness and its long uneconomic stretches. A motor road is to be constructed instead. The nature of the country seems to suggest an alternative to the British plans in the connection of Iraq and Iran with Beirut and Tripoli in Syria, the geographical and economic conditions being more favourable. More probable than a railway from Haifa to Baghdad is one from Beirut and Tripoli to Mosul, whence it would go on to Teheran and Baghdad. The French are planning the connection of the Syrian railway system, with its normal gauge track from Aleppo via Homs to Tripoli, with Mesopotamia. From Homs the railway is to go to Mosul via Palmyra (which was once an important centre for caravan traffic and the seat of an empire in the Syrian desert), and via Deir-ez-Zor on the Euphrates. The port of Beirut is being developed and is to out-distance Haifa, and Tripoli will receive the same oil supplies from Iraq as Haifa. So the rivalry of the Powers along the old trade routes of the land of the Levant is springing up again : Britain and France are both exerting themselves to develop their "own" Mediterranean ports as entrepôts for European trade and communications with Mesopotamia and Iran, and to push their trade and their power into the interior of Asia along rival routes, both familiar to the ancients and to the Crusaders. This is the purpose of the railway planning.

But the indigenous national governments are themselves trying to develop railway systems which they intend to make independent of the imperial routes of communication. Ibn Saud wants to connect Mecca with Medina and Jidda. The Iraq government wants to connect Baghdad with Mosul and Syria. Beirut is to be a free port for transit trade from the Mediterranean to Iraq and Iran. This will make the Haifa-Baghdad Railway a still more doubtful matter. But motor car and aeroplane

have awakened the old trade routes of the Levant to new life more rapidly than the railway.

THE TRIUMPH OF THE MOTOR CAR

Without question the motor car has made the greatest of revolutions in transport in the Levant. Its introduction required no heavy outlay. Native workers quickly developed into skilled chauffeurs, not easily tired, and often wildly reckless. The motor car was soon no alien introduced and driven by foreigners ; it acquired citizenship and was soon able to adapt itself to difficult roads, or, rather, to the lack of roads. It conquered deserts and steppes, mountains and stony fields. Its coming led in a few years to the rapid spread of good roads. In most cases it did not run alongside the railway as in Europe ; it ran alongside the camel, competing with it in endurance and in the overcoming of difficulties. Along the great strategic main routes it is the forerunner and pioneer of the railway and the aeroplane. In the Levant it serves not only for short distance travel but often for regular communication in the regions without railways over distances of hundreds of miles. In the thinly populated regions, where it is impossible to find custom for a full service of trains, the railway cannot be made to pay ; in the absence of inland waterways (only Egypt and Iraq have inland water communication on any important scale), railways are of service only for such little goods transport as is to be had and for strategic needs. Apart from the very closely settled Egyptian river oasis, it is difficult for railways to get used to capacity. The situation of the motor car is different ; it is precisely in the thinly settled and difficult regions that its versatility makes it indispensable.

In the Arabian desert and in Iran the introduction of the motor car has strengthened the central power ; its mobility has lengthened the arm of the executive and made possible a well ordered administration directed with a consistent purpose. King Ibn Saud can cross the

Arabian peninsula from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf by car in a few days ; a little while ago it would have taken him several weeks. His capital Riyadh, in the heart of central Arabia, is connected with Mecca and El Hasa by motor roads. There is no need for expensive roads in the steppes ; on the hard soil the direction is shown by tracks running parallel with one another, often over a breadth of a kilometre. Traffic through the deserts and vast steppes requires special preparation ; there are no water sources or reserves, and water, petrol, and spare parts must be carried in the car. But in recent years there has been remarkable progress. Strong rulers like Riza Shah in Iran and Ibn Saud in Arabia are fully alive to the fact that the independence and the internal peace and order of their states depend on the construction of a network of communications, and for the immediate future this means motor communications.

The most important motor route in the Levant is that from Damascus to Baghdad. Damascus and Baghdad—the two great centres of medieval times, Damascus itself one of the oldest cities of humanity, Baghdad united with the very earliest times through the neighbouring Babylon and Seleucia. Both command key positions on the route from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. A few years ago the waterless and uninhabited steppe, 500 miles long, between these two cities was crossed only by the camel. Since 1923 there has been a regular postal motor connection, and to-day motor cars, motor buses, and motor lorries go twice a week in each direction. On those days there is busy life in the desert. The cars leave Damascus early in the morning ; they run for a few miles through the green and thickly populated oasis ; then they enter the steppe, after passing the Syrian frontier post of Khan Abu Shemat, about thirty miles from Damascus, where the telegraph line ends. Here there begins the infinity of the steppe. The motor vehicles, mostly of American manufacture, dwindle in it to small black points and disappear. Their 500-mile journey soon leads over firm sandy soil, which might be imagined to

have been rolled ; over this the car can proceed at forty-five miles an hour ; but soon difficult shingle is reached, reducing speed to twenty miles an hour. In the evening Rutbah is reached—a solitary fort in the desert, built in 1926, 200 miles from the nearest human settlement, but an assemblage of the most modern technical achievements, filling station and hotel, airport and wireless transmitting station. The car goes on through the night, an astonishing achievement on the part of the one chauffeur, who sits for twenty-four hours at the wheel. In the early morning the long stream of the Euphrates may be seen across the desert. Baghdad has thus been brought within a day's journey from the Mediterranean. Formerly it took three weeks to go from Baghdad to Europe via Basra and Bombay ; now the old overland route has been revived. Here the automobile has not followed the railway but has done creative work of its own of the utmost importance in the field of communications.

Postal traffic along this route has shown rapid growth in recent years :

	<i>From Beirut to Baghdad.</i>		<i>From Baghdad to Beirut.</i>	
	1927.	1930.	1927.	1930.
Letters (kilograms)	8,440	42,940	9,393	40,728
Parcels (number)	3,521	9,379	1,484	3,782

The number of passengers carried in 1930 was 15,800. Special motor lorries carried 2,133 tons of goods ; but the expensiveness of this method of transport leaves the field still open to the old caravan route for cheap goods. With the laying of the pipe-line from Iraq to the Mediterranean a telephone line has been carried along the motor route from Baghdad to Syria and Palestine. The asphaltting of the route will reduce the duration of the motor journey from Damascus to Baghdad to some twelve hours.

In spite of their importance to internal communications in the Levant, the motor routes are of little political

interest. Competition, on the other hand, in the newest means of transport, air transport, is of a highly political character. Unlike steamships, railways, and motor vehicles, which have more or less arrived at finality, aircraft may be expected to show very important advances. This prospect of revolutionary discoveries itself increases the political importance of air traffic.

AIR TRAFFIC

In March 1924, Imperial Airways was founded in London, the only great aviation company supported by the British government. It was granted a government subsidy for the period of ten years. In the course of these ten years the company, which originally had run air lines only in Western Europe, has reached the ends of the earth. In April 1929, it established the first regular world air service, between London and the East Indies. By 1932 it had connected up the portions of the Empire in Africa, Asia Minor, and southern Asia, in an organized network of air services, which in 1935 was extended to Australia. The network of air routes from London to Cairo and the Cape and from London to Baghdad and India sets out to serve the same strategic purpose as the railway system (not yet completely developed and so overtaken by the new means of transport) connecting the Cape with Cairo, Baghdad, and India.

Aircraft, of course, will never supplant railway and steamship; their advantage in speed is set off by their inability to transport goods in bulk. The various forms of transport have to be co-ordinated and made use of as required by the geographical and economic conditions and by the conditions in regard to the size of the population. In the short period of twenty years the aeroplane has been so perfected and has brought such savings of time that, especially in regard to regions where communications are ill-developed or difficult, and for world routes, one can only agree with Richard Hennig's remark that "the world is on the threshold of changes in regard to communications

which are probably of the most revolutionary nature that the history of human civilization has known".

At the same time world political relationships are taking on a new aspect. From Ternes in the Soviet Union to Cabul in Afghanistan used to be three or four weeks' caravan journey; the aeroplane takes as many hours. The almost impassable barriers which Persia and Afghanistan with their high mountains and few passes placed between British India and Russian central Asia are disappearing before the aeroplane. This will necessarily mean that strategic positions in regard to Eastern policy hitherto regarded as impregnable may no longer be so. There are still many difficulties to be overcome; but the time is not far distant when in regard to communications, but also in regard to the security of frontiers and spheres of influence, the geographical conditions will become more and more irrelevant. Mountains and deserts which in the Near East have formed strategic bastions of the first rank, and which still represent serious obstacles to railway and motor car, are of no service against aircraft. Great Britain has quickly recognized this. As once she went in search of naval bases, coaling stations, and cable stations, and later of oilfields with pipe-line routes and railways to serve them, she is now concentrating her attention on airports and air lines. Germany has concentrated on the development of her home air lines, so that to-day she has the closest network in the world, and after the relaxation of the restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles in 1926 she rapidly came to the fore in European air communications: Great Britain has concerned herself first with the development of long distance oversea communications in every part of her Empire. These great trans-continental air lines are to span the earth like her world-wide realm. At the same time they are to be of strictly national character and are to be as little dependent as possible on landing places under other than British sovereignty. But already there are rivals for the trans-continental dominion of the air, and before

long there will come a struggle similar to those for the dominion of land and sea.

The first international conflict over air routes was associated with the organization of the East Indies line of Imperial Airways. The first regular air-mail service in the Near East was organized by the British Royal Air Force, in August 1921, between Cairo and Baghdad. It was a fortnightly service. Imperial Airways took it over in January 1927, extended it to Basra, and turned it in April 1927 into a weekly service. This was itself an important advance, for the length of journey from Cairo via Gaza (in the south of Palestine), Rutbah, and Baghdad to Basra was now only twenty-seven hours. The Indian mail could thus reach London with a very substantial saving of time. Baghdad could be reached from the Mediterranean by daylight. Imperial Airways saw in the Cairo-Basra air line only a section of the East Indies line, which was to be opened in 1928 over the south of Persia. As early as 1926, at the Imperial Conference, the line from Cairo to Basra, Bushire, Bandar Abbas and Karachi was announced as "an approach towards a system of Imperial air communications".

But the Persian government entered a protest against any flying over south Persian territory. Tedious negotiations followed, and not until December 1928 was an agreement arrived at, permitting Imperial Airways to fly over southern Persia and to land in Persian airports for the period of three years, under very burdensome conditions. Consequently it was not until 1929 that the air route from London to Cairo, Baghdad and Karachi could be inaugurated. Meanwhile air mails to and from Baghdad had steadily grown in volume. The number of postal packets carried was 63,883 in 1926, 306,674 in 1927, and 536,775 in 1928.

On April 1st, 1929, the Iraq government took over the control of passenger, mail, and commercial air communications within its territory, and the aerodrome at Baghdad-West, which thus became accessible to civil and

foreign aviators. Baghdad became a junction for important air routes. Under the British-Persian treaty the German Junker air service in Persia was extended, on and after April 1st, 1929, from Teheran via Kasr-i-Shiran to Baghdad. Thus Baghdad was finally brought out of its isolation ; it was connected with India, Egypt, and Persia, the seats of ancient civilization, and also with London and (via Teheran) with Moscow and Berlin. In April 1930 the French Air Union instituted a weekly air service from Damascus to Baghdad. The automobile had reduced the distance between the two cities to some twenty-six hours ; the aeroplane reduced it to little more than four. In October 1930 the Dutch air lines began a weekly air service from Amsterdam via Baghdad to Batavia. Aircraft of four nations met in the airport of Baghdad, which had become of international importance in world communications.

At Cairo the Imperial Airways lines branch off to the Cape and to India. In Africa and Asia Imperial Airways use only landing places in territory under British influence. The single exception was Iran, with which the British treaty concerning air communications expired in 1932 ; from then on Imperial Airways have no longer flown via southern Persia but over the Persian Gulf, where groups of islands off Arabia under British influence have been selected as landing places. Asia and Africa are ultimately to be connected through British territory by a line from India via southern Arabia (Oman, Hadramaut, Aden) to British East Africa. The security of all these air lines, with that of the all-British railway from Haifa to Basra and another railway intended ultimately to run from Akaba to Kuwait, requires the maintenance of peace in the Arabian peninsula ; here again the importance to the Empire is revealed of the Pax Britannica in Arabia, one of the war aims in the world war.

But the British air lines have no monopoly in the Near East. Air communications are being developed with great energy in Soviet Central Asia, and carried up to the borders of India. In 1927 the Persian government

granted a concession to the German Junker company for a regular service of air mails and communications for the period of five years. The Junker company fulfilled its task very well under difficult conditions ; it established four air lines from Teheran, via Resht to Baku (connecting with Moscow), to Meshed (with connection to Herat and Cabul), via Hamadan and Kermanshah to Baghdad (with connection to Cairo), and via Ispahan and Shiraz to Bushire (with connection to India). Thus the great Russian and German networks of communication were extended to the Persian Gulf and to Afghanistan.

Iran has not only been connected in this way with world communications in all directions, but has also been given by the aeroplane new opportunities of control of her own territory. A caravan going from Teheran to Bushire, the principal port on the Persian Gulf, took some seven weeks ; the motor car took ten days to a fortnight ; the aeroplane takes seven hours. The German Lufthansa is planning an air line from Berlin via Athens, to Baghdad, Teheran, and Kabul. Baghdad will thus be brought within two days' journey from Berlin, India within four. What a shortening in comparison with the days of the Baghdad Railway !

The French lines originally intended to extend their air service via Istanbul (Constantinople) and Ankara to Aleppo in Syria. But Turkey refused to permit foreign aviation companies to fly over her territory. She is considering the development of a national air service, to connect Istanbul and Ankara with the mountain regions, at present difficult of access, in eastern Anatolia. For years a national aviation society has been carrying on busy propaganda, and preparations are being made for the opening of a regular line, purely Turkish, from Istanbul via Eskişehir, Ankara, and Konia to Diarbekir. The western and eastern regions of the republic will thus be brought within nine hours' flight of each other. An extension from Diarbekir to Teheran is proposed. A national Turkish line from Istanbul via Ankara and Teheran to Kabul would mean a strengthening of the

alliance of the three independent Near Eastern states. The other states of the Near East are also considering national aviation ; Egypt, Iraq, and Iran are training young officers and students as aircraft pilots and engineers. All these states, and even Nejd, have already purchased aircraft and built up the nucleus of an air fleet of their own. These efforts are part of the general policy of emancipation of the Near Eastern states. The young Egyptian or Iraqi, Turk or Iranian has learnt to drive a car ; he is now learning to pilot a plane. Students are being sent for this purpose to Europe by their governments, and Egyptian and Iraqi aviators have already flown their craft from London to Cairo or Baghdad. Aircraft were unknown in the Near East a few years ago ; now they are being naturalized.

France has in Syria the base of a trans-continental air system. The Air Union has a regular service by flying boat from Marseilles to Beirut. The Syrian airport is to be transferred later to Tripoli, where the French pipe-line from Mosul reaches the Mediterranean, and where the normal gauge railway from Anatolia via Aleppo ends. From Damascus French aircraft fly to Baghdad, whence there is air mail connection with Saigon and French Indo-China. Dutch aircraft connect Amsterdam with Sumatra in eight days. The three great air lines are trying to arrange their time-tables so that there may be a daily air service from western Europe to India and south-east Asia. But no effort of the other Powers approaches the breadth of the British imperial conception, which has already created a permanent framework to connect up the British world empire in the organization and safeguarding of world routes by water, land, and air. In the Old World the Levant is the base and the junction of this system of communications, which in the last decade has been developed on a grand scale. The system is beginning to restore the old importance of the Levant, which lay so long isolated from world traffic. The result has been the final completion of the inclusion of the Near East in the

world-wide economic system initiated by Europe. The process of Europeanization, begun only superficially by means of the lines of communication opened in the nineteenth century, is now penetrating every field of social and individual life.

INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD ECONOMICS

COTTON

COTTON has played the principal part in the history of the Europeanization of economic life in the Near East. Clothing is one of man's principal needs, and accordingly the textile industry, 80 per cent. of which is concerned with cotton, has played a decisive part in economic history and is to this day one of the principal elements in world trade and industry. With the Oriental's liking for clothing and materials of fine quality and varied colours, the trader in piece goods and clothing has been the pioneer since the end of the eighteenth century in the economic transformation of the East. It was through the textile dealer that mass production first replaced individual production in native trade, through him that imports grew, and therewith the need of capital, through him that trade began to take the place of barter, that a class of traders grew up and began systematically to exploit the opportunities of business.

Cotton, which is of Indian origin, was known in the Mediterranean region in the time of Herodotus. But it was not until the time of the Crusades that it began to play its important part in economic life and to penetrate Europe from the Levant. It was the creator of the wealth of the Italian cities and of their superiority over the Flanders wool trade, and it was responsible for the revival of the trade routes of the Levant. The great demand for the highly valued coloured cotton fabrics was one of the principal causes of the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in England. Between 1764 and 1800 the cotton consumption in England doubled every ten years. Its cheapening increased the demand and increased the incentive to cotton cultivation. There was

a rapid growth of slave plantations in the southern states of North America ; until then the centre of the plantation industry had been in the West Indies. In 1784 no more than seventeen bales of raw cotton were exported from the United States ; in 1852 the States were already producing three million bales, two-thirds of the total being exported, mainly to England.

In England in the second half of the eighteenth century there grew up in the southern part of Lancashire, in an old wool-working area, the most important cotton manufacturing centre of the whole world. The mild and damp climate was regarded as particularly suited to this manufacture. Lancashire had already been specially favoured by its geographical situation and by its coal-fields ; it was in Manchester that in 1789 the first steam-driven factory began operations. Liverpool, with its great natural advantages as a port, had become famous in the eighteenth century as a port of departure of the fleets engaged in the slave trade ; the industrial development of Lancashire was made possible by the profits from this trade. In the nineteenth century Liverpool attained world importance through the import of raw cotton and the export of cotton piece goods. Since 1760 Lancashire had had a splendid system of navigable canals, and seventy years later the first railway was built there, from Manchester to Liverpool.

The population of the county grew from 673,486 in 1801 to 4,406,409 a hundred years later. Between 1769, the year of Arkwright's epoch-making invention, and 1860, the import of raw cotton was multiplied four hundred times. In 1860, owing to the Civil War in the United States, there began the five hard years of the Cotton Famine. The Lancashire industry was crippled by the absence of cotton imports, and the many thousands of working families who depended on cotton for their whole living suffered real starvation.

These years of want demonstrated to the Lancashire industry and to the British Empire the urgent necessity of making the supplies of raw cotton as far as possible

independent of imports from the United States. Moreover, with the victory of the industrial North over the agricultural South in the American Civil War there began a rapid industrialization in the United States, and the country began itself to spin the bulk of its own production of raw cotton. Raw cotton imports had become a vital matter for the Lancashire cotton industry, and so became one of the main concerns of British imperial policy, which directed its efforts more and more to securing imports of raw cotton from the Empire and from Egypt. The principal Empire source was India, producing a cheap cotton; Egypt produced cotton of high quality.

The competition for the raw material supply continued with increased intensity in the twentieth century. In 1914 the world cotton production was about 25,500,000 bales (of 500 lbs.); Empire and Egyptian supplies totalled 6,250,000 bales or about a quarter of the world production. On the other hand, the Empire and Egyptian production of high quality cotton (Egyptian Sakellaridis and American Sea Island) was 89 per cent. of the world total. The Lancashire cotton mills are the principal consumers of the long-fibred Egyptian cotton, which requires special machinery. In Great Britain there was founded in 1902 the British Cotton Growing Association, and in 1921 the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, both concerned with promoting British self-sufficiency in raw cotton supplies. After the turn of the century there were similarly increased efforts in Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, who began active promotion of cotton cultivation in their colonies.

Russia had begun a similar policy years before, after the conquest of her Central Asian territories in Turkestan, where, since 1884, American medium qualities had been introduced in place of the short-fibred native cotton. In Fergana, the principal cotton-growing district in Turkestan, the area under native cotton in 1888 was 56 per cent.; by the end of the century the area under cultivation had been multiplied by five and the proportion under native cotton had fallen to 7 per cent. By

150 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

1914 the cotton production in Turkestan had reached 1,270,000 bales. During the War and the years of revolution it steadily fell until in 1921 it was no more than 43,000 bales. The Soviet Union has energetically promoted the recovery of cotton cultivation, and by 1928-1929 it had already reached the fifth place among the cotton producing countries of the world, after the United States, British India, China, and Egypt. In 1934 the raw cotton production of the Soviet Union reached 1,850,000 bales, surpassing Egypt and accounting for about 8 per cent. of the total world production.

The highly industrialized countries exerted themselves to induce their supply countries to standardize cultivation, concentrating it mainly or almost exclusively on the production of a single raw material. This happened in Egypt, originally a wheat-growing country, which had itself produced the whole of the food needed by its population; it became dependent for its existence on the export of raw cotton to Lancashire and the import of foodstuffs. In this way colonial or semi-colonial countries, confined to a single type of production, became entirely dependent on the industrial countries economically and, therefore, politically.

Restriction to cotton cultivation involves many dangers for the planter. His dependence on the world market, on the state of the harvest in other countries, and on international price movements makes his business highly speculative. The standard of living of the cotton cultivators is everywhere extremely low. The fact that they only get payment for their produce once a year makes the credit problem specially acute.

Alongside the struggle for raw material territories comes the competition for markets. Cotton manufactures are to this day the principal imports in Oriental countries. In India and Egypt cotton goods are much the most important imports as raw cotton is the most important export. In China in 1931 the value of cotton goods imported was nearly four times that of the next item

of imports. In all the countries of the Near East, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Palestine, cotton goods head the imports.

The importance of cotton to Great Britain is no less than to the Orient. In British exports cotton yarns and piece goods have for many years held much the most important position. British exports of cotton goods amounted in value to £126,000,000 in 1913, and in 1924 to £199,000,000. Iron and steel products came next and their value was much less than half that of the exported cotton goods. Recent years, with the growing economic crisis, have brought a fall in the absolute value of the exports of cotton goods, but they remain the principal British exports. The exports of cotton yarns and cotton piece goods in 1930 totalled £87,000,000, in 1931 £56,000,000 and in 1935 £60,000,000. Raw cotton similarly takes the first place in the importation of raw materials into Great Britain. The figures, like the export figures, reflect the general movement in volume of trade and price levels :

			£
1913	70,000,000
1924	121,000,000
1930	45,000,000
1931	34,000,000
1935	37,000,000

These figures show the immense importance of cotton in British trade and industry. Cotton is of the greatest importance to world trade, and no less important on the political side is the struggle for raw cotton supply regions and for markets for cotton goods. In the era of Imperialism there is no separating the political from the economic struggle in world affairs. "Nothing is more characteristic of the transformations of the raw material supply system than the fact that its conduct is visibly determined by political considerations under the influence of political ideas. This is a fact of fundamental importance in the present phase of world economic development." (Walther Pahl.) In the nineteenth century equilibrium seemed for a time to have been attained : colonial or semi-colonial countries produced the raw materials ; the

industrial countries transported them in their ships, worked them up at home, and then supplied the whole world with their manufactures. This structure of the capitalist trade and industry of the nineteenth century underwent two fundamental changes in the twentieth, which are still working themselves out—in the struggle for raw material supplies and in that for markets. Both arose out of the increase or awakening of nationalism in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, which found expression in the struggle both for political and for economic independence, the latter by means of the organization of a national economic system as nearly as possible self-sufficient and independent of the outside world. A very important part in this transformation in world trade was played by the world war. It largely destroyed the connection between raw material countries and industrial countries ; at the same time it increased the demand for cotton and so led many new countries to embark on cotton cultivation or the manufacture of cotton goods. Colonial or semi-colonial countries which hitherto had confined themselves to exporting raw cotton began to manufacture it.

The awakening or growing nationalism set out to liberate its countries from dependence on the developed industrial countries, and saw in industrialization a means of attaining economic independence. In the old European centres of the textile industry production fell in comparison with pre-war times ; it grew in the countries which formerly had either supplied the raw material or been dependent on imports of the finished goods. Between 1913 and 1926 cotton manufacture was nearly trebled in China. It was more than doubled in Japan, which has developed a new Lancashire in Osaka and grows cotton in its colony of Korea, and which also is favourably situated in regard to freight to India. In British India and in Brazil cotton manufacture increased more than 50 per cent. in the same period. Between 1913 and 1925 the number of spindles in Europe increased from 99 to 101 millions ; in the same period the number

in Asia increased from 8 to 17 millions. This evolution has since continued. In 1934 the number of spindles in Europe had decreased to 96 millions ; the number in Asia had increased to 23 millions. The corresponding evolution in regard to looms is no less striking. In 1913 Europe had 1,857,000, America 804,000, and Asia only 121,000 looms. Twenty years later, in 1933, the European and American figures had fallen to 1,847,000 and 766,000 ; the number in Asia had grown to 515,000. The world consumption of raw cotton in 1925 totalled some 23,000,000 bales ; of this America manufactured 7,000,000, Europe 9,500,000, Asia 6,500,000. In 1933 to 1934 the world consumption totalled about 25,000,000 bales, of which America manufactured 6,600,000, Europe 9,900,000 and Asia 8,100,000.

The United States mainly manufacture their own cotton, and have so great a home market that exports are not of critical importance to them. Great Britain still imports most of its cotton from America, which is still the greatest of the world's producers of raw cotton, and it is inevitable that Great Britain should fear dependence on American price dictation. Hence the British concentration on the development of new sources of raw cotton supply, in spite of falling sales. But the hope of self-sufficiency is still far from realization. For the present Great Britain is able only to draw a small part of her cotton supplies from Egypt, India, and other cotton countries. Unlike America, she is mainly dependent on sales abroad. In 1934 to 1935 she consumed about 2,500,000 bales of raw cotton. Of this, 1,049,000 bales came from the United States, 520,000 from South America, 362,000 from Egypt, 342,000 from India, and 107,000 from the Soudan. Not only for her raw material supply but also for her sales Great Britain, unlike America, is mainly dependent on foreign markets.

Originally the new textile industries manufactured the cheap sorts of cotton, but they are gradually embarking on the more complicated stages of manufacture. The fall in raw material prices forms a strong incentive

to the industrialization of the raw material countries, as they keep for themselves the substantial margin of manufacturing costs. At the same time there is setting in an interesting retrograde movement in transport. In the nineteenth century the cheapening and speeding up of transport had made industry more and more independent of its situation in regard to its raw material source. This independence was largely reinforced by the superiority of the West in capital, technical equipment, and supply of skilled labour. The penetration of capitalism and of technical equipment and knowledge of the countries of the East is gradually levelling away this former advantage. With it is proceeding a return of manufacturing industry to the site of its raw material supply. "The advantages to industry of working where it has direct access to its raw material are once more exercising a strong influence. This shifting of industrial sites to the source of the raw material supply is, of course, damaging those manufacturing industries which had been built up through technical experience of production and the skill of the workers and had drawn their raw material from oversea colonial territories. The growing supply of Asiatic markets by their own mills has plunged the British textile industry into a serious sales crisis. The circumstance that a large part of the Indian cotton crop is now manufactured in India is compelling Britain to look round for new sources of cotton supply. Textile machinery can only work at a profit when it has an adequate supply of raw cotton." (Walther Pahl.)

Nationalism not only works for industrialization but also combats specialization in crop production. Egypt had become a cotton country, to the prejudice of its food production. It had so been made wholly dependent on world trade, though only participating passively and without any initiative of its own. It had become entirely dependent on foreign countries for the feeding of its population. Lancashire bought its raw cotton ; if prices fell or if Lancashire declined to buy, Egypt was threatened with destitution. The country produced little of what

it could consume itself. It had to import almost everything it lived on, foodstuffs as well as manufactured goods. Cotton planting in Egypt had been begun in 1821 by Mehemet Ali, the great modernizer of his country. The American Civil War brought an increase in cotton prices which stimulated cotton growing in Egypt. But only after the British occupation of the country was cotton cultivation systematically promoted to the neglect of all else. In 1920 in Lower Egypt more than 45 per cent. of the cultivable area, and even in the less fertile Upper Egypt more than 34 per cent., was planted with cotton. The Egyptian cotton crops grew as follows :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Cantars.</i>
1821 (Introduction of cotton cultivation)	944
1830 	213,585
1863 (American Civil War) 	1,181,888
1882 (British occupation) 	2,912,073
1929 	8,531,172
1934 	7,780,000

Not until Egypt achieved at least formal independence and, in 1929, fiscal sovereignty, was she able to take steps to make an end of these conditions. While trade was booming, and with the rise in raw-cotton prices during the world war, Egypt's concentration on cotton brought her great wealth, but with the fall in price during the years of crisis it threatened the economic existence of the country. This explains the efforts to broaden the economic basis and to go over to the production of the country's own food. The national government is trying to promote and develop grain and especially fruit and vegetable cultivation by means of tariff measures, instruction, and material assistance.

With her growing political independence and her detachment from the Imperial connection and the sphere of direct British influence, Egypt is ceasing to be a dependable source of Lancashire's raw material supply.

156 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

The British government has accordingly taken steps to introduce and increase cotton cultivation in recent years in those parts of East Africa which are climatically suitable for it and are under British control—in the Soudan, and in Uganda. The Soudan produces cotton of a similar excellent quality to that of the best Egyptian, the black labour is even cheaper than Egyptian, and the political and economic conditions enable cultivation to proceed on a vast scale under uniform leadership, with suitable irrigation. The cultivation has also direct political advantages for Great Britain: while Egypt is beginning more and more to slip out of her control, Great Britain is establishing herself in the Soudan, whose growing cotton production is threatening the livelihood of the Egyptian fellaheen and whose growing consumption of Nile water threatens to sever the vital nerve of Egypt's existence. Through her possession of the Soudan Great Britain remains the unchallengeable controller of Egypt and her destiny. The possibility of the extension of the irrigated area in the Soudan hangs over Egypt like a sword of Damocles. Great Britain has also made the Soudan commercially independent of Egypt by building a railway from Khartoum to Port Soudan on the Red Sea, and so has provided the Soudan with direct access to the sea for its imports and exports. As recently as 1910 Egypt's share in African production of raw cotton was 96 per cent.; by 1929 it had fallen to 77 per cent. Formerly rubber was the principal commercial product of the Soudan; the growth of raw-cotton production is shown by the following figures:

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Ginned Cotton.</i>	<i>Cotton Seed.</i>	<i>Rubber.</i>
	£	£	£
1922	341,796	63,437	530,023
1923	458,188	71,235	1,006,623
1930	3,046,330	205,746	980,157
1934	£2,173,557		494,740

These figures, bearing in mind the fall in raw material prices, show the rapid development in the importance of cotton cultivation for the Soudan. As in all other eastern countries, imports of cotton goods into the Soudan are much the most important item of all. Uganda also shows a steady growth of cultivation. The area under cotton increased between 1923 and 1930 from 418,600 to 739,690 acres. In 1934 it was 1,170,000 acres. The cotton crop grew from 14,000 bales in 1913-14 to 102,000 in 1925 and 198,000 in 1934.

Egypt is the only important cotton country in the Levant; cotton is planted in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, but is of much less importance than other products. Its importance is greatest in Turkey. In Iraq cotton cultivation has been fostered by the British Cotton Growing Association, but without much success as yet. France claimed the fertile cotton area of Cilicia in the Treaty of Sèvres, but had later to give it back to nationalist Turkey; now she is trying to promote cotton cultivation in Syria through the Association Cotonnière Coloniale, and has introduced high-grade cotton plants from Texas into the Alauite territory. A Société Cotonnière de Syrie has been formed at Mulhouse, in Alsace.

Hand in hand with this struggle for raw material sources goes the struggle for markets. In 1929 Great Britain was much the largest importer into Egypt, with 21·2 per cent. of the total imports; Italy came third. With both countries cotton manufactures were the predominant item of imports. Italy has become a serious rival of Great Britain in the Levant market. Egyptian imports in 1929 were as follows :

	<i>From Great Britain.</i>	<i>From Italy.</i>
	£E.	£E.
Cotton piece goods	3,059,000	1,524,000
Mixture fabrics (cotton and artificial silk)	169,000	588,000
Cotton yarns	140,000	164,000

158 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

Recently Japan has come more and more to the front in the importation of manufactured goods. In the French mandated territory of Syria the imports of cotton manufactures in 1930 were :

<i>From</i>		<i>French francs.</i>
Great Britain	..	65,000,000
Italy	49,000,000
Japan	48,000,000
France	6,000,000
Germany	4,000,000

In 1930 Japan came tenth among the countries importing into Syria. Four years later, in 1934, she had come up to the third place, the value of her imports of cotton manufactures into Syria being more than twice that of the combined imports from Great Britain and Italy. In Egypt in 1933 Japanese imports came next after British, surpassing those of Italy, Germany, and France. British exports of cotton goods fell from £3,434,862 in 1929 to £1,053,499 in 1933 and £625,453 in 1935.

There is a further serious competitor in the importation of cotton goods into the Iranian market—the Soviet Union. Its share of the total imports of cotton goods grew from 24·4 per cent. in 1927-8 to 46·9 in 1928-9. In the same period the British percentage fell from 41·6 to 27·3 and the Indian from 23·4 to 17·8.

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS

In his book on the problem of the Europeanization of economic life in the Orient, Reinhard Junge has remarked that the importation of Western textiles and other articles of consumption stimulates the extravagance of the Oriental, impoverishing him and preventing the formation of capital; and that “the absence of any national consciousness, typical up to quite recent times of all Islamic territories, must be regarded as, among other things, the absence of one of the defences against those dangerous influences”. Indigenous consumption

was increased and new needs were aroused, but nothing was done to increase indigenous production. Thus the growing but unproductive luxury of a small upper stratum of society brought progressive impoverishment of the general economic system in Oriental countries.

In the era of capitulations and concessions the Ottoman empire, Persia, and Egypt were brought into passive association with world trade and world finance. The fiscal and customs systems were administered in the interest of European creditors and European trade, not in that of the indigenous trade and industry and its active development. With the growth of national consciousness the situation began to change. The modernization of the state and the growth in its strength in relation to the outer world had their effect in the economic field. Any active entry into the economic field, any deliverance from vassalage to the European capitalistic states, was dependent on a rational formation of capital and provision of credit and on a choice of imports, with a corresponding organization of foreign trade, made in the interest of the development of indigenous trade and industry. Resources that had been merely hoarded needed to be put to use as productive capital, and at the same time the formation of capital through thrift had to be promoted. All economic reforms in the Orient are dependent on the training and instruction of the population, under state guidance by precept and practice, and with active state assistance in the modernization of the economic system.

As without the guidance and assistance of the state neither the educational nor the psychological conditions are provided for inducing the Oriental landowner, townsman, or peasant, to take the risk of radically changing his methods of business, it becomes necessary for the state to do the pioneer work of economic transformation. For this reason the economic system in Turkey and Iran approximates to state capitalism, partly under the influence of the example of the Soviet Union on the other side of the frontier, which is going through a similar

process of transformation. The modernization of the economic system has made the greatest advance in these independent states. Egypt and Iraq are following the same path, but in a less thorough-going way, owing to capitulations and to foreign interference in Egypt, and to the presence until recently of the mandatory government in Iraq. In Syria and Palestine the governments have done very little as yet to promote any thorough modernization of the indigenous economic and educational systems. The measures taken by the national governments, to which detailed reference will be made in dealing with the various countries, may be summarized under the two main heads of creation of an indigenous industry and intensification of agriculture.

In the first of these two fields Turkey decided in the spring of 1932 to found an industrial credit bank on the pattern of the agricultural bank. The new bank is to make advances on industrial buildings and for the provision and working of industrial machinery, to assist the purchase of raw material for the country's industries, to facilitate and regulate the provision of credit for industrial enterprises, and to take over and offer for subscription their debenture issues. In Turkey and Iran many industrial enterprises have been started with state assistance. Egypt is the only country rich enough for an Egyptian bank to be founded (in 1920) by the initiative of a private individual out of private means, to undertake the tasks undertaken in Turkey and other countries by state institutions—the training of a native staff in finance, commerce and industry, and the encouraging and financing of indigenous industrial, trading and transport companies. This bank, the Bank Misr, received state assistance after Egypt had gained her independence.

But no less important than the provision of credits and of financial assistance in the starting of industries and the modernization of native industry, which can thus be made able to withstand competition, is the development of trained staffs through the organization of

industrial and trade schools and the provision of opportunities for the indigenous population to take up positions in trade and industry which hitherto have been mainly occupied by foreigners, and so to acquire the needed capacity and experience. Industrialization incidentally performs a great educative function, promoting a psychological and social transformation. The level of education and the standard of living of the lower strata are gradually raised. The states of the Near East are faced now with the task of enacting a modern code of labour legislation. This industrialization of the colonial and semi-colonial countries makes them less dependent on imports from older industrial areas, and must thus lead to a transformation of European industry and trade so far as it has been engaged mainly on exports overseas.

The intensification of agriculture also presupposes an adequate provision of credit and a general educational and occupational training of the fellah. The Turkish Agricultural Bank, a national Turkish enterprise set up by the government and carried on under government supervision, helps in the starting of agricultural credit societies, co-operatives for buying and selling, and the provision of improved marketing opportunities. In Egypt the government has set up an agrarian bank for the provision of credits for small peasants, and also to assist in improving farming methods, to buy manure and seeds, and to help with credits and advice in the acquisition of agricultural machinery and animals for breeding. But an intensification of economic activity is only possible if the new credit institutes organize selling in the interest of the producers—which is part of their task. Co-operation has proved one of the principal means of giving economic training. But before it can be effective it is necessary for the peasant to be relieved of his burden of indebtedness, often more than oppressive, owing to the usurious rates of interest to which he has had to submit in the absence of any organized agricultural credit; it is also necessary for the tenants to be protected from arbitrary treatment by the landlords and from

expulsion from their holdings. Every agrarian reform must include regulation on a fixed plan of the agrarian taxation and the conditions of ownership. The technical work of increasing production must go hand in hand with the extension of the market, and the peasant must be placed by a suitable co-operative organization in a position to dispose freely of his products and to obtain the actual market price at a favourable moment. The co-operatives must see to it that the peasant actually receives the true yield of his production and is so enabled slowly to build up his capital, which will make it possible for him to re-invest his profits. The intensification of agriculture will lead to the increase of working capital in the countryside and will so help in turn in the creation of industries which will find their market among the increasingly prosperous peasantry.

But this depends on an improvement in the general level of education, on training the peasant in methodical labour, and on accustoming him to watch and be guided by the opportunities open to him. With the transformation of economic life there sets in a human change ; the two are dependent on one another and condition one another—just as in the economic sphere the intensification of labour precedes the intensification of capital, but each is a condition of and a promoter of the other. The modernization of the economic system is an extraordinarily complicated process, the many elements of which must be carefully attuned to one another, a gradual progress from stage to stage, the easing and execution of which requires the application of all the intellectual and moral forces of the nation, of its state organization and its leading personalities.

It is here especially that there is felt in all the countries of the Levant the lack, so frequently to be noticed, of an intellectual and moral élite, numerous enough as a class to be able to bear the heavy burden of the process of transformation. There is a lack of the hard work of intellectual and psychological preparation, of understanding of economic relationships and their function in

political life ; the sense of responsibility for the whole community has not yet by any means overcome everywhere and at all times the old sense of common interest of families, cliques, and friendships. Yet the example of the ten years and more of allegiance of the great majority of the Egyptians to Saad Zaghlul Pasha and to the Wafd has shown that, at all events in the presence of a great and unselfish leading personality, the national idea can bring the peoples of the Near East, like other peoples, to a unity rare in history and to the subordination of all personal and party interests. On the other hand, the awakening of national consciousness has often led to an exaggerated self-confidence, and has thus interfered with the due realization of the extent to which the Oriental peoples have still to gain a deeper understanding of the forces of modern civilization, of the elements of citizenship, to gain technical efficiency and to learn economic discipline, before they can become active and equal partners in the general complex of civilization. The countries of the Near East still offer a wide field for European assistance and advice in economic and state organization and education.

But the first condition of this must be that this help is not offered from selfish motives aiming at political or economic control, but from genuine readiness to be of service. The Oriental was never so suspicious as to-day. All the disguises of self-seeking under the cloak of mandates, all the hollow talk of furthering the prosperity and progress of the backward peoples as a sacred mission of civilization, that is to say of the stronger civilized nations, only go to strengthen the suspicion, and to magnify the mistakes made in the Near East instead of minimizing them. One of the strongest reasons advanced for the effort of the Oriental peoples to achieve full independence lies in the fact that it is only on that condition that they are willing to accept the help of the West, that it is only when that has been achieved that there can be any question of real assistance. Experience has shown that independence is an essential condition for any thorough-going

economic and cultural advance, for the Europeanization and modernization of the native economic system in the interest of the native peoples. Given that condition, fear and suspicion can gradually fade in the hearts of the Orientals, the mental and moral inadequacies resulting from centuries of oppression, under-nourishment, and ignorance, can be lessened and removed by steady and persistent educative work, and the old civilized countries of the Near East, once the cradle of culture and the centre of world trade, can once more enter fully into the community of civilized nations.

CURRENCY PROBLEMS

Two currency problems faced the countries of the Near East after the world war in their commercial relations with the world—currency vassalage, and the fall in the price of silver. Currency vassalage, a symptom of the economic weakness of these countries and of their lack of capital, showed itself in one of two ways—either through the currency unit being tied to that of an economically stronger country, or through the right of bank note issue belonging to a private banking institute entirely or mainly under foreign control. Often both conditions are found together. Thus the Egyptian, Palestinian, and Iraqi currencies are in a state of vassalage towards sterling, and the Syrian towards the French franc. The principal foreign commercial banks which have had the right of note issue are the National Bank of Egypt, the Banque Impériale Ottomane, and the Imperial Bank of Persia. The National Bank of Egypt, with a share capital of £E3,000,000 under British control, has possessed since June 25th, 1898, the monopoly of the issue of bank notes in Egypt. Before the world war this privilege was of no great value, as gold coin was in free circulation and the bank notes had to have a 50 per cent. gold cover. Up to the outbreak of war the bank note circulation scarcely exceeded £E2,500,000. On the outbreak of war the currency was pegged, and the decree of October 30th, 1916,

made fundamental changes. The obligation of payment in gold and the obligation of gold cover were removed ; British state securities were permitted as cover instead of gold. This established the currency vassalage of the Egyptian pound, which, once it was taken off the gold basis, followed every fluctuation of sterling. After the abandonment of the gold standard in England in the autumn of 1931, efforts were made in Egypt to break away from this currency vassalage and to create an independent Egyptian currency, but in view of the intimate economic relations between the two countries the Egyptian Ministry shelved the plan.

The Banque Impériale Ottomane was established in 1863 by an Anglo-French banking consortium, with the privilege of note issue. Its privilege was renewed in 1925 up to March 1st, 1936, the name of the bank being altered to Banque Ottomane. The national government in Turkey set up a number of commercial banks for the promotion of Turkish industry, and to enable the control of Turkish trade to be transferred into Turkish hands ; and in January 1932, the Turkish State Bank was founded with a capital of £T15,000,000. The State Bank is gradually to increase its gold reserve, so that this reserve, together with the holding of gold bills, may give the necessary cover for the Turkish bank notes in circulation from 1936 onwards.

The branches of the Ottoman Bank in the French mandated territory were constituted the Banque de Syrie et du Liban in 1919, with a share capital of 10,000,000 francs ; on April 1st, 1924, the bank received the privilege of note issue for fifteen years.

The development in Persia is also characteristic. The Imperial Bank of Persia, under British control, with a share capital of £650,000, received its original concession as a note issue bank in 1889 ; the concession was prolonged in 1924 for a further twenty-five years. " Before the War the whole of the country's banking system was dependent on foreigners and served (their) economic expansion. The new men in Persia therefore directed

their efforts from the first to recovering national independence in this field also." In 1928 the Persian National Bank was founded with a share capital of 2,000,000 toman. The first governor of the bank was the German Dr Kurt Lindenblatt. "The National Bank, which has worked with great success, is likely in the course of years to secure for the Persian government the independence it desires in banking as elsewhere. It is proposed also to establish an agrarian bank to grant mortgages and therewith to facilitate the modernization of agriculture. The European banks are mainly devoted to financing foreign trade, and so do not assist the industrialization of the country. It is the task of the National Bank to promote industrialization." (Fritz Hesse.) The Iranian government has bought up the note issuing privilege of the Imperial Bank of Persia and has transferred it to the National Bank. This transfer "was regarded by the Iranians as one of the most important steps along the road to financial independence". So in every country the efforts are increasing to follow up the achievement of political independence with that of economic and currency independence. Often these efforts go hand in hand with attempts at currency stabilization, which, especially in the countries with a currency on a silver basis, has become an urgent necessity owing to the extraordinary fall in the price of silver.

Since 1928 silver has lost more than half its value, measured in gold. Between 1835 and 1875 the price of silver had averaged 1.30 dollars an ounce in New York. Then, owing to the introduction of the gold currency by the Latin Monetary Union and the United States, it lost about half its value. It remained at this level, with only slight variations, until the world war, in the course of which it rose greatly in price, reaching a top quotation in New York of 1.388 dollars towards the end of 1919. It then became stabilized once more, from 1921 to 1928, at the same level as at the end of the nineteenth century; it was still worth 0.58 dollar in 1928. But from the

spring of 1929 it fell incessantly, until on February 16th, 1931, the ounce was worth only 0.25 dollar in New York.

As in other wide regions of Asia, silver was the basis of the currency in Arabia and in Persia. In Arabia, as in Abyssinia, the standard coin had for 170 years been the Maria Theresa dollar, which had first been minted in 1751 by the Vienna Mint. As recently as 1927 the Vienna Mint struck 15,561,000 dollars for circulation in these countries. In 1929 the figure fell to 2,846,000. The depreciation of silver led Persia to go over to a gold currency and to carry out a fundamental reform of the currency at the end of 1931. The Hedjaz also has gone over to a currency based on gold. Thus the same process has been going on in regard to the currency in the Near East as everywhere else. In the nineteenth century silver had been a general basis of currencies until the highly industrialized capitalist countries of the West went over to the gold standard. Many of the eastern countries remained on the silver standard, and are only now, with their active entry into world trade, following the western example. At the same time they are trying to liberate their currencies from foreign tutelage, and to bring their commercial banking system and their currency system under national control.

OIL

Like its cotton, the oil of the Levant has involved it in the great world struggle for raw material sources. Petroleum was known to the ancients—Herodotus mentions oil springs in the neighbourhood of Babylon, and Plutarch mentions springs at Kirkuk—but petroleum working first began on a commercial scale in the fifties of the last century. In the eighty years which have passed since then the oil industry has changed the economic face of the world. The United States was the first country to start an oil industry, and it still produces some

168 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

70 per cent. of the total world supply. The production in the United States has grown as follows :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Barrels.</i>
1859	2,000
1879	19,914,146
1899	57,084,428
1906	126,493,936
1923	732,407,000
1929	1,007,300,000
1934	908,100,000

The industry has grown correspondingly all over the world. Petroleum was originally used only for lighting ; now it is mainly and increasingly used for power production. This, in the age of machinery and motors, has brought oil into the world economic struggle as its decisive factor, taking the place of coal ; for anyone who has control of power-producing material has control of power. England's monopoly position a century ago as the ruling industrial power was based on her coal resources, and particularly on their remarkably favourable situation in the neighbourhood of ports and trade routes. With the coming of the new source of energy, the struggle for oil became one of the principal factors in world politics. The United States, the greatest oil consumer, had within their frontiers nearly three-quarters of the world production. Great Britain, who came next as an oil consumer, had within her empire at the outbreak of the world war barely two per cent. of the world's oil production. The principal oil countries after the United States—Mexico, Russia, Persia, the Dutch Indies, Roumania and Venezuela—were all outside the political control of the British Empire, although British oil companies owned oilfields in all quarters. Thus it became vital to the maintenance of Great Britain's power that she should increase her source of supply of crude oil, should discover oilfields that could be brought under her immediate control, and simultaneously should bring within her control the transport of oil from the fields to favourably situated ports. Oil has

the great advantage over coal that it can be more rapidly and more cheaply mobilized from territories difficult of access through a pipeline than the more expensive and less easily transported coal, with its need of railways. Hitherto coaling stations had been of critical importance to the command of the seas ; now they shared their importance with oil-bunkering stations, which had to be placed at suitable points for ocean traffic in order, in conjunction with oil tankers, to safeguard the supply of oil for ship's engines, and especially, in time of emergency, for warships.

The world extraction of petroleum in 1934 reached once more the record figure of 1929 of about 1,500,000,000 barrels. The development of the extraction of crude petroleum in the principal producing countries of the world has been as follows :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>United States.</i>	<i>Soviet Union.</i>	<i>Venezuela.</i>	<i>Roumania.</i>	<i>Iran.</i>	<i>Mexico.</i>	<i>Dutch Indies.</i>
1910	209	70	—	9	—	3	11
1920	442	25	—	7	12	157	17
1925	763	52	19	16	35	115	21
1930	898	135	136	42	45	39	41
1931	851	162	116	49	44	33	35
1932	785	154	116	53	49	32	39
1933	905	154	117	54	54	34	42
1934	908	168	142	62	52	38	42

(Millions of barrels.)

But geographical distribution alone does not determine the ownership of oil. The oil in the United States belongs not only to American but largely to British companies. Only in the Soviet Union and in some of the South American states is the oil supply nationalized ; everywhere else it belongs to private and often to foreign companies. Two enormously powerful trusts are competing with one another for oil supplies—the American groups, represented above all by the Standard Oil Company, headed by John D. Rockefeller, and the British companies, the (Anglo-Dutch) Royal Dutch Shell Trust, headed by Sir Henri Deterding, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, part of the capital of which is directly owned by the British government. The Royal Dutch Shell Trust came into being in

1911 through the fusion of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij with the Shell Transport and Trading Company. These two great trusts are in competition both for markets and for sources of supply. The struggle for markets has very little to do with the countries of the Levant, which, with their poverty, backwardness and sparse population, consume relatively little oil. But these countries come into the foreground in the struggle for oil sources between the American and British companies, supported on both sides by their states.

This struggle is rendered more acute by the fact that the known oil deposits of the world are limited; the estimates vary but are all within a maximum of some fifty years' supply at the present rate of consumption. It is calculated that the United States, which account to-day for about two-thirds of the world's oil yield, have little more than one-eighth of the world's oil resources, so that their reserves will soon be exhausted. The deposits in the Iranian and Iraqi oilfield are believed to be not much less, but they are being worked at a far slower rate, at which it is estimated that they will last more than two centuries. The battle for oil resources is thus concerned less with present extraction than with the provision of reserves for the future. In this field the British oil interests have once more shown themselves more far-sighted and enterprising than all the rest. The British were very successful in the acquisition of foreign oilfields, they husbanded their own reserves, and they have brought within their possession a large part of the remaining world resources.

There was a particularly tough battle between the British and the American oil interests in the Levant. The struggle began at the outset of the present century; it continued for years after the world war and determined the distribution of Mandates and the international policy in the Arab and Kurd territories of the Ottoman empire. America had renounced all gains from the war, all annexations and reparation payments, in Europe; but she demanded her share in the gains from the war in the Levant. At the back of the bitter struggles between the victors in

the world war for territory in the Levant stood the struggle for oil. It was inevitable that Great Britain should regard the penetration of foreign and especially of American oil interests into the territories, so important to the Empire, around the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf as a particularly serious menace. Great as is the importance of oil in peace time, it is still greater in war. Consequently it is not enough to possess oil sources; it is necessary to have political and strategic control of them, and the means of drawing upon them.

In addition to the great petroleum fields in Iran and Iraq, there is oil in the Red Sea region. Egypt has three oilfields on the coast of the Gulf of Suez; the oldest one has been worked since 1907 and the most important one, Hurghada, since 1914. The fields belong to the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Company, formed in London in 1911 with a capital of £1,808,000. Output has been growing in recent years. In 1929 279,607 tons of crude oil were extracted. Of this something over 78,000 tons were consumed in Egypt and the rest exported. The company possesses a refinery at Suez; in 1929 the dividend paid was 22½ per cent. In Palestine geologists had been prospecting for petroleum before the war in the service of the Standard Oil Company. After the war there were years of conflict between the British administration of the country and the American oil company, which so far has been unable to resume its exploration on any important scale.

The struggle between the British and American oil companies began in the Levant about the turn of the century. At that time the American Admiral Colby M. Chester came to Constantinople and tried to secure railway and oil concessions in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. More fortunate was the Australian engineer William d'Arcy, who obtained from the Shah of Persia in 1901 the monopoly for all Persian provinces with the exception of the five northern ones along the Caspian. This concession was granted for sixty years for the sum of 40,000 dollars. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) was founded, originally as a subsidiary of the Burma Oil Company, to work the concession. Since then it has extended its activity to many other countries. The British government acquired a majority of its shares, so that it has become virtually a British government undertaking. The purchase was made at the instance of Mr Winston Churchill, who at the time was First Lord of the Admiralty. In laying his Bill before the House of Commons in June 1914 he was moved by much the same sort of consideration as Beaconsfield had been in his purchase of the Suez Canal shares. He wanted to safeguard the oil supply of the British navy.

The oilfields lie in the south-west of Iran, north of Dizful and east of Ahwaz. Dizful and Ahwaz are now connected by a railway which goes on to the new port of Bandar Shapur—the first section of the great trans-Iranian railway. Bandar Shapur is a port newly laid out in a small sheltered bight at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. The Iranian government refused to carry the railway on to the more important town of Mohammerah, on the Iranian side of the Shatt-el-Arab: it was much too close to the British influence centred in Basra. The pipe-line from the oilfields of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company leads, however, from the main field at Maidan i Naftun to Abadan, not far from Mohammerah, on the Iranian banks of the Shatt-el-Arab. At Abadan there are large storage tanks and the company's refinery. From here the oil is shipped through the Persian Gulf. Abadan lies between Basra and Fao. Not far from Basra, about 140 kilometres from the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates and Tigris join to form the Shatt-el-Arab. Basra before the world war was a shallow roadstead, difficult of access for sea-going vessels. During the war, when Great Britain was landing her troops there for the Mesopotamian campaign, Basra was developed into a modern port. With the aid of a loan issue of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company a ship canal was dredged; by its completion at the

end of 1930 the Shatt-el-Arab was made accessible through its whole length to ocean-going ships.

Fao was a Turkish fortress at the point where the Shatt-el-Arab flows into the Persian Gulf. Immediately after Great Britain's declaration of war on Turkey, on November 7th, 1914, British and Indian troops captured the fortress, and on the 21st they took Basra. The declared purpose of the British in the Mesopotamian campaign was the protection of the oil plant of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the occupation of the Shatt-el-Arab throughout its course. For some time the British thought it would suffice to dominate southern Mesopotamia ; later on the recognition of the importance of the oil sources in the mountain country of northern Mesopotamia, and of the strategic importance of that mountain country for the defence of the southern lowlands, induced them to occupy the whole of Iraq. Thus Abadan lies on Iranian soil, but is directly controlled by whoever dominates the Shatt-el-Arab. Abadan is also the principal port on the Shatt-el-Arab. In 1930 the arrivals in the port of Basra were 177 vessels with a total tonnage of 799,000 ; at Abadan, 643 vessels, of tonnage 3,578,000. In the treaty of alliance of June 30th, 1930, between Great Britain and Iraq, Iraq binds herself to convey to Great Britain for the duration of the alliance, that is for twenty-five years after its ratification, an airport in or near Basra, and to permit its garrisoning by British troops. The port of Basra is under an administrative authority in which Great Britain and Iraq are represented.

Thus Basra, like Haifa, is important in two ways to the British Empire ; both are strategic points on the route to India ; Basra is of strategic importance for the protection of the Anglo-Iranian pipe-line, and Haifa for the protection of the pipe-line conveying Anglo-Iraqi petroleum from Mosul to the Mediterranean. But already there is associated with the Haifa-Baghdad line a still bolder plan, which depends on the attainment of more far-reaching security in the Arabian peninsula through

174 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

co-operation with Ibn Saud. From Kuwait, the originally intended terminus of the Baghdad Railway on the Persian Gulf, a British railway is to be laid to Akaba on the Red Sea, and the Anglo-Iranian oil is to be led to the Mediterranean through pipe-lines, either to Haifa or to Akaba.

There has been rapid growth in recent years in the output of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The output in 1912 was 80,000 tons, in 1929 5,700,000 tons, and in 1934 7,650,000 tons. The oil yield is also of the utmost economic importance to Iran. Oil accounts for more than half of the Persian exports and gives Iran a large credit balance of foreign trade. In 1929 the company paid the Persian government £1,250,000 in dues, about one-sixth of the Persian state revenue. In the following years, in consequence of the fall in petroleum prices and the restriction of output by the Anglo-Persian, its payment fell to some £300,000. In an agreement of August 1932, it was provided that the company should pay the Persian government at least £1,250,000 a year. But at the end of 1932 the Persian government terminated the concession. It was of the opinion that the concession granted in Persia in 1901, under entirely different circumstances and without regard to the most important national interests of the country, by a powerless and corrupt government, could no longer be maintained under the new conditions by an Iran (as Persia now calls herself) actively engaged in modernizing her country. The government has also introduced amendments into the new concession agreement which correspond to the transformation which is taking place in every field in Iran as in Turkey. The aim of the Iranian government is to make the great plant of the Anglo-Iranian in south-west Iran, under the joint control of the Iranian government an important factor in the industrial training and modernization of the region and its inhabitants.

The new concession was signed at Teheran on April 30th, 1933, for a period of sixty years. Under this new agreement the concession area was reduced from the

original 500,000 square miles, which William Knox d'Arcy secured under his concession of 1901 for a sum of £4,000, to 250,000 square miles and from 1938 to 100,000 square miles. A low price was fixed for oil sold in Iran, as cheap oil is of importance for the modernization of agriculture and of transport. The Iranian government is to be given a discount of 25 per cent. and Iranian nationals of 10 per cent. on the price fixed. The Company is required progressively to replace all its foreign employees by Iranians, and to spend £10,000 a year on the education of Iranians in Great Britain in engineering and research connected with the oil industry. The Company is to pay the Iranian government taxes amounting to £225,000 a year for fifteen years and £300,000 a year for a further fifteen years. Finally the government is to receive a royalty of four shillings gold for every ton of crude oil extracted, and 20 per cent. of the net profits after the payment of a fixed sum to stockholders.

In recent years both the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which has formed a subsidiary, the North Persian Oil Company, for the purpose) and the Standard Oil Trust have been in competition for the concession for borings in the five northern provinces of Iran. But their real field of battle was not Persia, whose principal oilfields had already been dealt with by the concession of May 28th, 1901, to William Knox d'Arcy, but Mesopotamia, where the American Admiral Chester had had less success than d'Arcy had had in Persia. The concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company extends into Iraqi territory, in consequence of the frontier regulation between Persia and Turkey in 1913. The oilfield of Naft Khana lies on the Iran-Iraqi frontier. On May 24th, 1926, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concluded with the Iraqi government an agreement under which the concession, originally granted until 1961, was extended for a further thirty-five years until 1996. A subsidiary was formed under the name of the Khanaqin Oil Company; a pipeline was laid along the fifty kilometres from Naft Khana to the nearest railway station, Khanaqin, and in 1927

a refinery was set up by the river Alwand. At present the Anglo-Iranian is extracting little oil in Iraq, for sale only within the country. The Basra district is supplied from the refinery at Abadan. Oil extraction on a large scale only began when the pipe-line from Iraq to Haifa had been laid. Thus the oil yield in this district did not approach the potential yield until 1935. The yield in 1930 was 80,000 tons and in 1933, 122,000 tons, but in 1934, the first year in which work really started, the yield reached 978,000 tons. During 1935 there were shipped from Haifa 1,823,426 tons of oil, and from Tripoli 1,625,773 tons. The yield of Iraqi oil has considerably cheapened the supply in the country, and in view of the growing importation of motor pumps for irrigation and of motor cars the cheapening has been of considerable economic importance.

The struggle for the oilfields of northern Mesopotamia has lasted a quarter of a century. After Admiral Chester's failure the Germans, who were busy at the time with negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railway concession, tried to secure oilfields in Mosul and Anatolia, and so to make an end of Germany's dependence on foreign companies, which was bound to be serious for her, especially in war time. (Germany's lack of oil deposits in her own territory was one of the main reasons for the efforts made by German chemists to produce synthetic spirit. If this process could be so cheapened as to enable the synthetic product to meet the commercial competition of natural petroleum, this would mean a further great revolution in the field of motor fuel supply, and would bring changes in the international situation in regard to economic policy.) The Sultan, and after him the Young Turks, refused for a long time to grant this important concession. Not until Great Britain and Germany united in 1912 to form the Turkish Petroleum Company was their joint political pressure at the Sublime Porte sufficient to compel the grant of the concession. Half of the shares were to be held by the Turkish National Bank, a British financial institution (its place was soon

taken by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company), a quarter by the Royal Dutch Shell group, and a quarter by the Deutsche Bank.

After the world war Great Britain seemed to be mistress of the oil supplies of the Near East. With the ending of the German participation the Turkish Petroleum Company had become purely British, and British troops were not only in occupation of southern Persia, but also of the north Persian provinces, whose oil resources were awaiting development. British troops had also pushed into Transcaspia and the Caucasus, where it was important for them not only to stave off the menace from the Russian Revolution but to obtain control of the rich oilfields of Baku. Not all these hopes attained fruition. North Persia and the former Russian territory had to be evacuated; the Soviet Union has nationalized the oilfields by the Caspian and increased output by perfecting the technique of extraction and rationalizing the industry; and even the British monopoly of the Turkish Petroleum Company was broken down and foreign interests had to be granted shares in it. After 1919 there began the struggle over the natural wealth belonging to the peoples of the Levant who had been "freed from the Turkish yoke". Only the course of historic events prevented a similar struggle over the natural wealth of "liberated" peoples of the Soviet Union. The Treaty of San Remo envisaged both possibilities.

France and the United States were competitors of Great Britain. The secret agreements concluded between France and Britain during the world war concerning the partition of Turkey in Asia had promised Mosul to the French as a sphere of influence. At the San Remo Conference of April 1920, in which the Asiatic spoils of the world war were shared out in various forms, as spheres of influence, Mandates, or concessions, France agreed to transfer Mosul and its oil to Great Britain in return for a 25 per cent. share in the Turkish Petroleum Company and for the recognition of the French Mandate over the whole of Syria, including even Damascus, which

was then under the rule of Britain's ally King Faisal. The agreement ran as follows :

"In the territories which belonged to the late Russian Empire, the two Governments will give their joint support to their respective nationals in their joint efforts to obtain petroleum concessions and facilities to export, and to arrange delivery of petroleum supplies. . . . In the event of a private petroleum company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oilfields, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of twenty-five per cent. in such company. . . . It is understood that the said petroleum company shall be under permanent British control. . . . Should the private petroleum company be constituted as aforesaid, the native Government or other native interests shall be allowed, if they so desire, to participate up to a maximum of twenty per cent. of the share capital of the said company."—*State Papers*, 1920, p. 350.

It was also stipulated in the agreement that pipe-lines should be laid from Persia (Iran) and from Iraq to the Mediterranean and should be carried through the French mandated territory to a Syrian port. This stipulation gave rise later to an Anglo-French dispute, as Great Britain decided to lay the pipe-line from Iraq to Haifa, in territory under its own administration.

France appeared to be satisfied, but American oil interests claimed participation in the oil of Mesopotamia. Their demands were energetically pressed by the American government under President Harding, himself intimately associated with the American heavy industry and oil combines. His Cabinet included Albert B. Fall, who later, together with his business friends Harry F. Sinclair, the oil magnate, and Edward L. Doheny, was involved in the Teapot Dome scandal. The British government sent Sir John Cadman, the British negotiator at San Remo and one of the heads of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to Washington to try to win over the Standard Oil Company.

by the offer of a 25 per cent. share in the Turkish Petroleum Company.

The battle of the oil interests produced political conflicts. The Americans had no direct territorial interests. They were fighting for the principle of the open door, which Henry U. Höpli has described as "the theory under which the economically stronger is enabled to exploit the economically weaker". The Anglo-French conflict in the Levant was over territorial issues, and it did not at once abate in the years that followed. Great Britain felt that her route to India would not be secure unless she had possession also of the Syrian ports; France had not forgotten her historic claims to Palestine and Mosul. And France in her turn had been taught by the world war how necessary it was to have reserves of petroleum. During the war she had been almost entirely dependent on American oil supplies. Immediately after the Armistice the French government founded the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles*, to develop the French oilfields abroad, present and future. The Anglo-French conflict was disguised in 1921 in the form of a Turco-Greek war: as Ludwell Denny says in his *We Fight for Oil*, "France and Great Britain hit upon the idea of fighting one another through third parties." France supported Turkey and Great Britain the Greeks. After the defeat of the Greeks the British were afraid that France would support Turkey in her claims to the Mosul region. This led Britain to agree in 1923 to the French occupation of the Ruhr, in return for which France allowed Great Britain a free hand in the Mosul region.

Mosul is important strategically as well as for its oil. The struggle for it between Great Britain and Turkey dragged on for more than two years. Not until December 1925 did the League of Nations Council decide in favour of Great Britain. Turkey agreed to the frontier delimitation in June 1926, perhaps under the threat of an Italian attack on Asia Minor with British approval. Great Britain had won. It was true that she no longer had a monopoly in Iraq; French and

American interests had a share in its development. But she had a controlling majority; under its statutes the company for the exploitation of the oilfields in Mosul, which changed its name to Iraq Petroleum Company, was a British company. An Armenian, Mr Gulbenkian, received 5 per cent. of the shares, the Anglo-Persian 31·25 per cent., and the British Shell, the American group, and the French group 21·25 per cent. each. Thus Great Britain holds 52·5 per cent. of the shares. But the essential thing is that in the event of war this oil will be available for the British navy.

On March 14th, 1925, a concession agreement was concluded between the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Iraqi government. The agreement runs for fifty-seven years, at the end of which the whole of the property of the company in Iraq comes into the possession of the state. The company was given the right to select within twenty-three months, on the strength of its experimental borings, twenty-four rectangular plots of land, each of eight square miles, in the districts of Mosul and Baghdad. The company had to undertake to carry out a fixed minimum of borings each year, and to pay to the government a fixed royalty for every ton of oil extracted. In the San Remo agreement it was originally provided that the indigenous government should receive 20 per cent. of the shares, but the Iraqi government failed to secure the fulfilment of this provision. The company bound itself to meet the requirements of Iraq in the first place, to employ as far as possible only Iraqis, and so far as possible to train Iraqis in the occupations for which there were not yet sufficient qualified indigenous workers. In all future share issues subscription lists were also to be opened in Iraq, and the Iraqis were to be given preference in the allotment of at least 20 per cent. of the new shares. The Iraqi government received the right to nominate a member of the board of directors. Under Article 32 of the concession agreement the Iraq Petroleum Company was to remain a British Company registered in Great Britain, was to have its head office within the British Empire.

and was at all times to have a British subject for its chairman.

The company began its experimental borings in 1927, and as early as October of that year it found at Baba Gurgur, near Kirkuk, an extraordinarily rich gusher. Large installations were set up, roads built, pipe-lines laid, and workings developed which cost the company in all more than £4,000,000. The company only extracted, however, enough oil for its own needs; commercial exploitation could only begin when transport was made possible by the completion of the pipe-line to the Mediterranean. With the fall in oil prices the British and American oil interests showed no great inclination to expedite the development of the Mosul oilfields; it was more important to them to have reserves for years to come than to increase the sales in an already overburdened market.

The Compagnie Française des Pétroles, on the other hand, was interested in obtaining as large an output of oil as soon as possible, in order to be made independent of imports by its own petroleum reserves. The Iraqi government was equally interested in an adequate output, as only that would provide it with substantial royalties, which it urgently needed for the development of Iraqi agriculture and industry. It put pressure on the Iraq Petroleum Company to select the fields it wanted as quickly as possible, so that the government should be able to give concessions to other companies for the remaining plots and so be able to increase the revenues of the state. The collapse of grain prices brought Iraq into a worse financial situation, and King Faisal took the opportunity of a journey in the summer of 1930 to get into touch with financiers in the European capitals and to pave the way for a settlement in regard to oil concessions that would be in his country's interest. The joint efforts of the French and Iraqi governments brought them a victory over the policy of making development depend on price movements and market conditions. On March 24th, 1931, a supplementary agreement was concluded between the

Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraqi government. Under this agreement the company received as its concession area all the land east of the Tigris in the provinces of Baghdad and Mosul. The company bound itself to complete the pipe-line to the Mediterranean by December 31st, 1935. This pipe-line was to be capable of conveying at least 3,000,000 tons a year. The company bound itself also to pay the Iraqi government a sum of £400,000 in gold every year until regular export to the Mediterranean began, £200,000 of this being on account of future royalties in so far as these exceeded a certain minimum. After the opening of the pipe-line the company guarantees the government for a period of twenty years a royalty of four shillings gold per ton for a minimum annual output of 2,000,000 tons, that is to say, at least £400,000 a year. The pipe-line was completed well ahead of the stipulated time, and was opened in January 1935. The prices of petroleum products in Iraq have been substantially reduced; oil fuel required for agricultural machinery and pumps is reduced in price by one-third.

The San Remo agreement originally envisaged the pumping of oil from Iraq to a Syrian port, but Great Britain soon insisted in taking the pipe-line to the Bay of Acre, where in the event of war she had the exclusive right of use of all port plant. Great Britain also insisted in bringing the pipe-line entirely through territory under British military supervision. France, on the other hand, was naturally interested in bringing the petroleum to a port under her own military control. A compromise was finally effected through the active mediation of King Faisal, and preparations were able to be begun in 1931 for the laying of the pipe-line. It runs from the oil region around Kirkuk across the Tigris to the Euphrates, which it crosses at Haditha. From there one branch crosses via Abu Kemal through Syria to Tripoli, and the other, which must convey at least 50 per cent. of the oil output, through Transjordan to the Bay of Acre. The Bay of Acre with the port of Haifa, and the Shatt-el-Arab from Basra to the Persian Gulf, will thus form in every respect

Great Britain's strategic bases in the Near East ; Haifa, on the Mediterranean, will also guard the Suez Canal, and thus outstrips Basra in importance.

The work of leading the pipe-line through the desert has changed the aspect of the desert. Workmen's settlements have been built, machines of the most complicated sort brought in, drinking water provided, asphalt roads built, and telephone lines laid. Thousands of Bedouins have found work, though this has only been a temporary palliative for the impoverishment of the owners of the herds of camels through the arrival of the motor car.

The definite settlement of the concession to the Iraq Petroleum Company gave the Iraqi government the opportunity of granting the concession for the oil deposits west of the Tigris, where the Iraq Petroleum Company had already had success with experimental borings near Kaijara, some sixty miles south of Mosul on the right bank of the Tigris. In 1932 the Iraqi government granted the concession to the British Oil Development Company, which, under British leadership, also represented German, Swiss, and Italian oil interests. The agreement resembles that with the Iraq Petroleum Company in providing substantial royalties for the government, requiring that the company shall always be a British company with a British chairman, and imposing on it the obligation, among others, of giving a number of suitable Iraqi students a training abroad at its own expense in geology and as petroleum technologists.

In a few years' time Iraq will become one of the most important petroleum countries of the world. The oilfields in southern Iran and northern Iraq, associated together and largely under unified control, will take the third or fourth place in the world's oil extraction. The pipe-lines to Abadan near Basra, to Haifa and to Tripoli, are making possible exportation from regions which in earlier times were difficult of access. Their situation by the Suez Canal and by the Persian Gulf increases the strategic importance of these oil supplies.

But oil extraction is also of more than merely fiscal importance to Iraq herself. She is concerning herself more and more for the gradual creation and advancement of an industrial working class in a country hitherto confined to peasants and nomads; she is working in the direction of industrialization and the transformation of her economic system. Cotton and oil are the two great economic interests which have involved the countries of the Levant in the modern world economic system and thereby in world politics. But over and above them there is at work the ambition of their peoples for political and economic autonomy, an ambition which has filled their minds in consequence of their contact with Europe.

INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD POLITICS

ECONOMIC CONQUESTS

THE characteristic feature of the age of Imperialism, and the basis of its conflicts, is the search for sources of raw materials and for markets of vast extent, and for strategic positions commanding the routes to them. But this is not all. The conflicts arise out of two contradictory sets of ambitions, whose course it determines—the ambition of the great empires for expansion, and that of the smaller nations for independence. Since the time of Napoleon the country between the Bosphorus and the Indian Ocean, the Nile and the Caspian, has been one of the principal fields of tension in world politics. In execution of the aims of the French Revolution, the genius of Napoleon had brought to Europe from Cadiz to Moscow a new self-confidence, a sense of freedom and energy: he made an end of the fusty provinciality, the isolation and backwardness of Italy and Germany, and the conception of Europe, which had gained a footing in courts and among a small caste of aristocrats and men of learning in the era of the Enlightenment, became an active force in the life of the peoples. These processes extended, in a very dilute form, as far as the Levant. Napoleon's expeditions and missions to Egypt not only made the Egypt of his day directly acquainted with its immemorial civilizations, but also laid the foundation for the awakening of modern Egypt which began under Mehemet Ali, the Albanian of humble origin who became an officer in the Turkish army and rose to be the founder of the dynasty that rules to this day in Egypt. Through Napoleon Egypt was brought within the field of the Anglo-French rivalry for the control of India and of the land route to India; and the rivalry over Egypt continued, though

for different reasons, until in 1904 King Edward VII arrived at an understanding with France, for which Egypt (and Morocco) had to pay.

Napoleon's activities also brought Persia for the first time within the field of Anglo-Russian rivalries; the rivalry over Persia continued in full force until 1907, when King Edward VII arrived at an understanding with Russia at Persia's expense. After Napoleon had failed in his plan of controlling the route to India through the conquest of Egypt and Syria, he tried in his struggle with England to strike through Persia, with Russia's help, at the heart of the second British Empire which was then beginning to grow. At the beginning of the nineteenth century French, English, and Russian missions were sent for the first time to Persia, to bring that country within the field of world politics. The result was a century of progressive weakening for Persia. Russia penetrated into the Caucasus and into central Asia, conquered Georgia and Azerbaijan, which had been Persian provinces, and weakened Persia's influence in central Asia. Great Britain protected Afghanistan, which formerly had been Persian territory, in its struggles against Persia, in order to preserve it as a bulwark against the advance of Russian influence through Persia; she extended the frontiers of British Baluchistan at Persia's expense, and established her influence in the Persian Gulf and over the Bahrein Islands, which had once belonged to Persia. The country was even more fatally weakened by the economic penetration that began with the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), which introduced the régime of capitulations into Persia and compelled the country to give Russia a free hand in commerce.

While Napoleon's emergence in Europe roused the nations of Europe from their lethargy, it accelerated the process of decay and dissolution in which the countries and peoples of the Levant were involved. These countries were brought within the sphere of world policy in the nineteenth century, but, just as in the economic field.

only passively. It was a universal assumption in European policy that the states of the Near East were destined to be "liquidated". Since, however, the interests of the European Powers conflicted, the essence of the Near East question consisted in carrying through this liquidation if possible without endangering world peace, and with due regard to the interests of each individual Power. It was not by their own strength and not by virtue of any national will to self-preservation that the Ottoman empire and Persia continued in existence during the nineteenth century, but through the conflict of interests of the European Powers. But it was a precarious existence. The formal independence of these countries was robbed of all reality by complete financial and economic dependence. Scarcely anywhere was the influence of foreign capital greater than in Turkey, Egypt, and Persia. In this respect the histories of these three states were identical; they were repeated in a slightly milder form in China and South America. The extravagance of princes free of all popular control, not seldom encouraged and exploited by Europeans, resulted in their acceptance of a steady succession of loans, which, being applied to unproductive purposes, rapidly swelled the burden of state debt into disastrous proportions. The loan service itself necessitated the acceptance of new loans, the grant of which was made subject to the grant in return of economic concessions, especially for the building of railways, the development of water power, and the exploitation of mineral wealth. The political power of the various states was brought to the support of their nationals in this hunt for concessions. The corrupt Oriental officials were tempted to more and more serious neglect of their duties toward their own country. The system of loans and concessions led not only to the exploitation of the countries in the interest of European capitalism, but to the further increase of corruption and of the internal weakness of the Oriental administrations.

It is true that some of these enterprises and concessions assisted in the development of indigenous economic

resources, but this was only an incidental and chance result ; the immediate purpose was the economic advantage of the European Power, which also, through its financial and capitalistic domination, secured political control. The countries quickly became bankrupt, and their financial administration was taken over by the European creditors. In Egypt the Caisse de la Dette Publique was set up in 1876. In December 1881, the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was constituted in Turkey ; it had seven members, six representing the European creditors and one the Banque Impériale Ottomane ; the Turkish representative was appointed only in an advisory capacity.

The Treaty of Sèvres of August 10th, 1920, envisaged the setting up of a Financial Commission, to consist of a French, a British, and an Italian member, to control the whole financial and economic life of the state. The annual Budget was to be laid before it and only to be presented to the Turkish Parliament in the form approved by it ; the Parliament was to make no changes in the approved Budget without the assent of the Commission. The Commission was to supervise the administration of the Budget and of all financial legislation in Turkey. To this end the Turkish financial inspectorate was directly subordinated to the Commission, whose assent was required to the appointment of members of the inspectorate. The assent of the Commission was required for all external or internal loans, and all Turkish sources of revenue were placed at its disposal, as the Commission alone was to take measures for developing the economic potentialities of the country. The Turkish government was to grant no concession either to a Turkish national or to a foreigner without the assent of the Financial Commission. The Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was to continue in office, but the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian representatives were excluded, leaving only those of France, Great Britain, and Italy. The Customs administration was to be entrusted to a Director General who was to be appointed by the

Financial Commission and to be subject to dismissal by it, and no change was to be made in tariff rates without the approval of the Financial Commission.

In the Treaty of Sèvres, which was never ratified, the control of Oriental states by foreign capital and its interests reached the theoretical maximum ambition of the European Powers, an ambition they were never able to carry into practice on such a scale. This past experience makes intelligible the aversion of Turkey and Persia to the acceptance of foreign loans since they have won their independence. They have preferred to put up with delays in carrying out important economic reforms and public works rather than incur the risk of falling again into economic tutelage. Next to the Soviet Union, Turkey and Persia have given the strongest evidence of their determination to preserve their independence by definitely emancipating themselves from the position of semi-colonial countries serving European economic interests.

There are plenty of semi-colonial countries economically dependent on foreign capital outside the Orient. The special feature in the East was that this dependence was clinched and reinforced by the system of capitulations, which not only secured to foreign capital and its holders freedom from taxation and placed them under courts of justice of their own, but prevented the economic and social development of the country and its administrative and juridical modernization. A special means of subjecting Oriental trade and industry to the domination of European and American capitalism was provided by the tariff legislation. Under this Turkey was only permitted to levy a uniform fiscal duty on imports of 8 per cent. *ad valorem*. She was not permitted to make any sort of differentiation between different categories of goods or countries of origin. European industry had in Turkey a permanently open market, an international free trade area at the service of foreign capital, while Turkish production could enjoy no protection either through tariffs or through treaties with particular states. When

the Turkish government wanted to raise the general rate of duty from 8 to 12 per cent., in order to increase its revenue, it had to purchase the assent of the Powers by a series of valuable concessions and heavy sacrifices.

Even after the world war the European Powers hoped to be able to retain their old position of advantage in the Near East; they were ready to agree to a relaxation of the capitulations, the misuse of which, they were unable to deny, had often been carried to grotesque lengths; but they regarded the abolition of capitulations as impossible. In the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey insisted on the complete abolition of capitulations, and Persia denounced them in 1928 without meeting with any serious resistance. Egypt secured tariff independence in 1929, but the capitulations continue in full force. The desire for the maintenance of capitulations, which are in the interest of the foreigners and not in that of the native population, finds very significant expression in the League of Nations Mandates, which may serve as an interesting type of camouflage and paraphrasing of the methods of imposing colonial status familiar in the Near East in the century before the world war, bringing them up to date or at least up to the date of the immediate post-war period. According to the Covenant the well-being and the development of native peoples is a sacred task of civilization, but nevertheless the interests of foreigners and of foreign capital are given first consideration. Thus until 1935 Palestine was entirely under British administration, and had no native authorities against whose "corruption" or "incompetence" the foreigner might need special protection; yet the foreigner in Palestine was better situated in many ways than the native, as he still is in Syria. The capitulations are formally suspended for the period of the Mandate; but the statute of the Mandate (which, of course, was created in order to train the country, which is "not yet entirely ripe", until it reaches a cultural and social level at which it could take its place on terms of equality in the modern world)

contains this provision in regard to the event of the termination of the Mandate :

“ Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.”

The old Ottoman empire collapsed long ago, the Turkish Republic has swept away the last vestige of the capitulations, but the League Mandate serves to maintain “ in their entirety ” the principles of this system, described by so many observers as an abuse, if the interest of the Powers demands it and if the Powers so determine.

But the Mandate not only maintains the obsolete system of the capitulations for an indefinite period in the interest of the Powers ; it also, in the interest of the Powers, restricts the fiscal sovereignty of the mandated territories. The Mandates for Palestine and Syria lay down that “ there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any ” State Member of the League of Nations. These two countries are thus prevented from negotiating mutual tariff privileges, quotas, and so on. All States Members of the League of Nations enjoy most-favoured-nation conditions in mandated territories, without such territories being permitted to claim a corresponding advantage. Instead of promoting the economic progress of the mandated territory, which should be the purpose of the Mandate, the “ sacred task of civilization ”, the lack of complete tariff sovereignty restricts the economic activities of the mandated territory in favour of the importing countries.

POLITICAL TENSIONS

Ultimately the interests of six Powers came into competition in the international arena of the Levant. It

was Austria and Russia who originally, in the eighteenth century, brought to an end the victorious advance of the Ottoman power in central and south-eastern Europe and loosened Turkey's hold of her European possessions. Austria's attention, however, was soon diverted from the Turkish scene ; so long as her rulers wore the German imperial crown or she belonged to the German Confederation, Austria's interests lay in the west. Only after 1866 did she seek compensation for her losses in the west through an extension of her influence toward the south-east. This necessarily brought her into conflict with Russia, who since the time of Peter the Great had regarded the Balkans, where peoples allied to her in faith and race were living under Turkish rule, as her own field of expansion. For Russia the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would have broken down the barrier that isolated her from the ocean. In the north she possessed only inadequate ports, ice-bound during the winter ; the natural outlet for the south of Russia with its great exports of grain was the Black Sea, but this remained an inland sea so long as its one narrow outlet was not under Russian control. Constantinople, however, was more than the object of economic ambitions ; it was the romantic dream of the Russian people, its Church, and its Tsar. Only in Constantinople would they be able to feel that they had won the full spiritual self-integration which united them with the cultural development of centuries, and the undertaking and consummating of which they regarded as their mission. Thus for the Russians the Bosphorus was a strategic, an economic, and a spiritual desideratum. While Austria-Hungary contented herself with influence in the Balkans, Russia's ambition went much farther ; she wanted the break-up of Turkey and the final expulsion of that state from Europe and from the Straits ; she wanted to restore the Byzantine empire, regarding herself as its true heir.

In the nineteenth century Russia had a rival in this ambition : a rival, indeed, who hardly counted politically—Greece, who was consumed by the " great idea " of the

liberation of Thrace and Constantinople, the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor, the southern shores of the Black Sea, and Cyprus, and of their re-union in the glory of the Pan-Hellenic past and future. But Russia pushed on not only west but east of the Black Sea ; she climbed over the Caucasus, where she came into conflict with Persia and Turkey, and she found south of the Caucasus a Christian people under the dominion of the Turks and in need of liberation—the Armenians. Southward from the Caucasus, and later through the steppes of central Asia, the way seemed to open for her to the Persian Gulf, and to the Indian Ocean, in rounding off her continually growing Asiatic possessions.

While Russia thus became the great adversary of Turkey in the nineteenth century, Great Britain had little interest in Turkey herself. All that was of economic importance was the cotton cultivation in Egypt ; scarcely a thought was given in the nineteenth century to the oil deposits of Persia and Iraq. For Great Britain the Ottoman empire and Egypt were of importance as transit countries between Europe and southern Asia ; her policy was dictated by the fear of a closing of the route to India. She sought to prepare the way for the creation and safeguarding of a land connection with India. Great Britain's policy in the nineteenth century was directed to the preservation of Turkey ; in this she was also concerned for her seventy million Mohammedan subjects in India, who represented there the best support of British rule against the growing unrest of the Hindus. On the other hand, Great Britain could not permit Turkey to grow stronger. A weak Turkey on the route to India mattered little, while any other Power in possession in her place of important regions of Asia Minor might be a very serious obstacle. The " Sick Man " was to be kept alive, but must not be allowed to get well.

As with Turkey, so with Persia : Great Britain was interested in her preservation, but not in any increase in her strength. Persia and Afghanistan were necessary to Great Britain as buffer states between India and Russian

penetration from the north. The safeguarding of India was served by the transformation of the Indian Ocean and its two approaches, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, into British waters, surrounded on all sides by British possessions or spheres of influence. The Red Sea was enclosed through the possession of the Sinai peninsula and of Aden ; this process was completed in recent years through the acquisition of Akaba. The Persian Gulf, which has only two good ports, Kuwait and Muscat, was converted into a British sphere of influence even more thoroughly than the Red Sea, which has remained an international traffic route ; British governments have repeatedly emphasized Great Britain's special strategic, political, and economic interests in the Persian Gulf. This policy was given its most decided expression in the declaration of the British government of May 5th, 1903, that "His Majesty's Government would regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and would certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal."

As long ago as 1798 the English concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Oman, to exclude the French from there. In 1903 Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Persian Gulf assumed threatening forms. In November of that year Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, undertook a voyage from Karachi into the Persian Gulf, accompanied by British warships, which had much of the nature of a naval demonstration. The whole of the trade and shipping in the Persian Gulf was in British or Anglo-Indian hands ; it was bound, therefore, to arouse apprehension in Great Britain when it was proposed to extend the Baghdad Railway to Kuwait, the best port in the Gulf. But Great Britain had already protected herself. All the states on the shores of the Persian Gulf have come through a series of treaties under British, or, rather, Anglo-Indian protection—the Bahrein Islands, which Persia also claims, the principalities of Qatar and Kuwait, which until 1914 were nominally under Turkish overlordship, the sultanate of

Oman with its capital Muscat, and the six principalities of the so-called Pirate Coast, off which there lie a number of islands which are in dispute between Persia and Great Britain. The Persian Gulf is of importance to Britain not only as a sea route but as an air route: the air line from Iraq to India makes use of the islands of the Persian Gulf, and that from India via Aden to East Africa will perhaps do so.

Great Britain has tried to penetrate Arabia from the Persian Gulf and from the Red Sea. During the world war the Anglo-Egyptian administration entered into negotiations with the Arabs of the Hedjaz; the Anglo-Indian administration negotiated with the Arabs of Nejd, whose leader, Ibn Saud, had conquered the coastal regions of El Hasa and Hofuf, on the Persian Gulf (until then nominally Turkish), in 1913, becoming thus a direct neighbour of the British sphere of influence. In 1915 the British High Commissioner in Egypt, General MacMahon, came into touch with the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, and on December 28th, 1915, Great Britain concluded a treaty with Ibn Saud, in which he was recognized as ruler of Nejd and Hasa, accepting in return a loose British protectorate. During the world war British troops not only penetrated through the Shatt-el-Arab, the only stream of fresh water running into the Persian Gulf, past Basra into Iraq, but also into southern Persia, where Great Britain held a strong position in Bushire and Mohammerah. The British purpose in the occupation of Persia was to prevent an anticipated Turco-German attack on India. Neutral Persia became a field for struggles and intrigues between Russians and British on one side and Germans and Turks on the other. After the collapse of the Russian front the British occupied the whole of Persia, together with Baku and Georgia on the west of the Caspian and Transcaspia on its east. Great Britain's power in the Near East appeared then to have reached its zenith. British troops controlled Constantinople and the Caucasus, Egypt and Syria, Iraq and Persia. This whole immense block of territory seemed

destined to form an assured bridge to India, and the German and Russian perils seemed to be at an end for all time. The Treaty of Sèvres, the Mandates over ex-Turkish territories in Asia Minor, and the treaty with Persia of August 9th, 1919, which amounted to the establishment of a veiled British protectorate over the country, especially over its army and its finances, aimed at permanently establishing this unhoped-for and to some extent unintentionally acquired position, resulting from the world war, and, of course, only made possible by Russia's collapse. But Russian rivalry was soon to emerge in a new and more dangerous form, as an ally of a new and totally unexpected factor, the will to self-determination of the Oriental peoples, which had started at the outset of the twentieth century as a movement of the intellectuals on the European model, and began amid the disasters of the world war to spread to the masses of the people and to win their active support.

Germany had turned her attention to the south-east comparatively late. It is doubtful whether the ultimate purpose of the Baghdad Railway and other projects of economic expansion in Turkey in Asia was to gain any increase of territory. What Germany was seeking was sources of raw material and markets for the industry of this youngest of the capitalist Powers, an industry which had made such enormous advances in so short a period but was faced everywhere with older competitors. German trade with Turkey had been insignificant just before the outset of the present century, but had grown with great rapidity. According to figures published by Eliot Grinnell Mears, German imports into Turkey grew from 1,239,000 dollars in 1894 to 22,915,000 dollars in 1912. The bulk of this advance, from 5,831,000 dollars to 22,915,000 dollars, took place in the six years 1906 to 1912. Up to 1906 Germany had imported only about half as much as France or Italy; by 1912 she had far out-distanced both of these countries. The building of the Baghdad Railway was to open access to more distant Asiatic countries for German trade and finance. This plan collapsed during

the world war through the British conquest of Mesopotamia, and the attacks against the Suez Canal proved insufficiently prepared; Germany's political and economic leaders then, after the Russian collapse, tried to find a way to the south-east through the Caucasus. "The politicians who advocated these plans promised themselves for Germany, given a strong position in the Caucasus, predominant influence in the Black Sea and the ability to close the Straits at any time, without being dependent for this purpose on Turkey. The Caucasus seemed to them to serve as a springboard for political activity in Persia and central Asia; the control of the Caucasus seemed to them to be nothing less than the keystone of German policy in the Near East. From there it would be possible to threaten India, and after Baghdad had fallen into British hands the slogan Berlin-Baghdad was very simply converted to Hamburg-Herat. The imagined route led via the Black Sea, Batoum, Tiflis, Baku, and Teheran to Herat in Afghanistan." (Kurt Ziemke.) So the collapse of Russia allured both Great Britain and Germany into Caucasian dreams, both of which quickly vanished into thin air.

France's interests in the Levant are more difficult to define in territorial terms. In all the countries of the Levant France was the leading European Great Power in the cultural and financial fields. Among the investments in the Ottoman empire French capital held first place, ahead of British and German. French was the language of culture and literature of the educated classes of all the peoples of the Levant; Paris was for them the centre of Europe; French ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and the lay state, had won the minds and the hearts of the progressive Turks, Egyptians, Arabians and Persians. France's cultural and financial interests in Syria were particularly great. They were further strengthened by the memories of the Crusades, by France's traditional position as protector of the Catholics in the Ottoman empire, and by the effort of the strongest Mediterranean Power in the western basin of the Mediterranean to obtain

a firm footing also in the eastern basin. Next to France as a Mediterranean Power came Italy, a late-comer like Germany in the creation of a unified national state and a powerful industry. She was interested in the Ottoman empire at three points, in the Adriatic, where she successfully competed first with Austria-Hungary and then with Serbia over predominance in Albania; in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, where as long ago as 1912 she occupied the important Turkish island group of the Dodecanese, with Rhodes, which is mainly inhabited by Greeks (these islands, together with the island of Castellorizo, just off the coast of Asia Minor, which has been developed into an air base and naval base, are a menace to south-western Anatolia); and in the Red Sea, where she attempted to penetrate Yemen and Asir from Eritrea. Italy is seeking opportunities of colonization in the Levant for her growing population. But these countries, now that national consciousness has been awakened in them and has penetrated the masses of the people, are a thoroughly unsuitable field for attempts at colonization. Even in Tripolitania, which is much more backward than the countries of the Levant and is everywhere thinly populated, Italy had to overcome the greatest difficulties for the most modest of success in colonization. Even without political penetration, the influence of Italian trade in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean grows through the country's advantageous geographical situation. Since the reconciliation with the Vatican, Italy has been trying to take over the protectorate over the Levantine Catholic Christians, hitherto exercised by France alone, and has begun to compete with France in the development of a comprehensive missionary and cultural propaganda.

DURING AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR

Turkey's support of the Central Powers in the world war seemed to provide the opportunity for Russia, Great Britain, and France to agree upon their plans for dealing

with the Ottoman empire in the event of their victory. The future territorial division of the Ottoman empire was partly determined by secret treaties (which only came to public knowledge in the autumn of 1917, after the opening by the Soviet government of the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry); and partly by promises, deliberately left in vague terms, which the Allied Powers, and especially Great Britain, made in the course of the war to Arabs, Armenians, Jews, Kurds, and other peoples whose support they endeavoured to gain in this way. These secret treaties and promises were made in the spirit of the greatest imperialist war ever known; and all of them were only binding so long as the relative strengths of the Powers that made them required or permitted their observance. Henry U. Höpli writes of Great Britain's promises that "it may be said in general that there was no intention of observing any of the treaties concluded in the course of the military operations if they ran counter to her interests", and this is equally applicable to all the other states. The coming years were to show the extent to which the small nations of the Levant were in reality "only pawns on the chessboard of the victorious Powers".

As early as March 1915, Russia, Great Britain, and France concluded an agreement under which Constantinople and the Straits were to fall to Russia and the neutral zone in Persia to Great Britain. The Holy Places in Arabia were to be put under an independent Mohammedan government. In the Treaty of London of April 26th, 1915, Italy adhered to these agreements, being promised in return the section of the south coast of Asia Minor around the Gulf of Adalia. At the end of 1915 the negotiations were concluded between Great Britain and the Sherif of Mecca, the independence of the Arabs being agreed to, subject to certain limitations which were not clearly defined. So soon after this as May 1916, Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot, the British and French experts in Levant questions, concluded a secret treaty in which the general idea was accepted of an "independent

200 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

Arab state or a federation of Arab states ", but at the very outset, while this Arab state was still entirely non-existent, it was divided on the model of the old Turkey or Persia into British and French zones of influence which made any sort of independence illusory. In addition to this, France received the Syrian coast and Great Britain southern Mesopotamia for administration as colonies, subject to no restrictions, while, with the agreement of Russia and of the Sherif of Mecca, an international administration was to be set up in the region west of the Jordan, with Jerusalem as its centre. Great Britain also received the ports of Haifa and Acre and the right to build a railway from Haifa to Baghdad. For a period of twenty years the Turkish Customs tariff, with its uniform *ad valorem* duties, was to remain in force in the "independent" Arab state. The importation of arms into the independent Arab realm was to be under the control of Great Britain and France, so that this state was deprived not only of all economic but of all military freedom of action.

In the spring of 1916 Russia gave her agreement to these plans of partition, being promised Armenia and Kurdistan in return. In order that Italy should not be left empty-handed, she was promised, in April 1917, the western coast of Asia Minor, with Smyrna, to which Greece subsequently made claim. This dispute led to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and this in turn to the Greco-Turkish war, out of which the new Turkey was to emerge. On November 2nd, 1917, Great Britain, through a letter from Balfour to Lord Rothschild, promised her support for the creation of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, a country which the Arabs regarded as a part of their future realm. Armenian delegations had repeatedly been solemnly promised by Britain, France, and America that an Armenian state should be set up after Russia's collapse; this state was also to include the historic regions of Armenia, although these were inhabited by a majority of Turks.

When the time came for carrying out these agreements and promises, the situation had fundamentally changed. Russia had retired from the war; and the victory over Turkey and over the Central Powers had been more complete than was expected. In the Levant Great Britain was dominant, as it had been her troops that had carried on the campaign in Mesopotamia and in Syria and had pushed on victoriously to the limits of Asia Minor. In view of the completeness of the victory, the Lloyd George Government departed from the view of earlier British governments that Turkey must be kept alive as a "sick man". But the sharing of the spoils among the various Powers was hampered by mutual suspicion; France and Italy, the two Mediterranean Powers, had no interest in an excessive strengthening of Great Britain in the eastern Mediterranean basin. Not until April 24th, 1920, was an agreement arrived at at San Remo. This agreement was the first public instrument after the war in which the oil question was opened up; it also laid the bases of the peace treaty of Sèvres of August 10th, 1920. This treaty partitioned Asia Minor into Greek, Italian, and French spheres of influence; it assigned Mesopotamia and Palestine to Great Britain, subject in the case of Palestine to the obligation of facilitating the creation of a Jewish National Home; Syria was assigned to France, and provision was made for setting up an Armenian and a Kurdish state.

But the Treaty of Sèvres had become out of date at the very time when it was drawn up. As T. E. Lawrence caustically wrote of the drawing up of the treaty by the victor states, "Each party making the terms considered only what it could take, or rather what would be most difficult for her neighbours to take or to refuse her, and the document is not the constitution of a new Asia, but a confession, almost an advertisement, of the greeds of the conquerors. No single clause of it will stand the test of three years practice, and it will only be happier than the German treaty in that it will not be revised—it will be forgotten."

Lawrence's forecast has in the main been confirmed. In the course of the two years that followed the San Remo Conference the situation in the Levant was completely changed. The Treaty of Sèvres disappeared from view. A new factor had unexpectedly come into play, the nationalism of the Oriental peoples, a new determination, strengthened by experiences of the war and its diplomacy, to maintain their independence. The Allied Powers had done much by their own conduct to awaken this nationalism. The contrast between their promises and their true aims had been too gross. As early as November 9th, 1918, after the armistice which had brought the war with Turkey to an end, Great Britain and France had made a declaration to the Arab peoples on the future destiny of their countries, in which freedom and independence were promised, but there were also promised an unasked "support and effective assistance":

"The aim which Great Britain and France have in view in conducting in the East the war which was unchained by German ambition is the complete and final enfranchisement of the peoples which have for so long been oppressed by the Turks and the setting up of national governments and administrations, drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

"In order to give effect to these intentions, Great Britain and France have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories where the Allies are still carrying out the work of liberation, and to recognize these governments and administrations as soon as they are effectively established. Far from desiring to impose upon the populations of these districts any particular institutions, Great Britain and France have no other concern than to assure, by their support and effective assistance, the normal working of the governments and

administrations which these territories will give themselves of their own free will.

“To assure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the countries by stimulating and encouraging local initiative, to favour the spread of education, to put an end to divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the rôle which the two Allied governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories.”

After this the peoples to whom all this was promised certainly had the right to wonder in the years that followed how far national governments would be permitted to be set up in accordance with the free choice of the native populations, and how far economic initiative on the part of the native populations would be encouraged and the dissensions between the various sections of the population no longer accentuated and exploited.

The first step in the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres came with the practical settlement of the Armenian question. It had already been settled at the time when the signatories to the Treaty of Sèvres were still holding to the policy of setting up an independent Armenian state. Simultaneously with the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, a treaty was signed by the Allied Powers with Armenia, containing various provisions in regard to the protection of minorities, most-favoured-nation treatment, and so on. It was no more than the ghost of a treaty. The Turks under Mustapha Kemal began in the autumn of 1920 an attack on the Armenian Republic, which had been called into existence by the agreement of May 28th, 1919, between the Russian and Turkish provinces of Greater Armenia. In the Turco-Armenian peace treaty of December 2nd, 1920, Armenia had to forgo the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and to content herself with a section of Russian Armenia. It was the last important official act of the Armenian Republic. A few days later Soviet Russian troops occupied its territory.

The Turkish resistance in Asia Minor to the Treaty of Sèvres, under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal, served

as an example and a stimulus to the other nations of the Near East. A period of unrest and ferment set in in all these countries, and was only brought to an end by the agreement of the Allied Powers to a series of concessions which set limits to their domination over this wide territory, a domination which at the beginning of 1919 had seemed to be secure and absolute. France renounced the economically important territories of Cilicia and southern Kurdistan and gave them back to Turkey. In the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey won her entire independence. On February 21st, 1919, a new Persian government came into power, under the leadership of Zia Eddin and Riza Khan, commander of the Persian Cossack brigade; on March 8th, 1921, this government denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement of August 9th, 1919, without protest from the British government. Persia was soon entirely cleared of British troops.

In Egypt, Great Britain had declared a Protectorate during the world war, and in 1919 she was unwilling to bring the Protectorate to an end. After months of unrest, and under the pressure of the changed situation in the Near East, she decided on February 28th, 1922, to recognize Egypt's formal independence and to make an end of the Protectorate. In Palestine the British government modified the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration through a statement made by Sir Herbert Samuel and repeated by Winston Churchill. The statement interpreted the words "National Home" as meaning that "the Jews, who are a people scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to found here their home, and that some amongst them, within the limits fixed by the numbers and the interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants."

In June 1922, before the conferment of the Mandate by the League of Nations, the official interpretation of the British policy in Palestine was defined in a White Book.

In Iraq the Mandate was replaced by a treaty with a parliamentary government; the treaty contains no mention whatever of the Mandate. Meanwhile Great Britain had agreed to the French Mandate over Syria, and allowed King Faisal, son of Hussein of Mecca, to fall: Faisal had founded a Syrian-Arab kingdom in Damascus. The British aim in this was not only to fall in with the French claims but also to drive a wedge between the various Arab countries. But Great Britain established Faisal as king in Iraq and his brother Abdullah as Emir in the country east of the Jordan. This latter move was regarded by the French as a menace to their possession of Syria. The after-effects of the old conflict between British and French policy in the Levant were still at work.

In general, however, the end of 1922 saw a completely changed situation in the whole of the Near East. It was reflected in declarations made by two statesmen of the Allied Powers, which throw a characteristic light on the extent to which valuations of one and the same event may differ. On November 22nd, 1920, at the first sitting of the League of Nations, Lord Balfour described Mustapha Kemal as a "bandit" who was utterly insensible to all the motives which the League brought to bear. In the French Chamber on July 11th, 1921, Briand said: "The Turkish Nationalists are suspicious like all nationalists; they are men who, perhaps owing to the immoderation of some parts of the Treaty of Sèvres, have plunged into nationalism in a burst of violent excitement. In France, when French affairs are concerned, we call this patriotism. But when it happens in other countries it is often called fanaticism, although the cause is the same in both cases."

Briand's speech was a sign of the dawning of an understanding of the new movements in the Near East; so also was the change in the British policy in Egypt, Persia, and the countries of Arabia. It is one of the fundamental characteristics of British policy that it is skilled in adapting itself to changed circumstances, and that it

takes pains to keep to the path of agreement and forbearance, if it is able in this way to attain its purpose. In this it not only shows an eminently practical sense, a refusal to be led entirely by theories and an unfailing readiness to learn from experience, but also gives expression to those ideas of liberty and humanity which found their earliest and still find their most powerful embodiment in England and have also given to British imperialistic efforts the consecration of a civilizing mission. In the British character there is a strange mixture of a hard and unswerving pursuit of power, such as is to be found among other peoples as well, and a religious idealism. Britain's rule and influence in the East rested not only on the high degree of ability and integrity of her officials, who in many cases set a standard unknown until then in the Near East, but also on the ideas of liberty, manliness, and patriotic idealism of which they were an embodiment and which they transmitted to the best elements among the Orientals.

As the Europeanization of the East, this supreme triumph of the social and intellectual world of the West, seems to be turning against Europe and to be leading at the very moment of her triumph to her political dethronement, so the acceptance and development of the British model by the East has turned in a certain sense against British control in the East. In the extremely difficult years that followed the world war, and seemed likely to bring the collapse of the whole economic and political system of the world through a violent dynamic impulse fed from many sources, the British imperial will to self-preservation was forced into a position in conflict with the ideals on which it rests. The uncertainty as to what was coming and the desire to do all that was possible to safeguard the position won in a century and a half of unparalleled advance, explain the fluctuations which came in the British policy toward the new nationalism of the Oriental peoples, once the intoxication of the Lloyd George period, produced by the unexpected scale of the victory, had passed.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEAR EAST

Great Britain would never have been able to deal so freely with Persia and the Ottoman heritage in 1919 if the Russian empire had still been in existence. But Persia and Turkey would not have been able to offer effective resistance to the British plans and so completely to throw off the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 and the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, if the Russian empire had not given place to the Soviet government. With the arrival of the Soviet régime there began a new epoch in the history of the relations between East and West. Russia had been the European Great Power which had most seriously menaced the independence of Turkey and Persia. Now there rang out from Russia an entirely new note :

“Mohammedans of the East, Persians and Turks, Arabs and Indians, all those with whose heads and with whose freedom and homelands the greedy robbers of Europe have traded between themselves for centuries, all those whose countries the plunderers who began the war want to share out—

“We declare that the secret treaties of the fallen Tsar concerning the forcible acquisition of Constantinople are now torn up and abolished. We declare that the treaty concerning the partition of Persia is torn up and abolished. We declare that the treaty concerning the partition of Turkey and the taking away of Armenia is torn up and abolished. Lose no time in shaking off your shoulders the robbers who have pillaged your countries for centuries. Yield to them no longer the soil of your native land for plundering. You must be yourselves the rulers of your countries. You have the right to this. Your destiny is in your hands.”

This manifesto was an encouragement of the national liberation movements of the Oriental peoples. No doubt Communism had further aims : the national revolution was to become a social revolution, it was to be the peasants and workers of the Oriental nations who should

set up their state. At the Congress of Eastern Nations at Baku in September 1920, this declaration was made :

“ Our main blow must be aimed at British capitalism. But at the same time we want to arouse the working masses of the Near East to hatred, to the determination to struggle against all rich classes without discrimination. The revolution which is now beginning in the East does not aim at asking the British imperialists to take their feet off the table in order to permit the rich Turks to stretch their own legs with more comfort. No, we shall very courteously request the rich to lift their feet off the table so that there shall be no more vain luxury among us, no more contempt of the people, no idling, but that the world shall be governed by the horny hand of the worker.”

This attitude, however, was soon changed. The national revolutions in the Near East had replaced effete and corrupt monarchies, politically and economically dependent on Western Imperialism, by a young bourgeoisie which was out to secure political and economic emancipation, and the Soviet Union saw in them natural allies in the struggle against Western Imperialism and Great Britain. There was no community of ideas ; the new states were actively occupied, with unmistakable success, in keeping all Communist propaganda outside their frontiers. But the Soviet government was sufficiently realist to recognize the natural historic process, and adroitly adapted its policy to the situation. It most carefully avoided all exercise of Communistic influence that went beyond the minimum felt to be necessary for form's sake. Mustapha Kemal for his part entirely renounced all Pan-Turanian propaganda (which had figured so prominently in the programme of the Young Turks) among the numerous Mohammedan peoples of Turkish race who inhabit the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and the states of the Near East were united in a defensive relationship, since all of them imagined

themselves to be threatened by "Western Imperialism". But the states of the Near East not only strenuously shut themselves off from any sort of Communist propaganda, but also emphatically asserted their independence again and again in their relations with the Soviet Union. They refused to allow themselves to be drawn under its leadership; they merely accepted its support in order to hold their own against the West, taking care at the same time on no account to come to a breach with the West, whose support was necessary to them in order to enable them to hold their own against the Soviet Union.

All these states are undergoing a process of Europeanization and industrialization similar to that of the Soviet Union, though at a much slower pace and on a much smaller scale. As this process is taking place in the Near East with the assistance of the state and under the leadership of the state, it has many features in common with state capitalism. The Soviet Union is prepared to encourage this development in Turkey and in Persia; in the Near East it finds a useful market at its door for its own growing industries, just as Turkey, as the pioneer of industrialization in Asia Minor, will seek for markets in the neighbouring Asiatic states. Thus there is an economic as well as a political community of interest. Both are exceeded in importance by the strategic community of interest, as Turkey and Iran, owing to their situation along the Straits and the Black Sea, are of great service in covering the flank of the Soviet Union, just as their friendly relations with their great neighbour in the north give Turkey and Persia the assurance of opportunities of peaceful development. Thus a relationship has developed between the Soviet Union on one side and Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan on the other, which is built up on co-operation between the two groups, while preserving the complete independence and the fundamentally divergent structure of each party. The leaders of the Soviet Union recognize that any strengthening of political and economic independence of the former colonial and semi-colonial peoples represents in itself a weakening

of the imperialist capitalism against which they are struggling ; and they consider that there can be no question of a social revolution in the countries of the Near East until those countries have completed their bourgeois movement of national emancipation.

In the critical years during which they were establishing their position with regard to Europe, Turkey and Persia found in the Soviet Union an ally without whom they would have been unable to maintain their stand. The very existence of Tsarist Russia would have made their emancipation impossible or very nearly so. The Soviet government not only did not continue the policy of the Tsarist empire, but entirely reversed it, making a complete break with the past policy of all the European Powers in the Near East. It accepted and carried into execution all the demands of the national movements of the Near East in regard to their relations with Europe : the renunciation of territorial acquisitions and spheres of influence and the abolition of all capitulations and concessions. A European Great Power which until then had been regarded in the Near East as one of the most dangerous aggressors now voluntarily renounced everything that could in any way restrict the full independence of the states of the Near East. Russia did not give up her century-old struggle against Great Britain in the Near East, but took up the struggle in another sphere. Hitherto Britain and Russia had faced one another as rivals in the same field of ideas, and had competed with one another in limiting the political and economic independence of the states of the Near East : Russia now placed herself on the side of the national struggles for independence of these states, continuing in this way to pursue her struggle against Britain. Thus it was that the success of Turkey and Persia in their struggles for independence and in the abrogation of capitulations was at the same time a success for Soviet policy. This attitude of the Soviet Union has also influenced the attitude of the other European Powers in the Near East ; Britain herself, in her later spirit of accommodation in Persia

and in other countries, has been at pains to take account of the changed situation.

The new situation dates from the treaty concluded in Moscow on February 26th, 1921, between Soviet Russia and Persia. This treaty not only recognized Persia's entire independence and the abrogation of all capitulations and concessions, but also declared Persia's debts to Russia to be wiped out, and transferred to the Persian government the roads and railways which Russia had built in northern Persia. On March 16th, 1921, there followed the treaty of friendship with Turkey, Article 4 of which runs as follows :

“ Recognizing that national movements in the Orient are similar to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian working men for the new social order, the two contracting parties assert solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free choice of such forms of government as they themselves desire to have.”

This treaty was an important step in Turkey's struggle for freedom. It recognized for the first time the Turkish Great National Assembly and the Turkish national pact, together with the frontiers it established, the demarcation of which involved a Russian renunciation of territory. On the strength of this treaty Turkey was able to stand out against the Powers at the peace conference of Lausanne. On many subsequent occasions Turkey was able to take advantage of this entrenchment of her position. After the decision of the League of Nations that handed over the Mosul region to Great Britain, Turkey concluded with the Soviet Union the Treaty of Paris of December 17th, 1925, which was to draw still closer the bond between the two countries. In the additional protocol signed at Ankara on July 1st, 1926, it was expressly stated that the Treaty of Paris rests on the same principles as the Treaty of Moscow of 1921. On December 17th, 1929, the treaty was renewed. The policy of the two states follows the same lines, resting on

a common conception of the independence of the Oriental nations. As between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers themselves, Turkey intends to remain neutral, while preserving her friendship with the Soviet Union. Without desiring to imperil this friendship, Turkey wishes to keep open all the roads to the West. With this view she entered the League of Nations in July 1932. In doing so she became in effect a bridge between the Soviet Union and Europe, which itself began to put out feelers in the direction of the League. In the autumn of 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League. It had further reason for doing so in view of the completely altered conditions in Europe since 1933. Afghanistan joined the League in the same month; Iraq had already become a Member State in 1932, and thus the Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq are now all represented in the League of Nations.

In its intervention on behalf of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union not only gave support to their independence but worked to bring these three states into closer relations with one another. It is thus the originator of the loose coalition which these three states have formed. The first treaty of this nature was significantly signed in Moscow, as early as March 1st, 1921, between Turkey and Afghanistan. In this treaty the contracting parties declare "that all Oriental peoples have the right to entire freedom and independence, that each of these peoples is free to govern itself in the manner it desires, that each of them, if there should be any aggression on the part of an imperialist state in the pursuit of a policy of expansion or spoliation in the Near East, regards this aggression as directed against itself and will resist it with every means." Afghanistan declares in this treaty that Turkey is a model of national liberation, and Turkey binds herself to assist Afghanistan by supplying instructors.

This treaty also breathes the new spirit which has been brought by nationalism and Bolshevism into the relations of the states of Asia Minor with one another

and with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has surrounded itself in the south with a zone of neutral states, bound to it and to one another by treaties of friendship. This association of countries of Asia Minor, which makes impossible any menace to the Soviet Union in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and central Asia, came into existence on the initiative of Soviet Russia and is under her patronage. It is one of the most important achievements of the Soviet Union in Asia, though it is exclusively a political and economic achievement and not one of Communist propaganda. But this achievement was only possible because the Soviet Union was guided by ideas which placed the relationship between East and West, between Great Power and semi-colonial country, on a new basis. This policy enabled the states of the Near East to preserve neutrality in the Anglo-Russian conflict and to maintain their independence. These states, once the plaything of international politics and of world industry and finance, have attained to an existence of their own, the independence of which is carefully guarded on all sides.

MINORITIES

In the occasions of political tension in the Levant the problem of minorities has always played an important part. It has served again and again as a ground for the intervention of the Powers in the internal affairs of the states of the Near East. The minorities have thus become a means of weakening the states in which they lived, an obstacle in the way of the efforts at consolidating and strengthening these states and at gaining their emancipation and independence. The Treaty of Sèvres itself, after carefully defining the right of the ethnic, religious, or lingual minorities in Turkey, expressly provides that the Powers, in unison with the League of Nations, have unrestricted authority themselves to take the necessary measures to assure the protection of the minorities, independently of the Turkish state, which declares its

agreement in advance with any step they may take. The treaty aimed in this way at perpetuating the Powers' right of intervention and extending it at any time if they so desired. The policy of the Powers and its application on behalf of the minorities was of little advantage to the minorities, certainly of no permanent advantage to them. It prevented the natural process of integration of these minorities in the state, and the social and economic advance that would bring; and often it brought the minorities into a very dangerous situation, as it accentuated the hostility between majority and minority and increased it beyond endurance. Such apparent advantages as accrued to the minority turned in the last resort greatly to the disadvantage not only of the state but also of the minority. Sources of conflict were created and attained a more and more menacing character. The internal peace of the Oriental states, and with it often the peace of the world, was endangered by nothing so much as by the policy not seldom followed of strengthening the minorities at the expense of the majority and playing off the two against one another. The minorities were often only too willing to permit themselves to be used in this way, blind to the potential ultimate consequences.

While the national process of integration in the Levant eliminated certain minorities as political factors, especially such purely religious minorities as those of the Copts in Egypt and the Christian Arabs in Syria proper, it increased the differences where there were diversities of race or nationality. Various differences grew in acuteness through the policy of the Great Powers. The most important example in the past of the political effects of the Powers' minority policy is provided by the Armenians, in whose favour the Berlin Congress of 1878 imposed reforms on Turkey and invested the Powers with a right of intervention. From then on the aiding of the Armenians and the prospect of their being able to regain their existence as a state in their historic homeland, in which the overwhelming majority of their race still lived as peasants, became the subject of vigorous propaganda among the

Christian peoples, especially in England. The Armenians were not only a Christian people but had a high level of culture; they were always keenly interested in the advancement of education and of their school system, their sense of their historic past as a nation was particularly highly developed, their church, a national church, was the loyal guardian of the national traditions and aspirations, and the Armenians placed themselves with the utmost devotion at the service of these aspirations. But the propaganda and the sympathy in the Christian states, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, for the Armenians and their cause were of service to them only for a period. The American writer Eliot Grinnell Mears has said not without justice in his book *Modern Turkey*:

“The Armenian tragedy in Turkey is the inevitable outcome of uncontrolled propaganda. Stimulated into a sense of growing independence and of false security because of the extensive publicity in foreign countries and the successful appeals for charity, these people were led to believe the time had come when they would be partitioned off entirely from their oppressive ruler, the Ottoman Government. How long will it take minorities or weak countries to understand that in practical politics outside assistance is a mere gamble? Yet, if ever a people thought that they were well supported from abroad, the Armenians were justly entitled to this opinion.”

The Armenians received repeated promises from the Great Powers and from public opinion, and large sums of money were collected abroad for them, with the result that many Armenians were actually pauperized by being made dependent on foreign support. During the world war the Armenians were military allies of the Western Powers, and even after the armistice they took an active share in Cilicia in the fighting against Turkey. The Armenians have a past filled with suffering and martyrdom

such as few other nations have borne. On March 11th, 1920, Lord Curzon said in Parliament :

“ Armenia is really an international interest, and it ought not to fall to the duty or to the charge of any individual nations to be solely responsible for this people in the future. Their sufferings have touched the whole world. The obligation to restore them has been given by the fighting powers of the world, and it is no unreasonable thing to ask the world—and by the world I mean the Allied Powers in the recent war—to show their interest in the future of that country.”

These words of Lord Curzon's were spoken in order to shift Great Britain's moral responsibility on to a collectivity which found itself just as unable to do anything as Great Britain herself. This melancholy interment of the Armenian hopes, in so far as they were based on British promises, was completed by Sir Austen Chamberlain when he declared in the House of Commons on December 5th, 1928 :

“ The history of this question is, I think, one of the saddest phases of the War. If there has been failure to carry out all the obligations undertaken by ourselves jointly with other Powers, I think the blame is not upon this country.”

It is true that Great Britain was not alone in having promised help to the Armenians. Boghos Nubar Pasha, who represented the Armenian cause at the Peace Conference, has said : “ The Armenians remember, and will never forget, the wonderful enthusiasm shown in our favour by the American people, and how greatly it was promoted by the personal action of President Wilson.” The consequence was that the Armenians fully trusted the United States, and hoped for their assistance in regaining the Armenian soil with which they felt themselves to be united by all the sacred memories of their history. Nubar Pasha defended their claim for the allocation to

them of the territories which in their opinion had always been Armenian geographically, historically, and ethnologically, even though they were now inhabited only by a minority of Armenians, on the ground that the country of their forefathers could not be denied them because there were now too few of them, especially since this minority condition was the result of massacres and expulsions through a long period of tragic history. The resettlement of the Armenians in their old homeland, in which the majority of their nation had always lived, would not only mean the recovery of this country through Armenian industry and enterprise, the Armenians would not only regain their place among the civilized nations of the world, but they would also become, "as they were in the past, an element of peace and prosperity in the Near East".

Before the war the Armenians had set all their hopes of liberation, and of union with the Armenians in Russia, on the Russians. Meanwhile the British had made genuine efforts to improve the situation of the Armenians by means of reforms. In the agreement of February 8th, 1914, the Armenian parts of Turkey were granted a measure of autonomy under international control. But this agreement brought the Armenians fresh hopes of entire independence, and on the other hand it opened the eyes of the Turks to the danger represented by the Armenian question to the security of their empire. During the world war France promised that the Armenian problem should be settled "in accordance with the high dictates of humanity and justice". But with the collapse of the Russian empire, to which it had been proposed to assign Armenia, the Armenian question became acute, especially as it was proposed that Armenia should form part of the buffer zone providing security against Soviet Russia, and should at the same time form a wedge between Turkey and Persia. In his speech of January 5th, 1918, Mr Lloyd George placed Armenian independence in his programme. A delegation chosen in the spring of 1919 by a Pan-Armenian Congress in Paris demanded from the

Peace Conference the creation of an independent Armenia, to be placed as a Mandated territory under one of the Allied Powers for the period of twenty years. "It is noteworthy that the Armenians asked of their own accord to be placed under a Mandate, in entire contrast to the Arabs, who rejected the mandate system. This provided the Allies with a really splendid opportunity of carrying through the idea of mandates to success in entire accord with the mandated nation as one which, by its own confession, had not yet attained maturity." (Kurt Ziemke.)

Thus the Armenian Mandate would have come into existence in genuine agreement with the terms of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, whereas the other mandates were not in accordance with its provisions. But nobody could be found to accept the Mandate, and so Armenia became a fully sovereign state against its will under the Treaty of Sèvres, of which it was one of the signatories.

But while the Powers and, later, the League of Nations were still debating the destiny of Armenia, it was in fact already decided. Armenia, already recognized as a sovereign state, applied for admittance to the League of Nations. Through the intervention of the Great Powers the application was rejected, though the hope was expressed that it would be possible to admit Armenia at the next League session. This hope was not fulfilled, although at subsequent sessions in the years that followed platonic resolutions in favour of the Armenians and their national home were repeatedly adopted by the League. The Armenian delegation at the peace conference at Lausanne was reduced to the bitter remark that the belligerent nation which had suffered most in the world war, and, trusting the Allied Powers, had lost one-third of its population in fighting for its independence, now found itself completely isolated, and surrounded by a silence in strong contrast to the propaganda which once had so greatly encouraged the national hopes of the Armenians.

In the end all the goodwill and readiness to help, which originally existed beyond question in Great Britain and America, was reduced to capitulation in face of the facts, and was unable to do anything to modify the fate of the Armenians. Armenia also exemplifies the wide gap between intentions and the actual execution of the mandatory idea in the former Turkish communities. The mandates were intended to bridge over the conflict between the secret agreements made by the Allies for the partition of Turkey in Asia and the Wilsonian principles of the independence of the small nations. The proposed mandated territories were Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria. The distribution of mandates was preceded by long and bitter struggles between the Allied Powers. The provision in the Covenant, framed in the Wilsonian spirit, that in the choice of the mandatory Power the wishes of the population should be the primary consideration, found no practical application. President Wilson did make an effort to put it into practice by sending two Commissions, one under Charles Crane and Henry King to Syria and Palestine, and one under James Harbord to Armenia. But the two reports were kept secret by the Peace Conference, and no notice was taken of their recommendations. The delimitation and distribution of mandates was decided neither by the interests nor by the desires and needs of the mandated peoples, but by the interests, desires and needs of Great Britain and France. The Powers were not interested in the mandates for Armenia, whose inhabitants wanted one, or for Arabia, whose inhabitants were certainly more backward and more in need of guidance than, say, the Syrians. The remaining mandates, arranged in the interest of the Great Powers, had to be imposed by force and maintained by force over the "liberated" peoples. The practical application of the mandate principle has little in common with Wilsonian idealism.

Nevertheless the relaxation of colonial rule which lay at the root of the mandate principle has been productive of good and has assisted progress. Great Britain in

220 INTER-RELATION AND IMPLICATIONS

Iraq, in wise application of her art of adaptation and progressive development of political forms, has given effect to the original intention of the mandatory idea, over-riding the spirit of San Remo and Sèvres, and France has had to follow her example to some extent in Syria, although only with reluctance and half-heartedly. There seems a prospect of many further struggles and difficulties in Syria before France will proceed to carry out the mandate idea as has been done in Iraq, but it is of great importance that in Iraq the mandate has developed in the direction originally intended—that of a compromise between the interests of the Great Powers and the national aspirations of the Oriental peoples.

NEAR EASTERN ALLIANCES AND COLLABORATION

The nations and rulers of the Near East know that in isolation from one another they are too weak to be able to defend their interests in face of the interests of the Powers. The economic and social transformation they are undergoing, the transition from an agricultural barter system to the use of money, involving them in the complexities of capitalism and industrialization, is calling for the recruitment of elements which can only be supplied by communities of a substantial size, as only such communities possess population, organizing ability, and economic and cultural resources and sources of energy on the needed scale. This naturally raises the question of union and mutual assistance. The idea of this forces itself particularly on popular attention in cases in which racial and lingual unity are present, the existing territorial divisions being the result of dynastic rivalries or the interests of foreign Powers, as has been the case in the countries of Arabia. Thus we find in the Near East two types of effort, one, among the countries of Arabia, directed to close union, even to union in a single state; the other, embracing peoples of entirely different language and origin, directed only to collaboration and a loose form of alliance and mutual assistance. The former of these

two movements, the Arabian unity movement, has been the work of the peoples, their governments, either in subservience to foreign Powers or out of concern for dynastic interests of their own, often working against the movement; the latter movement, working for the formation of a system of alliances between powers of the Near East, is at present being engineered entirely by the governments, which are national independent governments, while their peoples, differing in language and race, are strangers to one another and in many cases mutually uncomprehending.

A third "pan-movement", the Pan-Turanian movement, which came into prominence some twenty years ago, has since vanished from sight. After the Balkan wars and the loss of the bulk of its possessions in Europe, the centre of gravity of the Ottoman empire shifted into Asia Minor. The transfer of the centre of activities in Turkey from the European shore of the Bosphorus to Anatolia dates virtually from that period. The Young Turks were beginning to fear the loss of the Arabian provinces, and worked for union with the Turkish peoples of the Caucasus and central Asia, who were allied with them in race and language. Mustapha Kemal entirely dropped the Pan-Turanian idea. Instead, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Arabian idea had emerged, and it steadily gained in concreteness.

The beginning of the movement for the liberation and union of the Arabs dates from about thirty years ago; it embraced the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, and the rest of the Arabian peninsula, but not the Arabic-speaking races of the north of Africa. At the head of the movement there stood Arab officers of the Turkish army, who were influenced by the example of the Young Turks, and Arabian intellectuals, especially Syrians, who had begun to come under the influence of European thought. If the world war had not come, the preparations of their secret societies would have grown by 1920 or so to the stage when a general rising of Arabian countries would have come, with the aim of liberation

from Turkish rule. The war hastened developments, but at the same time put difficulties in their way. During the war the League of Arabian officers which existed in Mesopotamia rigorously avoided all association with the Entente Powers, considering that any European intervention would be much more dangerous to their future than was Turkish rule. A different policy was adopted by the Syrian nationalists, and by the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, who was under their influence: they entered into negotiations with the Entente. Hussein's rising against the Turks first brought into the public eye the Arabian national movement for unity and freedom; the movement was recognized by Great Britain and the Allied Powers. Hussein adopted the title of King of the Hedjaz. His rising brought valuable assistance to the British in the protection of the Suez Canal. His troops served as the right wing of the allied army against the Turks, and under his son, Faisal, and T. E. Lawrence, the English organizer of the "revolt in the desert", they conquered Transjordan and Syria from Akaba to Aleppo.

Hussein was a romantic dreamer, out to obtain not only Arab unity and freedom but the restoration of the Khalifate to its original holders. But he proved too little of a realist, too inexperienced in the ways of European diplomacy. Instead of insisting on precisely drawn agreements, he contented himself with vague promises from the British and started the revolt before treaties in clearly defined terms had been drawn up between him and Great Britain. About the same time Great Britain and France had concluded the Sykes-Picot agreement, disposing of the Arab countries regardless of the assurances given of their independence, and there began the interplay between incompatible public promises and secret agreements, in the meshes of which Hussein found himself entangled. No attention was paid to the protests of this aged Arab leader, and in the end he refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles and to join the League of Nations. There was an end of the dream of Arab unity and freedom; Arabia had been partitioned.

But under the changed circumstances of the post-war period the Arabs kept alive their ambition for unity and freedom. Their experience had taught them that they could only win independence by unity among themselves. Hussein's heritage was taken over under these new conditions by Ibn Saud, the leader of the Wahhabites, and by Faisal, son of Hussein. Ibn Saud, after wresting the Hedjaz from Hussein's hands, founded a unified central Arabian state reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. Faisal, as King of Iraq, stood at the head of the first Arab Member State of the League of Nations. These two rulers have beyond doubt been the ablest political leaders of the Arabs, incomparably more realist and more experienced than Hussein. Ibn Saud has succeeded in enlisting the religious energy of his Wahhabites in the service of the Arab unity movement and in bringing order and state cohesion into the former chaos of the desert, the essential preliminaries for the bringing of central Arabia into a unified Arab realm and at the same time for a gradual modernization.

Under Ibn Saud Mecca has once more become one of the centres of the Arab national movement, the centre that is most firmly anchored in the tradition of life and faith of the nation. Baghdad, under the able and statesmanly leadership of Faisal, has become another centre, more open to European influence and to social and economic modernization. Both of these rulers are working deliberately and with tenacity toward the goal of Arab unity, and their reconciliation in February 1930 brought this goal nearer. From the first Ibn Saud regarded his state as the nucleus of Arab unity, regardless of its poverty and backwardness. In Italy and Germany in the nineteenth century unification proceeded similarly from regions which originally were backward in economic and cultural conditions and had built up their power on a military basis. In 1932 Ibn Saud changed the name of his dual kingdom of Hedjaz and Nejd to Saudi Arabia, thus introducing the name of the new national unit. In 1934 he successfully demonstrated the military superiority of

his realm by defeating the only strong rival still remaining in the Arabian peninsula, the Imam Yehya of Yemen.

The Peace Treaty of Taif, concluded in June 1934, confirmed Ibn Saud's rapid and decisive victory. But its main purpose was to strengthen Arab unity. It was therefore described in the preamble as a "treaty of Moslem and Arab brotherhood, to promote the unity of the Arab nation, to enhance its position, and to maintain its dignity and independence". Both parties declared that "their nations are one, and agree to consider each other's interest as their own". The desire expressed in the treaty to form a united front against any attack on the Arabian peninsula marks a distinct progress, which ten years ago would have seemed almost incredible, in Arab national consciousness. Only a few years ago the two sides were divided by traditional feuds and by a vehement antagonism arising from narrow religious dissension, and both were regarded as moved only by an obstinate sectarian spirit and as completely alien to any broad nationalism. Now the tribal and sectarian particularism has given way, largely through Ibn Saud's efforts, to a new sense of community. Growing ties of solidarity and national feeling are beginning to unite the peninsula with the Arab countries of the fertile crescent in which Baghdad, under the leadership of King Ghazi (who succeeded to the throne on his father's death in September 1933), has become the rallying point of the national aspirations of the Arabs of Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. But nobody can say when or how the unity and freedom proclaimed thirty years ago by the first protagonists of the Arab national idea will be attained.

Baghdad also formed the link between the future Arab league and the much looser association of the states of Asia Minor, which originally embraced Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, and which is seeking the support of the now independent Iraq. All these states are passing through the same process of social and economic transformation. The country which has made most progress

in this respect, Turkey, is for that reason becoming the leader of the association and the model for the process of development. It is a process that has swept away the differences between the various states, some of which had lasted for hundreds of years. For decades the relations between Turkey and Persia were clouded by frontier disputes: the Turks claimed Persian Azerbaijan, which was inhabited by Turks, and the Persians regarded the Kurds as racial brethren who should be included in the Persian realm. There was also friction between Persia and Afghanistan, which had earlier been under Persian influence. In the Peace of Paris of 1857 the Persians had been compelled by Great Britain definitely to abandon the conquest of Afghanistan. But until quite recent times Persia had been trying to gain possession of the important region of Herat in north-west Afghanistan, and Afghanistan in her turn wanted to gain possession of Persian Baluchistan and so to secure access to the sea.

These differences were removed through the friendly offices of the Soviet Union. The Turco-Afghan Treaty of March 1st, 1921, first announced the intention of the Oriental powers, who were now assured that their rear was covered by the Soviet Union, to pursue an active policy. The treaty was followed by a new treaty of friendship and co-operation, signed in Ankara on May 25th, 1928; the first Article of this new treaty, which is not subject to denunciation and is to be regarded as valid for all time, provides that there shall be perpetual peace and sincere and unchanging friendship between the two states and the two peoples. On April 22nd, 1926, the treaty of friendship and security was signed at Teheran between Persia and Turkey, and there followed on November 28th, 1927, the Persian-Afghan Treaty. These are not alliances in the narrow sense but mutual undertakings of friendship and goodwill. This association and co-operation has become still closer in the last two years, through many visits and meetings at Ankara and Teheran and in the Soviet Union, though for a time at all events

Afghanistan took no active part in them. Turkey has been trying to bring in Iraq, so far as this is possible in view of the special position of this country with regard to Great Britain. Turkey cleared away her own quarrel with Iraq by accepting the arbitral award over Mosul, and has been trying to smooth away the elements of friction between Iraq and Iran. In recent years the former strained relations between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have been influenced by the progress of new ideas and a fresh outlook, and the closer political association will also lead to economic co-operation. The national Turkish commercial bank, Ish Bankasi, intends to set up branches in Teheran and Baghdad, in addition to the one in Alexandria. The national Egyptian commercial bank, the Misr Bank, has set up a subsidiary in Syria and intends to set up others in Iraq and in Saudi Arabia. All this is an entirely new development. The countries of the Near East, hitherto only passive elements in world economic and political movements, the arena in which European interests competed with one another, are becoming, as a consequence of their Europeanization, active participators in history.

METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF EUROPEANIZATION

THE Europeanizing forces at work in recent decades in the Near East, as in other parts of the world outside Europe, have been the same everywhere. The transformation now in progress all over the world is thus essentially a uniform process. For all that, there are important differences of detail. For all their uniformity, the forces at work have been operating in different environments, and their detailed operation has been conditioned by factors differing from place to place—such factors as the political system, the geographical situation, the national character. Consequently the process of Europeanization has followed, for instance, varying courses in Turkey and in Egypt, in Syria and in the Hedjaz. The fundamental process, however, has been the same—that of adaptation to the intellectual, economic, and social elements of existence which have spread over the world from Western Europe.

Europeanization has proceeded most rapidly and most thoroughly in the states which have won national independence, such as Turkey. Here the government is devoting all its energies to the development of the nation and the raising of its standard of living. In states which are not independent, in colonial and mandated territories, the foreign government directly or indirectly responsible for administration has little interest in the economic modernization of the country through the energies of the native population itself, or in any rapid improvement in the level of education. It may not hamper these advances, but as a rule it does not actively promote them. This is particularly the case in purely colonial countries, countries, that is, which serve for the settlement of European immigrants. In these countries least progress of all is made with the Europeanization of

the native population, since the necessary functions of Europeanization are fulfilled by the immigrants, with whom the native population is entirely unable to compete either in capital resources or in experience. Such countries become Europeanized, but the Europeanization does not proceed from the native population and in the main does not affect it. The first essential for the raising of the standard of living, for the awakening of a new sense of freedom and worth, which Europeanization brings with it for the indigenous masses, for the creation and assurance of a fuller, richer, and finer human life, is the possession of a government which feels itself to be intimately associated with the native population and its interests.

The pace of Europeanization and the form it takes are also very largely determined by the geographical situation of a country and its natural fertility. In regions which for centuries have been accessible to world trade, in the coastal districts of the seas crossed by European vessels, in countries rich in natural resources, the process of Europeanization can develop more rapidly and more thoroughly than in less favoured regions. Thus Turkey has an advantage over Iran, the Syrian coast over Iraq, Egypt over Abyssinia or the Hedjaz.

The third dominant factor is the character of the people. Europeanization means training in initiative, in activity, in discipline. It demands a steeling of the character, an independence, a civic courage, a devotion unknown or very rare under Oriental autocracies. A strong race, used to domination, like the Turks, will thus make its way more easily than softer and more pliable races like the Egyptians. There are also the differences, found all over the world, between the dwellers in the mountains and highlands and the men of the plains, or between country people and townspeople.

All these different factors reinforce or run counter to one another in each particular case; so that the Europeanization of the Near East, like every other element of real history, offers a variegated and multiform picture. The

process embraces the whole of the Near East, with which until quite recent times and in many cases even to this day the Balkans may be included—the countries, mainly of the Orthodox Christian Church, which at the beginning of the last century formed part of the Ottoman empire. Intellectual and social stagnation, the absence of life and change, and the adherence to an outlook on the world bound up with cults and with magic, were characteristic of Orthodox Christendom as of Islam or of Oriental Jewry even in the nineteenth century. But now “Europe” is penetrating everywhere. On its own soil “Europe” is passing through a difficult crisis, embracing all intellectual, social, and economic life; but in the outer world it preserves its power of penetration, it seems even to have increased it in recent years, to have grown in range and intensity, all at a pace never before known in history. It is a repetition, on an incomparably greater, a world wide, scale, of what happened to Hellenism, the conquest of foreign countries by the fascination of an intellectual system at a time when this system was already passing through a severe crisis in the country of its origin. The fascination of “Europe” is making itself felt by all the world. The backward nations feel that there is only one way of salvation for them—adhesion to “Europe”. Only at the price of this adhesion can they maintain their existence and achieve renewal and growth in stature. The direction is the same for them all, but the route varies according to the situation of each country and people. Out of the wealth of varied developments and efforts the examples of Turkey, Iran (Persia), and some of the new Arab states will be selected as characteristic of the developments of recent years in the process of the Europeanization of indigenous populations.

TURKEY

On October 29th, 1933, the new Turkey celebrated the tenth anniversary of its birth. For this occasion the citizens of the Republic had to learn the new national hymn, the March of the Republic. It runs, in effect :

“ Oh, what happiness have these ten years been for us ! We have set up a new home. The morrow is full of an immense hope. We have torn up the wild tares ; we have laid gleaming rails. In every struggle the Ghazi is at our head. The place of this nation is at the head of all.”

This hymn celebrates the great achievement of the construction of the system of communications. For coming years Turkey has set herself a new task—the expediting of industrialization. Its purpose is the same as that of the corresponding process in the Soviet Union, which until recently was a member of the Orthodox Christian and Islamic world but now is undergoing a process of transformation similar to that of the Oriental states, but more rapid. The Five-year Plan of Turkish industrialization, published in January 1934, is entirely under the influence of the example set by the Soviet Union. This plan, too, according to the official statement, aims at converting “ an economically backward and primitive agricultural nation into one of the most highly civilized nations of the world ”. Here, too, American experts are to be brought in to help, and here, too, the plan is to be executed under the direction of the state and largely with the resources of the state. The agricultural, mineral, and industrial potentialities of the country, which until now have lain fallow, are to be developed. The first Five-year Plan is to be followed by further similar ones. The economic aspect of Turkey is to be revolutionized. Hitherto Turkey was dependent on imports of manufactured goods ; now, as in the Soviet Union, only the means of production are to be imported, the country becoming self-supporting in foodstuffs and consumable commodities. In regard to many of these, such as sugar, chocolate, woollens, and shoes, this aim has already been attained. But the Five-year Plan has far more ambitious aims. As a Turkish Member of Parliament has declared, it represents Turkey’s resolve to be out-distanced by no other nation in the world in capacity for progress, in activity, and in independence. When the

Plan has been carried out Turkey will possess new factories for the production of paper, artificial silk, china and earthenware, glass, chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. The existing cotton mills, which employed 127,000 workers in 1933, are to be added to so that in five years they shall employ 350,000 workers. The number of spindles in the cotton mills in 1931 was 72,000 ; by 1937 it will be 300,000. The Turkish textile industry will then be able to provide 80 per cent. of the country's requirements of cotton goods. Four large new cotton spinning and manufacturing mills have been set up. New factories have been erected for the manufacture of paper, artificial silk, semi-coke, glass, and bottles. The erection of a large iron and steel plant near the Zonguldak coalfield is planned, to meet the requirements of the country's industries and of national defence. Three electricity generating stations will supply current to industry and to the railways. Mining is to be substantially extended and modernized. Railways will open up the principal mining areas, such as the copper mines of Ergani, where it is hoped to have an output of 10,000 tons in 1936 and 24,000 tons in 1940 (which would leave a surplus available for export), and the Zonguldak coalfield, where the output has grown from 70,994 tons in 1884 and 410,000 tons in 1922 to 2,288,000 tons in 1934.

An agrarian programme, to supply the country's needs of raw material, will be carried out alongside the industrial programme. Energetic government action has turned Turkey from a grain importing country into one with a surplus of cereals. Sugar-beet cultivation was begun in 1926 ; already it covers the whole of the country's requirements. In these two branches there has already been a certain degree of over-production, which has led to a restriction of cultivation. State assistance is intended to be given for the improvement and extension of the cotton crop and the wool clip, so as to cover the country's requirements and provide a surplus available for export. Thus there is growing in the Near East a busy internal economic activity, hitherto unknown, on the European

model; the Near East is Europeanizing itself, and in doing so is making itself independent of Europe.

The Turkish Five-year Plan sets the crown on the preparatory work that filled the first decade. The Peace of Lausanne of July 23rd, 1923, had set up in place of the state of the Sultan and Khalif, resting on a medieval religious conception of an empire, a modern national lay state free from all outside control and all interference in its sovereignty. The summoning of Mustapha Kemal, the victor in the war of national independence, to be President was the external symbol of this change. In the place of the legitimist dynasty there came the leader who had emerged from the people and was supported by the national enthusiasm. The sureness of purpose and the ruthless energy of a dominant personality were favoured here by the general tendency of the time to subject the constitutional, legal, economic and cultural life of the people to fundamental transformation. The process of Europeanization found a more receptive soil in Turkey than in other Oriental countries because there had been fifty years of preparatory work among the intellectuals. The victorious national campaign had also awakened national self-confidence and had created among the masses the political and psychological conditions for radical transformation. The conduct of the state in the new Turkey is similar to that in Italy since 1922 and in Germany since 1933 in that it rests on the personality of a leader, but in this case the leader was able first to satisfy his nation's claims in external policy and drew from that achievement the power to proceed to internal reforms. In its socio-political structure the Turkish constitutional system much more closely resembles the Italian than the German. Both were born at about the same time, and both belong to the Mediterranean type of civilization. The Turkish constitutional system draws its programmes and its ultimate aims from the rhythm of life and the intellectual system of the nineteenth century. Turkey's task (and the same is true of southern Italy and the Islands) is to replace the traditional pace of life of the

Mediterranean countries, with their primitive agriculture, by the rhythm of the industrial north-western Europe of the nineteenth century. A close association of all the forces of the nation in an intensified nationalism, conscious of its distant past (which it magnifies to mythical dimensions), and turning with indignation from the immediate past in which the country was merely a picturesque museum exhibit; the exploitation of all economic opportunities by an expanding capitalism with state assistance and control; industrialism and better popular education—these aims are common to Fascism and the Republican People's Party which Mustapha Kemal has created and which, as in Italy, is the only party in the state. The statutes of this party breathe the spirit of the nineteenth century, secularist and liberal, which to-day is penetrating the whole of the Near East and is fulfilling everywhere the same task as in Europe a century and a half ago, that of overcoming the darkness of the religious and feudal Middle Ages through the Enlightenment. The first article of the statutes runs: "The purpose of the party is a government through the people for the people, and the raising of Turkey to a modern state." They demand the entire separation of religion and politics and the organization of the national community on the bases of present-day civilization and the empiric and positive sciences, the full equality of rights of all citizens of the state, and the removal of all privileges of any class, group, or persons. Emphasis is laid on the importance of Turkish cultural activity and on the equality of rights of women.

Thus the Turkish Constitution is radically democratic, and the constitutional powers of the President, who in point of fact is an absolute dictator, are exceedingly restricted. Under the Constitution all legislative and executive power is in the hands of the Great National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage. It elects the President from among its own members by a simple majority of votes; the Ministry drawn from its membership is responsible to it; it decides peace and war, and all treaties of the state, and it can dissolve itself. The

President has a veto on laws passed by the National Assembly, but his veto is over-riden by a second passing. Thus under the Constitution the popular representation in Turkey, which has only one Chamber, is all-powerful.

But an ingenious mechanism has turned the constitutionally impotent President into an actual autocrat. The Chamber represents not only the will of the people but the entirely uniform will of the people. All the members of the National Assembly belong to the Republican People's Party, whose President under the statutes is Mustapha Kemal. The President appoints the Vice-President and the General Secretary of the Party, and with them forms the Presidential Council, which determines who shall be the candidates at the parliamentary elections; its decisions are absolutely binding on all members of the Party. The Presidential Council elects twelve party inspectors, who are responsible for the organization of the Party throughout the state. The Republican People's Party, and it alone, has its organization in every centre. Thus the Great National Assembly has unrestricted control over the country and is the source of all legislation and every state action; the Republican People's Party in its turn has unrestricted control over the Great National Assembly, and President Mustapha Kemal has unrestricted control over the Republican People's Party. He has thus become the sole pillar of the whole life of the state.

Mustapha Kemal's internal policy, directed to the building up of an entirely independent and industrially modernized state, rests on three main principles: nationalism, secularism, and industrialism. These are not new ideas in Turkey. The Ottoman empire formed a supernational unit up to 1908, held together by religious and dynastic bonds. The head of the dynasty, the Sultan, was at the same time the religious head of all Mohammedans, the Khalif. His Mohammedan subjects were supporters of the principle of his empire without regard to their race or language, and Abdul Hamid II, the last effective monarch of the Osman dynasty (which in

former centuries had produced a series of powerful ruling personalities), had tried once more to maintain Islam as the basis of the state against the intruding influences of a new age. All social and constitutional life in the Ottoman empire rested on religious traditions and canonical prescriptions. The many non-Mohammedan religious communities formed states within the state, living in accordance with their religious precepts and usages; they were autonomous administrative groups under the leadership of their religious head. The rule of the Sultan-Khalif rested on a medieval constitutional principle which in modern life was an anachronism, a principle which could be maintained only through the selfish interests and the mutual jealousies of the European Powers. Abdul Hamid's romantic and reactionary policy of isolation was unable in the long run to prevent the influx of new political ideas and forces. Under their impact this empire, which had endured for five hundred years, rapidly collapsed.

The new leaders who succeeded to power, the members of the Committee of Unity and Progress, were, like Mustapha Kemal, under the influence of modern Western political ideas. Their ideal was the temporal national state, maintained by the nation united by geographical conditions, language, and historic ideals. Thus they came into conflict with the religious principles on which the empire had rested and with Pan-Islamism, and also with the other Mohammedan and non-Mohammedan racial groups within the empire. In place of the religious "pan"-ideal they sought to put one of race and language: Pan-Turanianism, under the leadership of the Ottoman Turks, was to unite the Turkish races of the Caucasus, south-eastern Russia, and central Asia. Enver Pasha, who had become Emir of Turkestan, fell fighting against the Soviet army in August 1922, in an effort to save out of the wreckage of the Pan-Turanian dream and the chaos of the world war at least the old home of the Turanians in central Asia.

The Young Turks had vainly sought to create a modern national state amid the chaos of a dying empire, torn by

nationalist and religious strife and under continual pressure from external enemies stronger than itself. After the war Mustapha Kemal pursued the same purpose under far more favourable circumstances, and carried it into execution. He recognized that the Ottoman ideal of the state was untenable and the Turanian racial ideal impracticable. With his keen sense of realities he confined himself to the original Turkish territories in Anatolia, and determined to devote his whole attention to the Anatolian peasants, who in the past had borne the burden of the imperial idea without any return for their devotion. Mustapha Kemal would tolerate no rival, and in order to secure his personal leadership against any possible opposition he dealt terribly in the summer of 1926 with the former leaders of the Committee of Unity and Progress. Yet Turkey's internal policy after the world war under his leadership was only a continuation of the broad lines by which the Young Turks had been guided fifteen years before. But they had lost the Balkan wars and the world war, they had been the grave-diggers of the empire, and it seemed as if they were destined to make the very name of Turkey fall into oblivion. Mustapha Kemal was the victorious leader of the national struggle for independence, and his Turkey was the only one of the states that had been defeated in the war which had been able to replace a dictated peace by an advantageous treaty of peace negotiated between equal parties. This peace also created for the first time a Turkey which satisfied all the conditions for a modern national state. An end was made of all foreign control and all interference in the sovereignty of the country, which in the past had made all progress impossible, as in every country of the Near East. Turkey had become in regard to nationality and religion virtually a uniform state. The Christian minorities scarcely existed any longer. In 1923 there were living in Asia Minor a million and a half Greeks, whose forefathers were among the original inhabitants of the country and whose towns and villages in Ionia and Pontus could boast of descent from the old centres of Hellenic civilization east of

the Aegean. Together with the Armenians they had been responsible for the modern economic life of the country through their alertness, their industry, and their commercial ability. The forcible exchange of populations which began on May 1st, 1923, removed all these Greeks to Greece and brought about half a million Mohammedans from Greece to Turkey. This made an end for all time of the Pan-Hellenic dream of restoring the old Greece around the Aegean, a dream which had been shattered by the military success of Mustapha Kemal in 1922.

Before this the Armenian problem had been given a still more radical solution by sinister means. In Asia Minor there are now neither Greeks nor Armenians; the only national minority remaining is that of the Kurds, who number about 1,200,000. Mustapha Kemal set out to solve the Kurdish problem by ruthless Turkization. With his vastly superior army he was able after sanguinary battles to suppress the repeated risings of the Kurds in defence of their freedom, and to break their spirit, at least for a time, by means of drumhead courts martial and by a policy of colonization. The modern Europeanized national state he had set up had no room for national minorities.

But this modern state could only exist if its productive forces were utilized in the interest of the native population. This depended on developing the network of railways and communications in the wide and relatively thinly populated country, to make possible the exchange of goods between its various provinces, with the varied production of their different climatic zones and their great mineral wealth, and the transport of commodities from inland regions to the sea. In the fields of shipping, banking, and commerce a campaign was carried on against alien ownership and in favour of Turkish control. Turkish shipping has made rapid advance; as lately as 1926 it held the fourth place in the port of Istanbul (Constantinople); by 1929 it had risen to the first place. Coastwise shipping has been reserved to Turkish vessels. The

Turkish flag is also frequently met in foreign ports, in the Piraeus and in Alexandria. The improvement of Turkish roads is driving out the camel caravans in favour of the motor lorry, even in the mountainous regions. The aggregate length of roads in 1932 was estimated at 16,000 kilometres. The railway network had a total length of 2,316 kilometres in 1923 and 6,150 in the spring of 1931. In November 1935, two new railway lines were opened. One, from Irmak to Filios, running 245 miles through difficult mountain country, connects the coal-basin on the Black Sea coast with the industrial region of central Anatolia. The other, from Fevzipasha to Diarbekir, is 315 miles long; it runs close to the Ergani copper mines and for the first time opens up the districts of Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan to economic and-social development. It will be continued later into Iran.

On the completion of the railway building programme there will be two great lines in Anatolia running right across Turkey from west to east. They will be connected together and with the three sea-coasts by numbers of branch lines. There will thus be created a ring of railways starting from Ankara, from which lines will radiate in every direction, connecting with one another and with the heart of the country provinces which, owing to the difficulties of communication, have been entirely isolated until now.

Until 1929, when Turkey was able to introduce her autonomous tariff, she was like all other Oriental countries in importing industrial products, especially cotton piece goods and sugar, and exporting raw materials. The new Customs tariff aimed at protecting the country's growing industries, whose development requires the provision of the necessary capital and the awakening of the initiative of the population and its interest in technical advance. For the initial period the state is affording facilities to industry by admitting machinery into the country free of duty, by exemptions from taxation, and by subsidies. But the great bulk of the industrial enterprises are being started by the state itself or financed by it through the national banks. In this way the transition from a barter

system to that of trade and industrialization is to be facilitated, and a staff of organizers and of clerical and industrial employees gradually trained to carry out the new development among the Turkish people. This in turn requires an intensification and rationalization of agriculture. The farmer himself can only emerge from present conditions and advance to modernized methods of farming with the aid of the state, through the provision of credit banks and co-operatives, capital and training. The transition from an entirely primitive agriculture, bound by tradition and trading within the narrowest limits, to a rationalized, intensified, mechanized system, capable of taking its part in world trade, is extremely difficult. The Oriental peasant is intelligent and anxious to learn. But it requires all the care of the state to train him in the new mentality required by a more highly developed technique and system of farming. The government has provided a network of good elementary and secondary agricultural schools, has re-organized the agricultural bank, has abolished the old tithe tax, has founded a central bank for the agricultural co-operatives which it is actively promoting, and is planning the erection of great repair workshops for agricultural machinery.

Since 1929 the government has also secured a credit balance of foreign trade. The import of many goods that can be produced in the country or merely serve luxury requirements is entirely forbidden; on the other hand, raw materials, machinery and tools, seeds, and the like, may be imported without limit.

Among the many industrial works started in Turkey, textile and sugar mills have taken the first place; textiles and sugar had been the principal articles of import, while the country itself produced their raw material. The national banks created or re-organized have played an important part in the fight against the alienation of trade and industry. Among these banks founded and financed by the state, apart from the Central Bank, which has the privilege of bank note issue, mention may be made of the Industrial Bank, the Agrarian Bank, the commercial

bank Ish Bankasi, the Sumer Bankasi, and the Eti Bankasi. The names of the two last reflect the new Turkish theory of history, under which the Turks are descendants and cultural heirs of the Sumerians and Hittites. The "Hittite Bank" has been set up primarily for the financing of the electrification of the country and the development of its internal resources.

Foreigners are shut out of many occupations in Turkey. Turkish is required to be the exclusive business language within the whole country. Foreign experts are only appointed where no Turks are available with the required training, and are made to undertake to train Turks who can ultimately fill their place. Provision has been made for supplying Turkey within a short period with native experts through the re-organization of the Turkish collegiate and technical education system and by sending numbers of students abroad. Industrialization has also brought to the fore the problem of labour protection legislation. New measures under consideration provide for progressive regulations on modern lines such as have been unknown hitherto in Oriental countries. Rapid progress has also been made in recent years in increasing the productivity of native labour.

The Turkish government is also endeavouring to train and give settled occupation to a class of industrial workers. Many of the measures adopted in the field of education and in that of the modernization of public life also serve the rationalization and Europeanization of trade and industry. The introduction of the Latin alphabet, the simplification of the written language, the development of the educational system, and the special attention paid to occupational training in commercial, industrial, agricultural, and normal schools have all contributed to raising the general level of education. In 1933 there were in Turkey 6,733 elementary schools with 10,440 men and 4,624 women teachers, and with a school attendance of 366,344 boys and 201,619 girls. In addition there were 228 secondary and technical schools with 2,081 men and 1,065 women teachers, attended by 36,891 male and

13,650 female students. The university system was entirely re-organized. The old university in Istanbul was closed and a completely new institution opened in December 1933, largely staffed by numbers of the leading "non-Aryan" professors who had been driven out of Germany under the Hitler régime. The agricultural university has also had the advantage of the selection of eminent teachers.

Close co-operation is intended to be maintained between scientific research and economic planning. The Gregorian calendar has been introduced in place of the Mohammedan; the metric system has been introduced, and in May 1935, Sunday was made the weekly day of rest instead of Friday, the Mohammedan Sabbath. All Turks have been required to adopt family names in place of the personal names formerly in use. Mustapha Kemal himself took the name of Mustapha Atatürk. The old titles, such as Pasha and Bey, Effendi and Hadji, so characteristic of the old Turkey, have been declared illegal; Turkish men may only be addressed with the old Turkish form of Bay, and women Bayin. Thus class distinctions are to disappear in the new democratic Turkey, at all events so far as their recognition through titles goes.

For the new Five-year Plan close co-operation is envisaged with the Soviet Union. Turkish workers and engineers are to go through their training in Soviet Russian works. As early as May 1932, Turkey concluded with the Soviet Union a credit agreement which is characteristic of the tendencies of Turkish economic policy since the world war. The Soviet Union granted the Turkish government a credit of 8,000,000 dollars for twenty years, without interest, on the strength of which Turkey will buy machinery for her industries from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union makes its appearance here for the first time as a lender and as a country now able to export industrial and agricultural machinery and so to help the countries of the East which are emancipating themselves; Turkey shows her intention of accepting credits only in

order to enable her to procure means of production. The credit agreement with the Soviet Union was incorporated in the Five-year Plan for the industrialization of Turkey when the plan was worked out in detail.

Equally with her home and economic policy, Turkey's foreign policy is guided by the effort to make a complete break with the past. The "sick man" on the Bosphorus had been for a hundred and fifty years a plaything of European policy, and in his turn had tried to win over now one and now another of the states that menaced him, and to play each off against the others. The new Turkey has maintained the freedom and independence of its foreign policy, and has steadily pursued a policy of peace, in order to assure itself the necessary breathing space for years to come for the modernization of the state. The neutralization and demilitarization of the Straits has diminished the interest of the Great Powers in them. On both sides of these Straits, this immemorial bridge between Asia and Europe (by which the Entente armies suffered a serious defeat in the war), Turkey is still planted, to-day in a more real sense a bridge between two worlds.

The country is on terms of close friendship with the Soviet Union. It was the attitude of the Soviet Union that enabled Turkey to make headway against Europe in the difficult years between the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, and it was the Soviet renunciation of capitulations and of Russia's concessions in Turkey that prepared the way for the country's constitutional and economic renewal. When the national revolutions in the Near East replaced decayed and corrupt monarchies, dependent politically and economically on Western imperialism, by the rule of a young bourgeoisie out to emancipate itself politically and economically, the Soviet Union regarded them, as has already been mentioned, as its natural allies in the struggle against Western imperialism. In this there was no community of *ideas*, no success for Communist doctrines; the new states of the Near East had actively and successfully prevented

Communist propaganda from crossing their frontiers. The Soviet Union and the states of the Near East, with Turkey at their head, were united by a community of *interests*, both parties being concerned to prevent any return of their past semi-colonial condition, and to make a complete change in their social condition through the introduction of industrialism and of modern economic activities. On March 16th, 1921, Mustapha Kemal concluded a treaty with Soviet Russia, Article 4 of which reads as follows :

“ Recognizing that the national movements in the Orient are similar to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian workingmen for the new social order, the two contracting parties assert solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free choice of such forms of government as they themselves desire to have.”

Her friendship with the Soviet Union did Turkey service of the utmost importance in buttressing her position during the peace negotiations at Lausanne and also on later occasions. But the treaty of friendship, which has twice been renewed, does not mean that Turkish policy follows in the wake of Moscow's. The policy of the two states runs on parallel lines, under the influence of a common conception of the independence of the peoples of the East. Now that Turkey has acquired and is maintaining her entire independence, her intention is to remain neutral as between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, while preserving goodwill and friendship toward the Soviet Union. She cannot afford to endanger this friendship, but she intends nevertheless to keep open all the roads to the West. It was in accordance with this principle that Turkey became a Member State of the League of Nations in July 1932.

Under the influence of the Soviet Union a loose association has also developed between the states of the Near East, Turkey, Iran (Persia), and Afghanistan. The first of the treaties between these states was signed in

Moscow on March 1st, 1921, between Turkey and Afghanistan. In this treaty Afghanistan already describes Turkey as a model for the national liberation of Oriental peoples. Since then the economic and cultural transformation of the new Turkey has become the model for Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the rulers of these countries, Shah Riza Pahlevi, King Amanullah, and King Faisal, who became the leaders of the national independence movements of their peoples about the same time as Mustapha Kemal, have taken that leader and his activities as their model. Iraq and the new Arabia, in process of creation, which is to embrace the Arabian countries, and Turkey and Iran, will form a common front in the Near East. It will not be an alliance, but there will be mutual obligations of friendship and goodwill, with which there will also probably be associated economic co-operation. For the industries of the neighbouring Soviet Union the countries of the Near East form a natural market, and similarly any expansion of Turkish trade must be southwards and eastwards.

While success was thus achieved in the north-east in turning the traditional enmity between Turkey and Russia into friendship, there was success also, under much more difficult circumstances, in the south-west in making an end of the tension between Turkey and Greece. For nine centuries Turks and Greeks had faced one another as bitter opponents in the struggle for the heritage of the eastern Roman Empire; the years 1919 to 1922, with the Greek penetration into Anatolia and the atrocities by which it was accompanied on both sides, and 1923 with the vast miseries of the compulsory exchange of populations, had further accentuated the old hostility and left a legacy of deep embitterment. Nevertheless Mustapha Kemal succeeded in 1930 in concluding with Venizelos a series of treaties of friendship, which swept away all the old differences. The hearty reception given in Ankara at the end of October to the Greek plenipotentiaries was one of those statesmanlike acts which are of epoch-making importance, determining

the course of history for centuries to come. The Turco-Greek rapprochement was at the same time the consummation of the European peace policy which Turkey has taken pains to follow in the last dozen years.

Turkey sought to place alongside the association of the states of the Near East an association of the Balkan states, to stave off the rival influences of the Great Powers from the Balkans, where the old Austro-Russian rivalry has been replaced since the war by Franco-Italian rivalry. She succeeded in this through the conclusion of the Balkan pact in 1934, and her new rôle, in which she has become no longer a passive subject of historic change but an active collaborator in it, her strict policy of independence and neutrality, has put a completely different complexion on the "Eastern question" which filled the political history of the nineteenth century.

Thus the ten years of the new Turkey under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal have been filled in every field with an almost uncanny activity. Like the whole of the Near East, and at its head, Turkey has been going through the process of advance from one stage of civilization to another, a process which deeply affects every manifestation of social and personal life and aims at changing men, their habits, and their ideas. This is a difficult period of transition, full of inconsistencies, weaknesses, and inadequacies. The men affected by it are being drawn into a whirlpool of uncertainties. They are not finding it so easy to penetrate the essentials of Western humanism, the intellectual bases of science and research, and they are trying first of all to assimilate the things that are "practical"; but all this belongs essentially to the period of transition; these are symptoms of decay which are mixed up with evidences of advance, a fateful process with a double aspect, not to be retarded by any regrets or any romantic glance backward into the past. In this awakening out of centuries of passivity, narrowness, lethargy, there lies a creative fresh start. At the same time the men of the present day feel a hatred of the country's immediate past, which is scarcely yet entirely

in the past, a period in which they felt that they were despised, exploited, and humiliated, by "Europe". All the stronger is the growth of the desire to make an entire break with this immediate past, ignominious as it is felt to have been, to enter upon new paths, to take over in their entirety the lessons learned from Europe and to use them for self-protection against Europe. Mustapha Kemal is a son of this transition period. Like all great non-tragic personalities of history he is an embodiment of two elements, the outstanding energy and statesman-like ability of the born leader and the tendencies, independent of personalities, at work at a particular period of history and serving to shape it. The new Turkey is Mustapha Kemal's work, but he was only able to bring this work to completion because he undertook the direction of tendencies which had been striving for realization for a quarter of a century in Turkish as in all Oriental life, and allowed his course to be dictated by them, entering then upon that course with unerring sureness of purpose and with ruthless energy.

IRAN (PERSIA)

Turkey has preceded the other Oriental states along the path of Europeanization. She was favoured in every way, by her geographical situation, which had already brought her intellectuals into contact with Europe through many decades; through the victorious war of independence which assured her full sovereignty; and by the character of the people. In Iran, Arabia, Egypt the conditions were much more unfavourable. The process of Europeanization is thus proceeding more slowly, amid many obstacles, and often by indirect means. But in these countries also there have arisen leading personalities similar to Mustapha Kemal, who have initiated or accelerated this process, Riza Shah in Iran, King Faisal in Iraq, King Ibn Saud in the Arabian peninsula, Zaghlul Pasha in Egypt. Each of them was faced by a different situation, different geographically, politically, and

psychologically. Each of them had thus to carve out his own path. But all of them were instruments of the common process of Europeanization.

Iran is in the most unfavourable geographical situation conceivable. It is a basin without an outlet, surrounded by high mountain ranges. A large part of the country is desert. The permanently settled parts, in which agriculture depends on irrigation, are typical instances of oasis civilization. The nature of the soil and the climate form exceptional obstacles in the way of any development of a modern state in the vast but thinly settled country. The lack of all modern means of transport prevents any closely knit organization of the various tribes and regions. The townspeople are Iranians, among whom the national movement of recent years has re-awakened the memory of their great past. The warlike element of the population is formed by the non-Iranian nomad tribes. Since 1927 the Iranian government has begun gradually to induce the nomads to settle, but not until there has been further economic and agricultural progress in the country in general will it be possible to bring the nomads out of their deep poverty, and to incorporate them in the Iranian community and associate them in its efforts for economic and constitutional advance.

The difficulties in the way of communication, the poverty of the country, misgovernment, corruption, and above all the constant external pressure from Russia, were the causes of Persia's condition as one of the most backward countries of the Near East. The national movement which has modernized the state in recent years is engaged now in the effort to modernize the economic and social conditions of the country. Every economic advance is dependent on political and social conditions, and these in turn depend on the independence of the country, without which the government is unlikely to have either the will or the capacity to act in the interest of the population, instead of that of foreign states or groups. Iran has suffered from her geographical situation ever since Napoleon made her a pawn in world

policy and world economic activities. Only two states had any tangible interests in pre-war Persia—Russia and Great Britain. Russia was out to incorporate Persia in her empire, and pursued this aim by all available political and economic means. Persia's history during the nineteenth century and up to the time of the Bolshevik revolution is one long story of violation of the country by Russia. In scarcely any other country of the East or of Spanish America was such ruthlessness and unscrupulousness shown as by Russia in Persia. Even in the Ottoman empire this would have been impossible; there were other Powers too closely interested, and the country was too close to Europe and too open to the gaze of all observers. Persia was remote, outside the sphere of the immediate interests of the European public, visited by comparatively few Europeans, and reached only with great trouble and difficulty. Thus Russia had a free hand there. The extraordinary poverty of the country in capital, the entire illiteracy of its population, the fantastic corruption of its officials and of public life made it easy for Russia to exploit her own political, cultural, and economic superiority.

The only opponent Russia had to fear was not Persia, but Great Britain. Great Britain was interested not in the destruction but in the preservation of Persia, in order to keep Russia away from India and from the Persian Gulf. Great Britain wanted a formally independent Persia under British influence. She did little to strengthen or modernize the country, confining herself in general to the methods of an economic penetration of the sort carried on everywhere by the economically stronger Power against the economically weaker. Lord Curzon, who later, as Viceroy of India, exercised decisive influence over the Asiatic policy of the British Empire, set out to show in 1892, in his book on Persia, which laid the foundation of British policy in that country, that Persia's interests are Great Britain's interests; "in other words, the development of the industrial and material resources of Persia, the extension of her commerce,

the rehabilitation of her strength, these are the objects of British policy." "Unless, therefore, we are prepared to see Persia fall into the plight of Bokhara and Khiva, and to concede to a Power whose interests in Central Asia may in the future, if they do not now, clash with our own, an incalculable accretion of strength, Englishmen must be up and stirring, and the preservation, so far as is still possible, of the integrity of Persia must be registered as a cardinal precept of our Imperial creed."

Great Britain followed this policy until 1907, and protected Persia against excessive pressure from Russia. In 1907, to strengthen her European position, she concluded an agreement with Russia, the price for which had to be paid, and soon was paid, by Persia. The whole of northern Persia, economically the most fertile and politically the most important territory, with the capital, fell to Russia, who exercised unrestricted authority in this territory both in economic and political affairs.

Just at that period the Persian national movement had begun. The Persians forced the concession of a Constitution in 1906; they were the first Oriental nation to do so. The Persian nationalists had gained courage for this step in consequence of the weakening of Russia by the Russo-Japanese war (in which an eastern nation which had only shortly before then been organized on European lines defeated a European Great Power), and of the first Russian revolution, in which a people had shown the possibility of rising against despotism and corruption and compelling democratic reforms. They had also had genuine assistance, before the Anglo-Russian treaty, from the Liberal government of Great Britain, which had pressed for reform in Persia. But the Persian parliament had scarcely assembled and begun to enact reforms, and especially to wrest the finances and the administration of the country from a chaos of corruption and incapacity, when Russia, in league with the autocratic ruler of Persia and a section of the Persian aristocracy, made all reform impossible.

Shortly before the outbreak of the world war the final dissolution of the Persian empire and a Russian annexation of northern Persia seemed to be imminent. The Persian nationalists had shown themselves, in the few years that had elapsed since 1906, too weak to cope with the difficult situation.

The situation changed with the Russian Revolution. The Soviet government not only gave Persia back her independence, but enabled a first beginning to be made with constitutional and economic re-organization by renouncing Persia's debts to Russia, declaring the capitulations and concessions at an end, and restoring to the Persian government the Russian state and church property in the country. A Cabinet formed by the nationalists then came into power, but in 1919 Great Britain succeeded in once more forming a pro-British ministry, which concluded a treaty with Sir Percy Cox on August 9th, 1919. Under this treaty British advisers were to be appointed in all the more important government departments, British officers were to train the Persian army, British capital was to build the railways and other means of communication, and Great Britain was to have controlling influence in the revision of the Persian tariff policy. Great Britain was prepared to grant a loan, to finance the reforms carried out under British supervision.

Under this treaty Iran would have shared the fate of the old Ottoman empire, the only difference being that Great Britain would have been placed in a position of monopoly. But the victories of the Communists in Russia against the White armies and of Mustapha Kemal in Anatolia completely altered the situation. A new government was formed in Persia under Zia Eddin, a nationalist democrat, and Riza Khan, a Persian of humble origin who had begun his career as a soldier in the Persian Cossack Brigade and had risen to be its commanding officer. The new government, which had overthrown the pro-British ministry on February 21st, 1921, concluded a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia on February 26th, 1921, and denounced the treaty with Great Britain on

March 8th. A few weeks later the last British and Russian troops had left Iranian territory for ever.

Riza Khan, a born leader like Mustapha Kemal, had won such popularity in Iran through the success of the *coup d'état* that he soon became the unrestricted leader of the country. He, too, in 1924, wanted to set up a republic in Iran on the Turkish model, but abandoned the plan in view of the opposition of the priests, who feared any radical modernization of the country, which until then had been shut off from European influences. In the autumn of 1925 the Iranian parliament deposed the Kajar dynasty, which at the last had had no more than a shadow existence. On December 12th, 1925, a National Assembly convoked for the purpose elected Riza Khan to be hereditary Shah. He took as the name of his dynasty the Iranian name Pahlevi. On March 22nd, 1935, the Persian New Year's Day, the Persian government declared the ancient name of Iran as the only official name of what has hitherto been known as Persia.

In Iran as in Turkey the Constitution provides that the legislative power shall be in the hands of Parliament. But the Shah appointed the ministers and provincial governors exclusively from among trusted intimates, and so set up a personal dictatorship. In Iran, in her more primitive stage of development, the process of modernization depends even more than in Turkey on the energy and determination of the ruler. The Shah depended from the outset mainly on the army, with every branch of which, as a soldier who had worked himself up from the ranks, he was thoroughly familiar. The first condition both for the modernization of the country and for the preservation of its independence was the Europeanization of the army. For the first time in modern Persian history, the country possesses an army which is paid regularly and well and is well equipped. The army succeeded in a few years in establishing peace and order in the country and in turning a loose association of provincial and tribal units into a realm in which it was possible to lay the foundations of modern state organization and in which the orders

of the central government are carried out. Compulsory military service was introduced and was made a reality. The army was provided with modern war material, a rapidly growing air fleet was developed, special care was devoted to the training of officers, and the navy was strengthened by ordering new gunboats. More than one-third of the Budget is expended on the army, whose mobility is the first condition for the reforms in the fields of administration, economic life, and education.

The broad lines of the reforms in Iran follow those of Turkey—development of communications, modernization of the country's economic system through industrialization and through the introduction of intensive farming, precautions against the alienation of trade and industry, the setting up of the country's own financial institutions, the introduction of a modern system of elementary and higher education with special emphasis on technical and industrial training, and the reform of the financial administration and the judiciary, with the abolition of capitulations and all foreigners' privileges. But the pace of the reforms is slower than in Turkey. The country is much poorer in capital resources than Turkey, and Iran had not already in existence a staff of officials, teachers, and judges, trained on modern lines. Riza Shah has shown himself a realist in his policy; like Ibn Saud, he has taken full account of the existing conditions and the limits they set to the scope and the pace of all work of reform. None the less, in the last ten years Iran, too, has been revolutionized.

Iran is still in the transition stage from a theocratic to a temporal state. In Turkey state and religion have been entirely separated. Turkish civilization has cut adrift from its historic bases; the process of modernization has been carried out with much the same radicalism as among the Mohammedan peoples of the Soviet Union. The abandonment of the Arabic alphabet has made the Turk no longer able to read the Koran or the theological literature of Islam. Instruction in the Arabic and Iranian languages, the study of which was the basis

of the whole of the Turk's humanistic education, has been abolished. The practice of religion, the services conducted by the clergy, have been placed under the supervision of the state; the priest has become an official, no longer exercising any influence over the state but dependent on it. In Iran, on the contrary, the influence of the priesthood is still very great, and their opposition has so far made any radical reform impossible. Islam in its Shiite form is still the state religion. The Shah must be a member of the Shiite faith, and no law may be enacted which is in conflict with the canon law of Islam. Under Article 2 of the law of October 7th, 1907, amending the Constitution, Parliament must always include among its members five *mujtahids* (experts in canon law), as only they can say whether new laws are in consonance with the teachings of Islam. These five members are required to be men of proved strength of character and great learning, and thoroughly familiar with the needs of their age. The chief priests of Iran elect twenty eminent experts in the law, and Parliament elects from among these twenty the five men who form the Canonical Council to which all important projects of law that touch on questions of the Islamic faith have to be submitted.

In his zeal for reform the Shah at first aroused the opposition of the clergy, and it was the clergy who refused to agree to the setting up of a republic, as they feared that the Turkish example would be followed. The Shah succeeded, however, in conciliating the clergy and so obtaining the necessary consent of this influential caste to his mounting the throne. In 1927 he also expressly confirmed the privilege of the canonical Committee of Five in Parliament. The result has been to introduce a certain dualism into Iranian legislation, leading to ambiguity and half measures, since the Parliament, in order to modernize the administration of the country and its trade and industry, is enacting laws based on European conceptions, while the Committee of Five has to see to the maintenance of canon law, which permeates the whole of the country's legislation and the whole

judicial system. Thus the process of secularization in Iran, which is a constant accompaniment of the modernization of public life, is being carried out more or less in opposition to the traditional religious principles embodied in the Constitution ; and the consequence is that some laws are not placed before the Committee of Five, under a restricted interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution requiring this to be done, but the omission permits doubt to be thrown on the legality of these laws.

The *ulemas* or clergy in Iran are independent of the government. The government appoints and pays an *imam* at every mosque to preach and intone the Friday prayer, but the principal influence over the population is exerted by the *mujtahids*. Most of these pious and learned men live in the Shiite holy places in Iraq, outside Iranian territory. *Mujtahids* are not officially appointed but owe their title to the thoroughness of their canonical learning, to the depth of their wisdom and the holiness of their way of life. Thus the *mujtahids* and the *ulemas* have an influence which is often applied in reactionary directions and against radical reforms.

The Shah has pursued a path of moderate reform in favour of which he has had, in addition to the support of the army, that of the overwhelming majority of Parliament and of the priesthood. But there are also a left and a right wing, supporters on one side of radical and democratic reforms and thoroughgoing Europeanization, in whose eyes the Shah is too cautious and too autocratic, and on the other side supporters of a conservative attitude, who see in every attempt at reform and Europeanization a weakening of Islam and of the traditional bases on which they consider that state and society should be built up in Iran. But the opposition of both these extremes is far too weak to be able to obstruct the middle path the Shah has pursued. This path is leading Iran cautiously but steadily on the way to thorough modernization ; it is permitting the formation of a unified national will and the creation of an Iranian society which is slowly emancipating itself from its

traditional bases and from the antagonisms of families and guilds, nomads and town-dwellers, and is working towards a unity composed of new sociological factors.

In its cultural reforms the Iranian government is following the example set by Turkey. Numbers of Iranian students are being sent abroad every year at the cost of the state for scientific and technical study at European universities. In 1934 a state university was opened in Teheran, for scientific instruction on modern lines. It has six Faculties, religion and philosophy, science, education, medicine, law, and engineering. The old Persian literature is being studied again, and a language academy has been entrusted with the promotion of the modernization of the Persian language on its classic foundations and with the study of the question of the introduction of the Latin alphabet.

The Iranian government has embarked, among other things, on dress reform. A national Iranian head-dress, the Pahlevi cap, had been introduced in order to give all the subjects of the state the sense of unity and common citizenship. In June 1935 it was abolished in favour of European hats, which are removed from the head on entering houses and as a greeting—a breach with the past Mohammedan tradition. The number of persons permitted to wear priest's clothing has been rigorously cut down, and the customary titles, forms of address, and traditional elaborations of speech have been done away with. Thus by 1935 the Iranian reforms have taken on a radical character approaching more and more closely to the Turkish model.

Iran's attitude, like Turkey's, in foreign policy has entirely changed. Until 1921 her foreign policy was entirely passive: she was the plaything of Russia and Great Britain. To-day, like Turkey, she is pursuing an active policy of independence and peace. In 1928 the capitulations were abolished and foreigners were placed in every respect on the same footing as Iranians; the country established its full fiscal sovereignty; the note-issuing privilege of the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British

financial institution, was withdrawn; and in February 1931 the transfer of the telegraph lines of the (British) Indo-European Telegraph Company to the Iranian government was effected. On her own soil there is no longer any limitation of Iran's sovereignty. The government watches jealously over the country's full independence. In view of its memories of no distant past, it refused to allow southern Iranian territory to be crossed by the aircraft of Imperial Airways on their way to India. Only after long negotiations did it concede this right for a short period and under burdensome conditions. Where the Soviet Union voluntarily renounced all concessions in Iran and all rights under the capitulations, Iran won her entire independence in her relations with Great Britain only through a series of trials of strength, from all of which Iran emerged victoriously.

The last of these was the enforcement of a new concession treaty with the Anglo-Persian (now Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company in 1933. Iran is interested in this petroleum concession, as it represents an important source of revenue, and the company's widespread activities contribute greatly to the industrialization of the country. But here as elsewhere Iran tried as early as 1931 to secure increased recognition of the claims inspired by its new sense of independence, and to subordinate this British company to Iranian control. The conclusion of the negotiations in the spring of 1933 brought Iran entire success and at the same time greatly strengthened Riza Shah in his policy. Iran carried all three of her demands—the limitation of the area of the company's concession, giving the Iranian government a free hand in the granting of further concessions; the increased employment and training of Iranians in the extraction of oil, including training for the higher posts; and, finally, the securing of increased royalties, independently of the level of oil prices. The control exercised by the Iranian government has been strengthened, all workmen, and as far as possible the engineers also, must be Iranians, and the company is to pay £10,000 a year for the training in

England of young Iranian students selected by the government.

In the economic sphere Iran sought co-operation with the Soviet Union, and this eventuated in the trade agreement of October 1931, on terms advantageous to the Soviets. In order to preserve her economic independence and to be able to carry out the modernization of her economic system better and on a definite plan, Iran followed the example of the Soviet Union and set up a state monopoly of foreign trade. Her efforts to attain a maximum of self-sufficiency have steadily and greatly reduced the volume of her foreign trade. It is difficult to get imported goods in Iran. The monopoly of foreign trade has led to the conclusion of various agreements with foreign trading firms permitting the importation of certain goods in consideration of the export of Iranian goods to an equivalent value. This has prevented the import of luxury goods and other non-essential articles, has reduced the flow abroad of the very limited Iranian capital, has trained the Iranian public to pay due attention to the products of the country's own industries, and has permitted the setting up of industries in the country without resort to foreign loans.

The first condition of progress in Iran is to bring it into closer contact with the outer world and to develop the system of communications within the country. Until a little while ago Iran was remote from all important routes of communication, and was touched only by two seas, one of them an Asiatic inland sea and the other an arm of the Indian Ocean. British and Russian railway lines ran only as far as the Iranian frontier. The Iranian government has now begun the construction of a railway to cross the country from north to south, from the Caspian via Teheran to the Persian Gulf. It has developed new ports at both the terminal points, and it has decided to build connecting lines from northern Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Close connection with the Mediterranean and so with Europe is to be provided via Beirut, which will become Iran's free port. The railway network

will be served by the motor roads which have been built. These are an essential preliminary to the intensification of agriculture and to industrialization. The lack of good roads and railways has hitherto prevented the export of crops and import of machinery and has made impossible the development of Iran's rich mineral deposits, which include coal and iron. The road-building has also enabled caravan traffic to be replaced by motor traffic. Imports of motor vehicles have steadily increased. In 1924-5, 529 motor cars and 103 motor lorries and motor buses were imported; in 1928-9, 1,369 cars and 1,783 lorries and buses. Of the newly-introduced road-tax half is being expended on road construction and half appropriated in aid of the estimates for education and public health. The yield of the sugar and tea monopoly is assigned to the accumulation of a special railway fund, out of which the great railway lines are to be laid down in sections. During a period of five years the German Junker company has been organizing air traffic within Iran; now the Iranian government intends to follow the example of the Turkish and Egyptian governments in organizing its own air service through Iranian companies. Aviation has made rapid progress in Iran as throughout the Near East.

All this shows the efforts that are being made to bring this country, hitherto remote and difficult to reach, into touch with the world outside and with modern technical progress. Imports of machinery are growing, and with the aid of the Iranian National Bank mills have been set up for the production primarily of the two principal commodities imported into Iran, textiles and sugar. The value of the imports of cotton goods into Iran in 1931-2 was 231,000,000 rials, and of sugar 73,000,000. In the following year the imports dropped to 168,000,000 and 61,000,000 rials. In the same period the imports of machinery rose from 33,000,000 to 50,000,000 and of motor cars from 45,000,000 to 60,000,000 rials. Since 1929 agriculture has made very substantial progress through the introduction of modern methods, the better

utilization of water supply, the improvement of cattle breeding and the combating of the diseases of animals and plants. Agricultural colleges and secondary schools have been established, and in every province agricultural institutes have been set up with experimental stations and laboratories, which devote special attention to the improvement of tea and cotton culture and to cattle breeding and dairy farming. A veterinary college has been founded. Special attention is being given to afforestation. The industrial programme provides for eight sugar mills, to provide the whole of the country's requirements; two had begun working in 1934. The programme also includes the establishment of cement works and textile mills; in 1934 there were eight spinning mills and three textile manufacturing mills at work. A whole series of other works are contemplated in the very ambitious programme of industrialization. Already there are 17,000 kilometres of roads suitable for motor traffic.

This programme of rapid development is being carried out without recourse to loans: Iran, like most of the states of the Near East, has no internal loan and only a small foreign indebtedness. But it is accepted, as in the Soviet Union, that during a number of transition years the standard of living of the population will be affected. The Budget has been balanced, the balance of trade is in the country's favour, and the three financial institutions, the National Bank, which has thirty branches in the principal towns, the agricultural bank, and the Pahlevi commercial bank, serve as the financial instruments of the economic development of the country.

The Iranian government has not only balanced its Budget but carried out a currency reform, transferred the privilege of note issue to the National Bank (in which only Iranian capital is invested), set up an agrarian bank, called into existence a government department of industry, and issued a slogan never before heard in Iran: "Buy Iranian Goods." New legal codes have been introduced. The number of schools has grown from 612 with 55,000 children in 1921 to 3,642 with 182,000

children in 1932. The expenditure on education has been multiplied four times over in the past seven years. Every year the Iranian government sends hundreds of students to Europe at its own expense, to complete their education in the various branches of science, under a carefully worked-out scheme. Everywhere there are the signs of a fresh beginning, though they are hindered and restricted by the continuing influence of the heritage from a still recent past. The national consciousness has been greatly developed in recent years, though frequently it is not matched either by practical ability or by disciplined readiness for personal sacrifice. But in recent years the foundations have been laid on which, under the impulse of the deepening national consciousness, the modernization of the country and its economic system can be organically and securely developed.

In the neighbouring country of Afghanistan, where the conditions are even more unfavourable than in Iran, the first beginnings of modernization have been embarked on. In February 1934 an Afghan National Bank was founded, with government participation. It has branches in London and Berlin. It has been given the privilege of note issue, and has been made responsible for the organization of foreign trade, of government supplies, and of the monopoly in the principal raw materials.

SYRIA

The varying forms of the process of Europeanization in the Arabian territories of the former Ottoman empire may be seen in Syria and Iraq. Conditions were incomparably more favourable for Europeanization in Syria than in Iraq. The fertile coastal region of Syria by the Mediterranean had long been accessible to European influences, which had also penetrated into the four important towns in the interior of Syria on the borders of the desert. Iraq, on the contrary, is separated from the Mediterranean by deserts which until recently were virtually impassable for Europeans; its natural outlet

is the Persian Gulf. But in Syria the natives have had little active share in the process of Europeanization, which was due to the initiative and the activities of the Europeans; the Syrians themselves have been expending their energies during the last twenty years, as they are still doing, on the demand for national independence, while the Iraqis have won their national independence in recent years and have been able to make an energetic beginning on this foundation with the Europeanization of their country, much more unfavourable though its situation is in every respect. There is an entirely different atmosphere in Baghdad to that of Damascus or Beirut, an atmosphere of initiative, constructive work, and confident activity.

In Iraq a nation in the modern sense of the word is coming into existence; in Syria religious antagonisms dating from the medieval, shackled conditions of the immediate past are still alive and at work, and are being kept alive by the alien government. Until quite recent times the loyalties and the sense of community of the inhabitants of Syria were not bound up with their country or with the nation, which had no existence whatever in the modern sense, but with the religious group. The very numerous priests, many of them not very well educated, were looked up to with reverence; they were the leaders of the community in political and economic matters; and they represented the rigid and conservative element of medievalism, perhaps even more in the Christian communities than in Islam. The people held tenaciously to their various religious practices and customs; canon law, and the administration of justice by ecclesiastical courts, controlled family life. Under the Islamic Turkish rule this tendency of the various groups to live in isolation from one another and to form states within the state was recognized. There was no national consciousness, no sense of common citizenship of the state, no social intercourse, no common system of education. Turkish policy played off the various groups against one another; from the nineteenth century, when they began to take an active interest in Syria, the

European Powers were in no way behind Turkey in this policy; and since the war the mandatory administrations have even developed this reactionary policy further, and have made it the basis of their statesmanship.

This policy also plays a part in Syria in the administrative departments and in the educational system. Officials are appointed less on account of their fitness for their posts than of the group to which they belong, and are often expected to work for the interests of their group rather than for the general good of the state. The centuries of oppression suffered by Syria under her foreign rulers have prevented the population from developing any sense of citizenship, and have not contributed to the strengthening of character. Not until complete self-government is won will self-reliance and initiative be awakened, with a consciousness of unity between government and people and a ready acceptance of responsibility to the whole community, of which each will feel himself to be a member.

At the same time, before the world war Syria was the province of the Ottoman empire which had come most of all under European influence. As early as 1649 France had declared herself the protector of the Catholic Maronites; Maronite priests were educated in Rome and Paris. American missionaries began their work in Syria in 1821, and in 1862 they decided to found a college in Beirut, the first centre of higher education on European lines in the Levant. In 1875 the Jesuits followed with the founding of the French University of St. Joseph; they had resumed missionary activities in the Lebanon in 1831. Before long French, American, British, and Italian missions in Syria, Catholic and Protestant, were competing in the field of education, and to some extent in medical work. The mission often pursued more than merely religious and philanthropic aims; it formed men who remained loyal to the language, the stock of ideas, and the political outlook impressed on them at school. The states and the cultures to which the missions belonged extended their influence in this way in the Near East;

the intellectual impress received by their pupils subsequently had its effect in the political, economic, and cultural fields. Many leaders of public opinion in Syria and other countries of the Near East came from these schools. The Maronite and other priests and prelates of Oriental Catholicism who had passed through St Joseph's University became the pillars of French influence in the Levant.

But the European influence also found ways of exerting itself politically by direct means. The European Powers, in their competition for the extension of their spheres of influence, played on sections of the native population and engaged their sympathies not only in their own support but also as weapons against other Powers. The French relied on the support of the Maronites, the British on that of the Druses, the Russians on that of the Orthodox Christians. This rivalry between the Powers exacerbated the existing religious antagonisms, and bore the bulk of the responsibility for the sanguinary religious struggles of the nineteenth century in Syria and Lebanon. After the Napoleonic wars England exerted predominant influence in Syria. "The Lebanese had yet to develop acute antagonism of creed; and, so long as but one European Power, whether France before 1800 or Great Britain afterwards, was concerning itself with them at one time, they lacked the external temptation to dissension which was to offer itself presently. British influence, therefore, was doing as yet no more harm in middle and south Syria than French interest had done before it; but the fact that two European Powers, with growing and antagonistic interests in the Levant, had gained a footing, where one alone used to be, foreshadowed danger." (*Syria and Palestine*. Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.) Lebanon had experienced many struggles before, but these had been feudal quarrels, not wars of religion, and neither Maronites nor Druses had yet begun to aspire to oppress their neighbours with the aid of foreign protectors. They soon learned the art in the nineteenth

century—this art which has produced such fateful results in the Near East—and a series of violent religious and racial struggles turned the Lebanon from 1841 to 1864 into an arena of incessant bitter tension. The Great Powers were united in blaming the Sublime Porte "for what had been largely their own work". Not until an autonomous province of Lebanon was set up was this territory removed from the interplay of the activities of the Great Powers and given assured peace, until, after the world war, it was brought once more into the strong if not healthy light of European policy in the Levant.

In Abdul Hamid's time Syria enjoyed special treatment at the hands of the Sublime Porte. His reactionary despotism weighed as heavily on Syria as on the other parts of the Ottoman empire; but Abdul Hamid was turning his attention more and more to Asia, and realized the value of Syria as the necessary link in a realm it was desired to extend to Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Egypt. Syria was better provided with railways than were other parts of the empire. With the granting in 1888 of the concession for the building of the railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem, Abdul Hamid began an ambitious policy of communications which in the course of the decades that followed united Syria by rail with Constantinople and gave the country the line from Aleppo via Damascus to Beersheba in southern Palestine, with its five branch lines to Alexandretta, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, and Jaffa, uniting it with the Mediterranean. Syrians like Izzet Pasha el Abd, the father of the first president of the Syrian Republic, were among the most intimate advisers of Abdul Hamid, and owing to their influence Syria was one of the best-provided parts of the empire, though the degree of the provision can only be regarded as relatively good, in comparison with the other parts of Turkey.

The strongest influence in the process of Europeanization was that exercised by the foreign schools. It was exerted mainly, but not exclusively, over the Christian population. Great as was the service done in improving

the condition of the population of Syria, the influence of the schools had also in the long run fundamental disadvantages. To this day there are twice as many children taught in foreign or private schools in Syria as in the state schools. This prevents or delays the growth of the sense of unity among the younger population. In many schools the teaching is carried on in a foreign language unfamiliar to the children, and the country's own language, Arabic, is given inadequate attention. This works in two directions. The Armenian child who is brought up in one of the Armenian schools gains insufficient acquaintance with the language of the country in which he is to live and work. The Arab child, taught in a foreign language, never gains a full knowledge of his own, often is unable to read and write properly in it, and yet in many cases only gains a superficial fluency in foreign languages. In view of the poverty of modern Arabic literature, and the lack of scientific books and periodicals, the knowledge of European languages is indispensable to any higher education, but this necessary knowledge of the great languages of civilization is mostly obtained at the cost of inadequate acquaintance with the pupil's own tongue. This superficial Europeanization produces the type of Levantine who over-values the knowledge of languages and yet is without a really thorough knowledge of them. In the absence of national governments the mandatory administrations pay wholly inadequate attention to the provision of instruction in the national tongue in elementary and higher education; thus the foreign schools continue to be of great importance, as they are often the only places in which the native population can gain genuine education and be prepared to meet the demands of modern economic life. In 1934 in the French mandated territory of Syria there were 2,439 schools with 218,741 pupils, made up as follows :

			<i>Schools.</i>	<i>Pupils.</i>
State schools	684	73,689
Private schools	1,145	87,157
Foreign schools	610	57,895

Of the 218,741 schoolchildren in Syria, 118,550 were Christians, and of these only 10,329 attended the state schools; of the 80,815 Mohammedan children, 54,471 attended the state schools. The state education system has only been developed in any substantial degree in the Syrian Republic. There are seven higher schools, two of them for girls, with 1,404 students in all, and a university, the Arab University of Damascus, which has Faculties of medicine, law, and philosophy, and schools of pharmacy, dentistry, and midwifery. The teaching at this university is in Arabic. The number of illiterates in Syria is estimated at about 60 per cent. of the men and 80 per cent. of the women. In the Republic of Lebanon private and foreign schools are in the majority, the state schools playing only a small part; there is no higher state school, but the country is very well provided with private and foreign higher schools and colleges. The number of illiterates among the adult population is not very different from that in Syria, but almost all the boys of school age and about 30 per cent. of the girls go to school.

The methods of teaching in the foreign schools vary. In the French schools the children are taught French very thoroughly, and especially in Lebanon many of their ex-pupils have become entirely French in language and culture. There is strong insistence on the children speaking nothing but French even out of school; instruction in Arabic is neglected, the children are often without a real knowledge of Arabic, and Arab literature is beyond their reach. The French University, on the other hand, has devoted special attention to the study of the Arabic language and Arab history, and the members of its Oriental Institute and the publications of the Institute have done great service to the promotion of Arabic learning. The interest centres, however, mainly on the past. The French system of education has aimed at "Europeanizing" the children and so de-nationalizing them. To a Frenchman it seems natural that a Syrian should prefer French to Arabic. But in this attitude

the Frenchman betrays the characteristic failing of "Nordic" racial pride. He is ready to make the Syrians French and to admit them as equals into the French cultural community.

The schools of the Jesuits lay stress on the principle of the hard, humanistic education of earlier times. Supervision and discipline are exceptionally severe in their schools. The Anglo-Saxon schools proceed from other principles; especially so the American University in Beirut. The Anglo-Saxon's racial pride leads him to hold aloof from the native cultures, and so he does not fall into the error of attempting de-nationalization. Special attention is given to English teaching in the Anglo-Saxon schools; English is made to serve as the medium of association between European culture and science and the natives; but the pupil is allowed his own tongue and his own national origin. It would seem to the Anglo-Saxon scarcely natural for a Syrian to prefer English and speak it better than his native Arabic. The Anglo-Saxon system sets out to introduce the native population to modern thought, to form a small élite to inculcate the new spirit in the masses through their example, as teachers, physicians, and writers.

The awakening of initiative, the strengthening of character, training in fairness and truthfulness, the inculcation of the sense of responsibility and of service to the community are important first steps, especially in the Orient, towards any modernization. A spirit of tolerance, of enlightenment, of co-operation must be brought into play to help to smooth away religious antagonisms and to bring into prominence the elements of unity. It is just these traits of the liberal and practical American Protestantism that have made contributions of great value in the forming of the new type of man in the Near East. The Oriental has a natural inclination for humanist studies and understands their value. On the other hand, the upper classes of Orientals despise manual work, look down on the professions of farmer and industrialist, and are only ready to assimilate sufficient

technical knowledge to fit them for official careers. Technical education was regarded in the past as a matter for charity, enabling orphan children to do something to earn their daily bread. Only recently has the necessity begun to be understood of training engineers, skilled workers, mechanics and foremen. Technical schools of the modern type have been started by the Syrian and Lebanese governments in Damascus, Aleppo, and especially Beirut, but Syria is far behind Turkey and Egypt in this field.

There are still many obstacles in the way of economic Europeanization in Syria. A growing section of the population have either become entirely Europeanized as consumers, or have had the desire aroused in them for many elements of the European way of living ; but there has been little change in the country's methods of production. This rise in the standard of living without a corresponding rise in the standard of production is making the native population entirely dependent economically on the capital and the knowledge of the Europeans. The influence of the West has created new needs, but without putting the inhabitants of the country into a position themselves to carry out a systematic development of the country's resources and so to satisfy these increased needs. Western penetration has also contributed to the destruction of the existing industries through the competition of European products and the introduction of new tastes.

It was impossible for the native industries to withstand the competition of the West. The hand-worker, torn away from his traditional methods, was no longer able to produce with the needed accuracy. In their poverty the Oriental countries demanded cheapness of goods rather than quality of finish. The lack of training and of good models made itself felt, and also the truly Oriental attitude of sovereign indifference—" *malesh* ", "what does it matter?" The Oriental showed equal inaptitude at first for initiative in enterprise, for bringing industries into existence. Here there came into play not only the contempt for manual work but the reluctance

to undertake responsibility, or to take a risk, and the lack of organizing ability and of foresight. Undoubtedly the great lack of capital plays its part as in other fields. The lack of needs among the population adds to the difficulty of the attempt to raise the standard of living and the quality of output. The taxable capacity of the population is too low to permit of good and comprehensive schooling, while on the other hand only education can increase the economic aptitude of the population and therewith their taxable capacity. The lack of capital makes difficult the starting of important enterprises. There have been great difficulties in the countries of the Levant in uniting in practical business activities the capital, ability, and experience of groups of men of initiative. The Syrian is individualistic by nature and suspicious, especially of his own compatriots. There is a lack of readiness for important initiatives and of the capacity to wait and slowly to build up on a grand scale, to dispense with small gains in order later to secure more important ones. Thus the process of Europeanization of trade and industry has led in the first place to a weakening of the native economic system, stimulating consumption without increasing productivity. Often the market has been flooded by European commercial agencies, and the Syrians have been unable to choose between them or to choose what is good for themselves. The native trade and industry stood doubly in need of encouragement; the system of capitulations has tended instead to subordinate it to foreign trade and industry. The governments have done nothing to promote native trade and industry. In Turkey, in Iran, and in other countries with national governments the situation now is fundamentally different, but the European governments in the Levant have not the necessary knowledge and patience, and often have not the inclination, to identify themselves with the process of modernization of native trade and industry.

Only in recent years has the example of the general progress awakened a new spirit of activity in native trade

and industry in Syria. The need of co-operation, rationalization, and initiative is beginning to be appreciated. Native capital is taking a more active part in the economic development of the country. Native industries are coming into existence with modern equipment, and technical schools are training staffs of skilled native workers. The suspicion of limited liability companies and other forms of impersonal and supra-personal collaboration is being overcome, and native credit institutions are beginning to depart from their traditional limitation of their activities to bill and loan business, and to prepare and promote the founding of industrial and trading enterprises. The appreciation of the difference between credit for consumption and credit for production is penetrating more and more generally into the mind of the people. The Egyptian national Bank Misr has set up a subsidiary in Syria, the Bank Misr-Liban-Syrie, in which it holds 51 per cent. of the shares and Syrian investors 49 per cent. This Europeanization is proceeding more rapidly, and with state support, in states in which national governments have control of economic life. There is developing here a neo-Mercantilism reminiscent of the Europe of the eighteenth century. In the states administered by foreign governments the Europeanization of the native trade and industry has to proceed under incomparably greater difficulties, without active governmental assistance, and accordingly at a much slower rate.

Syria was always a centre of the textile industry. In addition to silk it has its own supplies of cotton and wool. There have long been famous textile manufacturing firms in Syria, doing an extensive export trade with their productions. Syria was also rich in other industries. Damascus furniture, mostly inlaid in accordance with Eastern taste, is famous, and so is the Damascus trade in working copper and precious stones into trays and vases and ornamented weapons. After the world war the advance of Europeanization resulted in a progressive decay of the native industries. Oriental clothing and

furnishing began to give place to European, and the European styles were subjected to frequent changes of fashion, which had not been the case with Oriental clothing, or in the segregated women's quarters. Oriental industries were unable to withstand the competition of European industries with their great capital resources and their perfected technique and organization. Only in recent years is an industry of modern type beginning to replace the traditional crafts ; wholesale production with the aid of machinery is replacing the old home industries, and new industries are coming into existence to meet needs hitherto unknown. The modern industries are employing some of the workers who have lost their livelihood through the dying out of the old ones. But the modern rationalized methods require fewer workers, and the women are no longer earning the extra money they used to be able to make by working at home with the help of their children. In the new industries wages are higher, especially for skilled workers. Some of the workers thrown out of employment are employed on public works, road-building, and housing, in which there is growing activity. Nevertheless, the changing conditions in trade and industry are bringing a great deal of trouble in their wake, driving large numbers into poverty while increasing needs and multiplying the use of money, especially where there is no national government to lend help. A national government is able to help by reserving employment in the new industries to native workers and by training them for skilled work. Only state control and state investment of capital can remove the material and psychological obstacles in the way of the founding of modern industries and so place the native consumers in a position to meet their needs from native production, restricting imports from Europe to the high-quality goods in which European industry will for a long time to come have a monopoly in the Near East.

For all that, the Syrians have done notable work with their own resources and their own capital, especially in the field of electrification. To-day all the towns and

very many of the villages are electrically lit. But a further development of industry depends on increased returns from agriculture, without which there can be no extension of the market for the industries producing high-quality products. But this in turn demands fundamental agrarian reform. The existing agrarian system stands in the way of any intensification of agriculture, as it gives the landholder no security and so deters him from making any improvements. The obsolete tithe tax also stands in the way of any intensification of agriculture. The burden of taxation presses heavily on the small farmer, while the prosperous classes in the towns escape it almost entirely. The farms are often much too small to support even the most meagre existence. Native agriculture is without adequate supplies of natural manure and has not the financial means for purchasing fertilizers. Consequently the yield of the soil is very poor. It could be increased by irrigation, where this is possible, by manuring, and by better choice of seed. But this depends on a reform of the taxation and leasing system and the creation of a modern organization of credit. Beginnings have been made in this direction in Syria. Under a decree of 1926 the great areas of land belonging to the state are being split up, the leaseholders being given the right to buy their holdings and the purchase price being made payable in annual instalments without interest. An important advance would be the suppression of joint ownership and the formation of co-operatives for water supply. The fellah's great lack of capital, which puts him at the mercy of the moneylender, can be remedied in some degree by agrarian banks, which would be responsible for the granting of loans to farmers and leaseholders, the supply of cattle, seed, machinery, implements and manures on payment by instalments, and the purchase of land for dividing up and sale to the peasants by instalments over long periods. These agrarian banks could be placed on a firm foundation and extended by the forming of agricultural co-operatives.

IRAQ

Incomparably more primitive than in Syria are the conditions in Iraq, which the first waves of European influence reached little more than ten years ago. Syria, moreover, had established connection with Western culture through emigration. Syrians were living in Egypt, North America, South America, and Australia. While Abdul Hamid's despotic rule was stifling all progress and all freedom of intellectual and cultural life in the Ottoman empire, a cultural revival was taking place in the Syrian colonies abroad, which were producing the Arabic literary renaissance and the first symptoms of a modern national consciousness. Syrians in Egypt founded the first modern Arabic newspapers and reanimated the intellectual life of the Nile valley. In America and Europe the emigrants frequently acquired wealth, became familiarized with European customs and economic ideas, and sent money home or themselves returned at a later time. There was none of this in the case of the inaccessible ancient civilization of the Euphrates and Tigris, which was sleeping the sleep of the dead.

The land between the two rivers is alluvial, and, since it lies rather below the level of the rivers, it is overflowed when the water begins to rise in April, after the melting of the snow in the mountains in which they have their source. The rainfall in the plain is too small to permit agriculture without irrigation. To this extent Mesopotamia resembles the other centre of an immemorial human civilization, the Nile valley.

In a country which, in spite of the fertility of the alluvial soil, is rainless and exposed to the burning heat of summer for eight months of the year, irrigation is the most important preliminary to any extension of the area under cultivation and to the adoption of any sort of intensive culture. The art of irrigation was known to the old Babylonians, and brought fertility to the plain, which is still covered with remains of the old system of canals. Through the canals the two rivers of Mesopotamia have

frequently changed their course, even in historic times ; when insufficient control was exercised, the water chose the canal instead of its previous bed. It is difficult to decide how far these canals justify the accounts ancient writers give of the fruitfulness of Mesopotamia ; the ancient system has not yet been investigated, and it is not certain how far the canals were in use simultaneously or at different periods. It is evident that the soil has become exceedingly impoverished in the course of centuries by excessive irrigation and lack of manuring, and it will need not only a new irrigation system but heavy capital expenditure and a great deal of labour to effect a partial restoration of its former fertility. A great difficulty for any irrigation system has always been that the flood that comes with the thaw rushes down with great violence and sweeps away embankments and irrigation works. Since the Euphrates in its middle course lies higher than the Tigris, the ancient canals were often led from the Euphrates eastwards to the Tigris.

In Iraq the irrigation conditions are not the same as in Egypt, where high water begins in the late summer and continues into the autumn ; flood-time in Iraq is in April and May, at the beginning of the very hot and completely dry summer, which takes the moisture out of the germinating seed. In Iraq the grain is sown in November, the winter rains bring up the shoots, and the watering of the fields from March onwards by means of canals or pumps helps the crop to ripen. The usual method is to pump the water up from the river to the banks, whence small canals distribute it to the fields. The development of the oilfields, which has brought a considerable fall in oil prices in Iraq, and the good prices the grain fetched immediately after the world war, induced many farmers to buy and use motor pumps. The number of these had grown by the end of 1929 to 2,047, with a total horsepower of 54,000, sufficient to irrigate a million acres of winter crop. Later, with the disastrous fall in grain prices, the demand for motor pumps slackened off greatly, and many farmers who were buying on the instalment

plan got into difficulties. A system of continuous irrigation in Iraq would call for lengthy preliminary scientific study and the costly erection of dams, weirs, and regulators. So far, very little has been done in this direction. Egypt owes the great fertility of her irrigated land to the extensive irrigation works and the careful attention devoted to the upkeep of the system and the distribution of the water. The work of the British irrigation engineers and inspectors has produced important results, on the basis of which the Egyptian government can build farther. In Iraq the conditions were much less favourable; the land is too thinly populated, and the financial appropriation to the irrigation department was bound, in view of the country's poverty, to be inadequate; great irrigation works can only be made to pay it accompanied by improved and more intensive methods of agriculture, to which the lack of education of the peasants is an impediment, and the irrigation system must be kept continuously in good order and under control, since in Iraq there is a risk of the rapid choking of the canals with mud.

The history of the modern irrigation plans dates from 1908, when the Turkish government commissioned Sir William Willcocks to study the question. In 1911 he submitted a comprehensive report, on the basis of which the Turkish government carried out two important works on the Euphrates, which up to the present constitute the principal elements in Iraq's irrigation—the Hindia dam, not far from Kerbela, and the Habbania reservoir at Ramadi. To-day the districts of central Iraq to the north-east and west of Baghdad and to the south of the Hindia dam are continuously watered by large canals supervised by the irrigation department. The irrigation problem cannot be dealt with separately from the other elements of economic and social life in Iraq; it has to take its place in the general work of raising the cultural and economic level of the peasant population. It is the basic difficulty of the process of modernizing Oriental economic life, that particular measures are essential preliminaries

to others and at the same time depend on them, that the complex process extends simultaneously into all the ramifications of cultural and social life, and that all partial attempts and reforms must remain incomplete, because they are designed to call into being an attitude and a way of life the existence of which is essential to their successful introduction. The modernizing process requires firm and skilful leaders, thoroughly familiar with and primarily regardful of the interests and life of the people. During the transition period there is need of the guidance and example of European experts, but their work can only be successful if they are able to win confidence and produce an atmosphere of mutual sympathy. The new conditions after the War, the extension of the network of communications, which now includes even remote districts and villages, and the encroachments of machine industry have added to the urgency of the modernizing process, while the world-wide economic crisis and the fall in the prices of agrarian products and raw materials, on the export of which most of these countries depend, have checked and retarded the incipient modernization of industry, the development of education, and the social advance of the people, for which the national governments had been working with energy. Their new association in world industry and world politics has been the great inspiring influence in these countries, rousing them out of their lethargy, but it involves dangers to the rapid progress of modernization; to overcome these there is need for caution combined with wide vision and devotion to the welfare of the people.

The cultivation of the soil in Iraq is even more primitive than in Syria; it is mostly in the hands of semi-nomads—settled peasants who have nevertheless retained the social organization and the legal ideas of the nomadic tribe. The peasant in Iraq still thinks in terms of barter, preferring to be paid in kind with a share of the harvest; he is mistrustful of planting for the market. The sharing system hinders the use of machines—which in view of the sparsity of population are the one thing needful for

extending the area of cultivation—and of chemical fertilizers, which would raise the production per acre. In recent years the intensification of the irrigation has caused increased demand for agricultural workers, whose wages have risen accordingly.

The Europeanization of Iraq after the war was made possible by two circumstances—the turning of the Turkish province into the kingdom of Iraq, and the development of communications, which brought the country within easy reach of the Mediterranean. The kingdom of Iraq was a mandated territory like Syria, but the mandatory Power in Iraq aimed from the first at creating a sound framework for the state, so that in 1932 Iraq was able to secure full sovereignty. In Syria the old strife of religions and races continues and finds encouragement; in Iraq a unified national consciousness has grown in a short time out of a similar difference of religions and races, and has especial power with the young, who have much more influence over the fate of the country than in Syria. Iraq also, unlike Syria, possessed a leader with high personal qualities in King Faisal. This son of the desert, born in the Hedjaz, was the leader of the “revolt in the desert” of the Arab troops in the world war. In an extremely difficult situation he succeeded, with unusual practical sense and tact, in turning a community of primitive tribes and a few towns into a modern state, in wresting its independence out of the negotiations with Great Britain, and in securing to his country the full benefits of modern technical progress. Faisal, whose youth was spent among Bedouins, was one of the best examples of the effects of Europeanization. Himself an ardent Arabian patriot, he succeeded in mediating between Europe and the unruly nationalism of his followers, and won and kept the confidence of both sides in the course of an obstinate and lengthy struggle. He knew—and in this he was distinguished from most of the other Arabian nationalists, and resembled King Ibn Saud—that what was needed was something more than declarations and rhetoric, or even conviction and appeal to moral

right ; what was needed was constructive activity, a long and tireless struggle with recalcitrant interests and traditions, a sense of realities, strength of character, and endurance. In his use of aircraft, in his negotiations with the European oil companies, in his journeys in Europe, this son of the desert proved himself a modern European ruler. Through him, Iraq has become not only an independent kingdom but the nucleus on which the hopes are rested of a future union of all the inhabitants of northern Arabia in a single state, which alone would possess sufficient men, intelligence, and capital to be able to carry the process of Europeanization to success.

Parliamentary life and self-government have welded the originally heterogeneous population of Iraq into a unit. The only important national minority in Iraq, the Kurds, enjoy a position incomparably more favourable to their national development than the numerically superior Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iran. In August 1930 the Iraqi government issued the following declaration : "The Iraqi government have, from the time when they first took over the effective control of the Kurdish liwas,¹ been firmly of the opinion that it is vital for the future of the Kingdom of the Iraqi to work for the unity of the two peoples and to discountenance any proposals which would result in the separation of the Kurdish liwas from the rest of the Kingdom. They have, however, realized that the Kurds have a strong national consciousness of their own, and that success is to be gained, not by trying to stamp this out, but by recognizing it in such a way that the Kurds may feel, in taking their part as Iraqi, that their customs, their traditions and their language are being preserved intact." In the Kurdish districts Kurdish is the official language and the language of the courts and schools. Kurds are given preference in the appointment of officials, and even the Arab officials employed must know Kurdish. In the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, and in that of Education, there are special departments for Kurdish affairs. On

¹ Regions.

being received into the League of Nations, Iraq undertook far-reaching obligations in regard to the protection of minorities.

The government of Iraq has concerned itself above all with perfecting the army, with popular education, and with the creation of modern industries. In 1929 a law was passed for the promotion of industry: it conferred freedom from import duties and taxation, and assisted with protective duties those industries which have favourable prospects of development; it provided that as far as possible government orders should be placed with native contractors and Iraqi goods used. In April 1932 the first national exhibition was opened, to provide publicity for the country's products and stimulate its industries. The government watches jealously over the preservation of the national industries. In its report on Iraq to the League of Nations in 1929, the British government pointed out that, at the present stage of Iraq's development, legislation for the protection of the agricultural tenant was much more pressing than legislation for the protection of industrial workers. In Iraq, as in the neighbouring countries, there was a growing demand for economic independence and an increasing feeling that native industries should be supported by the state and by the patriotic citizen against foreign competition. Thus any attempt by Great Britain to press for the introduction of protective labour legislation might be interpreted as an attempt to put difficulties in the way of the development of a national industry. In 1929, without any foreign influence, the first beginnings of the formation of trade unions and provident societies among workmen made their appearance in Baghdad.

On December 3rd, 1930, the first considerable strike took place in Baghdad. The workmen from the railway shops, most of whom were members of the mechanics' union, went on strike as a protest against the introduction of short time employment in consequence of the economic crisis. They objected to the reduction of hours bringing a lowering of their wages, while the foreign foremen,

who had a yearly contract, were unaffected. The Minister of Communications and Public Works received a deputation of the strikers, and succeeded in settling the trouble. A few days later a Member of Parliament, who as a medical man had first-hand acquaintance with the conditions of the workers, brought forward a motion in Parliament that the Government should be called upon to prepare a Labour Protection Law, which should make provision for the limitation of working time, the prohibition of child labour, medical attendance for sick workmen, compensation for accidents, the grant of invalidity and old age pensions, and payment for holidays for men permanently employed. "Defence of the worker's right against unjust encroachments by the capitalists and preference for native over foreign workers in foreign companies" were also demanded. After a good deal of discussion the motion was unanimously adopted, and referred to the government. The largest employers in Iraq are the railways and the Harbour Board at Basra, which maintain a forty-eight-hour week for their men, and the oil companies, which work some fifty hours a week. In all these enterprises the men receive medical attendance, and compensation is paid in case of accident or death. On the other hand, in the traditional small industries the conditions of employment are still primitive.

In view of the shortage of capital in the country, a considerable loan would be necessary for any rapid economic development. But a past still fresh in men's memories has left behind it a strong aversion to any external loan, which is suspected as a danger to Iraq's independence. Iraq, like Iran, prefers to reduce the pace of her economic development rather than make it dependent on the foreigner. Yet, considering the great poverty of the sparsely populated country, surprising results have been obtained in a few years. Baghdad, the ancient city of the Khalifs, after centuries of existence as a decayed and somnolent provincial town remote from international intercourse, is beginning to attract the

interest of the Arab world, and to be regarded as a centre and metropolis. This change is noticeable in externals. The city's energetic and far-seeing municipal authority has brought new modern districts into existence with astonishing rapidity. The quality of the housing has greatly improved, and modern conveniences which only a few years ago were entirely unknown are beginning to be a matter of course. In the interior of the city new thoroughfares have been cut, and many of the narrow lanes and alleys have been paved. A wide garden-belt is being placed round the city, and a great stadium and an entirely modern civil aerodrome testify to the rapid infiltration of new life. The public health service and the police make a good impression. Like almost all the towns in Iraq, Baghdad is electrically lighted. Everywhere can be traced the energy of renaissance. The whole of existence is being modernized. An income tax on the British model has been introduced, and a special Parliamentary Commission is considering the introduction, as in Turkey, of a modern code of civil law on the basis of the Swiss code. The government of Iraq has called in an American and a German expert, who are examining the country's requirements in the realm of industry, and are above all to assist in working out the syllabus of instruction for the new technical and industrial schools to be started.

Progress on a scale unknown in the other Arabian countries has taken place since 1931 in the education system. Every year many new primary schools are opened in the villages, and since 1934 the government has borne the expense of sending 100 students a year to European universities. Modern methods of education are being introduced, and great attention is being paid to the training and the intellectual alertness of the teachers. At the invitation of the government a committee of American teachers, familiar with conditions in the East, visited Iraq under the leadership of Paul Monroe, and presented a report on the reform and development of the education system.

Similarly the army has been placed on a new footing. A law introducing compulsory military service has been passed, and the first recruits were called up in September 1934. Iraq will thus have an army of twice the previous strength at a much smaller cost, and in a few years substantial and well-trained reserves. The economies on the army are to be devoted to the creation of a strong air force. The same object is served by a voluntary fund collected by the citizens in the towns. Like Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, Iraq possesses native pilots in growing numbers, and is planning the introduction of a national passenger air service run by a native company, to connect Baghdad with Mosul.

Iraq will shortly be connected with the Mediterranean by aircraft, motor car, and railway. Junction with the railway systems of Syria and Turkey is only a question of a few years. The ancient harbours of the Phoenician coast will gain new importance with the acquisition of this hinterland. The extension of the lines from Iran and Mosul to Beirut will assist in the advance of the Europeanization which promotes them. Thereby Syria as well, if the government takes appropriate measures in the meantime, will regain her ancient importance. In the past considerable numbers of sailing vessels called at the Syrian ports. This traffic has been greatly reduced, and the smaller harbours, used only by coasting-vessels, are losing their importance, since the development of motor traffic and the improvement of the highways permit goods to be brought direct to the main ports from the various districts. While Turkish shipping has been making steady progress in the last decade, since the coasting trade there is reserved for Turkish vessels, the shipping industry in Syria has been steadily decaying. No attention is paid to the training of skilled seamen. Syria, with her long and thickly-populated coast, whose inhabitants in ancient days were pioneers of world traffic, no longer plays any active part in shipping. Improved facilities for loading and discharging in the small harbours and the equipment of the sailing ships

with auxiliary motors might at least revive the coastal traffic.

Her political situation has prevented Syria from playing in the process of Europeanization the part for which she is suited by her geographical situation, by the fertility of many of her districts, and by the comparatively high level of education of a section of her population. Once self-government and self-development are assured to the country, Europeanization will be able to set in there just as in Turkey. The necessary condition for this is the growth, which may be observed everywhere now among the young, of the spirit of tolerance, of initiative, and of co-operation, in order to overcome the traditional strife of groups and provinces and the consequences of centuries of foreign rule and of lack of education. Iraq, through her political independence and the statesmanship and ability of King Faisal, has provisionally taken over the leadership of the coming Arabian nation, thanks to her organization as a state and in spite of the great poverty of the country and the backwardness of its inhabitants.

SAUDI ARABIA

In contrast with the border territories, the Arabian mainland is cut off from cultural and economic intercourse with Europe by its position and desert character. That is why its connection with the Syrian coast is of such vital importance, for even though the "heart" of the race is in the desert of Arabia, the essential elements of the social and cultural development of an Arab nation are contained entirely in the fruitful Mediterranean regions, which alone are able to bridge the gulf between the life of Europe, so infinitely more intensive and more highly developed, and the primitive and conservative penury which is all that the deserts and steppes of the Arabian peninsula can sustain. Except for a few fertile oases, the vast area of the peninsula is inhabited by Bedouin tribes. Sandy desert, wild mountains, and steppes which are only green for a passing moment in the

short spring, alternate with one another, with but few *wadis*—dry river-beds during the greater part of the year—to lend them life. It was not until the decade after the war that modernization invaded the desert. King Ibn Saud's rule has been the turning-point in the history of Central Arabia. With it began the transition from the anarchy of the desert and the poverty of nomad life to order, the beginnings of civilization, and a more productive economic life. The religious fanaticism of the puritan Wahhabis was drawn upon to overcome tribal particularism, to give the nomads a consciousness of unity and of a common mission, and to cement the new order by means of their settlement by wells and around mosque schools. Ibn Saud aimed at the creation in the desert of an Arab kingdom which should acquire a permanent nature through the adoption of modern principles of State organization. The settlement of the Bedouins as agriculturists around the wells in the desert, working partly on irrigated soil, and their introduction to the more civilized form of existence made possible by the mosque and school in the centre of the settlement, were the first steps to an economic and political stabilization of the kingdom and to a fight against the appalling poverty and ignorance of the Bedouins. In a few years Ibn Saud has succeeded in changing their character. From time immemorial they were a disturbing element, opposed to all settled government, and at the dictates of hunger they sought their maintenance in raids, levies on caravans, and mutual feuds. To-day exemplary order and safety reign throughout the whole of the vast and only thinly habitable region; the Bedouin is becoming a citizen, and acknowledges the law of the realm as valid for himself. Ibn Saud has introduced the aeroplane, wireless telegraphy, and the motor car into Central Arabia. The modernization of communications makes possible the maintenance of the authority of the state and the gradual modernization of economic life. Plans have been drawn up for a state bank, for the construction of a railway, and for the exploitation of mineral resources.

It is not only in Central Arabia that the position of the Bedouin has become critical owing to contact with a new age. Everywhere European civilization, which forced its way into the East in the decade after the world war, has destroyed the immemorial basis of Bedouin life. Until the war, the Bedouins were a match for regular armies. With approximately equal weapons, they had the advantage of greater mobility and knowledge of their country. The aeroplane and the other elements of the modern technique of war have changed this relationship, entirely to the disadvantage of the Bedouin ; a small regular army can ensure order and safety over large areas, and raids and levies on caravans, for thousands of years a source of income for the Bedouins, are becoming impossible. Moreover, the Bedouin lived by breeding camels, and the camel, too, is being rapidly and systematically supplanted. Everywhere in the Near East the motor car is taking its place. The Europeanization of the East has confronted the Bedouin with an entirely new situation, with which he is unable to cope without the help and guidance of the state, which is indeed part-author of this Europeanization. The Bedouin has always seized any opportunity of settling, of escaping from the poverty and insecurity of the desert to the prosperity and security, as he sees it, of the agriculturist, and on the border between the desert and the fruitful country one finds nomads and semi-nomads in every phase of transition from a roaming herdsman's life to a peasant's. In Central Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, a beginning has been made with efforts to furnish the Bedouins with the necessary land and stock, initiation and instruction. Thus in Syria in May 1930 the chiefs of the great Bedouin tribes communicated to the High Commissioner their needs in regard to the sinking or renewal of wells in the desert, development of the medical service, and establishment of an educational system. The mandatory Power had already been paying attention to the question of providing settled homes for the tribes. The Bedouins have provided the labour for the sinking of new wells, and the cultivated area has thus

been extended. Old Roman canals have been put into repair once more, and in the neighbourhood of ruins, which prove the fertility in ancient times of many a stretch of desert, the Bedouins have begun to till the soil. The government has started itinerant schools, and policlinics have been established at Palmyra, once the centre of a desert empire, and at other places. Europeanization has not halted before the life of the Bedouin, which has remained unchanged from the time of Abraham almost to the present day. If the Bedouin means to hold his own in the midst of the new change, he also must take an active part in the process of Europeanization.

EGYPT

Mustapha Kemal and Ibn Saud are soldierly figures, but the great Egyptian national leader during this period had the stamp of the bourgeois citizen. Saad Zaghlul Pasha was already verging on old age when in the autumn of 1918, after a long and distinguished but comparatively uneventful career, he assumed the leadership of the Egyptian nation, which he held undisputed until his death nine years later. Egypt is the typical country in which Europeanization materializes in the form of the rise of the middle classes and their struggle for participation in the direction of the state. Zaghlul Pasha, born in a peasant village, received the traditional religious education of the Mohammedan scholar of the nineteenth century; later, as a barrister and political leader, he personified the rise of the more gifted sons of the peasant class to the intellectual bourgeoisie of the towns.

The character of the fellah in Egypt has altered remarkably little since ancient times. His attachment to the soil (with which he is bound more than almost any other peasant), the oasis character of the country, and the constancy of the climate have all contributed to this. The country is as unique as the people. Egypt is a part of the North African desert, in no way differing from it

in appearance or in dryness of climate. But it becomes unique through the Nile, which, owing to its enormous energy, instead of drying up in the desert has converted its valley into one great oasis. Long before it enters Egypt, from a point where it still has more than 2,000 kilometres to flow to reach its mouth, it receives no further tributaries. It parts with much more water by evaporation than it receives from the scanty showers. Yet, in an annual rhythm of flood and "low Nile", it converts along its course a thirtieth part of the Egyptian desert into the most fertile of garden-land, one of the most thickly inhabited regions on earth. The fertility of this region does not depend on the amount and distribution of the rainfall, but exclusively on the annual rise and fall of the Nile. The rise begins with the tropical summer-rain in early summer in the region of the river's source; then the Nile overflows the land and deposits fertile mud. The whole region was originally swamp; it became the country of the oldest civilization through human organization. In the modern system of irrigation the supply of mud is so regulated by reservoirs and a more even distribution of water that two or more harvests can ripen in a year. The irrigation works not only form a protection against inundations and keep the river in its bed, but distribute the water over the land through innumerable canals, extend the cultivable area, and win fresh habitable land from the desert. Great dams were built in the nineteenth century to hold back the superfluous water during the time of "high Nile" in late autumn, and to give it up again during the winter and spring until the flood rises once more.

The Nile is the father of all life and civilization in Egypt. In such river-oases the oldest human civilizations were developed just because of the problem of irrigation. Astronomy had to help to determine the time of arrival of the flood season, the art of the land-surveyor had to re-establish every year the boundaries washed away by the water, careful laws and a good administration had to regulate the use of the restricted soil and of the

all-important water. The wide stream offered the country, which was no more than the river-valley, a convenient means of communication, which connected together all parts of the country and facilitated the organization of the state.

To-day all the inhabitants of Egypt, Mohammedans and Copts (the representatives of the age-old Monophysite sect of Christians), fellaheen, Arabs and Nubians, form in their speech and manner of life, as they have done for a thousand years, a part of the great Arabic and Islamic civilization, which has shown itself in Egypt, as elsewhere, a most powerful factor in proselytizing and conversion. Alongside them the Europeans play an important part, not through their numbers, but through their dominant position in finance and industry and the privileges conceded to them by the Capitulations. They live in their own quarters of the towns, entirely apart, without any share in the real life of the country.

Owing to Napoleon's expedition Egypt was the first country in the Near East to be affected by the new spirit. The founder of the present ruling dynasty, Mehemet Ali, was an enlightened monarch who tried to re-organize, arouse, and modernize the country with a strong hand. But until the 'eighties of the last century this modernization had the effect of disintegrating the higher strata of society without penetrating into the depths. It was only passively that Egypt suffered the effects of a Europeanization that enriched a small upper stratum and a number of foreigners and led to the complete disruption of the Egyptian finances. Egypt presented the same picture as all other Near Eastern countries during this transition period. It was only at the beginning of the 'eighties that resistance to this form of Europeanization began to be offered by the fellaheen, at first in vague and uncomprehending ways; it was aimed primarily at the Turkish ruling class, and gave the British the opportunity of occupying Egypt, and so for a long time suppressing the emancipation movement. The British administration, however, put the country on a higher economic plane

through its thorough modernization of the economic and governmental machinery, through the execution of great irrigation works, and through its ordering of the finances and fight against corruption; and in so doing it indirectly improved the position of the fellah, although little or nothing was done for Egyptian education and public health. "Praise is due to the British occupation for the Five Feddan Law, due to Lord Kitchener, under which a landed property of five *feddan* (about five acres) or less cannot be hypothecated; this has contributed greatly to the improvement of the lot of the fellah, since it put an effective check on usury, which had been gaining ground for half a century." (George Schweinfurth.) The difficult and dangerous transition from dealing in kind to money transactions, which often causes the peasants in Eastern countries to incur debt and so forces them to sell their property, was facilitated by the British administration, which protected the fellah alike against the large landowner and the European capitalist.

During these years there arose from among the fellaheen a native middle-class and a native intelligentsia, who became the exponents of a modern national emancipation movement, and who now saw their way much more clearly than their predecessors thirty years earlier. After the world war, with the wave of nationalism, caused by its upheavals, which shot up suddenly throughout the Near East, to the astonishment of observers, the movement, which had previously been confined to the towns, spread to the broad masses of the countryfolk, and their pressure was successful in wringing from Great Britain a formal recognition of Egyptian independence in February 1922. The leadership of the people was in the hands of Saad Zaghlul Pasha, who had sprung from the class of the fellaheen and might be considered their best personification. The king's opposition to popular representation and repeated British interference in Egyptian politics hampered the due development of Parliamentary life, and the death of Zaghlul in the summer of 1927 robbed the popular movement of its

great leader, who had won recognition even from his opponents.

About the end of the last century the British administration laid the foundation of an ordered financial and industrial development on the European model, and thereby made possible not only the economic penetration of the country by European capital but also the gradual adaptation and elevation of native industry to this process. A real Europeanization would have gripped the life of the people themselves, but there was none. This was due to the alliance of the British administration with native reactionary circles, which prevented a thorough reform of the traditional Islamic character of the state and of the medieval structure of society, as well as to the Capitulations, which existed not so much in the interest of Britain as in that of international capital. The world war, the presence of numerous troops in the country, and the extraordinary rise in the price of raw cotton, brought an unexpected stream of money into the country and increased the value of land many times over. The Egyptians now felt able themselves to take in hand the modernization of their country ; but they were unable to do this as radically as the Turks had done, partly owing to the softer character of the people and to the milder climate of the lower Nile valley, and partly because they found themselves constantly checked by their merely partial independence and by the Capitulations.

Finally, in recent years the world-wide industrial crisis supervened. It was bound to have an especially powerful effect in a country like Egypt, whose one product, raw cotton, reacted most sensitively to the state of world industry, and, just as in Turkey and Iran, it slowed down the realization of all industrial, educational, and social plans of reform. But the general lines of development are as plainly recognizable in Egypt as in other independent countries of the Near East. Here too it is a question of active entry into world trade and industry, of emancipation from the power of the foreigner in capital as well as in personnel, of the training of the native population in

the economic and technical fields, of the building-up of native capital and its guidance to productive investment in agriculture, industry, and commerce.

An obstacle in the path of the social and industrial development of Egypt, and one which, perhaps, was even more serious than the Capitulations, was the lack of an independent Customs régime. Since 1884 all goods imported into Egypt had paid an *ad valorem* duty of 8 per cent. and all exports 1 per cent. If Egypt made a treaty of commerce conferring most-favoured-nation treatment on any state, this extended automatically to all other states. Egypt could not make any distinction in Customs duties between raw materials and luxuries, she could not protect a promising native industry, nor could she promote the cultivation of important agricultural products. She could not distinguish, for the moral and material benefit of her citizens, between necessary and less necessary imports. The Egyptian market, in this respect a typical Oriental market, stood open to every import; it was flooded with inferior goods, which did not educate the purchasing public to pay attention to quality and solidity of workmanship, as well as with luxuries that tempted the purchaser to uneconomical expenditure. The rigidity of the Customs system also involved unfortunate consequences for the state finances. In 1922 the Egyptian government tried to negotiate for an alteration in the indefensible Customs tariff, but the Powers insisted on their "rights" and refused any concession. Egypt had thus to wait until February 17th, 1930, when the last of the most-favoured-nation treaties expired. Then only was it possible for a systematic Egyptian economic policy to be embarked on. The new Customs tariff, which introduced differentiated *ad valorem* duties, set out to protect native agriculture and promising branches of industry, to ensure the supply of cheap raw materials and essential articles of consumption, and to put a high tax on luxuries.

Egypt is a country with one product—cotton. It is the fourth country in the world as regards the quantity

of cotton produced, but the first in production per head of population. Cotton has made Egypt a prosperous country and brought wealth to a small top stratum of the population, but what matters is not so much the increase in the country's wealth as the distribution of the increase. Whether the fellah has been able to improve his standard of living materially through the cultivation of cotton is doubtful. It is true that exceptional market conditions like those of 1919 benefited even the fellah. The price of a *kantar* (124 lbs.) of Egyptian cotton was 15 dollars in 1914 and 200 dollars in 1920. In 1914 the mortgages totalled £E45,000,000; by 1920 a third of this had been paid off, so that the total had fallen to £E29,000,000. From 1902 to 1914 the value of the cotton crop had varied between £E15,000,000 and £E30,000,000; in 1919 it was £E98,000,000. The fellah found himself in a position to buy European imports; his purchasing power rose, although of course the general increase of prices in Egypt was very great; new needs were aroused and, for the time, satisfied. All the more crushing was the effect of the fall in cotton prices that then came. The fall was considerably greater than the fall in other agrarian products in Egypt. The value of the cotton crop sank in 1930 to about £E20,000,000, the pre-war level. Cotton is by far the largest Egyptian export; the drop in the value of this item was not due to a decrease in quantity, but to the fall in prices. The quantity of cotton exported in 1931 was only 3 per cent. below that of 1929, but the export value was 52 per cent. below.

This dangerous position strengthened the resolve of the Egyptians to abandon dependence on this single article, to extend the cultivation of cereals for home consumption and of fruit and vegetables for export, and alongside agriculture to start industries which could utilize a part of the cotton crop in the country. As recently as 1930 the imports of flour and wheat into Egypt still amounted to £E2,332,000, of cotton piece goods to £E5,160,000, of fodder to £E1,500,000, and of fruit to £E588,000. Protection, the granting of credits to

agriculture and industry, special instruction for technicians, tradesmen, and farmers, are the means adopted.

The Misr Bank may be regarded as one of the most important supports of Egypt's economic will-to-live. Modern banks were unknown until recently in the Near East. In the nineteenth century there were branches of foreign banks in Egypt, but their clients were limited to the members of the foreign colony whose government's interests they represented. These banks were not to be found in the provincial towns. It was only with the foundation, in 1898, of the National Bank of Egypt, an Egyptian company with British capital, that these conditions began to change. The bank possessed the right to issue notes, and served as the government bank; it was thus compelled to open branches in the provincial towns. It also called into life the Agricultural Bank of Egypt, which undertook the granting of credits to small farmers. At first it was very difficult to persuade the Egyptian Mohammedans to leave their money in the bank at interest. The religious prohibition of interest stood in the way, as well as the traditions, centuries old, of an eminently feudal and peasant people. Only a short time before the end of the last century, the Mufti of Egypt, whose learning makes him the acknowledged exponent of the canonical law, had to issue a *fetwa*, a canonical decision, to the effect that the investment of money at interest was not contrary to the divine law. It was only then that a Post Office Savings Bank could be established, giving the opportunity after 1890 for the depositing of savings through the extension of the Post Offices even into the smaller centres. In 1930 there were 354,908 depositors with deposits amounting to £E2,346,187. But even the National Bank of Egypt was foreign both in capital and staff, and it did not primarily serve Egyptian interests. It was not until 1920 that the first Egyptian bank, the Bank Misr, was founded. Its capital was exclusively in Egyptian hands; it employed an exclusively Egyptian staff, in order to train them in banking and educate them to take responsible positions in economic life; and

it set out, as a participating bank, to establish and promote Egyptian industries and trading and transport companies.

The bank was founded in 1920 under the chairmanship of Mohammed Talaat Harb Bey, with a capital of £E80,000, subscribed by patriotic Egyptians. According to the articles of association the shareholders must be Egyptians. Subsequent increases brought the paid-up capital in 1927 to £E1,000,000. In the course of its first decade the Bank Misr quickly secured a great influence on Egyptian economic life, and it has fully realized the hopes of its founders. It has branches in France and Syria, and is considering an extension of its activities into the countries of the Near East. Many patriotic Mohammedans have deposited money free of interest, in compliance with the religious prohibition of interest ; the amount of these deposits is estimated at some £E3,000,000. The Egyptian government uses the Bank Misr as a central bank for the agricultural co-operative societies, and grants advances through the bank to Egyptian industry and to the cotton planters. Among the industrial and commercial companies the bank has founded, which all bear the name of Misr, mention should be made of a company for cotton spinning and weaving and one for the ginning and marketing of cotton. This latter is the largest cotton-ginning organization in Egypt, possessing six modern factories and ginning annually over a million kantars of cotton. The bank has also founded companies for silk-spinning, weaving, and dyeing, and a company for the export of cotton. These companies serve the development of the various branches of the Egyptian textile industry. The Bank Misr has also founded a river shipping company, an aerial navigation company, which trains Egyptian pilots and has started an air service between Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, and Palestine, and a shipping company, which since 1934 has maintained a regular service of fast passenger vessels between Egypt, Naples, and Marseilles. All these companies serve the same end and carry out the same idea as the Bank Misr

itself—the training of the Egyptians in the creation and direction of independent industries of their own.

The emancipation of native trade and industry is promoted by various government measures. Thus a law of 1927 laid down that at least a quarter of the shares and debentures of all joint-stock companies must be issued in Egypt and four-fifths of this portion reserved exclusively for Egyptians. This provision, however, has hardly been put into force yet. The Department of Trade and Industry encourages native enterprises by arranging exhibitions of model works and model stocks, by establishing laboratories and centres for technical advice and instruction, by making efforts to find markets, and by calling in European experts. Among the industries which have already derived advantage from the protective duties and technical assistance are tanning and leather-working, glass manufacture, dyeing, and the production of clothing, pottery, bricks, tubes, furniture, buttons, footwear and sweetmeats. The oil and soap industry for the local market has made rapid progress. Three large cement factories at Cairo and a smaller one at Alexandria have very substantially reduced the import of cement. In the years between 1922 and 1931 there has been great building activity, public bodies competing with private house-owners in extending and beautifying the towns. The Egyptian cement factories can now produce some 400,000 tons annually and thus make the country independent of import from abroad. The same has been true since 1931 of Egyptian sugar production. The Egyptian sugar refinery company has carried out important irrigation works in Upper Egypt and increased the area of cultivation.

These are entirely new developments for Egypt. The creation and promotion of Egyptian industry was first envisaged in 1916; in 1920 a Bureau for Trade and Industry was started in the Ministry of Finance, and at the same time the Bank Misr was founded; in 1922 there followed the establishment of the Federation of Egyptian Industries. Since 1927 home products and industries

have been given preference in all government contracts, provided that their prices are not more than 10 per cent. above those of foreign competitors. Egypt is, moreover, distinguished among the countries of the Near East by the numerous lower, middle and higher schools of industry, handicraft and commerce, which have been established in recent years with a view to providing qualified native staffs in every sphere. An art-craft school has been established to revive the once famous Egyptian glass and pottery working.

In 1933 there were no less than 48 secondary schools giving practical training in Egypt; of these 35 were occupational schools, 2 engineering schools, 5 commercial schools, 4 agricultural schools and 2 schools for fine and applied arts. In addition to the Egyptian University there were colleges for agriculture, engineering, commerce, fine arts and veterinary science. A higher normal school trained teachers for the secondary schools and 30 training colleges prepared teachers for the elementary schools. There were 30 secondary schools under government control with 13,722 boy and 1,299 girl students. There were also many private secondary schools. A law of April 1933, made education compulsory for all children between 7 and 12 years of age.

Egypt imports increasing quantities of machinery, but has as yet no engineering industry of her own, only a number of engineering and repair workshops. A modern working class has developed so far only in the large towns, where the first trade unions have been started. The workers in the cotton-ginning mills scattered over the country are thoroughly primitive, still living entirely under village conditions. Economic progress has brought heavy migration of Egypt's rapidly growing population from the countryside into the towns, and the economic crisis has given the country its first experience of unemployment of the modern type. This change in the social structure has confronted the government with entirely new problems, and application has been made to the International Labour Office at Geneva for assistance

in drafting labour legislation suitable to the altered circumstances.

As with the rest of Egypt's economic life, the government is trying to secure national control of communications. Shipping in the Egyptian ports and the air services, which since the War have given Egypt a new importance in world communications, were until recently entirely in foreign hands. The Egyptian merchant fleet consisted only of small steamers that traded in the Eastern Mediterranean, bringing timber from Galatz and fruit from Palestine, Syria and Cyprus. In 1931 the Egyptian government made a contract for ten years with the Alexandria Navigation Company, and granted it a monopoly for the conveyance to Egypt of a large part of the purchases of the Egyptian administration and the state railways, combined with a premium system in relation to the tonnage conveyed. Egypt is thus following other countries in adopting a system of state subsidies in order to promote the development of a national merchant navy, which is to train the Egyptians as seamen and officers and show the Egyptian flag in foreign ports. With the co-operation of the Bank Misr a Société Misr pour l'Aviation has been founded. The government grants it duty-free import of machines, has offered prizes at the examination of pilots, and has undertaken to bear half the cost of insurance and replacements. The company has already organized the whole of the inland air service and air connections with adjoining countries.

This development was favoured by the good financial position that existed from 1913 to 1928. The balance of trade was in favour of Egypt in most of these years, and left a considerable surplus over the whole period. This favourable balance of trade was reinforced by other factors, which still further improved the country's balance of payments. During the War the large numbers of foreign troops spent a great deal of money, and after it the stream of tourists set in more strongly than ever. The rising wealth of the country expressed itself in the drop in debts on mortgage, in the increase in bank and savings-bank

deposits, in the purchase by Egyptians of Egyptian state loans and other securities, and in the formation of a national reserve fund available for the execution of great irrigation and other works. The Egyptian public became more and more accustomed to money dealings, money was placed at interest, and from 1913 to 1926 the deposits in the Post Office Savings Bank were trebled. The note circulation of the National Bank of Egypt, which at December 31st, 1913 amounted to £E2,700,000, was £E31,800,000 at December 31st, 1928. In 1920 only 31 per cent. of the coupons of the Privileged and 33 per cent. of the Unified State Loan were paid in Egypt; by 1927 the share of the state bonds owned by residents in Egypt had risen to 59 and 68 per cent. Little benefit, it is true, came from this growing wealth to the overwhelming mass of the population, the fellaheen. In spite of a high rate of infant mortality the rural population of Egypt shows a very rapid increase, and the recent material improvement in sanitary conditions will further accelerate the natural increase; it will be many years before the first beginnings are seen of the cultural and civic advance amid which people think of birth-control. There are not enough native industries to give the population adequate employment apart from agriculture. The proportion of rural to urban population is only slowly changing in favour of the latter. The growth of the rural population and the constant division of the small properties among heirs has produced a steady reduction in the size of the holdings, so that even in good years the peasant is hardly able to make a living. To this land-hunger is added the rise in land prices and rent that has been going on during the British occupation of the country, and more than ever since the world war.

The history of the public finances of Egypt has been similar to that of most other states of the Near East. The policy of borrowing brings the country to the verge of bankruptcy, and in the interests of the foreign creditors the Powers introduce a strict financial control, putting the whole of the revenue and expenditure of the debtor

state under the supervision of a Commission, which is accorded the right to interfere in all sorts of ways in the internal affairs of the state. This condition lasted in Egypt until 1904, when the Anglo-French Agreement on Egypt and Morocco left none but purely formal functions to the *Caisse de la Dette* and placed the Egyptian financial administration exclusively under the control of British officials. It was only in 1922 that Egypt secured financial autonomy, which was still limited in the most injurious manner by the Capitulations. Since 1889, except for three years, the Egyptian budget had regularly been balanced, deficits being always easily covered out of the reserve fund which had been accumulated in the years of plenty. The world war almost exhausted the reserve. In 1920 the formation of a fresh fund began, and the prudent financial policy, continued by the independent Egyptian government, had enabled this fund to accumulate to over £E40,000,000 by 1930.

Foreigners in Egypt are only allowed to be taxed on their income from real estate ; and the urban industries are largely in the hands of foreigners. Thus any direct tax on the income of the Egyptian town population would still further hamper the native in his struggle for economic existence. Consequently the Egyptian taxation system is extraordinarily inelastic. It is not possible in Egypt for the revenue to be determined and regulated according to needs ; so long as the Capitulations stand, needs must be adapted to revenue, and this retards the cultural and social development of the country. Apart from fees and a tax on ginned cotton levied on the factories, the government's only important sources of revenue in the form of indirect taxation are the Customs and the tobacco tax, and in the form of direct taxation the land and house taxes. With the exception of the tobacco tax, all these revenues are inelastic and uncontrollable. Thus the tobacco tax plays much the same part that is played in England by the income tax. The result has been, however, that the cultivation of tobacco, which showed

great promise, has been forbidden in Egypt. The Egyptian cigarette industry works exclusively with foreign tobaccos. The question of the introduction of new taxes and the increase of the state expenditure is a vital one for Egypt. Only so will it be possible to carry out within a reasonable period the great plans that have already been adopted, and to lay the foundations of a new Egypt—universal school attendance for boys and girls, extension of the public health services, provision of drinking-water and consequent improved sanitary conditions in all the villages (this is expected to cost twenty millions), improvement of communications, and, above all, the execution of great irrigation and land reclamation works to satisfy to some extent the land-hunger of the fellah. After the abrogation of the Capitulations, inheritance duties and imposts on banks, commercial companies, trades and professions, will open up fresh sources of revenue, and, lastly, the expiration of the Suez Canal Concession in 1968 will bring a considerable addition to revenue.

The plans of agricultural development which the Egyptians have sketched out for the near future have already been referred to as a part of the general economic transformation—the gradual transition from the single crop for the world market to a mixed cultivation which will cover home requirements and permit of a varied export (in view of the climatic conditions there are good prospects for the shipment of early vegetables to Europe); protection of native fruit and cereal cultivation by duties; improvement of the cotton cultivation; and better cultural, social, and economic equipment of the fellah through the introduction of compulsory elementary education and the extension of technical instruction, through sanitary measures, through guidance and instruction in agriculture, and above all through the organization of an agrarian credit system. In 1931 the government founded the Agricultural Credit Bank, one of whose duties is to intervene in forced sales to prevent the alienation of peasant property. The expenditure

on public health has risen from £E301,514 in 1910 to £E1,638,689 in 1931. The fellah is an industrious worker with few wants, devoted to his home. He usually works his ground with only the assistance of his family ; where outside labour is employed, the men are often engaged for the whole year and paid in kind. The fellah generally uses the maize and wheat crop for his own needs, and his economic existence depends on the cotton, the proceeds of which have to pay his taxes, rent, and working expenses. The rent of good cotton soil has risen considerably since the War ; the fall in the price of raw cotton in recent years made it impossible for the tenant to continue to pay this rent, and the government has had to come to his assistance with various enactments and with the grant of credits.

The industrialization of Egypt began with the private initiative of the newly-arisen middle-class ; the modernization of agriculture began through the work of the co-operative societies. Omar Lutfi Bey founded the first urban co-operative in Cairo in 1909 on the Italian model, and the first rural one in 1910. His early death robbed the movement of its leader, and the societies started during the world war collapsed in consequence of the lack of suitable legislation and of government support. It was only after the attainment of independence in 1923 that the first legislative measures in this sphere were passed ; they were followed by others in 1927. In the Ministry of Agriculture a special section for the co-operatives was created, and many financial privileges and other aids were granted to these societies, loans being conceded at a low rate of interest. The Ministry devotes itself to the propaganda of the co-operative idea, gives instruction in starting and running the societies, employs a number of inspectors and organizers, and issues a special newspaper. The co-operative movement not only brings material economic assistance to the fellah, but is also of great educational value. An association of co-operatives is now to take over from the government the duty of supervision and assistance.

The modernization of Egyptian economic life also finds expression in the increase in the use of agricultural machinery. The import of artificial manure is steadily rising. The traditional wooden water-wheel worked by animals has been displaced almost everywhere by the motor, which soon pays for itself, even on small holdings, in view of the high value of land. The growing industries and the large number of electrical undertakings need an increasing quantity of modern machinery. The raising of the Assuan dam will provide a fall of level which will represent a large and cheap source of power, sufficient to supply the whole of Egypt with electric power. At present Egypt does not possess an adequate field for the full utilization of the great quantities of current the electricity station at the dam will generate. The government has made comprehensive plans to find a market for the current as soon as possible by using it for irrigation, for urban consumption, for industry, and, later on, for the railways.

Thus the transformation of Egyptian life finds expression in every sphere. The Egypt of 1935 is neither politically nor economically the Egypt of 1910 or even that of 1920. The change is not so drastic as in Turkey, but it points unmistakably in the same direction in which to-day all the peoples under colonial and semi-colonial rule, all the nations which have been permanently or temporarily without a history of their own, are beginning to develop—in the direction of an increasingly active participation in the cultural and economic existence of mankind, of entry into the great human society, of an attempt to take in hand the shaping of their own lives, to re-order them under the impact of the paramount European civilization, and to give them their due place in it.

How far the Oriental—and with him the South American or the Russian or the Chinese—will become different as a result of this process, how far he will modify the European civilization originally adopted by him in self-defence and afterwards from inclination, nobody

can say. We are only at the beginning of the process ; there is still very strong resistance to it from without, from the stronger and more fortunate nations who are the *beati possidentes*, as well as from within, in the form of impediments due to history and character, to the lack of an intellectual *élite*, and to poverty. But the attraction of the historical study of our period and of the analysis of our times lies in following up and trying to realize the spirit of the life which is stirring and surging toward the future as it grows—that spirit which dominates and sways all life, whether life obeys or resists it.

The ever-closer contact of these very different civilizations and forms of life on the basis of a single civilization, which is Western European in origin but universal in compass and aim, is entering everywhere on its victorious course in the most various forms and amid obvious and strange contradictions, to shape the mind of man and to awaken his initiative. From it there is arising in the provinces of the Ottoman empire as in China, in the Soviet Union as in South America, even in the steppes and plateaux of Central Asia and in Africa, a new mankind. It will receive, take over, and transform European civilization, the inalienable intellectual inheritance from the great historic development which started in Europe with the centuries of the Renaissance, of the Enlightenment, and of the revolutions. In the French Revolution a nation realized for the first time that man was living no longer in a stable and traditional world but in a changing one, the modification of which is the task of man. This new consciousness was translated into action and dominated European political thought and the European social attitude in the nineteenth century. The same significance that the French Revolution had for Europe, the contact with Europe which came of that revolution has had for the Near East—the recognition of the inadequacy of the traditional form, and the awakening of the determination to alter it radically.

With this world-wide spread of an active realization of the need of a new age, the present is acquiring in the

East, as elsewhere, a unique and unprecedented significance. Hitherto the past had determined life entirely ; generation followed generation in the shackles of tradition, working with the same tools and by the same methods. To-day the struggle between the generations has set in, as it set in some decades ago in Europe ; the present is becoming the controlling life-force, transforming men and calling them to its service.

For thousands of years human civilization, split up between continents and wide geographical areas, developed along entirely separate paths ; to-day for the first time spatial and intellectual interconnection is established. Mankind as a whole is beginning to confront the same problems and needs. What was formerly, even in the nineteenth century, the task of separate nations, is increasingly becoming the task of mankind. Nationalism, which first appeared as a formative principle in history in Western Europe, has in the last few decades extended its dominion over the whole earth. It stands to-day at the height of its power : it rules history and destiny, thought and action in all nations, in every latitude and clime.

But for that very reason it no longer seems to suffice in the changed situation. In the nineteenth century, applied to geographically restricted regions of the social and intellectual world, it signified a new order ; but it is out of tune with the planetary extent of social and intellectual life to-day. In a situation which, for the very reason that it embraces the whole of the habitable globe, is not comparable with anything in the past, all peoples without exception share the feeling—some in almost painful clearness, others in dim presentiments—that a critical turning point has come for all humanity. All have to find a way to subordinate national interest, in which the will to live and the lust for power have become sovereign and overweening, to the discipline of humanity and of the spirit, which alone can give life a meaning and save from chaos this age of unexampled portent and promise. The entry of the Near East into this age has

begun to be an accomplished fact during the last thirty years, and this development, with the awakening of nations of immemorial age, which had been imagined to be long dead and petrified, but which were once the centre of the most ancient civilizations on earth, is one of the most significant events of the new epoch in human history, which started in Western Europe and thence took its triumphant way over the whole inhabited earth, bringing all men under its spell.

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Neither have I included any books given in the bibliographies in my *History of Nationalism in the East* (London: Routledge, 1929) and *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London: Routledge, 1932) and in the notes in the later book. I have therefore included in the present bibliography only a selection of recent books dealing directly with the problems of changing civilization, and refer the student for less recent or more general books to the bibliographies mentioned above.

I have not included in the bibliography any articles published in periodicals. Much of the most valuable material, however, on the Europeanization of the Near East is to be found in a number of periodicals, of which I should mention first of all *Oriente Moderno*, which has

been published as a monthly in Rome by the Istituto per l'Oriente since June 1921, and deals with the Near and Middle East and Islam in general, and *Die Welt des Islam*, edited for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde in Berlin by Professor G. Kampffmeyer. Periodicals of a more general character are the quarterly *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, published in London, the beautifully illustrated monthly *Asia*, published in New York, which frequently publishes contributions by Orientals interpreting the cultural trends of their countries, and the weekly *Near East and India*, published in London, which changed its name in the autumn of 1935 into *Great Britain and the East*. Some missionary periodicals show great interest in the impact of Western civilization on Eastern lands. Among them I may mention *The Moslem World*, *A Christian Quarterly Review of Current Events, Literature and Thought among Mohammedans*, edited by Samuel M. Zwemer, *The Missionary Review of the World*, and *World Dominion : an International Review of Christian Progress*. *The Open Court* (Chicago) published in 1932 and 1933 a monograph series of the New Orient Society. *Foreign Affairs*, a quarterly, published by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, *International Affairs*, published every two months by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, *Pacific Affairs*, a quarterly, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York, and the English monthlies like *The Nineteenth Century and After* and *The Contemporary Review*, frequently contain relevant articles on Oriental problems. The Foreign Policy Association in New York devotes its fortnightly Reports from time to time to Near Eastern and Oriental problems and countries. The excellent reports on the Near East are mostly written by Miss Elizabeth P. MacCallum.

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INDEX

- Abadan (port on Persian Gulf), 172, 173, 176, 183
 Abbasids (dynasty of Arab khalifs), 30, 49, 56, 63
 Abdullah (Emir of Transjordan), 205
 Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur Rahman (leader of the Wahhabites) (see Ibn Saud)
 Abdul Hamid (Sultan of Turkey), 67, 127, 130, 234, 235, 264, 273
 Abu Bekr (Arab Khalif), 34.
 Abyssinia, 167, 228
 Abyssinian church, 39
 Acre, 59, 61, 62, 127, 129, 130, 182, 200
 Adalia (in Asia Minor), 199
 Aden, 123, 143, 194, 195
 Adrianople, 63
 Adriatic, 58, 198
 Aegean, 2, 12, 193
 Afghanistan, 141, 144, 186, 193, 197, 209, 212, 224, 225, 226, 243, 244, 260
 Africa, 4, 11, 122
 Aga Khan (Mohammedan religious leader), 53
 Agricultural Bank of Egypt, 293
 Agriculture, 18, 75, 76, 108, 161f., 239, 272, 275, 298 (see also Cattle, Credit system, Drought, Manure, Rain, Taxation)
 Agriculture, capital provision, 76, 77, 239, 301
 Agriculture, reforms, 76, 77, 162, 239, 272, 301
 Ahwaz (Persian town), 172
 Aircraft, 118
 Air lines : British, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 195, 256
 Dutch, 143, 145
 Egyptian, 145, 294, 297
 French, 143, 144, 145
 German, 141, 143, 144, 258
 Iraqi, 142, 145
 Soviet Russian, 141, 143, 144
 Turkish, 144
 Air traffic, 140-6, 256, 258
 Akaba (Red Sea port), 58, 121, 130, 131, 143, 174, 194, 222
 Alauites (Syrian sect), 54, 59
 Albania, 198
 Aleppo, 58, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 144, 145, 222, 264, 268
 Alexander the Great, 4, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31
 Alexandretta, 54, 59, 127, 134, 264
 Alexandria, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 38, 133, 226, 238, 295
 Algiers, 63
 Ali (Arab Khalif), 51
 Allenby, Viscount, 61
 Amanullah, King of Afghanistan, 244
 Amman (capital of Transjordan), 131
 Anatolia, 13, 105, 111, 116, 128, 144, 145, 171, 176, 198, 221, 236, 238, 250
 Anatolians, 6, 111 (see also Turks, Committee of Unity and Progress)
 Anglicanism (see Christianity)
 Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Co., 171
 Anglo-Iranian (Anglo-Persian) Oil Co., 169, 171f., 173, 174-6, 177, 178, 256
 Ankara (Angora), 99, 101, 106, 111, 144, 211, 225
 Antioch, 29, 30, 59, 127, 134 (see also Patriarchs)
 Arabia, 14, 17, 18, 73, 81, 85, 127, 133, 138, 143, 167, 173, 199, 205, 219, 220, 223, 226, 246, 264, 283-6
 struggle for, 127, 129, 195
 Arabic language, 10, 35, 36, 48, 101, 265, 266, 273
 Arabs, 6, 10, 34, 45, 46, 47, 48, 73, 195, 197, 199, 200, 207, 214, 288
 struggle for unity, 221f., 223, 224
 Aryans and Turanians, 112
 Armenia, 13, 200, 203, 207, 218, 219
 Armenians, 61, 75, 199, 214-19, 237, 265
 Armenian Church, 39, 43, 215
 Army and military duty, 250, 282
 Artistic sense in the East, 77, 79, 80
 Asia, 3, 4, 39, 196, 197, 213, 249, 264
 Asia Minor, 10, 24, 63, 111, 116, 179, 193, 196, 198, 200, 201, 209, 212, 213, 221, 224, 237
 Asir (in Arabia), 53, 198
 Assuan, 302
 Assyria, 14, 56
 Assyrians, 39, 43
 Atlantic, 11, 117
 Augustus (Roman Emperor), 32
 Australia, 124, 125
 Austria-Hungary, 64, 126, 192, 198
 Autocracy, its results, 64, 79, 85, 187, 228, 233, 261
 Azerbaijani (in Caucasus), 186, 225
 Baba Gurgur (oil wells), 181
 Bab el Mandeb (straits of), 123
 Babylon, 14, 24, 30, 31, 138, 167
 Baghdad, 30, 31, 56, 63, 80, 101, 118, 127, 129, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 180, 197, 200, 223, 224, 226, 261, 275, 279, 280, 282

- Baghdad Railway, 7, 118, 126-9, 132, 135, 194, 196
 Bahrein Islands (in Persian Gulf), 186, 194
 Baku, 7, 144, 177, 195, 197, 208
 Balfour, Lord, 205
 declaration, 200, 204
 Balkan wars, 5, 221, 236
 Balkan countries, 6, 63, 192, 229, 245
 Baluchistan, 134, 186, 225
 Bandar Abbas (in Iran), 142
 Bandar Shapur (Iranian port), 172
 Bari (Arab Sultanate in Italy), 48
 Basra, 7, 10, 34, 62, 128, 129, 131, 134, 139, 142, 143, 172, 173, 183, 195, 280
 Beaconsfield, Earl of, 120, 135, 172
 Bedouins, 20, 26, 45, 73f., 183, 277, 283-6
 Beersheba, 264
 Beirut (Syrian port), 107, 130, 136, 139, 145, 257, 261, 262, 264, 267, 268, 282
 Belgrade, 10, 118
 Benedict XV (Pope), 44
 Berlin, 118, 129, 143, 144, 197
 congress of, 214
 Black Sea, 3, 12, 18, 63, 192, 193, 197, 209, 213
 Bombay, 118, 124, 139
 Bosphorus, 7, 64, 192, 197, 199, 221, 242
 Brazil, 152
 Briand, Aristide, 205
 British Empire, 5, 8, 133, 135, 145, 148, 168, 173, 186 (see also Anglicanism, Great Britain, Suez Canal, route to India)
 British Oil Development Co., 183
 British policy, 130f., 141, 177, 183, 205, 206
 British railway policy, 129, 132-7, 143, 174, 200
 Brussa (in Asia Minor), 63
 Budapest, 63
 Burma Oil Co., 172
 Bushire (Iranian port), 142, 144, 195
 Business, Oriental attitude to, 71, 269, 289, 292
 Byzantine Empire, 31-37, 192
 Byzantium, 2, 10, 31f., 33, 36, 40, 63, 118 (see also Constantinople)
 Cabul (capital of Afghanistan), 141, 144
 Cadiz, 185
 Cadman, Sir John, 178
 Cairo, 34, 101, 103, 134, 135, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 295
 Calendar reform, 241
 Camel, 20, 137, 238, 285
 Calcutta, 135
 Canterbury, Archbishop of, 38, 43
 Canton, 62
 Cape of Good Hope, 62, 140, 143
 Cape Town, 135
 Capital, formation of, 86, 158, 159, 162
 lack of, 77, 79, 108, 161, 228, 268
 Capitulations, 59, 107, 159, 186, 189, 190, 191, 210, 211, 252, 256, 288, 290, 300
 Carlowitz, Treaty of, 64
 Carthage, 24, 27
 Caspian, 12, 18, 195, 257
 Castellorizo (off coast of Anatolia), 198
 Cattle, 20, 21, 73, 74
 Caucasus, 7, 186, 193, 195, 197, 213, 221
 Central Asia, 4, 186
 Ceylon, 39, 124
 Chalcedon, oecumenical council of, 39
 Chaldeans, 39
 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 216
 Charlemagne, 32, 55
 Chester, Colby M. (American admiral), 171, 175, 176
 China, 4, 39, 62, 150, 152, 187, 303
 Chivalry, 60f.
 Christianity, 10, 32, 33, 46, 47, 48
 Anglican, 8, 38, 43, 44
 divisions, 39, 40, 41, 43
 Eastern, 8, 29, 33, 35, 36, 37-45, 229
 Church (see Christianity, State and Religion)
 of the Holy Sepulchre, 55, 65
 Churchill, Winston, 172, 204
 Cilicia, 13, 127, 157, 204, 215
 Citizenship, 25, 79, 228, 261
 Citrus fruits, 18
 Climate, 14-18, 69f.
 Clothing industry, 79, 147
 Coal, 168
 Coffee, 18
 Colonial countries, 7, 91, 150, 152, 161, 189, 213, 227, 302
 Committee of Unity and Progress, 67, 221, 235, 236
 Communications, significance of, 115f. (see also Trade routes)
 Compagnie Française des Pétroles, 179, 181
 Concessions, hunt for, 66, 177, 178, 187
 Congress of Berlin, 214
 of Paris, 65, 225
 of Vienna, 65
 Conrad (German king), 60
 Constantine I (Emperor), 31
 Constantine VI (Emperor), 32
 Constantine XI (Emperor), 32
 Constantinople, 7, 31f., 62f., 68, 129, 135, 171, 192, 193, 195, 199, 207, 264 (see also Byzantium, Istanbul)
 siege by Arabs, 34
 plundered by Crusaders, 40f.
 conquered by Turks, 63
 occupied after the Great War, 68
 Constitutions in the Near East, 97f., 100
 Co-operative societies, 161, 162, 239, 301
 Copts, 39, 47, 214, 288
 Corruption, 64, 187, 190, 247
 Corsica, 11

- Cotton, 18, 147-58, 193, 231, 270, 291f., 300, 301
 goods, 231, 238
 Cox, Sir Percy, 250
 Crane, Charles (American), 219
 Credit system, 77, 160, 161
 Crete, 3
 Crimea, 10
 Crimean War, 5, 65
 Crusades, 4, 10, 11, 40, 55-62, 147, 197
 Currency problems, 164-7
 reform, 259
 Curzon, Earl of, 194, 216, 248
 Cyprus, 3, 61, 193
 Cyrus, 32
- Damascus, 49, 58, 78, 101, 130, 131, 132, 138, 139, 143, 145, 177, 205, 261, 264, 266, 268, 270
 D'Arcy, William Knox, 171, 175
 Darius, 32, 119
 Date palms, 18, 73
 Dead Sea, 58
 Deir-ez-Zor (in Syria), 131, 136
 Democracy, 233, 249
 Deraa, 130
 Dervish monasteries, 99
 Desert, 14, 59, 74-84, 137, 138, 139, 141, 183, 222, 223, 260, 277, 278, 283, 284, 285, 287
 Despotism, 233 (see also Autocracy)
 Deterding, Sir Henri, 169
 Diarbekir, 144
 Dictatorship, 233
 Dizful (in Iran), 172
 Dodecanese, 198
 Drought, 16
 Druses (sect in Syria), 74, 263
- East Africa, 143, 156, 195
 cotton in, 156
 Eastern Empire (see Byzantine Empire)
 Eastern Question, 5, 65f., 187, 193, 235, 245 (see also War, Ottoman Empire, Turkey)
 East and West, in ancient times, 24-6, 39
 relation of, 24, 33, 41, 47f., 54f., 56, 63, 107f., 110, 163, 207, 213f.
 unity of, 5, 47f., 107
 Economic transformations, 158-64
 Edessa, 59
 Education, 84, 85, 100f., 106f., 239, 255, 259, 260, 262, 264-7, 281, 286, 296, 300
 Edward VII, 186
 Egypt, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 23, 24, 28, 30, 34, 39, 46, 47, 60, 84, 103f., 108, 109, 132, 133, 136, 137, 143, 145, 159, 160, 185, 193, 204, 205, 227, 246, 264, 268, 273, 274, 275, 286-305
 and the Soudan, 156
 cotton in, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 291f., 300, 301
 currency policy, 164f.
- Egypt, education in, 103f., 289, 296
 finances of, 187
 modernization of industry, 155, 160, 290-6 (see also Mir)
 national debt, 188, 298f.
 Egyptians, 6, 23, 38, 197, 228
 Electrification, 231, 271, 281, 302
 Élite, formation or lack of, 6, 162, 267, 303
 Encyclopædists, 4 (see also "Enlightenment")
 England, 11, 147f., 168, 206 (see also Great Britain)
 "Enlightenment," the, 87, 102, 185, 233, 267, 303
 Enver Pasha, 235
 Ergani, copper mines, 231, 238
 Eritrea, 198
 Ertoghul (ancestor of Osman dynasty), 63
 Eskishehir, 144
 Euphrates, 14, 131, 136, 172, 182, 273, 274, 275
 Europe, as a historical and spiritual entity, 3, 24, 54, 62, 87, 185, 206, 227f., 229, 246 (see also "Enlightenment", Technical progress)
 Europeanization, 4f., 11f., 87, 89f., 98, 113, 206, 209, 227, 228, 240, 245f., 254, 261, 277, 285, 290, 302f. (see also "Enlightenment", Industry, Religion, Secularization, Technical progress, Women)
 of education, 103f., 262 (see also Education)
- Faisal (King of Iraq), 178, 181, 205, 222, 223, 277f.
 Famagusta (in Cyprus), 61
 Fao, 172, 173
 Farmers, 21, 239 (see also Agriculture, Peasants)
 Fatalism, 50f., 72, 86
 Fatimids (dynasty of Khalifs), 56
 Fellaheen (see Peasants)
 Fergana (in Turkestan), 149
 Fertilizers (see Manure)
 Fig tree, 18
 Finances, disorganization through loans, 116, 187f.
 and political control, 116, 188f.
 Five Feddan Law, 289
 Flora of Mediterranean, 18, 19
 France, 7, 53, 134, 136, 145, 149, 177, 178, 179, 186, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 217
 in Syria, 58, 197, 220, 262
 Franks, 55, 58, 61
 Frederick II (Emperor), 48, 61
 French language, 11, 101, 197, 266
 Fuad, King, 121
 Fustat (in Egypt), 34
- Gaul, 3
 Gaza (in Palestine), 46, 142

- Genghis Khan, 62
 Genoa, 12, 57, 59, 124
 Georgia, 186, 195
 Gerga (in Egypt), 103
 Germany, 7, 118, 125, 126, 134, 141, 149, 176, 185, 196, 197, 198, 223, 232 (see also Baghdad Railway)
 Ghazi, King, 224
 Gibraltar, 10
 Gnosis, 28
 Goats, 17, 21
 Godfrey of Bouillon (leader of Crusade), 58
 Grain, 16, 18, 74
 Grapes, 18
 Great Britain, 7, 64, 129, 132, 136, 141, 151, 153, 154, 168, 171, 177, 178, 186, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 211, 216, 219, 248, 249, 250, 256, 263, 277, 279 (see also British Empire, England)
 Great National Assembly (Turkey), 107, 233, 234
 Greece, 2, 192, 237
 Greek citizens and freedom, 25, 26
 Church, nationalism of, 42
 dispersion ("diaspora"), 28
 efforts for unity, 192, 237
 language, 35f.
 wars of liberation, 29, 33
 Greeks, 24ff., 28f., 61, 75, 83, 96, 107, 179, 198, 236f.
 called Rumi, 33
 Gregory XIII (Pope), 40
 Hadramaut (on South Arabian coast), 123, 143
 Hagia Sophia, 62, 102
 Haifa (port in Palestine), 7, 61, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 143, 173, 174, 178, 182, 183, 200, 264
 Haifa-Baghdad Railway, 132-7
 Hama, 58
 Hamadan, 144
 Hanbalites (Islamic sect), 51
 Harbord, James (American), 219
 Haroun al Rashid, 30, 55
 Hasa (on Persian Gulf), 138, 195
 Hasan-ibn-Ali (grandson of the Prophet), 52
 Hauran (in Syria), 130
 Health service, 85, 289, 300
 Hedjaz, 131, 167, 195, 222, 223, 227, 277
 railway, 116, 129-32
 Hellas (see Greece)
 Hellenism, 4, 8, 9, 23, 26, 34, 35, 36, 48, 62, 68, 229
 Heraclius (Emperor), 46
 Herat (in Afghanistan), 144, 197, 225
 Hindus, 193
 Historical stage as determining factor, 54f., 69
 Hitler régime, 241
 Hittites, 111
 Holland, 125, 126
 Holy Places (see Palestine)
 Home industries, 271
 Homs (Syrian town), 58, 136
 Hospitality, 73
 Humanism, Eastern, 4, 5
Humanitas, 27
 Hungary, 62
 Hurghada (Egyptian oilfield), 171
 Husain ibn Ali (grandson of the Prophet), 52
 (king of the Hedjaz), 195, 205, 222, 223
 Ibn Saud, 74, 136, 137, 138, 174, 195, 224, 246, 252, 277, 284, 286
 Ibrahim ibn Adham, 50
 Idrisides, 53
 Illiteracy, fight against, 103f., 106f., 264-7
 Imam, 52
 Mahdi, 52
 Yehya of Yemen, 224
 Imperial Airways (see Air Lines, British)
 Imperial Bank of Persia (see Persia)
 Imperialism, 6, 87, 117, 135, 151, 177f., 185, 199, 206, 208, 212
 and reaction, 87, 249, 288
 Independence, struggle for, 83, 110, 189, 261
 value of, 90, 160, 163, 227f. (see also Nationalism)
 India, 4, 124, 125, 129, 133, 140, 143, 144, 149, 150, 153, 194, 195, 196, 197
 route to, 7, 30, 127, 133, 135, 179, 185, 186, 193, 196 (see also Railways, Air lines, Suez Canal)
 Indian Ocean, 117, 135, 138, 193, 194, 257
 Indo-China, 124
 Indo-European Telegraph Co., 256
 Industrial centres, development, 30, 154
 Industrialization, 152, 160, 161, 184, 209, 230f., 279
 Industry, 79f., 160
 modernization of, 108ff., 158-64, 268-72
 Intellectuals, 66, 88, 96, 197, 221, 232, 289
 Iran, 96, 97, 109, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 143, 144, 151, 157, 160, 171, 174, 175, 178, 183, 209, 212, 228, 229, 246, 269, 280, 282, 290 (see also Persia)
 Iranian banks, 258
 Iraq, 12, 104, 109, 129, 133, 136, 142, 157, 160, 171, 173, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 193, 195, 205, 212, 220, 223, 224, 226, 228, 254, 257, 260, 261, 273-83, 285, (see also Mesopotamia)
 Iraq Petroleum Co., 180-3

- Irene (Empress), 32
 Irrigation, 81, 272, 274f., 287, 289, 295, 300, 302
 Isch Bankassi (Turkish Bank), 226
 Ispahan (Persian town), 144
 Islam, 4, 8, 35, 45-55, 62, 66, 98, 229, 235, 261, 293
 and Arabia, 45, 49, 55, 102
 and Persia, 53, 102, 253
 and Turkey, 92, 98f., 101f.
 democracy in Islam, 46, 99
 equality in Islam, 46
 Khalifate, 48f., 52, 98
 law of, 99, 253f., 293
 Mohammedan world congress, 131
 religious conception of, 50
 sects in, 51ff.
 State constitution in, 51, 67, 93, 253
 toleration in, 46, 49, 53, 55
 Ismail (Viceroy of Egypt), 121
 Ismailia (town on Suez Canal), 121
 Ismailites (Mohammedan sect), 53
 Istanbul, 62, 68, 144, 237, 241 (see also Constantinople)
 Italy, 7, 11, 27, 85, 126, 149, 157, 185, 196, 198, 200, 201, 223, 232
 coastal towns, 3, 27, 57, 124
 Italian language, 11

 Jacobite Church (in Syria), 39
 Jaffa, 264
 Japan, 149, 152, 158
 Jerusalem, 16, 46, 58, 60, 61, 131, 264
 (see also Palestine, Crusades, Patriarchs)
 Jesuits, 262, 267
 Jews, 24, 25, 58, 59, 88, 93, 199, 200, 201, 204, 229
 Jidda (port in Hedjaz), 130, 136
 John VIII (Pope), 48
 Judaea, 58

 Kajars (Persian dynasty), 66, 251
 Kalbites (Arab dynasty), 48
 Kantara (on Suez Canal), 121, 134
 Karachi, 142, 194
 Kasr-i-Shiran (in Persia), 143
 Kemal (see Mustapha Kemal)
 Kerak, 58
 Kerbela (in Iraq), 52, 275
 Kermanshah, 144
 Khaled (Arab general), 34
 Khalif, 34, 39, 47, 49, 51, 52, 67, 97, 222, 232, 234, 235, 280 (see also Abbasids, Abdul Hamid, Islam, Omayyads)
 Khan Abu Shemat (in Syria), 138
 Khanaqin (in Iraq), 175
 Khartoum, 156
 King, Henry (American), 219
 Kirkuk (in Iraq), 128, 129, 167, 181, 182
 Kismet (see Fatalism)
 Kitchener, Lord, 132, 289
 Knightliness, 56
 Arabian, 60f.
 Konia (in Anatolia), 63, 144
 Korea, 152
 Kuds al Sherif, 60
 Kufa (in Mesopotamia), 34
 Kurdistan, 127, 129, 200, 201, 204, 238
 Kurds, 6, 73, 74, 199, 237, 278
 Kuria Muria Islands, 123
 Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, 64
 Kuweit (on Persian Gulf), 128, 143, 174, 194

 Labour, 18, 72, 184, 240, 279, 296
 legislation, 161, 240, 279, 280, 297
 Lambeth Conferences, 38
 Lancashire, 148, 149, 150
 Languages and their influence, 35, 101
 Latin alphabet, introduction of, 106, 240, 252, 255
 America (South America), 5, 83, 187, 248
 language, 35
 Latakia (in Syria), 59
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 190, 204, 218, 242
 Lawrence, T. E., 132, 201, 222
 Leaders, personality of, 232, 234, 244, 251
 Lebanon, 130, 263, 264, 266
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 119
 Lessing, 60
 Levant, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 24, 26, 35, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 71, 74, 75, 85, 88, 96, 97, 103, 108, 117, 118, 137, 138, 139, 145, 147, 162, 170, 177, 184, 186, 197, 198, 199, 200, 205, 213, 214, 263, 264, 269
 Sea, 2, 12, 24
 Levantines, 29, 71, 72, 78, 79, 265 (see also Franks)
 Liverpool, 148
 Lloyd George, David, 201, 206, 217
 Loans, imperialist, 66, 116, 133, 187, 189, 250, 280
 London, 124, 125, 129, 140, 143, 145
 Treaty of, 199
 Louis VII (king of France), 60
 Lutfi Bey, Omar (Egyptian), 301
 Luxuries, 158f., 239, 257, 291

 Maan (in Transjordan), 130, 131
 MacMahon, General, 195
 Mahmudia Canal, 28
 Maize, 18
 Malaria, 85
 Malay Peninsula, 124
 Malta, 10
 Man, Near-Eastern, 69-86, 267, 293
 Near-Eastern, change in, 90f., 114, 162, 239, 245, 257, 268f.
 pre-capitalistic, 71, 72, 293
 social forms, 71, 90
 time spirit of, 71, 72
 Mandates in the Levant, 60, 77, 90, 105, 131, 133, 163, 170, 171, 177, 191, 196, 204, 218, 219, 220, 262, 277, 285

- Manure, 21, 161, 231, 272, 302
 Maria-Theresa dollar, 167
 Maronites, 39, 40, 59, 262, 263
 Marseilles, 12, 124, 125, 145
 Mecca (in Arabia), 130, 138, 199, 200, 222, 223
 Medina, 130, 131
 Mediterranean, unity of, 3, 5, 8-11, 69
 Mehemet Ali, 11, 28, 126, 155, 185, 288
 Meshed, 144
 Mesopotamia, 3, 80, 81, 132, 134, 136, 171, 173, 197, 200, 201, 202, 219, 221, 222, 264, 273, 274 (see also Iraq)
 Middle Ages, 55, 62, 233
 Middle Eastern Empire, 7, 195f.
 Miletus (in Ionia), 24
 Mind and power, 1, 24f.
 Minorities, favour to, 59, 215, 263
 protection of, 203, 204, 215, 278
 religious, in Near East, 198, 215, 235, 261
 Minority policy, 214-19, 237, 278
 Misr (National Egyptian bank), 160, 226, 270, 293, 294, 295, 297
 Mission of a people or a civilization, 6, 206
 Missions, Christian, 106, 198, 262, 264-7
 Modernization and Europeanization, 88ff., 98f., 107f., 227-303
 of law, 100, 280
 Mohammed (the Prophet), 45, 102
 ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, 51
 Said (Viceroy of Egypt), 119
 Mohammerah (in Iran), 172, 195
 Mongols, 63
 Monoculture, 150, 154f., 291
 Monophysites, 39
 Monothelites, 39
 Monroe, Paul (American), 281
 Moscow, 36, 143, 144, 185, 212
 Mosul, 128, 129, 134, 135, 136, 145, 173, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 183, 211, 226, 282
 Motor cars, 118, 137-40, 183, 238, 258, 259, 282, 284, 285
 Mulberry tree, 18
 Murad I (Sultan of Turkey), 63
 Muscat (on Persian Gulf), 194, 195
 Mustapha Kemal (Mustapha Atatürk), 99, 106, 113, 203, 205, 208, 221, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 250, 286
 Napoleon I and the Mediterranean, 7, 11, 119, 126, 129, 185, 186, 247, 288
Nathan der Weise, 60
 Nation and cultural origins, 111f.
 and language, 100f., 240, 262
 and religion, 39ff., 60, 93, 102
 National Bank of Egypt, 164, 293
 National character, 1, 69
 Nationalism, 2, 5, 6, 60, 67, 86, 92, 112, 152, 163, 198, 203, 205, 232, 304
 and cultural work, 107, 112f.
 Nationalism and industry, 108-12, 152, 154, 158-64
 Navigation in ancient times, 27
 in modern times (see Suez Canal)
 Nejd, 145, 195, 223
 Nestorians (Christian sect), 39
 New Zealand, 124
 Nile, 2, 121, 156, 273, 287
 Nissibin (in Turkey), 128, 129, 131
 Nomads (see Bedouins)
 Nubar, Boghos Pasha (Armenian), 216
 Nussayrians (see Alauites)
 Oasis economic life, 78f., 81
 Odessa, 29
 Oecumene (see World State)
 Officials, 187, 206, 252, 262
 Oil, 141, 167-84, 193, 201, 256, 278, 280
 Olive tree, 18
 Omayyads (dynasty of Khalifs), 49
 Oman (in Arabia), 14, 143, 194, 195
 Open door, principle of the, 179
 Orient and Occident, 3, 7 (see also East and West)
 Orient Express, 129, 135
 Osman (founder of the Osmanic dynasty), 63, 234
 Osmons, 63 (see also Turks)
 Ottoman Bank, 165, 188
 National Debt régime, 188
 Ottoman empire, 10, 62-8, 115, 129, 130, 159, 170, 187, 193, 197, 198, 199, 221, 229, 234, 235, 248, 260, 262, 264, 273, 303
 as heir of Byzantium, 37, 63
 reforms in, 65, 92f.
 Palestine, 12, 15, 46, 55, 59, 60, 94, 105, 132, 133, 135, 139, 151, 160, 179, 201, 204, 219, 221, 224, 263, 294, 297
 Holy Places, 55, 61, 65
 Palmyra (oasis in Syrian desert), 136, 286
 Pan-Hellenism, 193, 237
 Pan-Islamism, 67, 130, 235
 Pan-Turanianism, 112, 208, 221, 235
 Paris Congress, 65, 225
 Parties, 82f., 97, 163 (see also Republican People's Party, Wafd)
 Patriarch of Antioch, 38, 42
 Constantinople, 38, 38, 42
 Jerusalem, 38, 42
 Patriarchate of Eastern Church, 29, 37, 40
 Paul, 24
 Peasants, 73, 75, 76, 77, 239, 272, 276f., 286, 288, 292, 298, 300, 301
 Perim (in Red Sea), 123
 Persia (Iran), 12, 31, 47, 65, 85, 107, 115, 116, 134, 142, 143, 145, 157, 159, 166, 167, 171, 172f., 174, 175, 177, 178, 186, 187, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 217, 224, 225, 246-60

- Persia (Iran), Imperial Bank of, 165, 166, 255
 Iranian National Bank, 259
 and Great Britain, 143, 173, 174, 175, 177, 195, 204, 207, 208, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256
 and Russia, 66, 195, 196, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 248, 249, 250, 256, 257
 Persian industrial emancipation, 166, 257ff.
 nationalism, 250f., 260
 railways, 172, 257
 revolution, 66, 251
 Persian Gulf, 12, 63, 124, 127, 129, 132, 134, 135, 138, 143, 144, 171, 172, 173, 183, 193, 194, 195, 223, 257
 language, 101
 Persians (Iranians), 6, 197, 207, 247
 Peter the Great, 192
 Petroleum (see Oil)
 Philistines, 58
 Philo, 24
 Phoenicia, 24
 Phoenicians, 3, 9, 24, 58
 Piott, Georges (French), 199, 222
 Pipe-line, 133, 139, 172, 173, 174, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183
 Pius XI (Pope), 44
 Political interests and life, 81f., 163, 289
Ponente, 3
 Pope, 32, 40, 57
 Population, 84f., 298
 Port Fuad (on Suez Canal), 121
 Port Said (on Suez Canal), 121, 132
 Port Soudan (in Soudan), 156
 Press, 81f.
 Qatar (in Arabia), 194
 Railway concessions, 116
 Railways, 116, 187, 237, 238, 284
 Baghdad Railway, 7, 118, 126-9, 132, 135, 194, 196
 Haifa-Baghdad Railway, 132-7
 Hedjaz Railway, 116, 129-32
 Iranian railway, 257
 Turkish railways, 238
 (see also British railway policy)
 Rain, 16
 Rationalism, 66
 Red Sea, 12, 58, 73, 119, 122, 123, 130, 135, 138, 171, 194, 195, 198, 223
 Religion as a social, etc., factor, 36, 54, 93, 98 (see also Encyclopaedists, Christianity, Islam, Middle Ages)
 Renaissance, 4, 94, 303
 Republican People's Party, 97, 111, 112, 113, 233, 234
 Resht (in Persia), 144
 Revolution, influence of French, 185, 303
 influence of Russian, 242, 250
 Riza Shah (Shah of Persia), 138, 204, 244, 246, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256
 Rhodes, 198
 Riyadh (capital of Nejd), 138
 Rivalry of Powers in Near East, 67f., 118
 Anglo-American (see Oil)
 Anglo-French, 120, 134, 179, 185f., 201f.
 Anglo-German (see Baghdad Railway)
 Anglo-Russian, 141, 186, 194, 195, 196, 207, 208, 213, 248-50
 Franco-Italian, 245
 Franco-Russian, 65
 (see also Trade Routes)
 Rockefeller, John D., 169
 Roman empire, 3, 9, 31, 32, 33, 34
 Rome, 9, 27, 33, 36
 Routes (see Trade Routes)
 Royal Dutch Shell Trust, 169, 177
 Rumi or Rhomaioi, 33
 Russia, 5, 7, 64, 149, 186, 192, 193, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 217, 247, 248, 249 (see also Soviet Union)
 Russia as successor of Byzantium, 36, 192f.
 as protector of Christian minorities, 64
 Russia's policy in regard to Turkey and Constantinople, 36, 64, 192f.
 Rutbah (in Syrian desert), 139, 142
 Saad Zaghlul (see Zaghlul)
 Sabaeans (sect in Mesopotamia), 80
 Safawids (Persian dynasty), 32
 Saigon, 145
 Saladin, 60
 Samarra, 129
 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 204
 San Remo (see Treaties)
 Sarmatia, 3
 Sassanids (Persian dynasty), 32
 Saudi Arabia, 283-6
 Sayyid (descendant of Prophet), 52
 Secret Treaties in the Great War, 177, 199f., 207, 222
 Secularization, 94, 98f., 103, 233, 234, 254 (see also Encyclopaedists, Religion)
 Seleucia, 30, 138
 Seljuks, 56, 63
 Semi-colonial countries (see Colonial countries)
 Serbia, 198
 Sévres (see Treaties)
 Shatt-el-Arab (in Mesopotamia), 128, 173, 195
 Sheep breeding, 21
 Shell Oil Co. (see Royal Dutch)
 Sherif (descendant of Prophet), 52
 Shiites (Mohammedan sect), 51f., 102, 253
 Shuster, Morgan, 66
 Sicily, 10, 48
 Silver, 164-7
 Sinai Peninsula, 121, 130, 132, 194
 Smyrna, 200

- Society in the Near East, 69f., 90f., 113, 245, 254f., 291
- Socotra Islands, 123
- Socrates, 25
- Soudan, 153, 156, 157
- South America (see Latin America)
- Southern Arabia, 14, 17, 73
- Southern Italy, 232
- Soviet Union, 5, 134, 150, 158, 159, 169, 177, 189, 199, 207-13, 225, 230, 241, 303 (see also Russia) and Persia, 207-13, 250, 252, 256, 257, 259 and Turkey, 207-13, 241
- Space in history, 1, 2, 118, 247
- Spain, 10, 11, 12, 85
- Stamboul, 101, 110, 111, 113
- Standard Oil Co., 169, 171, 175, 178
- State aid in modernizing industry, 77, 108f., 159, 209, 238f., 257, 269, 295ff.
- State and Religion, 36, 98f., 233, 251, 252ff.
- Debts (see Loans)
- modernization, 92f., 107f., 159ff.
- Suez, 119, 121, 171
- Suez Canal, 4, 28, 118, 119-26, 130, 132, 133, 134, 171, 183, 197, 222
- Sugar, 231, 238, 239, 295
- Suleiman I (Sultan of Turkey), 63f.
- Sumatra, 145
- Sunda Islands, 124
- Sunnites (Mohammedan sect), 52f.
- Sykes, Sir Mark, 199, 222
- Syria, 11, 12, 13, 56, 60, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 139, 144, 145, 151, 157, 158, 160, 177, 195, 197, 200, 201, 202, 205, 214, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 227, 257, 260-72, 273, 276, 277, 282, 285, 297 (see also France)
- Syrians, 221, 261, 264, 267, 269, 271
- Talaat Harb Bey, Mohammed (Egyptian), 294
- Tariffs, 107, 155, 189, 190, 200, 238, 250, 291
- Taurus, 128
- Taurus Express, 129, 135
- Taxation, 76, 189, 281, 300
- Technical education (see Europeanization of education) progress, 1, 4, 67, 94f., 160f., 183
- Teheran, 134, 136, 143, 144, 174, 197, 225, 226, 255, 257
- Tenure, security of (see Agriculture)
- Termes (in Russia), 141
- Teutons, 36, 111
- Textile industry, modern, 239, 294
- Thales, 24
- Thrace, 193
- Tigris, 14, 172, 182, 183, 273, 274
- Tobacco, 18, 299f.
- Tolerance, 55, 60, 267, 283 (see also Islam)
- Trade, traditional, 71, 79, 80, 81 routes, 5, 30, 56, 115ff., 118, 136
- Trade unions, 279, 296
- Tradition, breach with, 6, 100f., 244
- Transcaspiia, 195
- Transjordanian, 131, 133, 182, 205, 222, 224
- Treaties (see also Secret treaties): Anglo-Iraqi (1930), 173 Anglo-Persian (1919), 143, 196, 204, 207, 250 Anglo-Russian (1907), 249 Carlowitz (1699), 64 Congress of Berlin (1878), 214 Congress of Paris (1856-7), 65, 225 Congress of Vienna (1815), 65 Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), 64 Lausanne (1923), 190, 204, 211, 218, 232, 242 London (1915), 199 San Remo (1920), 177, 180, 182, 201, 202, 220 Sèvres (1920), 157, 188, 189, 196, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 213, 218, 220, 242 Turco-Grecian (1930), 244 Turkmanchai (1828), 186 Versailles, 141, 222 between Great Britain and Ibn Saud (1915), 195 between Soviet Union and Near Eastern States, 211, 241, 243, 250 of the Near Asiatic States, 203, 212, 225f., 244f.
- Trieste, 124, 125
- Tripoli (in Syria), 54, 59, 134, 136, 145, 176, 182, 183, 264
- Tripolitania (Italian Colony), 198
- Truce of God, 56
- Tunis, 10
- Turanians, 112
- Turkestan, 7, 149, 150, 235
- Turkey, 12, 77, 96ff., 129, 130, 132, 134, 144, 150, 157, 173, 179, 192, 193, 196, 198, 200, 201, 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 217, 224-6, 227, 229-46, 251, 252, 255, 257, 262, 264, 268, 269, 281, 282, 290, 302 education, 103, 105ff. foreign policy, 225f., 242-5 industrialization, 110f., 160, 230f., 239ff. modernization of language, 101 reforms in modern, 92, 96ff., 188 Turkish banks, 239f.
- Turkization of Islam, 92, 96ff., 188 of trade and industry, 110, 160, 165, 237f., 239f.
- Turks, 62, 75, 92, 107, 111, 112, 197, 200, 207, 217, 221, 222, 225, 228, 235, 236, 239, 241, 244 (see also Anatolians, Committee of Unity and Progress)
- Turkish Petroleum Co., 176, 177, 180
- Turkmanchai (see Treaties)

- Uganda, 156, 157
 Uniformity, tendency to, 2, 69, 91, 227, 303f.
 United States of America, 115, 148, 149, 150, 153, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 177, 178, 179, 216, 219
 Universalism, 4, 10, 44, 304
 Universities, 241, 262, 263, 266, 267, 281, 296
 Usury, 76, 161, 289

 Vasco da Gama, 62
 Venice, 12, 57, 58, 59, 61
 Venizelos, 244
 Victoria, Queen, 135
 Vienna Congress, 65

 Wafd (Egyptian party), 163
 Wahhabites, 51, 74, 223 (see also Ibn Saud)
 Wars : American Civil War, 148, 149
 Balkan Wars, 5, 221, 236
 Crimean War, 5, 65
 Greco-Turkish War, 179, 200
 Russo-Japanese War, 249

 Wars: World War, 5, 68, 152, 172f., 195, 197, 198-206, 215, 216, 217, 221, 222, 236
 Water question, 17 (see also Drought, Irrigation, Rain)
 William II (German Emperor), 127
 Willcocks, Sir William, 275
 Wilson, Woodrow, 216, 219
 Wine, 70
 Women, position of, 70, 113f., 233
 education of, 103-5, 106
 Woodlands, 19
 Wool, 21, 231, 270
 Workmen (see Labour)
 World State, 3, 5, 26, 304f.

 Yanbo (port in Hedjaz), 130
 Yemen, 14, 53, 130, 198, 224
 Yussuf Ziya (Turkish author), 111

 Zaghlul Pasha, Saad (Egyptian), 83, 163, 246, 286, 289
 Zeydites (Mohammedan sect), 53
 Ziya Goek Alp (Turkish author), 92
 Zonguldak coalfield, 231
 Zoroastrians, 35





